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 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
What is critique? What does it mean to be critical? In his study of the history of the concept of 
critique, Kritik und Krise, Reinhard Koselleck defines critique as the art of making judgments 
about something with reference to some standard.1 We may, for example, criticize a claim 
about state of affairs with reference to standards of truth, a norm with reference to standards 
of rightness, or a piece of art with reference to standards of beauty. This claim is not true, we 
say, assuming when doing so, a standard of some kind defining what conditions would have 
to be satisfied for something to be true. This norm is not just, we say, assuming when doing 
so, a standard of some kind defining what conditions would have to be satisfied for something 
to be just. This painting is not beautiful, we say, assuming when doing so, a standard of some 
kind defining what conditions would have to be satisfied for something to be beautiful. 
 
Which our standards of critique should be, is a topic for debate.2 In this dissertation I present, 
discuss and assess, from various perspectives, how feminists have approached this topic. 
What standards of critique do feminists defend? How do they justify their standards? Are the 
standards feminists defend defensible? These are central questions in the following chapters. I 
address these questions from a limited set of specific angels. Much can and has been said 
about feminist critique that is not touched upon in my deliberations.3 
 
Part I, Chapters 1-4, is called Feminist epistemology. Feminism is a social movement with 
roots in the political and intellectual struggles of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe 
(Arneil 1999), it is a normative political philosophy (Mansbridge and Okin 1993, Hampton 
1997, Kymlicka 2002), and it is, moreover, often regarded as a particular approach to ethics 
and moral philosophy (Grimshaw 1991). In recent years feminism has, however, also been 
introduced as an epistemology. An extensive literature on feminist epistemology has been 
                                                 
1 A similar definition of critique is introduced in Seyla Benhabib’s study of critical theory, Critique, Norm and 
Utopia. 
2 As are related questions, for example the question of where our standards of critique come from. In 
Rationalität, Recht und Gesellschaft Bernhard Peters outline a typology of social critique framed as a set of 
different answers to this question. I advance this typology in Holst (forthcoming a), where I distinguish between 
social critique as pragmatic critique, as technocratic critique, as immanent critique, as critique based on real 
contradictions, as critique of social pathologies and as morally justified critique. Social critique is, however, only 
one kind of critique. 
3 To my mind, one of the best introductions to the topic still is Feminism as Critique edited by Seyla Benhabib 
and Drucilla Cornell, published almost twenty years ago. 
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published.4 On this point feminism differs from other comparable -isms, such as liberalism 
and socialism. Marxism has indeed inspired epistemological critique; questioning of prevalent 
ideas of objectivity and good science. In contemporary epistemology and philosophy of 
science there are, however, relatively few who intervene as ‘socialists’ or ‘Marxists’. Feminist 
epistemology has, on the contrary, experienced a flourishing period the last twenty years.  
 
The efforts of feminist epistemologists are controversial. In Chapter 1 I introduce the 
philosopher and feminist5 Susan Haack’s extensive and sharp critique of the project of a 
feminist epistemology. In Chapters 2-4 I discuss Haack’s critique and outline how I believe 
the relationship between feminism and epistemology should be conceived. My notion of this 
relationship differs significantly from Haack’s notion. It differs, however, also substantially 
from positions taken by leading figures in contemporary feminist epistemology. 
 
Part II, Chapters 5 and 6, is called Feminism in a state feminist system. The state feminist 
system in focus is the Norwegian one. In Chapter 5 I present and discuss the debate on 
standards of critique in Norwegian academic feminism after 1990. Hence, I move from a 
discussion of the standards of critique introduced by feminists in the field of epistemology 
and philosophy of science (Part I), to an analysis of the meta-debates in a very different 
academic field: Norwegian feminist research. In Chapter 6 I explicate and discuss the 
normative basis of the state feminist political regime surrounding this academic field. 
 
Part III, Chapters 7-9, is simply called Elaborations. In these chapters I address three 
concerns in feminist debates on standards of critique that have been only touched upon in 
previous chapters:6 The relationship between feminism and moral universalism (Chapter 7), 
between feminism and a particular notion of equality as gender balance (Chapter 8), and 
between feminism and the public-private division (Chapter 9).7  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 For a good overview, see “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science” in Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/). 
5 She defends feminism as an ethical and political project. 
6 Which leaves many other concerns only touched upon in this dissertation unaddressed. 
7 I wish to thank Judith Larsen and Ursula Phillips for spending many working hours trying to improve the 
English of this dissertation. Judith Larsen has, moreover, translated previous versions of Chapters 6-9. I also 
wish to thank Jørgen Melve who assisted me during the last busy months. 
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PART I 
 
Feminist Epistemology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
CHAPTER 1 
 
SUSAN HAACK’S CRITIQUE OF FEMINIST 
EPISTEMOLOGY8 
 
1.0 A feminist epistemology? 
 
There is no such connection between feminism and the theory of knowledge as the 
fashionable rubric ‘feminist epistemology’ requires. One can be – I am – an epistemologist 
and a feminist; but ‘feminist epistemology’ is as incongruous as it sounds (Haack 1998: 3). 
 
This quotation is taken from the introduction to Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate. 
Unfashionable Essays (1998) by Susan Haack.9 She elaborates in one of the essays: 
 
[…] it is not appropriate to describe my epistemological position as ‘feminist’ anything […]. 
The point isn’t that I don’t think sexism in scientific theorizing is often bad science; I do. It 
isn’t that I don’t care about justice for women; I do. It isn’t that I don’t think there are 
legitimate feminist questions about science – ethical and political questions – about access to 
scientific careers, about funding priorities, about application of scientific discoveries; I do. It 
is, rather, that I see the aspiration to a feminist epistemology of science – to an epistemology 
which embodies some specifically feminist insight, that is, rather than simply having the label 
stuck on adventitiously – as encouraging the politicization of inquiry; which, by my lights, 
whether in the interests of good political values or bad, is always epistemologically unsound 
(original emphasis, op.cit.: 118-119). 
 
Feminism, according to Haack, is an “ethical and political” project that is “good” (ibid.). 
However, because “values” should not shape inquiry; because any “politicization of inquiry” 
is indefensible, a feminist commitment should not spur us to re-articulate our epistemological 
                                                 
8 Previous drafts of Chapters 1-4 have been presented at the Department of Philosophy, at the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, at the Center for the Study of the Sciences and the 
Humanities, University of Bergen, at the Center for Technology, Innovation and Culture, University of Oslo, at 
the Vatnahalsen-seminar of NFR’s theory of science project, at the dr.polit.-seminar at the Department of 
Sociology, University of Bergen, and at the Philosophy & Social Science Roundtable in Prague, May 2003. I 
wish to thank participants on these occasions for comments, in particular Gunnar Skirbekk, Anders Molander, 
Ragnar Fjelland, Torben Hviid-Nielsen, Mathias Kaiser, Truls Wyller, Bengt Molander, May Thorseth, Vidar 
Enebakk, Øyvind Giæver, Rune Nydal, Arve Monsen, Bente Nicolaysen, Asun St. Claire, Hans-Tore Hansen, 
Ove Skarpenes, Lars-Ove Seljestad, Roger Hestholm, Trond Løyning, Maeve Cooke and Hartmund Rosa. I am 
also grateful for valuable comments from Harald Grimen, Margareta Bertilsson and Gaute Torsvik.  
9 Susan Haack is British, was educated at Cambridge and Oxford, and is now Professor of Philosophy and 
Professor of Law at the University of Miami. 
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stance (ibid.); “the project of a feminist epistemology of science […] is neither sound 
epistemology nor sound feminism” (op.cit.: 104).10  
 
Why does Haack insist on keeping inquiry value-neutral or value-free?11 Why does she 
consider the idea of a feminist epistemology so outrageous? In Manifesto Haack presents a 
familiar ideal of value-free inquiry, an ideal many scientific practitioners probably would 
consider obvious – or at least not obviously mistaken. Historically, ideals of value-freedom in 
inquiry have been defended by central philosophical figures, such as Max Weber and Karl 
Popper. Arguments for value-freedom also occur routinely in contemporary debates in 
epistemology and philosophy of science. Haack’s contribution is, however, exceptional in that 
it connects an elaborated defense of value-freedom with a profound and detailed dismissal of 
feminist epistemology. This critical endeavor, perhaps “the sharpest response yet”12 to the 
feminist interventions in epistemological debates, deserves serious consideration from anyone 
who regards her epistemological position to be feminist something.13 In this chapter my 
ambition is to reconstruct Haack’s argument14 in a way that takes its complexity into 
account.15  
 
                                                 
10 Haack’s critique of feminist epistemology is part of a more general critique of “democratic epistemologies” 
(1998: 113); of “radical” sociological and literary approaches in science studies (op.cit.: 48-89, 104-136) –  
“vulgar pragmatism”, in particular as it has been developed by Richard Rorty (op.cit.: 7-47, 1993: 182-202) – 
and of the “scientism” of “naturalistic epistemology”, in particular as it has been developed within cognitive 
psychology (1993: 118-138). Manifesto, moreover, has the so-called science wars as its backdrop (see Enebakk 
2004), the heated debate in recent years between those who prefer sociological approaches in the study of 
science –  referred to in Manifesto as “the New Cynics” – and those who prefer rational approaches – referred to 
in Manifesto as “the Old Deferentialists” (1998: 90-103). Haack is often positioned in the latter group, recently 
by Helen Longino (2002a: 49-51). Haack herself considers, however, her position to be a third way approach 
(1998: 91-103). Philip Kitcher supports her on this point (2002: 558). The different ways Longino and Kitcher 
position Haack makes sense given their different outline of the two science wars camps (see Longino 2002b, 
2002c). How the science wars should be interpreted is a complex issue. My concern is that Haack’s way – 
whether a third way or not –  is an inadequate one. 
11 It can be argued that a requirement of value-freedom in inquiry is more demanding than a requirement of 
value-neutrality. Value-neutral inquiry may be conceived not as inquiry free from values but more weakly, as 
inquiry dealing with values in an impartial manner. Haack uses the terms interchangeably, but subscribes to a 
requirement of value-freedom in the context of justification: Values should not influence justification of theories. 
12 As summed up by Elizabeth Anderson (1995a: 32). 
13 Contemporary feminist epistemologists mostly debate how an adequate feminist epistemology should be 
developed, not whether and why it is necessary for feminists to pursue particular epistemological approaches at 
all. This is not obvious, however, and needs separate consideration. 
14 I refer mostly to Manifesto where Haack explicates her argument against feminist epistemology. I have, 
however, also consulted her more detailed discussions in Evidence and Inquiry. Towards Reconstruction in 
Epistemology (1993).  
15 It is its complexity that makes it a serious challenge to feminist epistemology. Feminist epistemologists focus 
too much on refuting crude doctrines of value-freedom. Such refutations are valid, but not very interesting, 
because not many contemporary epistemologists would maintain, for example, the “weak” conception of 
objectivity as outlined (and criticized) by Sandra Harding (1991: 145), or defend “the God trick” as outlined (and 
criticized) by Donna Haraway (1996: 257). 
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1.1 “Confessions of an Old-Fashioned Prig”16 
1.1.1 Value-free justification of theories 
 
The first question to be asked is what kind of “politicization of inquiry” Haack dismisses.17  In 
what more specific sense should inquiry be kept value-free? Elizabeth Anderson sums up: 
 
Feminists have long argued that scientific practice should promote women’s interests by 
removing discriminatory barriers that prevent women from participating in research, by 
developing technologies that empower women (such as safe, inexpensive birth control), and 
by paying due regard to women’s actual achievements in science and other endeavors. Many 
who attack the idea of value-laden inquiry are willing to accept such political influences on 
the conduct of inquiry, because such influences are not thought to touch what they see as the 
core of scientific integrity: the methods and standards of justification for theoretical claims. 
These influences affect the context of discovery (where the choice of subjects of investigation 
and of colleagues is open to influence by the interests of the inquirer or of those who fund the 
research) or the context of practical application (which, involving action, is always subject to 
moral scrutiny), not the context of justification (1995a: 28). 
 
Haack seems “willing to accept” precisely these kinds of “political influences on the conduct 
of inquiry” (ibid.). She considers her feminist commitment to have implications in the context 
of discovery as well as in the context of practical application: There are “legitimate feminist 
questions about science – ethical and political questions – about access to scientific careers, 
about funding priorities, about application of scientific discoveries” (1998: 118-119). In both 
contexts it is appropriate to “care about justice for women” (ibid.). In the context of 
justification the case is different: Justification of theories should be value-free, Haack 
maintains. Inquirers should not let ethical-political considerations18 influence the assessment 
of theories: It is “imperialist” to let feminist considerations influence “what theories one 
                                                 
16 This is the title of the introductory essay in Manifesto. Haack explains her choice of title: “Richard Rorty […] 
describes philosophers who think of themselves as seeking the truth as lovably old-fashioned prigs” (1998: 7). 
17 Haack’s essays focus on scientific inquiry. There is, however, in her view, nothing inherently exceptional 
regarding scientific inquiry (even though Old Deferentialists have sometimes assumed that there is): “[…] the 
problem of demarcating science from non-science […] is no preoccupation of mine” (1993: 96). Haack’s 
prescriptions are thus meant to be of relevance to “genuine inquiry” generally: “A better way sees science, not as 
privileged, but as distinguished epistemically; as deserving, if you will, respect rather than deference […]. Our 
standards of what constitutes good, honest, thorough inquiry and what constitutes good, strong, supportive 
evidence are not internal to science. In judging where science has succeeded and where it has failed […], we are 
appealing to the standards by which we judge the solidity of empirical beliefs, or the rigor and thoroughness of 
empirical inquiry, generally (Nor, of course, is science the only source of knowledge)” (original emphasis, 1998: 
94). Science as we know it, has, however, in her view, “succeeded extraordinarily well, by and large, by our 
standards of empirical evidence” (op.cit.: 95), even though her essays are also full of complaints about the 
present state of affairs in science. By the term ‘science’, Haack refers to the natural, human and social sciences 
in general. The distinction between the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the human and social sciences, on 
the other, are, however, made significant on several occasions. I will return to this. 
18 Note that in Haack’s argument for value-freedom, the term ‘values’ refers exclusively to ethical and political 
values, not to values generally (1998: 118-119). 
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accepts” (op.cit.: 116, 124). A theory may indeed, in the end, turn out to serve “good” 
feminist “values” – or “democratic” values generally (op.cit.: 113, 119). This fact does, 
however, not make the theory more or less justified, Haack insists.  
 
1.1.2 Feminist epistemology: Democratic epistemology, social epistemology 
and women’s ways of knowing  
 
Hence, Haack considers it generally unacceptable that justification of theories is influenced by 
values – any values. This view is what makes her regard theoretical justification influenced by 
feminist values, and “democratic” values more generally; “democratic epistemologies”, 
unacceptable (op.cit.: 113): Haack’s dismissal of feminist epistemology follows from her 
general critique of value-laden justification of theories. This critique may in turn be linked to 
her critique of  “social” epistemologies, epistemologies that focus in any way on “social 
acceptance” – for example on the social acceptance of certain values – “at the expense of 
warrant” (op.cit.: 110, 112).  
 
Epistemology should, moreover, not embody “some specifically feminist insight” (my 
emphasis, op.cit.: 119). Feminist epistemology should not only be dismissed because it shares 
the flaws of all epistemologies that focus on social acceptance at the expense of warrant – for 
example epistemologies that focus on what serves good, democratic values at the expense of 
what serves the truth. It should also be dismissed, more “specifically”, because it is based on 
the indefensible, and in fact undemocratic, idea, that “women’s ways of knowing” give us 
more valid knowledge than men’s way of knowing (op.cit.: x, 116, 119).  
 
In 1.2 I elaborate Haack’s argument against value-laden justification of theories. This is the 
basis of her dismissal of feminist epistemology as a democratic epistemology. A critical 
discussion of this argument is left for Chapter 2. In 1.3 I elaborate Haack’s critique of radical 
social epistemology, i.e. the basis of her argument against value-laden justification of 
theories. This critique is assessed in Chapter 3. Finally, in 1.4, I present her critique of 
feminist epistemologies that assume that women’s ways of knowing are superior. This 
critique is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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1.2 Defending value-freedom against democratic imperialists 
  
Haack’s argument against value-laden justification of theories – whether the values reflect a 
democratic commitment or totalitarian “Nazi or Soviet” ideologies (op.cit.: 131) – may be 
reconstructed under six points. 6) is the conclusion she infers from premises 1) to 5):19 
 
1) The sole aim of inquiry is to end up with theories that are significantly true.  
2) Whether a theory is justified depends, however, only on features indicative of its truth, not 
its significance. 
3) A theory is most probably true if it can be demonstrated that it is best supported by 
independently secure and comprehensive evidence. 
4) Values express subjective wishes or desires. 
5) The wish or desire that P provides no evidential support for P.20 
6) Thus, justification of theories cannot refer to values. 
 
In what follows I will develop in more detail the steps in Haack’s argument. 
 
1.2.1 The sole aim of inquiry is to end up with theories that are significantly 
true 
 
Haack accentuates on several occasions, that the goal of “genuine inquiry” is not to produce 
“trivial”, although perhaps true, quasi-theories (op.cit.: 8, 94), but rather true theories that are 
“significant” and “illuminating” (1993: 203): 
 
[…] the goal [of inquiry] decomposes into two elements: truth, on the one hand, and interest 
or importance on the other […]. Because inquiry has this double goal, appraisal of a person’s 
success in inquiry has two dimensions, which might be roughly characterized as depth and 
security, the former being interest- and the latter truth-oriented. (Correspondingly, appraisal 
of a person qua inquirer has two dimensions, roughly characterizable as creativity and 
carefulness) (op.cit.: 199). 
 
                                                 
19 This reconstruction owes much to Elizabeth Anderson’s presentation (1995a: 33-34, 56 n. 26). Haack’s 
Manifesto, published in 1998, contains essays previously published elsewhere. Anderson’s comments, obviously, 
do not relate to articles published after 1995. Two of the essays in Manifesto were, however, published (in an 
earlier version) already in 1993 and were therefore available to Anderson (1995a: 56, n. 22). 
20 P is a proposition about state of affairs. 
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This “double goal” of inquiry depends on another distinction; between “how to conduct 
inquiry” and “how to assess the worth of evidence for a proposition” (1993: 199, 1998: 94):  
 
It is important to distinguish two questions often run together in contemporary epistemology 
and philosophy of science: how to assess the worth of evidence for a proposition, and: how to 
conduct inquiry. The former kind of question, though hard enough, is a bit more tractable than 
the latter. The goal of inquiry is to discover significant, substantial truths; and since there is a 
certain tension between the two aspects of the goal – it is a lot easier to get truths if you don’t 
mind the truths you get being trivial – there can be, at best, guidelines, not rules, for the 
conduct of inquiry. Criteria for appraisal of the worth of evidence, on the other hand, are 
focused on only one aspect of the goal, on truth-indicativeness (ibid.). 
 
Thus, whereas the task of the inquirer is to construct theories that express “significant, 
substantial truths” (ibid.), which have both “depth” and “security”, and which are both 
“interest- and truth-oriented” (1993: 1999), a proposition is justified if it can be argued that it 
is true, i.e. that it is based on “truth-indicative evidence” (ibid.). True theories which are 
“boring, trivial, unimportant, [and] not worth the effort of investigating,” consist, then, of 
justified propositions (1998: 13). However, because of their lack of significance they are 
quasi-theories, and not theories proper: In genuine inquiry we consider not only whether 
propositions are justified as true or not, but also which truths are “worth the effort of 
investigating” and why (op.cit.: 13).  
 
Furthermore, considerations of significance require discretion in the context of justification – 
norms for the “conduct of inquiry” are not “rules”, but “guidelines”: 
 
In the narrow sense in which the phrase supposedly refers to a set of rules which can be 
followed mechanically and which are guaranteed to produce true, or probably true, or 
progressively more nearly true, or, etc., results, there is no scientific method. No mechanical 
procedure can avoid the need for discretion – as is revealed by the Popperian shift from: make 
a bold conjecture, test it as severely as possible, and as soon as counter-evidence is found, 
abandon it and start again, to: make a bold conjecture, test it as severely as possible, and if 
counter-evidence is found, don’t give up too easily, but don’t hang on to it too long (1998: 
96). 
 
Considerations of significance should not inspire us to alter the criteria of how propositions 
are justified, but make us approach the criteria more carefully, less mechanically, using good 
judgment. 
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1.2.2 Whether a theory is justified depends, however, only on features 
indicative of its truth, not its significance 
 
Haack considers both significant and trivial theories to be sets of propositions having truth-
values, i.e. propositions that are candidates for being included in theories, are more or less 
true or false.21 Her claim that justification of a theory is a matter of scrutinizing features 
indicative of the truth of the theory, exclusively, regardless of the significance of the theory, is 
linked to this idea of what a theory is (i.e. a set of propositions with truth-values).22 Even 
though the sole aim of inquiry is to end up with theories that are significantly true, the aim of 
theoretical justification; what is striven for in the context of justification, is finding truth, 
simply: In the end, significant theories are like trivial quasi-theories in the sense that they are 
sets of propositions that are justified if the propositions included are backed up by truth-
indicative evidence.  
 
How, then, do we distinguish between significant theories and trivial quasi-theories? How do 
we properly deal with the question of a theory’s significance? In Haack’s view, the question 
of a theory’s significance should not be dealt with in the context of justification, but rather – 
as an issue separate from the theory’s justification – in the context of discovery and in the 
context of practical application, where values – such as feminist values – are permitted. 
Because, what we regard as significant, is an issue of what we value as significant, also from 
an ethical-political point of view. “The distinguishing feature of genuine inquiry” is the search 
for something that is of “interest” to us, for “the truth of some question”, raised in the contexts 
of discovery and practical application (original emphasis, op.cit.: 8, 10). And several 
questions and interests are intertwined with ethical or political concerns. One might for 
example, like Haack, “care about justice for women” (op.cit.: 119), and frame the research 
questions accordingly. To do so is perfectly “legitimate” and compatible with the standards of 
genuine inquiry defended in Manifesto (ibid.). What is illegitimate and incompatible with 
these standards, is making “justice for women” a concern in the process of theoretical 
justification: “[…] the discovery of sexism in scientific theorizing” does not oblige us “to 
acknowledge political considerations as legitimate ways to decide between theories” (op.cit.: 
127).  
 
                                                 
21 See also 1.2.3 on Haack’s gradual notion of truth and justification. 
22 Under the condition of discretion (see 1.2.1): Which propositions to include in and which to exclude from a 
theory depends also on our good judgment; there is no mechanical procedure. 
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1.2.3 A theory is most probably true if it can be demonstrated that it is best 
supported by independently secure and comprehensive evidence 
 
We cannot say that theories are definitely true or completely supported by evidence, however 
(1993: 203-222). Justifying theories is rather a matter of probability or graduality; 
“justification is not categorical, but comes in degrees” (op.cit.: 222): 
 
Not all scientific claims are either accepted as definitely true or rejected as definitely false, 
nor should they be; evidence may be better or worse, warrant stronger or weaker, and the 
acceptance status of the claim can, and should, vary accordingly (1998: 110). 
 
This is so because both “our theories about the world and ourselves” as well as “our criteria of 
justification” are fallible (1993: 222):  
 
[…] we can have no proof that our [Haack’s] criteria of justification are truth-guaranteeing, 
but reasons for thinking that, if any truth-indication is available to us, they are truth-
indicative; reasons no less fallible than those parts of our theories about the world and 
ourselves with which they interlock, but no more so, either (ibid.). 
 
The fallibility of our theories and criteria of justification is due to our “real, imperfect” 
constitution as human beings (1998: 97): 
 
[…] any actual scientific community consists of real, imperfect human beings, […] individual 
idiosyncrasies or weaknesses may [however] compensate for each other. […] in a community 
of inquirers, some will be more conservative in temperament, inclined to try adapting an old 
theory to new evidence, others more radical, readier to look for a new approach. I doubt that 
real scientists are ever quite single-mindedly devoted to the truth […]. But to the extent that 
science is organized so […] that partisans of one approach seek out the weaknesses which 
partisans of another are motivated to neglect, a real community of imperfect inquirers can be a 
tolerable ersatz of an ideal community (op.cit.:97-98). 
 
Real communities of inquirers are always imperfect, although potentially less imperfect than 
an individual inquirer working on her own without correction from other inquirers. The most 
we can hope and work for are real communities of inquirers which are organized in ways that 
make them able to approach what we would consider to be the ideal epistemic community, 
and so produce theories that are as truth-indicative as possible, even if their truth can never be 
guaranteed. But even our ideal “hypothetical” notion of an epistemic community, even the 
best criteria of justification we are able to articulate, are fallible (1993: 214). That is to say: 
Not only is complete justification of theories faithful to our best criteria of justification 
impossible; if complete justification of theories was in fact possible, this would not guarantee 
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that the theories were true, because the best criteria of justification imaginable by real, 
imperfect, fallible human beings are themselves fallible.  
 
The best criteria of justification imaginable under the condition of fallibilism are what Haack 
refers to as the “foundherentist”23 criteria of justification; justification faithful to 
considerations of “supportiveness”, of “independent security” and of “comprehensiveness” 
(op.cit.: 73, 87). Genuine inquiry; inquiry where these considerations are taken properly into 
account, are compared with a crossword puzzle: “The structure of evidence” is regarded 
 
[…] as analogous to a crossword puzzle according to which an empirical proposition is more 
or less warranted depending on how well it is supported by experiential evidence and 
background beliefs (analogue: how well a crossword entry is supported by its clue and other 
completed entries); how secure the relevant background beliefs are, independently of the 
proposition in question (analogue: how reasonable those other entries are, independent of this 
one); and how much of the relevant evidence the evidence includes (analogue: how much of 
the crossword has been completed) (1998: 105-106).24  
 
Thus, whether a proposition should be included in a theory or not, depend on how well it is 
supported by independently secure and comprehensive evidence, i.e. on the degree of “its 
explanatory integration”25 (ibid.). Evidence, moreover, is “personal rather than impersonal” 
(1993: 20): 
 
The explicandum is: A is more/less justified […] in believing that p, depending on … . The 
choice of explicandum […] indicates […] that it is a personal locution, not an impersonal 
locution like ‘the belief that p is justified’ (op.cit.: 73).  
 
Haack defends an “epistemology with a knowing subject” (op.cit.: 97-98); the propositions of 
theories are more or less warranted for someone.26 Epistemology is precisely a matter of 
                                                 
23 Haack describes foundherentism as the outcome of a critical reconstruction of foundationalism and 
coherentism. Coherentists subscribe to the thesis that a belief is justified if it belongs to a coherent set of beliefs. 
Foundationalism is based upon two theses; i) that some justified beliefs are basic; a justified belief is justified not 
by the support of any other belief, but by the subject’s experience, and ii) that all other justified beliefs are 
derived; a derived belief is justified via the support, direct or indirect, of a basic belief or beliefs. 
Foundherentists, like Haack, claim however i) that a subject’s experience is relevant to the justification of 
empirical beliefs, but that there need be no privileged class of empirical beliefs justified exclusively by the 
support of experience, independently of the support of other beliefs, and ii) that justification is not exclusively 
one-directional, but involves pervasive relations of mutual support (1993:10-33). 
24 For a detailed and systematic outline of “the crossword puzzle of inquiry”, see Haack (1993: 81-89). 
25 “[…] by appealing to the notion of explanatory integration in the explication of supportiveness, 
foundherentism borrows some of the intuitive appeal of the notions of (on the foundationalist side) inference to 
the best explanation and (on the coherentist side) explanatory coherence” (1993: 84).  
26 The outline of an epistemology with a knowing subject is done in explicit opposition to Karl Popper’s 
“championship of an epistemology without a knowing subject concerned solely […] with propositions and their 
logical relations” (1993: 101). 
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explicating the best criteria of justification for a community of inquirers. Referring to Charles 
Sanders Peirce, Haack considers the ideal epistemic community, the community imaginable 
most likely to produce truth-indicative theories, to be a community where investigations, 
faithful to the foundherentist criteria of justification, continue indefinitely. Peirce 
characterizes truth as 
 
[…] the ultimate representation, the Final Opinion, compatible with all possible experiential 
evidence and the fullest logical scrutiny, which would be agreed by all who investigate were 
inquiry to continue indefinitely (1998: 162). 
 
Or as Peirce himself puts it: Truth is “the opinion that would be ultimately agreed by all who 
investigate”, as “that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which 
endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief” (quoted in op.cit.: 166, n. 25). 
Peirce did not defend an anti-realist, purely “conversational”27 consensus theory of truth and 
justification, however. If he had, Haack could not have made him an ally: Anti-realism is 
incompatible with foundherentism, constructed not to be vulnerable to what she refers to as 
“the drunken sailor’s argument” so “fatal to coherentism” (1993: 27): 
 
The fundamental objection is this: that because coherentism allows no non-belief input – no 
role to experience or the world – it cannot be satisfactory; that unless it is acknowledged that 
the justification of an empirical belief requires such input, it could not be supposed that a 
belief’s being justified could be an indication of its truth, of its correctly representing how the 
world is (ibid.). 
 
With Peirce, Haack considers “the real” both as independent of what “you or I or anybody” 
thinks it to be (1998: 163) – there is a “world” from which we can get “non-belief input” 
(1993: 27) – and as what is “ultimately” represented in “the Final Opinion” of the ideal 
community of inquirers (1998: 162). There are two presuppositions for this “reconciliation” 
(op.cit.: 163). One is the interpretation of reality as something within the reach of “possible 
cognition” (ibid.). Haack regards talk about “absolutely incognizable” reality as 
“pragmatically meaningless”: “it is impossible to make sense of any question to which we 
could not, however long the inquiry continued, determine the answer” (ibid.). This peculiar 
“repudiation of a world of unknowable things-in-themselves” is also defended by Peirce. 
Haack quotes Peirce saying: 
 
                                                 
27 Haack dismisses Rorty’s “vulgar pragmatist” conception of justification as “conversation” (1993: 182-202).  
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[…] the highest concept which can be reached by abstractions from judgments of experience 
– and therefore, the highest concept which can be reached at all – is the concept of something 
of the nature of a cognition […] Not, then, […] is a concept of the cognizable. Hence, not-
cognizable […] is, at least, self-contradictory […]. In short, cognizability (in its widest sense) 
and being are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synonymous terms (original 
emphasis, quoted in ibid.).  
 
It is this move, the equation between being and cognizability, between the world and the 
world-for-us, that enables Peirce (and Haack) “to avoid the hopeless obsession with the 
skeptical challenge to which more rigid realisms seem drawn” (op.cit.: 164).  
 
The second presupposition for the reconciliation of the real and the Final Opinion is that non-
belief input from the world, entering the human mind through perception, is considered 
epistemologically relevant. Our capacity to perceive and to let our beliefs be informed by 
what we perceive, i.e. by our sense experiences, is regarded as a cognitively significant 
capacity – we may be able to know better, to construct theories that are better justified, 
because of it. This is to allow for causal relations in justification, and a moderate naturalism in 
epistemology, since human perception is a process that can be studied empirically and 
elaborated causally.28 However, this does not allow for epistemology to be completely 
naturalized; to say “that traditional epistemological problems […] are illegitimate [problems], 
and should be replaced by new natural-scientific projects” (1993: 4). Justification should, 
rather, be considered an “interplay of causal and evaluative aspects” (op.cit.: 73). It involves, 
unavoidably, “normative” considerations (1998: 108): Sense experiences are 
epistemologically relevant in the sense that they are made epistemologically relevant by 
inquirers who let their investigations be directed by the best criteria of justification available 
(i.e. the truth-indicative criteria of foundherentism). 
 
This notion of justification highlights, moreover, the intimate connection between perception 
and conceptualization in inquiry. The fact that “our perceptual judgments are conceptualized, 
interpretative” should, however, Haack notes, not allow us to forget that “in perception we are 
in contact with something real, independent of our interpretations, of how anybody thinks it to 
be”: Perception involves “a potential for surprise” (1998: 161-162). We cannot conceptualize 
reality – which is what we try to do when we pursue genuine inquiry – without 
                                                 
28 Again, this point is directed especially against Karl Popper’s account that considers “only relations of 
deductive logic” as “epistemologically relevant” (1993: 101): Causal relations, and thus “scientists’ perceptual 
experiences”, can play no role in justification, according to Popper (op.cit.: 99). 
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conceptualizing. Nor do attempts to conceptualize reality make sense if they are not in fact 
attempts to conceptualize (cognizable) reality. There are many ways of conceptualizing the 
surprises of our encounters with the real: “There are many different vocabularies, and many 
different true descriptions of the world” (op.cit.: 157). Haack even stresses “that cognitive 
advance is not always a matter of new claims in an old vocabulary, but often a matter of 
conceptual innovations marked by new vocabulary, or by shifts in the meaning of old 
vocabulary” (op.cit.: 160). She insists, however, that 
 
[…] if there is complete failure of translatability [between descriptions], there is 
compatibility. If, on the other hand, there is translatability, there may be compatibility or 
incompatibility. If the different descriptions are incompatible, they cannot both be true […]. 
But if the different descriptions are compatible […] the different true descriptions can be 
conjoined in a single (even if heterogeneous) true description (op.cit.: 161). 
 
Thus, there is no “real incommensurability” (op.cit.: 96). Propositions of different 
vocabularies, however, can in the end be judged compatible or incompatible with other 
propositions: A proposition in any language whatsoever is warranted if it contributes 
sufficiently to the explanatory integration of a theory. Any proposed theory, however 
conceptualized, is justified if it is supported by independently secure and comprehensive 
evidence. The foundherentist criteria of justification are considered generally valid, i.e. as the 
proper standard of epistemological assessment of propositions of all vocabularies. Hence, 
with her construction of the crossword puzzle model of inquiry, Haack denies notions of 
“deep”, “normative or philosophical” “epistemic” and “ontological” relativism (op.cit.: 
148).29 For example is the problem with Richard Rorty’s notion of justification as 
conversation, both its anti-realist presuppositions, and its “relativist and cynical”, 
“contextualist + conventionalist” approach to epistemology (1993: 193).30 The foundherentist 
                                                 
29 Haack mentions also “normative or philosophical” “moral” and “aesthetic” relativism, but she does not 
address these relativisms (1998: 148). In her analysis of epistemic and ontological relativism, she introduces a 
set of finer distinctions: Both “epistemic value”, “meaning”, “reference”, “truth”, “metaphysical commitment”, 
“ontology” and “reality” have been presented – by different people – as being relative to “culture or 
community”, “language”, “conceptual scheme”, “theory”, “scientific paradigm”, “version, depiction, 
description” – or even to the “individual” (“subjectivism”) (op.cit.: 149-166). The deep, normative or 
philosophical relativism – which in Haack’s view is false – is positioned in opposition to “shallow”, “descriptive 
or anthropological” relativism “to the effect that different communities or cultures accept different epistemic 
(moral, or aesthetic) values” – which might be true, but which is philosophically uninteresting (op.cit.: 151).  
30 Haack notes, however, that Rorty has lately defended “tribalism + conventionalism”, and not really 
“contextualism + conventionalism”. Tribalism is not relativist, because it claims that “A is justified in believing 
that p if A satisfies the criteria of our epistemic community”; it is an ethnocentrist position. The tribalist move 
however does “not get him [Rorty] off the hook […]. Tribalism is entirely arbitrary and unmotivated unless one 
thinks that the criteria of one’s own epistemic community are better than those of other communities; that is, it 
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criteria of justification are considered, rather, to be the best standard of warrant available in 
any context (under the condition of fallibilism), because they are the standard most likely to 
produce theories that are truth-indicative.  
 
The question is why truth is so important. Why should justified theories indicate truth? Why 
not prescribe justified beliefs as the aim of inquiry, without presupposing that justified beliefs 
are (most probably) true? Rorty states that “it makes no difference in practice whether you 
aim at the truth, or aim at justified belief” (1998b: 20). Haack maintains, however, that “to 
believe that p is to accept p as true” (1993: 192); “truth is the internal goal of belief” (1998: 
16). She does not consider this to be “a sophisticated remark about truth” (1993: 192). It is 
rather a “truism about belief” (ibid.). It is “a tautology” to argue that inquiry, where we 
scrutinize our beliefs, aims at the truth (1998: 189): “If you aren’t trying to find out the truth 
about whatever-it-is, you aren’t really inquiring” (ibid.). But why bother really inquiring? 
Why seriously believe anything? Why “engage fully – non-cynically” in genuine 
investigations (1993: 192)? What is so upsetting about the “fake” and “sham” reasoning of 
pseudo-inquiry, i.e. with being either indifferent to the truth-value of a proposition for which 
one seeks to makes a case (fake reasoning), or not wanting to discover the truth of some 
question, but to make the case for some proposition to which one has a “prior and 
unbudgeable commitment” (sham reasoning) (1998: 9)? Generally, because non-cynical 
inquiry is instrumentally valuable in a very crucial sense: Haack is convinced that genuine 
truth-seeking serves the survival of the human species (op.cit.: 13-14).31 In addition, genuine 
inquirers are morally virtuous: To avoid fake and sham reasoning is a matter of being a 
“decent”32 academic and a “good”33 person.  
                                                                                                                                                        
pulls against conventionalism, to which, however, Rorty is unambiguously committed” (original emphasis, 
1993: 192-193). 
31 “Compared with other animals, we humans are not especially fleet or strong; our forte is a capacity to figure 
things out, and hence to anticipate and avoid danger. Granted, this is by no means an unmixed blessing; as 
shrewd old Thomas Hobbes put it long ago, the same capacity that enables men, unlike brutes, to engage in 
ratiocination, also enables men, unlike brutes, ‘to multiply one untruth by another’ […]. But who could doubt 
that our capacity to reason – imperfect as it is, and easily abused – is of instrumental value to us humans?” 
(1998: 13-14). 
32 “It seems almost indecent when an academic whose job is to inquire, denies the intelligibility or denigrates the 
desirability of the ideal of honest inquiry” (1998: 14). The indecency stems not from the often harmful 
consequences of what Haack refers to as over-belief (believing beyond what one’s evidence warrants) or under-
belief (not believing when one’s evidence warrants belief) as such, but rather from the fact that the inquirer can 
be held responsible for these consequences: It is because the damage “results from self-deception, from a lack of 
intellectual integrity, that it is morally culpable” (op.cit.: 15). 
33 “To be sure, intellectual integrity is not sufficient by itself, any more than courage is, or kindness, to make you 
a good person […]. And, yes, you might be in other respects a decent person […], while lacking in intellectual 
honesty. But, to my ear at least, ‘he is a good man but intellectually dishonest’, if not an oxymoron, really does 
not need an ‘otherwise’” (1998: 15). 
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1.2.4 Values express subjective wishes or desires 
 
As observed by Elizabeth Anderson, Haack conceptualizes ethical-political considerations as 
subjective and “arbitrary” judgments; as expressing “idle wishes or desires” (1995a: 35). 
Indicative is Haack’s presentation of the “tacit oath” that we presume on the part of “those 
who follow any scientific vocation, […] never to subordinate the objective truth-seeking to 
any subjective preference or inclination or any expediency or opportunistic consideration” 
(my emphasis, Haack 1998: 7). To disregard this oath of objective truth-seeking is considered 
equivalent to allowing justification of theories to be value-laden, which in turn is to 
subordinate objective truth-seeking to individual preferences, random inclinations and 
opportunistic considerations, because values are nothing but subjective wishes or desires. 
 
Accordingly, value-oriented action is simply the instrumentally oriented actor’s attempt to 
fulfill her wishes or desires as efficiently as possible. Haack embeds her idea of what it means 
to orient oneself with reference to values, in a rational-choice theory of action, where actions 
are conceived as motivated by desires, and explained with reference to the actor’s strategic 
means-end calculations given her beliefs and desires. Thus, in principle, our desires can be of 
any kind – they are presented precisely as arbitrary, random and unpredictable. In general, 
however, “human nature being what it is”, our desires are of a selfish kind. Indicative is 
Haack’s recommendation to reward the “egos” that choose to pursue the truth (op.cit.: 12): 
“All the same, human nature being what it is, people do mind who gets the credit; so putting 
ego in the service of creativity and respect for evidence is no bad thing” (original emphasis, 
ibid.). To reward the ego means, typically, to secure the advancement of individual “utility” 
or “ambition”, “fame or fortune” (op.cit: 8-9). Hence, desires and their ethical and political 
expressions, reflect arbitrary subjective preferences or inclinations, but are only arbitrary 
within the natural motivational horizon of human beings which is egoism.  
 
Moreover, as the term desire indicates, Haack assumes that our values express our emotional 
states. When an inquirer lets her values influence justification of theories, she gives in to what 
she is “temperamentally disposed to” (op.cit.: 10),34 to what she finds “emotionally 
                                                 
34 The expression is taken from a passage on the “impartial” and “genuine” inquirer not being “motivated by the 
desire to arrive at a certain conclusion”, in opposition to the “intellectually dishonest person” who “is given to 
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appealing” to the extent that it is “befogging” her (op.cit.: 113).35 The fact that our 
subscription to values has an emotional basis, does not imply, however, that the inquirer, 
giving in to her emotions, avoids individual responsibility. If she allows values to influence 
justification of theories, she is not in a position to blame her sentimental constitution, because 
she could have resisted her inclinations and decided to pursue genuine inquiry: The hazards of 
value interference are “something for which you can be held responsible” (op.cit.: 15). 
 
In addition to this elaboration of values as expressions of subjective wishes or desires, the 
essays of Manifesto also contain drafts of a conception of values as virtues and of values as 
justified moral standards, partly in accordance with, partly modifying premise 4): 
 
i) Values as virtues 
Haack distinguishes between “epistemological virtues”; “dispositions” that are 
epistemologically valuable, “instrumental virtues”; dispositions that are instrumentally 
valuable, and “moral virtues”; dispositions that are morally valuable (op.cit.: 7-21). The 
typology is introduced in her discussion of “intellectual integrity” as “a disposition to honesty 
in inquiry: to do your best to extend your evidential reach, to scrutinize your evidence with 
care and patience, to stretch your imaginative powers” (op.cit.: 13). Intellectual integrity is an 
epistemological virtue, because it advances genuine inquiry, not the fake and sham reasoning 
of pseudo-inquiry. It is an instrumental virtue because the genuine inquiry it advances serves 
the survival of the human species; it is valuable from an evolutionary perspective. And it is a 
moral virtue because it makes you a “decent” academic and a “good” person, i.e. it is a value-
laden virtue (op.cit.: 14, 15). 
 
Haack’s notion of virtues is related, however, to her notion of values as subjective wishes or 
desires. The virtue of intellectual integrity is introduced as a disposition to which you have to 
be “motivated”, the outcome of a “desire”, something you are “ready for” or “inclined to” 
(op.cit.: 11). And, just as value commitments that lead you astray from genuine inquiry are 
ones for which you can be blamed, to choose in favor of intellectual integrity is something for 
                                                                                                                                                        
deceiving himself about where evidence points, temperamentally disposed to wishful and fearful thinking” 
(1998: 10-11). 
35 The expression is taken from the following passage: “Democracy is a political value, and would be apropos if 
theory-choice in science were a matter of  ‘social negotiation’ pure and simple. But it isn’t; it is a matter of 
seeking out, checking, and assessing the worth of evidence. Unless you are befogged by the emotional appeal of 
the word ‘democratic’, it is clear the idea is ludicrous […]” (1998: 113). 
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which you can be held  “responsible” (op.cit.: 15): To be a virtuous inquirer is an individual 
achievement for which you deserve “honor” and “praise” (ibid.).36  
 
Virtues such as intellectual integrity, honesty in inquiry, “creativity” and “carefulness” 
(op.cit.: 97, 1993: 199), are, however, different from other value-laden wishes or desires in 
one crucial respect: Justification of theories directed by (some of)37 these virtues does in fact 
advance genuine inquiry even if they are value-laden (i.e. even if they are also moral virtues).  
 
ii) Values as justified moral standards 
Haack’s notion of genuine inquiry rests fundamentally on the premise that there are 
epistemological standards that are more or less warranted. Truth is even given a universal 
status as the most prominent of epistemological standards. The universal and superior 
epistemological status of truth is irrefutable:38 “Terms of epistemic appraisal, unlike moral 
oughts, carry no presupposition of voluntariness”, because the “internal connection between 
the concepts of beliefs and truth” implies that you cannot simply “believe at will” if believe is 
what you do – if you believe that p, you believe that p is true (1998: 18). This is not to deny 
that some inquirers disregard at will evidence and philosophical argument and give in to 
subjective inclinations, for instance ethical sympathies or political interests, which thus lead 
them astray; the wishful and fearful thinking of sham reasoning is a problem “precisely 
because the will can get in the way of our judgment of evidence” (original emphasis, ibid.). 
Oughts do, however, carry a presupposition of voluntariness. Questions about “good” and 
“bad” express our subjective, and most often selfish, wishes or desires, which we choose to 
pursue – or not pursue (op.cit.: 119). Nevertheless, there are standards, “moral” standards that 
are more justified than others (op.cit.: 14, 167); standards we should decide in favor of, and 
bring our motives in accordance with. However, in contradistinction to the epistemological 
standard of truth, Haack’s moral standards are neither explicated, analyzed, nor thoroughly 
justified. Apart from some general reflections connecting the requirement of “justice” to a 
recognition of our “common humanity”, Haack is silent on the topic of moral justification 
(op.cit.: 123). And, most important for her argument for value-freedom: Not even justified 
moral standards are allowed to play a role in theoretical justification: “Politicization of 
                                                 
36 Although Haack admits that the disposition towards intellectual integrity also depends on “an environment that 
encourages it” (1998: 11). 
37 Creativity is, for example, a virtue only outside the context of justification (“creativity in hypothesis”), 
whereas carefulness is a virtue of theoretical justification (“care in seeking out and assessing the worth of 
evidence” (1998: 97). 
38 Although under the condition of fallibility. 
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inquiry” is indefensible in the interest of any values, i.e. also values that can be given the 
status of warranted moral standards (op.cit.: 119).  
 
Haack is somewhat ambivalent on this point, however. On one occasion she emphasizes that 
“freedom of thought and information is vital to the scientific enterprise” (op.cit.: 97): 
“Freedom of thought and speech” are “important conditions for scientific inquiry to flourish” 
(op.cit.: 113). On another occasion she expresses concern for “the possibility that inquiry by a 
madman bent on destroying the planet might succeed – and bring further inquiry to an end” 
(op.cit.: 13). These passages suggest that there are standards that have to be respected if 
inquiry is to take place at all. If inquiry was pursued as though destroying the planet and 
freedom of thought and information did not matter, if inquirers when justifying theories 
disregarded the standards that are conditions for scientific activity to flourish, there would be 
a risk that inquiry itself would contribute to ruining the prerequisites for continued inquiry. 
But this concern does not prompt Haack to modify her general defense of value-freedom.  
 
In any case, Haack’s reluctance to destroy the planet and to disregard freedom of thought and 
speech, together with her general dismissal of “morally objectionable ends” (op.cit.: 14), as 
well as her considerations on justice as a “moral issue” (op.cit.: 167), exemplify a distinction 
that seems to be assumed in Manifesto, between moral standards which, in Haack’s view, are 
justified because they respect our common humanity, and other preferences and inclinations 
that people might give in to.  
 
The distinction plays a role, it seems, in the context of discovery and in the context of 
practical application, if not in the context of justification. In the context of practical 
application there is a set of morally objectionable ends that should not be pursued. Apart from 
avoiding “destroy[ing] the planet”, Haack links the morally objectionable to illegality, as 
when “the crook [is] paid to find out where the sewer runs so the gang can get into the vault” 
(op.cit.: 14). A third example of inquiry for morally objectionable ends, is inquiry in the 
service of totalitarian regimes. This was exactly “the disaster of Nazi or Soviet science” 
(op.cit.: 131). Finally, there are moral issues of justice – for example of gender justice – 
connected with the “application of scientific discoveries” (op.cit.: 119).  
 
In the context of discovery there are legitimate moral issues of “justice and opportunity” 
(op.cit.: 123). Freedom of thought and speech for all discoverers is obviously an essential 
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moral concern. Haack suspects in fact “that some who favor democratic epistemology have 
confused the concept of democracy with the concept of freedom of thought” (op.cit.: 113). 
The subtext of this passage seems to be that democracy might be a “good” value with a clear 
“emotional appeal” (ibid.), but that it does not have the superior moral status of the 
commitment to free thought and speech. On other occasions, however, democracy among 
discoverers is conceptualized as right and just – not simply as emotionally appealing: 
 
But perhaps, when it is said that science ought to be ‘more democratic’, the point intended is 
only that no one should be excluded from a scientific career on the basis of irrelevant 
considerations such as race, sex, or eye color. This seems right, […] morally (it is a bad thing 
if, for irrelevant reasons, people are excluded or discouraged from work for which they have 
talent) (op.cit.: 114).  
 
This link between justice in inquiry and equality of opportunity in the context of discovery is 
considered, however, to be more “meritocratic than democratic in its thrust” (ibid.). Hence, 
Haack seems to be uncomfortable with including the term democracy in normative 
discussions on epistemology, even when restricted to a discussion on recruitment in the 
context of discovery, because it contributes in a slippery-slope-like manner to the idea that 
“theory-choice” should somehow be “put to a vote”, when in fact “seeking out, checking, and 
assessing the worth of evidence” adequately, in science especially, ought to be done by the 
talented and properly qualified, with the “appropriate expertise” and competence, respecting 
“the institutionalized authority of well-warranted results” produced by “earlier generations” 
(op.cit.: 113, 114). This is the main reason why “a systematic underevaluation of women’s 
abilities” in academia is a problem (op.cit.: 172) – not because “appointing women 
contributes to a desirable diversity”, not because women are needed as role models, not 
because women bring special insights (op.cit. 169) – not even primarily because it is unjust 
and equality of opportunity is a moral standard that recognizes our common humanity – but 
rather because finding “the best person appointed despite her sex” will facilitate genuine 
inquiry, and sexism, possibly excluding a talented woman because she is a woman, will not 
(op.cit.: 172).  
 
Haack doubts, however, that sexism is a significant problem in academia (ibid.). The greatest 
obstacles to “genuine meritocracy” in present day academia, are not sexism (or racism), but 
rather the “disgracefully corrupt” hiring process driven more by “greed and fear” than by “the 
wish to identify the best candidate”, and what Haack refers to as “preposterism”; the mistaken 
belief that the “explosion of publications represents a significant contribution to knowledge” 
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(ibid.: 176, 177, 179, 192). And, as far as sexism in fact is a problem, Haack insists that we 
should stick to “procedural-fairness policies” (op.cit.: 169); “rules ensuring formal, procedural 
equality – “equal-opportunity” or “antidiscrimination” policies (op.cit.: 170), because 
affirmative action; “preferential hiring policies” (op.cit.: 169), are unfair and inefficient. 
Again, however, what is more important to Haack is not the moral concern that 
antidiscrimination is just, and that preferential hiring policies might discriminate (white) 
talented men illegitimately (op.cit.: 179),39 but rather that such policies are inefficient as 
means of having the most talented applicant appointed, and so will not inspire genuine 
inquiry.40 
 
1.2.5 The wish or desire that P provides no evidential support for P 
 
Values, as expressions of subjective wishes or desires, must be excluded from the context of 
justification, according to Haack, because including them is to claim that “propositions about 
what states of affairs are desirable or deplorable could be evidence that things are, or are not, 
so” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 129). To allow for value-laden justification, is to allow for the 
wishful and fearful thinking of pseudo-inquiry; of sham reasoning, and hence to betray the 
honorable ideal of “impartial” investigation which prescribes inquiry that is “not motivated by 
the desire to arrive at a certain conclusion” (op.cit.: 10). Sham reasoning, and the inherently 
biased theorizing that is its outcome, is sham, essentially, because it is based on an invalid 
logical inference, according to Haack: It is based on the idea that “it is possible to derive an 
‘is’ from an ‘ought’ (original emphasis, op.cit.: 129). This “rubbing out” of the “distinction of 
descriptive versus normative” is, however, “untenable” (op.cit.: 129). P is warranted if it is 
supported by evidence, not because we think P ought to be the case, because we wish or 
desire, or value, P. 
1.2.6 Thus, justification of theories cannot refer to values 
  
The conclusion 6) inferred from premises 1) to 5), is a conclusion one ought to accept, Haack 
argues, if one accepts the premises: If 1) to 5) are valid, then values cannot influence 
justification of theories. It follows from this argument that justification of theories cannot 
                                                 
39 “Am I saying, I am sometimes asked, that what bothers me is the unfairness to the better but unsuccessful 
candidate? This seems to me too crude a way of looking at it” (1998: 179). 
40 Such policies might ensure that we get more mediocre women replacing mediocre men in academia, but not 
that we recruit the “genuinely talented” (1998: 179). 
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refer to feminist values. One cannot accept without contradiction Haack’s argument for value-
freedom, and at the same allow feminist ethical-political considerations to influence 
theoretical justification.  
 
1.3 Countering radical interpretations of “science as social”41 
 
Haack presents one moderate prescription for a sociological approach to inquiry; the “good, 
sober sociology of science”, and three radical prescriptions which, in one way or another, 
focus on “social acceptance at the expense of warrant” (op.cit.: 99, 110). One of the radical 
prescriptions spurs us to “play down warrant and […] accentuate acceptance” (my emphasis, 
ibid.); another (more) radical prescription is to “ignore warrant altogether” and to 
“acknowledge only acceptance” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 112); and a third (even more) radical 
prescription is to replace “the concept of warrant by an ersatz of a purely politicosociological 
character” (op.cit.: 113), i.e. the approach of the defenders of value-laden justification of 
theories, such as feminist and other democratic epistemologists.42 Hence, these radical 
prescriptions all conflict with premises 1), 2) and 3) above. They imply that social acceptance 
and not (only) significant truth is the aim of theoretical inquiry (thus denying 1), and that 
whether a theory is justified depends on social acceptance and not (only) on features 
indicative of its truth (denying 2). Moreover, they imply that one shows that a theory is most 
probably true – if indeed this is considered something one should try to show – by 
demonstrating that it is socially accepted, not (only) that it is best supported by independently 
secure and comprehensive evidence (denying 3). The third and most radical prescription, 
defended by proponents of value-laden theoretical justification and democratic 
epistemologies, also contradicts premises 4),43 5) and 6) above: Not only are inquiry (1), 
                                                 
41 Haack (1998: 115). Consider again that Haack dismisses an exceptionalist approach to science. Her dismissal 
of radical interpretations of ‘science as social’ should therefore be understood as a dismissal of radical 
sociological approaches to inquiry as such. 
42 Haack’s distinction between moderate (i.e. the subtitle of Manifesto) and radical, refers to how far one departs 
from the Old Deferentialist picture of  “the logic of science”; whether one prescribes to moderate or more or less 
radical transformations of this picture (1998: 105, 106). The distinction is not meant to suggest that moderates 
are necessarily politically moderate, or that radicals are necessarily politically radical. The distinction is also not 
meant to suggest that the moderates demand only moderate changes in how contemporary science is organized, 
or that the radicals demand radical changes. The moderate Haack considers herself, at least occasionally, to be 
politically more radical than the radicals – for example when she criticizes “the new-fangled feminist ideas of 
women’s ways of knowing” to reproduce “sexist stereotypes” (op.cit.: x). She is also extremely critical of the 
pseudo-inquiry and the unmeritocratic recruitment practices of contemporary science. 
43 Or at least proceeds as if premise 4 was not the case. Haack seems generally to assume that critics of doctrines 
of value-freedom share her understanding of values as subjective wishes or desires, even though they, in her 
view, do not recognize the implications of this understanding properly when prescribing epistemology (if they 
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theoretical justification (2) and truth-seeking (3) made into “matter[s] of social negotiation” 
(ibid.). In addition, the set of values preferred by the pseudo-inquirers – for example the 
democratic values of feminist pseudo-inquirers – are prescribed a privileged epistemological 
role in these negotiations.  
 
This additional, normative move of those who subscribe to the most radical prescription, 
relies, thus, either on the least radical sociological approach to inquiry, making inquiry, 
theoretical justification and truth-seeking partly a matter of social negotiation, or on the more 
radical approach, making inquiry, theoretical justification and truth-seeking wholly a matter of 
social negotiation. Accordingly, any suggestion of a feminist epistemology would be mistaken 
if the presupposition that inquiry is more or less a matter of social negotiation, is also 
mistaken: If the context of justification cannot be reduced to a context of social negotiation, it 
goes without saying that it cannot be reduced to a context of social negotiation where feminist 
or other values might play a privileged epistemological role. And, this is precisely what 
Haack argues: The context of justification cannot be reduced to a context of social 
negotiation. The radicals have not and will not succeed in their endeavor. 
 
1.3.1 Inquiry, theoretical justification and truth-seeking – wholly a matter 
of social negotiation? 
 
Haack argues that it is “doubly false” to claim that “scientific knowledge is nothing more than 
the product of processes of social negotiation” (op.cit.: 112). The claim disregards the fact 
that theoretical justification is a matter of assessing the truth-indicativeness of evidence, and 
that science as we know it has “succeeded extraordinarily well, by and large” in doing so 
adequately (op.cit.: 98). It also rests on what she refers to as “the passes for fallacy”; it 
accentuates “what at a given time passes for scientific knowledge over warrant”, confuses 
“what we take as confirmation with what really confirms a hypothesis” (original emphasis, 
op.cit.: 117), and so completely ignores the crucial distinction between warrant and 
acceptance: 
                                                                                                                                                        
had, they would have defended a doctrine of value-freedom similar to her own). In some passages, Haack 
suggests, however, that her difference with the democratic epistemologists might also be a matter of different 
approaches to what values are: “I began to wonder if the problem might be that to engage in philosophical 
argument about moral issues puts one in chronic danger of falling into sham reasoning” (1998: 167). Haack 
recognizes, then, that there is a debate going on in moral philosophy about values, and thus, that her opponents 
might not share her understanding of values as subjective wishes and desires after all (even if they are wrong in 
not doing so, and even if philosophical arguments about values often end up in sham reasoning).  
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[…] not everything that has thus far survived those processes (of seeking out, checking, and 
assessing the weight of evidence) is knowledge; what survives those processes is what counts 
as knowledge, what is accepted as knowledge – but not all of it is, necessarily, knowledge. 
Some may, despite surviving those processes, not be warranted; some may turn out to be false 
(original emphasis, ibid.: 112). 
  
This argument relies partly on the presupposition of fallibilism. Even our best theories about 
the world and ourselves, as well as our best criteria of justification are fallible in principle: 
What is accepted as the Final Opinion indicates truth, but does not guarantee it. To uphold the 
distinction between acceptance and warrant is even more significant if we know – as we do – 
that existing scientific communities tend to be haunted by sham and fake reasoning: Their 
opinions are nowhere near Final. There is no reason to consider the conclusions accepted after 
pseudo-inquiry as warranted. 
 
Hence, Haack maintains premise 1), 2) and 3) in her argument for value-freedom: Inquiry, 
theoretical justification and truth-seeking are not wholly a matter of social negotiation. By 
maintaining this, she does, however, not deny that: “Scientific theories are devised, 
articulated, developed, by scientists; theoretical concepts like electron, gene, force, and so 
forth, are, if you like, their construction” (original emphasis, op.cit..: 113). She also does not 
deny that “objects of sociological theories […] social institutions (marriage, say, or banking) 
and social categories (gender, say, as distinct from sex) are, in a sense, socially constructed; if 
there weren’t human societies, there would be no such things” (ibid.). These are two examples 
often referred to by those who try to deconstruct the distinction between warrant and social 
acceptance. Haack insists, however, that neither electrons, genes nor forces nor the objects of 
sociological theories “are made real by scientists’ theorizing” (op.cit.: 113). This made-real-
approach ignores the causal aspect of justification; the epistemological significance of 
perception of reality. Foundherentism requires that our descriptions, concepts and theories 
relate adequately to relevant non-belief input from the real (social and natural) world.  
 
1.3.2 Inquiry, theoretical justification and truth-seeking – partly a matter of 
social negotiation? 
 
Those who describe inquiry, theoretical justification and truth-seeking partly as an issue of 
social acceptance, rely, according to Haack, on the presupposition that social evaluations, 
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interests and structures are “inseparable from scientific inquiry”; they “insist on the 
underdetermination of theory by evidence and the inextricability of non-evidential factors in 
theory-choice” (op.cit.: 110).44 Haack presents different interpretations of this presupposition, 
refuting them all as she goes along.  
 
The first interpretation tells us that social evaluations and interests are inseparable from 
scientific inquiry because “evidence never obliges us to accept this claim rather than that, and 
we have to accept something, so acceptance is always affected by something besides the 
evidence” (op.cit.: 110). This “something besides the evidence” that affects acceptance is 
assumed to be social evaluations or interests of some kind. Haack admits that we often accept 
claims that are possibly false. However, this is not necessarily a problem: 
 
Not all scientific claims are either accepted as definitely true or rejected as definitely false, 
nor should they be; evidence may be better or worse, warrant stronger or weaker, and the 
acceptance status of a claim can, and should, vary accordingly (ibid.). 
 
Justification is gradual and fallible. We talk about better or worse, stronger or weaker, and we 
might be wrong. If evidence is worse and the warrant is weaker, we have the choice to simply 
reject the claim, as scientists often do: “[…] we don’t have to accept something; if the 
evidence is inadequate, why not just acknowledge that we don’t know?” (original emphasis, 
ibid.). 
 
The second interpretation presents the underdetermination thesis somewhat differently: 
 
The point […] is not that, in practice, we don’t always have enough evidence to decide 
whether a theory is true, but that, in principle, even all possible evidence is insufficient to 
decide, that there is always an incompatible, but empirically equivalent theory (op.cit.: 110).  
 
According to this underdetermination-in-principle argument, “no amount of observational 
evidence could enable us to tell whether p1 or empirically-equivalent-but-incompatible p2 is 
true” (op.cit.: 110, 111). Again, under the condition of fallibilism we can never deem p1 or p2 
to be definitely true. But one of the propositions might still be more warranted than the other. 
If this is not the case, if we cannot say that p1 is more warranted than p2 or the other way 
around, “the most we could learn from inquiry is that either p1 or p2” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 
                                                 
44 And refer in this connection often to Quine’s underdetermination thesis. Among feminist epistemologists 
making this move, Haack mentions Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Helen Longino (op.cit.: 121, n. 23). 
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111). We have no reason to infer from this fact that something other than evidence, such as 
social evaluations or interests, should decide whether we opt for p1 or p2.  
 
The third interpretation tells us, however, that this is not a viable solution, because “we have 
to act, and so we have to accept some theory as the basis on which to act” (op.cit.: 111). But 
Haack does not consider this a problem: “We often decide to act as if a theory is true. From 
this it does not follow that we have to commit ourselves to the truth of the theory” (ibid.).45 
 
Haack maintains thus premises 1), 2) and 3) in her argument for value-freedom. Whether a 
theory is justified depends on its truth-indicativeness (2). This is not even partly an issue of 
social negotiation. Whether a theory indicates truth depends exclusively on whether it is 
supported by independently secure and comprehensive evidence (3). Whether the theory is 
socially acceptable or not is irrelevant. And inquiry as such should not, at least not 
unconditionally, be conceptualized as partly a matter of social negotiation. The context of 
discovery and the context of practical application allow for social negotiation, but the context 
of justification does not. This is to maintain that to end up with theories that are significantly 
true is the sole aim of inquiry (1), without which genuine inquiry will degenerate into pseudo-
inquiry. 
 
1.3.3 The good, sober sociology of science 
 
Haack recommends instead a moderate interpretation of science as social that does not 
conflict with 1), 2) and 3) above. This interpretation does not consider the context of 
justification partly or wholly as equivalent with a context of social negotiation, although it 
admits that justification takes place in a community of inquirers. Indeed, Haack considers 
with Peirce the Final Opinion not as “the ultimate representation” produced by an ideal 
individual knower, but by an ideal knowledge community (op.cit.: 162). To organize inquiry 
as a social enterprise in this sense, to institutionalize inquiry as an “engagement, cooperative 
and competitive, of many persons, within and across generations” will not undermine its 
potential for “epistemological distinction”, but rather contribute to it (op.cit.: 107). For one 
                                                 
45 In such cases “it is wise to take whatever precautions feasible”, if the theory turns out in fact to be false (1998: 
111). 
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thing, the fact that there is a cooperative community of inquirers “help[s] to compensate for 
individuals’ weaknesses and idiosyncrasies” (ibid.): 
 
I doubt that criteria of better and worse evidence will yield a linear ordering, and I am sure 
that no mechanical decision-procedure for theory-choice is to be anticipated. But a 
community of inquirers will usually, and usefully, include some who are quick to start 
speculating towards a new theory when the evidence begins to disfavor the old one, and 
others who are more inclined patiently to try to modify the old. And though real, imperfect 
inquirers are seldom, if ever, altogether free of prejudice and partisanship, a community of 
inquirers will usually, and usefully, include partisans of one approach keen to seek out and 
expose the weaknesses which partisans of a rival approach are motivated to neglect (op.cit.: 
107-108). 
 
Genuine inquiry is further facilitated by division of labor: Subcommunities of the scientific 
community should work on different problems, and members of the different subcommunities 
on different parts of “their” problems: “It is as if different subgroups, and different persons 
within them, worked on different parts of a crossword puzzle” (op.cit.: 107). The benefits of 
specialization are cognitive advance, if the inquirers specialize on the basis of talent and 
merit, and if “each individual and each subgroup has access, as needed, to the work of 
others”, making it possible to check “the consistency of their entries with other, distant but 
still obliquely interconnected, areas of the puzzle” (ibid.). Finally, the competitive character 
of genuine inquiry ought to be appreciated: “competition between partisans of rival 
approaches or theories, and […] between rival or research teams hoping to be the first to solve 
this or that problem” (ibid.: 108), will contribute making the cognitive outcome optimal.46  
 
That is: To recognize that the better scrutiny of evidence takes place in a community of 
virtuous inquirers where “the internal organization […] and the external environment” spur 
the proper mixture of “cooperation and competition”, is not to focus on social acceptance at 
the expense of warrant (op.cit.: 108). It is rather a matter of appreciating a decisive condition 
for the “more or less and by and large and in the long run” appropriate correlation between 
“the descriptive notion of acceptance” and “the normative notion of warrant” (my emphasis, 
ibid.). It is the task of the good, sober sociology of science to trace empirically how the 
internal organization and the external environment of science contribute to successful inquiry 
(that is, when the well-warranted and the accepted correlate), but also how the internal 
organization and the external environment of science might “hamper progress, […] 
                                                 
46 In accordance with Haack’s rational-choice theory of action, where the actors typically strive for “utility”, 
“fame or fortune” (1998: 8, 9). 
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discourage good, honest, thorough, scrupulous inquiry, [and] […] encourage fraud and fakery 
or pointless busywork” (ibid.); when the accepted is not the well-warranted, or the truths 
revealed are not significant. 
  
1.4 Escaping women’s standpoint 
 
Hence, Haack concludes that theoretical justification cannot refer to values (6), through an 
argument based on premises 1) to 5), all considered to be valid premises that ought to be 
maintained in the interest of genuine inquiry, despite attacks on 1), 2) and 3) from the 
defenders of a radical sociology of inquiry – because these attacks are all essentially mistaken. 
Moreover, Haack’s conclusion (6) implies that attempts to develop democratic 
epistemologies, such as feminist epistemologies, are unfounded: They all presuppose that 
values should play a role in justifying theories.  
 
There is, however, nothing particularly feminist about the radical interpretations of science as 
social,47 dismissals of the doctrine of value-freedom and defenses of democratic 
epistemologies: “What has science as social to do with feminism? Nothing” (op.cit.: 115). 
Indeed, arguments in contemporary debates in favor of a radical sociology of science and 
democratic epistemologies are prominently defended by those positioning themselves as 
feminist epistemologists.48 The arguments as such are, however, not feminist in any exclusive 
sense. In practice there are both radical sociologists and democratic epistemologists who are 
not feminists, and feminists, like Haack, who do not defend radical sociological approaches 
and democratic epistemologies; “neither all, nor only, women, or feminists, favor all, or 
indeed any, of the ideas offered under the rubric feminist epistemology” (ibid.: 124). Besides, 
“it is not difficult to think of philosophers, neither female nor feminist, who have subscribed 
to the thesis of science as social in those radical interpretations” (ibid.: 115).49 More 
                                                 
47 Haack does not intend to say that there is something feminist about the moderate interpretations of science as 
social. Her main ambition is precisely to disconnect the notion of feminism from any particular epistemological 
position. 
48 Haack’s main targets are Sandra Harding and Helen Longino, to whom she refers systematically. There are, 
however, several critical references also to other proponents of feminist epistemology (1998: 104-136). 
References to proponents of radical sociological approaches that are not primarily known to be feminist 
epistemologists (even though they might support the claims for some version of a feminist epistemology) are 
rare, except from the repeated references to Richard Rorty. Bruno Latour and Steve Fuller are however 
mentioned (op.cit.: 121, n. 17). 
49 Even though Haack does not come up with examples in this passage. Elsewhere she mentions, however, Rorty, 
Latour and Fuller, who are not primarily known to be feminist epistemologists. The moderate interpretation of 
science as social is also defended by feminists (such as Haack herself) and non-feminists alike: “In the modest 
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important, feminist arguments in favor of a radical sociology of science and democratic 
epistemologies are not in principle different from non-feminist arguments. Indeed, the 
feminist proponents of radically social and democratic epistemologies typically emphasize 
that science is the product of processes of social negotiation that are crucially gendered, that 
value-laden views on gender, as a subset of other value-laden views, are inseparable from 
scientific inquiry, and that epistemologies ought to be democratic also with regard to gender. 
However, this is a matter of difference in emphasis, not in principle: To claim that science is a 
gendered social construction, is simply an elaboration of the general claim that science is a 
social construction. The arguments for epistemologies to be gender democratic add nothing, 
in principle, to the arguments for epistemologies to be democratic.50 
 
And even the emphasis on gender is questionable, according to Haack. Obviously, any gender 
perspective connected to misconceived sociological doctrines and flawed prescriptions for 
democracy in the context of justification, ought to be dismissed. If, indeed, an emphasis on 
gender is appropriate, it must be made compatible with a good, sober sociology of science, 
and avoid the imperialist inclination to turn theoretical justification into an issue of values: 
Feminist values should be considered only in the context of discovery and the context of 
practical application. However, Haack considers feminists’ focus on gender, even in these 
contexts, as highly exaggerated. Feminists overstate, for example, the problem of sexism in 
processes of academic recruitment and in funding policies (op.ciit.: 176, 203). Moreover, even 
moderate feminist sociologists of science tend to exaggerate how bad science is the outcome 
of sexism. It is the task of a good, sober sociology of science to investigate any lack of 
correlation between the socially accepted and the well warranted. In some cases, particularly 
in the human and social sciences, the explanation of mismatch between what is accepted and 
what is warranted is sexism: 
 
In the social and human sciences, theories about women’s capacities, or incapacities, have 
sometimes come to be accepted by the relevant scientific subcommunity when they were not 
well warranted; and the explanation of how this came about would, probably, refer to the 
prejudices and stereotypes common among scientists as well as in the larger society (original 
emphasis, op.cit.: 116). 
                                                                                                                                                        
sense spelled out in the first section of this essay, it is true, and epistemologically significant, that science is 
social. […] Peirce, Polanyi, Quine, Popper, come immediately to mind as philosophers neither female nor 
feminist who have acknowledged, with varying degrees of detail and subtlety, something along those lines” 
(1998: 115). 
50 That is: Epistemologies are not democratic if they are not democratic also with respect to gender, in the sense 
that just prescriptions ought to presuppose “the common humanity of women and men” (1998: 123): There are 
no morally relevant differences between women and men on the level of “justice and opportunity” (ibid.). 
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The idea that sexism also infects “the physical sciences” depends, however, on “simple 
exaggeration about the supposed ubiquity of sexual metaphors in the writings of scientists and 
philosophers of science” (op.cit.: 117), and on misunderstandings of the cognitive role of 
metaphors: 
 
It is true that metaphors are not always just decorative, but can be cognitively important. It is 
true, also, that some cognitively significant metaphors implicitly compare natural with social 
phenomena […]. But whether a cognitively important metaphor is fruitful, whether it makes 
us look in the right or in the wrong direction, is independent of the desirability or otherwise of 
the social phenomenon on which it calls (original emphasis, ibid.). 
 
A scientific theory may be warranted, even though it makes use of “undesirable” sexist 
metaphors: Sexist metaphors ought to be criticized from an “ethical” or “political” 
perspective, but they do not make the theories as such into which they are integrated, 
unjustified (op.cit.: 119).  
 
However, there are feminist epistemological proposals that do differ from general democratic 
epistemologies also in principle, proposals claiming that there are distinct women’s ways of 
knowing that are epistemologically privileged. These feminist “standpoint” epistemologies 
are not simply yet another group of democratic epistemologies (op.cit.: 116). Haack suggests, 
rather, that they betray the commitment to equality inherent in democratic epistemological 
proposals. The claim that “some standpoints, those of oppressed and disadvantaged classes, 
women among them” are “epistemologically better”, is incompatible with a “democratic 
thrust” (ibid.). Standpoint epistemologists pay only shallow lip-service to democracy and to 
“multiple standpoints” (ibid.). However, feminist standpoint epistemologies do have in 
common with democratic epistemologies the denial of premises 2) and 3) in Haack’s 
argument for value-freedom: Whether a theory is justified, and whether a theory is true (if 
indeed true is regarded as something theories ought to be), depends, according to the feminist 
standpoint epistemologists, on whether it is the outcome of procedures of inquiry that reflect 
women’s ways of knowing (ibid.: 126). Haack considers, however, this to be an indefensible 
epistemological standard: “I do not think that women are capable of revolutionary insights 
into the theory of knowledge not available, or not easily available to men” (1993: 8). First, she 
is “not convinced […] that there are any distinctively female ways of knowing” (original 
emphasis, 1998: 125). There is simply no decisive factual evidence for this claim: 
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All any human being has to go on, in figuring out how things are, is his or her sensory and 
introspective experience, and the explanatory theorizing he or she devises to accommodate is; 
and differences in cognitive style, like differences in handwriting, seem more individual than 
gender determined (original emphasis, op.cit.: 126). 
 
To Haack, “reversion to the notion of thinking like a woman is disquietingly reminiscent of 
old, sexist stereotypes” (op.cit.: 125). Second, she considers feminist standpoint epistemology 
to be based on the unlikely assumption that “oppressed, disadvantaged, and marginalized 
people are epistemically privileged by virtue of their oppression and disadvantage” (op.cit.: 
126). Apart from the fact that Haack believes many feminists exaggerate the extensiveness 
and depth of women’s oppression, disadvantage and marginalization; if women were in fact 
extensively and deeply oppressed, disadvantaged and marginalized, this would not be a “good 
reason to think it true that oppression confers epistemic privilege,” because “one of the ways 
in which oppressed people are oppressed is, surely, that their oppressors control the 
information that reaches them” (ibid.). To be oppressed, disadvantaged and marginalized 
typically implies that one is deprived of the means to do genuine inquiry, not that one is better 
equipped. Hence, there is no reason, according to Haack, neither to modify nor replace 
premises 2) and 3) on the basis of feminist standpoint criticism. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE ARGUMENT FOR VALUE-FREEDOM: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
 
 
 
2.0 Justification of theories – a value-free endeavor? 
 
In Chapter 1, I elaborated Susan Haack’s argument against value-laden justification of 
theories, attempting to take its complexity into account (1.2). In this chapter, I discuss the 
premises in her argument, from 1) to 5). My ambition is to assess Haack’s steps towards her 
conclusion 6), and introduce what I consider to be a more adequate understanding of the 
relationship between inquiry and values. 
 
Haack’s critique of radical sociological approaches in the study of science (as introduced in 
1.3), will be discussed in Chapter 3, her critique of feminist standpoint epistemology (as 
introduced in 1.4), will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
 
2.1 Assessing the first premise51 
 
2.1.1 Separating significance from truth 
 
According to Haack, the sole aim of inquiry is to end up with theories that are significantly 
true; bot significant and true. She claims, moreover, that it is possible to uphold a clear-cut 
distinction between the question of a theory’s significance and the question of its justification 
as true. That significance-issues and truth-issues can be dealt with separately, in different 
contexts, is a fundamental assumption in her argument.  
 
                                                 
51 The sole aim of inquiry is to end up with theories that are significantly true. 
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2.1.2 Haack’s notion of discretion 
 
However, already in the explication of the first premise, Haack herself questions this 
assumption. Genuine inquirers must, in her view, both justify theories and consider the 
question of significance properly. The latter requires discretion in the context of justification; 
the use of good judgment. It is because genuine theories are not any trivial, even if perhaps 
true, theory, but theories that are significant, her foundherentist criteria of justifications should 
be considered as guidelines applied with the use of good judgment, not as rules applied 
mechanically (1998: 96).52 Haack’s distinction between significance-issues and truth-issues is 
thus not that clear-cut after all. Theories are not adequately justified as true, in her view, 
without a use of good judgment, and good judgment when justifying a theory, is to take into 
account the significant questions that inspire the investigations, i.e. the non-trivial questions 
significant theories are answers to.53  
 
And significance-issues are value-laden issues: We evaluate something as significant from 
different points of view, for example from an ethical or political point of view. Haack could 
have tried to argue that there are value-free ways to assess a theory’s significance. But she 
does not:54 When Haack says that the use of good judgment in the context of justification 
should be made with reference to the significant questions that inspire the investigations, this 
is said without reservation. She does not exclude instances where the questions rest on ethical-
political considerations. Discretion in the context of justification is presented, rather, as value-
laden; a good use of judgment is to take into account the significant questions asked, even if 
these are ethical-political questions. This suggests an inconsistency in Haack’s argument,55 
because she claims at the same time that values should not influence justification. 
 
                                                 
52 There are, however, also other reasons for why discretion is needed in theoretical justification (see 2.3.3). 
53 “The goal of inquiry is to discover significant, substantial truths; and since there is a certain tension between 
the two aspects of the goal – it is a lot easier to get truths if you don’t mind the truths you get being trivial – there 
can be, at best, guidelines, not rules, for the conduct of inquiry” (my emphasis, 1998: 94): The need for 
discretion in justification is presented as arising because of the requirement of significance. 
54 Generally speaking. There are, however, passages were she does (see 2.2.2). 
55 Haack does not support the strong coherentist claim that “a subject who has inconsistent beliefs, and hence an 
incoherent belief-set, is not justified in any of his beliefs. […] the mere fact that there is, say, a hidden 
contradiction within the corpus of my beliefs about the geography of Russia is, surely, no reason for saying that I 
am not justified in believing that snow is white” (1993: 25). She would consider it a reason, however, for saying 
that some of her beliefs about the geography of Russia are not justified. According to foundherentism, the 
evaluative aspect of justification cannot be reduced to logical relations. The evaluative part of justification is, 
however, obviously, also about tracking down logical inconsistencies. 
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2.2 Assessing the second premise56 
 
2.2.1 Significant theories – not only true 
 
With her notion of discretion, Haack makes us doubt the second premise in her argument for 
value-freedom even before it is introduced. She cannot claim without contradiction both that 
theories should not be justified with reference to significance, and that they should, in the 
sense that good judgment in theoretical justification is judgment informed by the significant 
questions asked in the context of discovery.  
 
Her explication of the second premise sharpens the inconsistency. Haack defines a theory, be 
it a trivial pseudo-theory or a genuine significant theory, as a set of propositions with truth-
values. However, if the question of a theory’s significance is considered a value-laden 
question, as Haack herself maintains,57 significant theories do not consist only of propositions 
that are more or less true, i.e. propositions about what “is”, but also of propositions about 
what “ought” to be; “propositions about what states of affairs are desirable or deplorable” 
(original emphasis, Haack 1998: 129).  
 
In other passages she talks about values in terms of “befogging” or “emotionally appealing” 
wishes or desires that we are not necessarily aware or conscious of, terms suggesting that 
values are not necessarily something we can elaborate propositionally (op.cit.: 113). However, 
even if this is the case, significant theories cannot be defined exclusively as sets of 
propositions with truth-values, anyhow. There would still be a value-laden residue escaping 
our definition. 
 
The question is whether this makes any difference. If a significant theory is not after all 
simply a set of propositions with truth-values, but also based on values, would it not still be 
possible to deal with the issues separately as Haack suggests; to handle ethical-political 
concerns in the context of discovery and in the context of practical application, and keep the 
context of justification value-free? This is not possible, however, unless the ambition to 
achieve theoretical justification is replaced with the ambition to achieve partial theoretical 
justification, i.e. unless inquirers restrict themselves as inquirers to justifying propositions 
                                                 
56 Whether a theory is justified, depends only on features indicative of its truth, not its significance. 
57 Generally speaking. 
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with truth-values, even if their theories also consist of ought-propositions (or a non-
propositional equivalent). However, Haack does not claim to give simply a partial picture of 
justification:58 To consider a theory’s truth-indicativeness is presented as theoretical 
justification proper. And this would be a prescription consistent with Haack’s idea that the 
sole aim of inquiry is to end up with theories that are significantly true, only if such theories, 
like trivial pseudo-theories, only consisted of propositions with truth-values. Haack defines, 
however, a significant theory as a value-laden theory, i.e. as a set of propositions consisting 
also of propositions about what is “desirable or deplorable” (or non-propositional equivalents) 
(op.cit.: 129). 
 
2.2.2 Why inquiring about features indicative of truth confronts the 
inquirer with ought-questions 
 
Thus, one cannot consistently claim both that the sole aim of inquiry is to end up with theories 
that are significantly true and that theoretical justification can be value-free, because questions 
of significance are questions of what we value. Consistency requires that one of the claims is 
given up.59 The question is, however, whether the context of justification can be kept free 
from values (i.e. whether we can uphold this claim), even if we give up the claim that the sole 
aim of inquiry is to end up with theories that are significantly true, and claim, instead, that it is 
to end up with theories that are true. In other words, can inquirers investigating state of affairs 
avoid being confronted with ought-questions? I will argue that they cannot. 
 
i) Is, can and ought 
Answers to our questions about state of affairs, have implications for our assessments of what 
is feasible; of what we can do. If, for example,60 investigations show that dogs lack the ability 
                                                 
58 In her defense of gradual, fallible justification, Haack does claim that theories are never completely supported 
by evidence, and thus that justification in this sense always will be partial. However, it is one thing to say that 
justification always will be partial despite our best efforts, another to say that we should reduce our efforts in 
advance (i.e. decide to concentrate only on parts of the theory, and leave other parts uninvestigated). 
59 Or that one admits that one’s definition of justification is partial. 
60 There are different approaches to the use of examples in philosophical argumentation. My use of examples in 
the discussion of Haack’s argument is meant to be illustrative. Onora O’Neill writes about this illustrative use of 
examples (often “hypothetical “ or “ostensive” examples) in  philosophy, in a discussion of Kant: “ They [the 
examples in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral and in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone] are 
indeed highly schematic examples. However, no addition of detail could make them fully determinate, and if 
they were cluttered with detail they would loose their pedagogic usefulness. Good illustrations need to be clear 
and simplified, even caricatures, if they are to get their point across. They need not, however, be trivial […]. If 
[…] examples are seen as illustrations they may (but needn’t) be trivial; but they must present sparse sketches 
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to do mathematics, efficient education policies cannot be made on the assumption that dogs 
possess the ability to do mathematics. It is not a sensible option, given what we know about 
dogs, to recommend, for example, establishing schools were dogs can cultivate their 
mathematical skills (when dogs in fact have no skills to cultivate). Or, for example, if our 
investigations show that global institutions of social redistribution must be based in a strong 
sense of solidarity among citizens to be stable, and that this strong sense of solidarity does not 
exist and cannot exist given what we know about how human beings relate to distant 
strangers, policies aiming at establishing and upholding stable global institutions will not be 
successful. If, on the other hand, a strong sense of solidarity among distant strangers are in 
fact present, or can be developed, or do not in fact constitute a necessary condition for 
upholding stable global institutions, policies aiming to upholding stable global institutions 
may be successful: It is feasible that such policies could be effective.61  
 
In short, when we say something about state of affairs, we also say something about what can 
and cannot be done. When we say something about what can and cannot be done, we have, 
however, already involved ourselves in discussions about what ought to be done, as questions 
of what we ought to do and what we can do are related. That one can to something, does not 
imply that one ought to do it, i.e. ‘can’ does not imply ‘ought’, and that one ought not do 
something, does not imply that one cannot possibly do it. That it is impossible to act in certain 
ways, does, however, imply that acting in these ways cannot be prescribed, i.e. ‘cannot’ 
implies ‘ought not’, and ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. This relationship between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ is 
a conceptual relationship: It does not make sense to tell someone that she ought to do 
something, when this is something she cannot to. It is, however, also a normative relationship: 
A norm obliging us to do something we cannot do is not a norm we would subscribe to. 
 
Consequently, because investigating state of affairs gives answers to questions of what can be 
done, investigations of state of affairs confronts us, at the same time, with ought-questions. 
That is: If investigations show that what we consider as something we ought to do is not 
feasible, this implies that we claim something about what ought to be, i.e. we claim that what 
is considered as something we ought to do is not something we ought to do, because we 
cannot do it. 
                                                                                                                                                        
rather than deep or nuanced pictures” (1989: 168). O’Neill contrasts this way of using examples in philosophy, 
with the Wittgensteinian approach to examples and examples in problem-centered ethics. 
61 For a discussion of this example, see Holst (forthcoming c). 
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ii) The value of theoretical virtues 
A second reason why assessing propositions about state of affairs confronts the inquirer with 
ought-questions is the value-laden character of “theoretical virtues” (Longino 1994: 477). 
Haack mentions intellectual integrity, general carefulness and honesty in inquiry as theoretical 
virtues; virtues functional for genuine truth-seeking.62 Theoretical virtues may, however, also 
be value-functional; functional for achieving certain values.63 From the perspective of a 
feminist commitment, Helen Longino emphasizes the significance of two theoretical virtues 
in particular; “the virtue of ontological heterogeneity” and “the virtue of complexity of 
relationship” (op.cit.: 477-478). The virtue of ontological heterogeneity involves, Longino 
says, a commitment both to ensuring that a theory’s conceptual scheme makes room for 
human potentialities and to representing these potentialities as normal variations, not as 
deviance or defect. The virtue of complexity of relationship involves a commitment to 
represent human beings’ potentiality for flexible behavior in response to altered 
understandings of themselves and others. These two virtues are theoretical virtues, but they 
are also value-laden virtues: They are at the same time truth-functional and bearers of feminist 
values.  
 
Haack would probably argue that what possibly makes Longino’s virtues into theoretical 
virtues, is that they are truth-functional, not that they are functional for certain values. The 
point is, however, that they are truth-functional virtues which are more functional for some 
values than for others. For example, in a situation where women are defined as not flexible, 
autonomous and creative, as in a patriarchal society, the virtues of heterogeneity and 
complexity will serve those who wish that women were flexible, autonomous and creative 
beings better than those who wish that women were not flexible, autonomous and creative 
beings. To this, Haack would probably respond that protecting definitions that are dear to us 
                                                 
62 Even Haack regards, however, for example, intellectual integrity as a moral virtue (not only as an 
epistemological and instrumental virtue (see. 2.4.2). 
63 This is not to deny that there are in fact “cognitive values” (Habermas 2003: 223). Habermas’ talk of cognitive 
values such as “coherence, simplicity and elegance”, “preservation of otherwise well-confirmed theories”, 
“predictive power” and “instrumental power” as “characterized by the fact that they are functionally related to 
truth, a feature that all other values lack” (2003: 223, 226). Haack would admit values of this sort in the context 
of justification. There might, however, be values involved when we single out what are to count as cognitive 
values, when we order them, articulate them and interpret them. Habermas are right when he claims that there 
are values not “functionally related to truth” and that there are values that are (ibid.). The latter values are, 
however, not necessarily neutral with respect to ought-questions (consider for example the value of instrumental 
power – to achieve what?), just as they are not necessarily neutral with respect to aesthetic values (consider for 
example the value of simplicity). 
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from investigation, is not what her crossword puzzle model of inquiry prescribes. When we 
investigate something, there are, however, always background beliefs64 that are left 
uninvestigated. We do not investigate all the propositions we rely on in our studies. We 
concentrate on some of them at the expense of others. Certain values inspire certain 
investigations, other values other investigations. Feminist values have, for example, inspired 
scientists to replace patriarchal definitions of women with other definitions, and definitions of 
what women are capable of with unprejudiced investigation into what their capabilities are. 
Longino’s proposal of feminist theoretical virtues is linked to the latter ambition. They are 
thus truth-functional, but at the same time value-laden.  
 
iii) Value-laden concepts and distinctions in factual propositions 
A third reason why investigating state of affairs confronts us with ought-questions, is the 
value-laden character of the concepts and distinctions on which factual propositions may rely. 
Even if it could be consistently argued that significant theories consist of propositions about 
state of affairs only, this does not rule out the possibility that concepts and distinctions used in 
these propositions are value-laden. Consider, for example, Haack’s claim that “it isn’t true” 
that there is significant “systematic underevaluation of women’s abilities” in present-day 
academia; her “nasty suspicion” that “sexism” in recruitment hardly constitutes a considerable 
problem (1998: 172). The belief that there is sexism in recruitment in present-day academia, 
in terms of a significant systematic underevaluation of women’s abilities, is a belief that can 
be considered more or less true or false after proper investigation: What we are discussing is a 
proposition about state of affairs. But, clearly, at least two of the concepts included in this 
proposition are value-laden. When Haack talks about underevaluation of women’s abilities, 
she presupposes a standard of evaluation: Women are underevaluated relative to a fair or just 
evaluation; to say that they are underevaluated, is to say that their abilities are not fairly or 
justly valued according to some standard. Sexism is also not a value-neutral term: It refers to 
unjust or unfair treatment of the sexes.65 
 
Haack simply takes it for granted that propositions involving value-laden descriptions of this 
sort can be properly assessed in the context of justification. She suspects that there is less 
sexism and underevaluation of women than is often assumed, and considers this a proposition 
                                                 
64 To use Haack’s own term. 
65 Certain kind of concepts and distinctions are inevitably value-laden. Consider Hilary Putnam’s explication of 
descriptions that are unavoidably “beyond the fact/value-dichotomy” (1990: 135-178). Consider also Ånund 
Haga’s notion of “critical descriptions” in the social sciences (1991: 252-281).  
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that can be considered more or less warranted after proper investigations. To prescribe 
justification of propositions containing value-laden descriptions is, however, inconsistent with 
her doctrine of value-freedom. To be consistent, she would either have to exclude value-laden 
descriptions from inquiry, or find a way of dealing with the values of such descriptions in the 
context of discovery and the context of practical application, leaving only stripped bare value-
free descriptions for scrutiny in the context of justification. The latter option would imply 
replacing the ambition of theoretical justification with the ambition of partial theoretical 
justification. A stripped bare value-laden residue would be excluded from justification, even if 
it was part of the theory under scrutiny. It is, however, not possible to remove and isolate the 
value-component from all value-laden concepts and distinctions.66 Behaviorists have tried. 
Behavioristic descriptions of, for example, slavery are, however, hardly value-free. 
“Representation” in an “Orwellian” fashion “describing whipping as a labor mobilization 
technique” expresses rather other values than a description of whipping as a violent means to 
control and humiliate  (Anderson 1995a: 39). 
 
To wholly exclude value-laden concepts and distinctions from inquiry would imply that 
Haack could no longer study sexism, and that historians could no longer study slavery. Social 
scientists could no longer study unemployment, because there is no value-stripped definition 
of unemployment; a definition beyond value-laden considerations on what is and what is not 
employment. Medical researchers could no longer study human illnesses, because there are no 
value-free classifications of human illnesses. It is impossible to classify “organisms living in 
the human body” into “pathogenic and nonpathogenic” without in any way “track[ing] human 
interests in health” (Anderson 1995a: 44).  
 
Hence, a limitation of this kind, to allow for investigations of propositions constructed 
exclusively on the basis of value-free concepts and distinctions, seems to be too restrictive: It 
                                                 
66 Consider Putnam’s argument (based on readings of Iris Murdoch, Bernhard Williams and John McDowell): 
“Murdoch was the first to emphasize that language has two very different sorts of ethical concepts: abstract 
ethical concepts (Williams calls them ‘thin’ ethical concepts), such as ‘good’ and ‘right’, and more descriptive, 
less abstract concepts (Williams calls them ‘thick’ ethical concepts) such as, for example, cruel, pert, 
inconsiderate, chaste. Murdoch (and later, and in a more spelled-out way, McDowell) argued that there is no 
way of saying that the ‘descriptive component’ of the meaning of a word like cruel and inconsiderate is without 
using a word of the same kind; as McDowell puts the argument, a word has to be connected to a certain set of 
‘evaluative interests’ in order to function in the way such a thick ethical word functions; and the speaker has to 
be aware of those interests and be able to identify imaginatively with them if he is to apply the word to novel 
cases or circumstances in the way a sophisticated speaker of the language would. The attempt of non-cognitivists 
to split such words into a ‘descriptive meaning component’ and a ‘prescriptive meaning component’ founders on 
the impossibility of saying that the ‘descriptive meaning’ of, say, cruel is without using the word cruel itself, or a 
synonym” (original emphasis, 1990: 166).  
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is not difficult to come up with examples of areas of inquiry in the human, social and medical 
sciences that could no longer be investigated were we to take this limitation seriously. It may 
be the case that these areas of inquiry cannot in fact be genuinely investigated. This would, 
however, not be Haack’s argument. Her general assumption is, as her reflections on whether 
sexism “is true” exemplify, that “social institutions and social categories”, such as slavery, 
unemployment and human illnesses, can be genuinely investigated (1998: 113, 172). Haack, 
once more, denies the implications of her own doctrine of value-freedom.67 
 
iv) Burdens of judgment 
A fourth reason why investigating state of affairs confronts us with ought-questions, is what  
John Rawls refers to as “the burdens of judgment”; “the sources, or causes, of disagreement 
between reasonable persons” (1996: 55). Rawls introduces the burdens of judgment to explain 
why “reasonable disagreement or disagreement between reasonable persons” occurs (ibid.).68  
 
Four of the burdens on Rawls’ “not complete list” of “the hazards involved in the correct 
exercise of our powers of reason and judgment”, “apply mainly to the theoretical uses of 
reason” (op.cit.: 56), when state of affairs are investigated. One of them is the burden of 
different “total experience”:69 
 
To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence […] is shaped by our 
total experience, our whole course of life up to now; and our total experiences must always 
differ. Thus, in a modern society with its numerous offices and positions, its various divisions 
of labor, its many social groups and their ethnic variety, citizens’ total experiences are 
disparate enough for their judgments to diverge, at least to some degree, on many if not most 
cases of any significant complexity (op.cit.: 56-57). 
 
Our unique total experience as concrete persons shape our personality, our bodies, our values 
and idiocyncracies, and influence our judgment, for example when we “assess evidence” 
(ibid.). Hence, this burden of judgment, a source of reasonable disagreement, is incompatible 
                                                 
67 Can we rule out that concepts and distinctions are value-laden in for example theoretical physics and 
mathematics? I will return to this question in 2.4.4.  
68 Reasonable disagreement is disagreement between “persons who have realized their two moral powers [they 
have a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good] to a degree sufficient to be free 
and equal citizens in a constitutional regime, and who have an enduring desire to honor fair terms of cooperation 
and to be fully cooperating members of society. Given their moral powers, they share a common human reason, 
similar powers of thought and judgment: they can draw inferences, weigh evidence, and balancing competing 
considerations” (Rawls 1996: 52, 55).  
69 The other three are listed in Rawls (1996: 56). 
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with the idea of value-freedom in theoretical justification. Genuine inquirers cannot abstract 
themselves from their “whole course of life” (ibid.).70 
 
v) Significance – a question of values 
Thus, inquirers investigating state of affairs are confronted with ought-questions. Even if one 
considers the sole aim of inquiry to be to end up with theories that are simply true (and not 
significantly true), theoretical justification will be influenced by values. If this was not the 
case; if value-freedom in theoretical justification was in fact possible, Haack could, however, 
have made a consistent argument where she defended truth as the aim of inquiry and value-
free theoretical justification at the same time. But the sole aim of inquiry, in her view, is to 
end up with theories that are significantly true. And this claim is only consistent with the 
claim that theoretical justification is value-free, if it can be argued that questions of 
significance can be answered in a value-free way.71  
 
In The Advancement of Science (1993) Philip Kitcher argues that “science aims at the 
significant truths, and that significance is a matter of identifying natural kinds, formulating 
unifying general principles, and so forth” (original emphasis, quoted in Kitcher 2002: 552). 
Kitcher now considers this idea to be “suspect” (ibid.), because “significance is determined by 
us and our evolving interests”, i. e. there are no natural kinds (op.cit.: 555). There is no sharp 
boundary between “epistemic” and “practical”: “[…] there is no context-independent notion 
of significance, and epistemic significance is intertwined with past and present practical 
projects” (Kitcher 2001: 148). Generally speaking, Haack tends to agree with the latter 
position. She acknowledges that questions of significance, at least in most cases, confront us 
with practical, non-epistemic concerns,72 confident that one can argue for value-freedom 
without denying this point: In genuine inquiry the question of a theory’s significance, whether 
value-laden or not, is not to be dealt with in the context of justification anyway, according to 
her prescriptions. Haack suggests, however, that significant research questions in the natural 
                                                 
70 Rawls suggests, however, that the burdens of judgment do not apply in natural science: “It [our attempt to 
reason with one another] seems to do so [lead to reasonable agreement] in natural science, at least in the long run 
(1996: 55). Rawls does not advance this suggestion. 
71 Or if one admits that one’s definition of theoretical justification is partial. 
72 Even if she at times seems to deny it. Consider her comparison between science and law in a recent article. In 
contrast to science, “the quest for truth in the courtroom” is a “kind of inquiry” that is “constrained not only by 
the demands of evidence, but also by considerations of principle and policy” (Haack 2004: 18). Scientific inquiry 
is, however, also constrained by principles and policies, only of another kind than inquiry in the courtroom. 
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sciences can be value-free:73 She suggests a distinction between the human and social 
sciences (and perhaps the more applied natural sciences) on the one hand, and (at least the 
more theoretical) natural sciences on the other, when it comes to the relationship between a 
theory’s significance and values.74 What Haack seems to say, is that it is hard, perhaps 
impossible, to avoid involving oneself in discussions about values when asking significant 
research questions in the human and social sciences, but also that it is hard to even make 
sense of how such discussions have any relevance when asking significant research questions 
in (at least some of) the natural sciences. In theoretical physics, mathematics and similar 
disciplines you can talk without contradiction about significant theories as sets of propositions 
with truth-values, because the research questions are not “politicized” in these disciplines as 
they are in other disciplines (op.cit.: 119).  
 
If this were to be accepted, Haack would have to modify the scope of her argument. She 
would have to admit that value-freedom is achievable only in (some of) the natural sciences, 
not in science or in inquiry as such. Alternatively, she could sustain that value-freedom is 
generally achievable, and take up the position that most of our investigations, inside and 
outside science, apart from in a limited set of cognitive practices pursued in some of the 
natural science departments, represent pseudo-inquiry. This is, however, not the picture 
presented elsewhere in Manifesto. For example, even if Haack tells us that there is more fake 
and sham reasoning in the human and social sciences than in the natural sciences, because 
research in these areas “bears most directly on politically contested issues” (op.cit.: 98), she 
does not claim that fake and sham reasoning is all there is in these areas. There is, rather, 
“good” and “bad” science even here: There are examples of pseudo-inquiry and examples of 
genuine inquiry also of issues that are more “directly” political (op.cit.: 98-99). 
 
Moreover, it can be argued that significant theories even in theoretical physics, mathematics 
and similar disciplines depend on values, if for no other reason, then at least for the 
fundamental, but often forgotten reason, that to institutionalize inquiry at all,75 in whatever 
area, as well as to answer only questions that are of significance to us and not any trivial 
                                                 
73 “The claim began to be heard (significantly, mainly from feminist philosophers, sociologists, and literary 
theorists, not from feminist physicists and chemists) that sexism infects all the sciences, the physical sciences 
included” (original emphasis, 1998: 117). In the passage that follows Haack characterizes this claim as an 
“exaggeration” and a “misunderstanding” (ibid.). She is “simply baffled by how work on quantum physics, say 
[…]  could be undertaken from a feminist point of view” (1998: 116). 
74 The scope of Haack’s claim on this point is not clear. She talks mostly about physics, but mentions also 
chemistry and biology (1998: 117). 
75 Haack argues herself that the decision to inquire reflects goodness and virtue (1998: 15). 
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question in these inquiries, i.e. to make only what Haack would refer to as genuine inquiry, 
are value-laden endeavors.  
 
If citizens in a polity decide to use the limited resources available to institutionalize genuine 
inquiry, then there are less resources left for them to do other things. “The normal conditions 
under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary” are “conditions of moderate 
scarcity” (Rawls 1999: 110). Scarcity is what John Rawls refers to as a “circumstance of 
justice” (op.cit.: 109):76 “Natural and other resources are not so abundant that schemes of 
cooperation become superfluous” (op.cit.: 110). Citizens’decisions to do some things, are also 
decisions not to do other things. 
 
Moreover, their decisions results in particular “division[s] of social advantages” (op.cit: 110), 
because “the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and 
necessary” is also a condition of “conflict of interests” (ibid.):77 People have “their own plans 
of life […] or conceptions of the good [that] lead them to have different ends and purposes, 
and to make conflicting claims on the natural and social resources available” (ibid.). Hence, a 
polity’s decision to spend its limited resources on institutionalizing genuine inquiry, for 
example to establish a university, is a decision more in accordance with certain people’s plans 
of life or conceptions of the good than other people’s plans of life or conceptions of the good, 
more in some people’s interest than in other people’s interest. Under “conditions of moderate 
scarcity” this decision is a prescription for a certain “division of social advantages” (ibid.). 
This is so because some people consider participation in institutionalized genuine inquiry to 
be a path towards self-realization, while others have no wish to pursue this way of life, but 
also, more importantly, because some have “interests”, “ends and purposes” that would be 
facilitated by the establishment of institutions of genuine inquiry, while others do not (ibid.).78 
                                                 
76 Rawls refers to moderate scarcity as one of the objective circumstances of justice (1999: 109). Rawls’ outline 
of the circumstances of justice is part of his description of the human situation, what Otfried Höffe refers to as 
conditio humana. A theory of justice is a theory of moral justification in the human situation: “Das 
Argumentationsmuster der politischen Legitimation heisst deshalb: Anthropologie plus Ethik. Durch die 
moralischen Seite entgeht die politische Legitimation dem Sein-Sollens Fehler, durch die anthropologische Seite 
zusätzlich dem Vorwurf eines blossen, von allen deskriptiven Fragen abgekoppelten Sollens” (Höffe 1989: 218, 
on the term ‘political’, see 2.4.6). 
77 This is one of the subjective circumstances of justice (Rawls 1999: 110). 
78 For example, would those who are in power in a system based on authority and tradition have more reason to 
oppose the institutionalization of genuine inquiry, and less reason to oppose arrangements encouraging inquiry 
of trivial issues, or arrangements not encouraging truth-seeking at all, than the disadvantaged in this system, 
because genuine inquiry might result in knowledge that casts doubt on the rationality and legitimacy of existing 
power relations: Inquiry might highlight that the system is inefficient and that people are oppressed. 
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In this sense, a polity’s decision to institutionalize genuine inquiry is not value- and interest-
neutral. 
 
Citizens, however, have also roughly similar needs and interests, or needs and interests in 
various ways complementary, so that mutually advantageous cooperation among them is 
possible (ibid.). The institutionalization of genuine inquiry may be thought of as a common 
interest or good of this sort. That institutionalized inquiry might be a common good, does not, 
however, make the decision to institutionalize inquiry value-free, only less controversial.79  
 
Other questions are what the investigators of institutionalized investigations should 
investigate, and how the outcome of their investigations should be applied; which research 
questions and applications of research that are considered significant. Haack herself suggests 
that these are value-laden questions: ”Funding priorities” and how we “apply […] scientific 
discoveries” depend on our values (1998: 119). In the circumstances of justice what we fund 
and how we apply knowledge, depend on what we consider to be of interest; they are “ethical 
or political questions” (op.cit.: 119).80 
 
Furthermore, decisions about funding and application are shaped by those who are allowed to 
make them, and by the processes in which they are made; by how and to what extent 
                                                 
79 Can we have an interest in deciding to institutionalize natural-scientific inquiry that is value-free? The early 
Jürgen Habermas argued that certain “Erkentnissinteressen” can be inferred from human anthropology; conditio 
humana is an interested condition (it is a context of discovery that is always already interested). The 
institutionalization of the natural sciences express, according to Habermas, “ein technisches Interesse” that 
human beings have because they are beings with certain characteristics (Heidegren 2002: 221-240). Karl-Otto 
Apel argues that “das Erkenntnisinteresse an Objektivierung” linked first and foremost to the institutionalization 
of the natural sciences has a transcendental status (1994a: 25): “Ich muss betonen, dass ich hier von einem 
notwendigen, internen Erkenntnissinteresse spreche, und nicht etwa von einer lediglich psychologisch oder 
soziologisch relevanten externen Motivation wissenschaftligen Forschens. Das, wovon ich rede, ist ein 
technisches Interesse, – doch nicht in irgendeinem externen oder empirisch nachweisbaren, sondern im 
transzendentalpragmatischen Sinne” (original emphasis, ibid.). However, both Habermas and Apel consider 
there to be more fundamental knowledge interests than the technical interest dominating, in particular, the 
natural sciences. Apel argues that there also is “[ein] zweite[s] Erkenntnisinteresse – das am Verstehen anderer 
Menschen” (original emphasis, 1994a: 27); an interest in understanding that ultimately spurs inquiry in the 
humanities and, to different degrees, in the social sciences (op.cit.: 31). Habermas outlines a similar scheme 
(although he connects the social sciences with a particular (third) interest in emancipation). Acting upon 
anthropological or transcendental knowledge interests in the social world, where the circumstances of justice 
apply, is, however, to act under conditions where acting has value-implications. 
80 Haack does consider “pressure to solve problems which are perceived as socially urgent, rather than freedom 
to pursue those most susceptible of solution in the present state of knowledge” a “potential hindrance” to the 
conducting of “good, honest, thorough, scrupulous inquiry” (op.cit.: 98). This is, however, a warning against 
inquiry led by short-term interests (and in any field of inquiry, not only in the natural sciences). This is not a 
warning against interested funding as such. Haack is critical of funders that encourage unmeritocratic 
recruitment practices, preposterism, value-laden justification of theories and inquiry primarily led by short-term 
interests. Her criticism adds up to a prescription for “virtuous” funding; funding encouraging intellectual 
integrity among inquirers (1998: 15). 
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scientists, citizens and funders are included. Haack acknowledges that principles of 
representation, deliberation and recruitment are “ethical and political” (ibid.). Her 
acknowledgment is, however, not followed up by reflections on the interconnections between 
such principles, funding-priorities and application.81 
 
Consequently, in the circumstances of justice of the human condition, considerations on 
theories’ significance are value-laden considerations, even in the more theoretical natural 
sciences. Haack’s exceptionalist account of certain kinds of natural-scientific inquiry as 
value-free, reproduces a “myth of purity” (Kitcher 2001: 91).82  
 
2.3 Assessing the third premise83 
  
2.3.1 Supported by evidence. What does it mean in the human and social 
sciences? 
 
Haack claims that the human and social sciences bear more directly on politically contested 
issues than do the natural sciences, that there is – because of this – more fake and sham 
reasoning in the human and social sciences (ibid.), as well as more theorizing “infected” by 
sexism (op.cit.: 98, 117), are imprecise and misleading. There is, however, a philosophically 
relevant difference between the natural sciences and the human and social sciences, i.e. a 
difference more profound than the fact that studies of the natural world and studies of human 
beings and society are very often, obviously, studies of different empirical objects.84 This 
                                                 
81 See 2.4.5. 
82 Whether all inquirers are aware of the value-laden basis of their investigations, is a different question. 
However, as Kitcher points out, “the absence of any pratical intent is [not] enough to isolate a branch of inquiry 
from moral, social, or political critique” (2001: 91). It is questionable, however, whether it is a good idea to state, 
for example, that one “work[s] on quantum physics […] from a feminist point of view” (Haack 1998: 116). This 
statement is easily associated with indefensible politicized pseudo-investigations. This and similar statements 
from feminists may, however, simply be a way of saying, for example, that one is faithful to virtues of 
heterogeneity and complexity or similar virtues that are functional for feminist values, or that one considers it 
significant to assess the values and interests of funders of quantum physics, the priorities made when knowledge 
from research in quantum physics is applied, the norms of deliberation within and the recruitment to the research 
community of quantum physicists, from the perspective of gender justice.  
83 A theory is most probably true if it can be demonstrated that it is best supported by independently secure and 
comprehensive evidence. 
84 Only very often, and not always, because disciplines considered to belong to the natural sciences, such as 
medicine and biology, also have human beings and society as their object of study, and contemporary social 
science is concerned, for example, with studies of human interaction with nature. My intention here is, however, 
not to discuss subtly where the border between the natural sciences and the human and social sciences should be 
drawn in the institutional context of modern science, but rather to say something of general relevance when our 
concern is “the study of [wo/]man” (Skjervheim 1959). 
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profound difference between studying nature and studying human beings is lost, however, in 
Haack’s elaboration of the third premise in her argument for value-freedom. 
 
To demonstrate that a theory is supported by independently secure and comprehensive 
evidence requires something different in the human and social sciences than in the natural 
sciences. If we should not talk about this difference in terms of degree of “politicization” 
(op.cit.: 119), how, then, should we talk about it? What is the basic distinction between 
making nature the object of science and “the study of [wo/]man” (Skjervheim 1959)? As 
noted by Karl-Otto Apel, the distinction has something to do with the fact that human beings 
can contest (or subscribe to) the inquirer’s interpretations and explanations of their behavior: 
 
[…] die unvollständige Objektivation, die die Möglichkeit des Sprechens über Dritte 
begründet, […] konstituiert sozusagen ein Subjekt-Objekt, d.h. ein Objekt der Erkenntnis […] 
das zugleich ein Ko-Subjekt […] bleibt […] – ein Ko-Subjekt, das möglicherweise in die 
Diskurs- und Forschergemeinschaft eintreten könnte (original emphasis, 1994a: 33) 
 
In the human and social sciences the object the inquirer wants to know something about is a 
fellow subject; a subject-object, who is capable of questioning the inquirer’s interpretation 
and explanation of her behavior85 on the basis of what she considers to be the real reasons for 
her actions; her “Interessen, Zielsetzungen und Überzeugungen” or “Handlungsgründe” 
(op.cit.: 37).86  
 
Moreover, the subject-object’s own reasons, are not something the inquirer can simply decide 
to disregard:87 If we have no idea of, or do not care about, the subject-object’s reasons for 
behaving as she does, our interpretations of her behavior will be inadequate, because we will 
not be able to understand them properly. This is not to say that the reasons given by the 
                                                 
85 Even if she does not in fact question the inquirer’s interpretation or explanation of her behavior. There are 
several reasons why a subject-object does not contest the inquirer’s claims. She might, after having deliberated 
upon them (by herself or with others), agree with the inquirer. On other occasions, she might not even consider 
questioning them, because the inquirer’s interpretations and explanations are in accordance with the tacit 
knowledge of their shared lifeworld: They are in “the communication-domain in which […] [they] tacitly 
presuppose and recognize the validity-claims implicit in utterances” (Habermas 1984: 140). In addition, the 
subject-object might not be able to question the inquirer’s claims because she lacks the cultural or social 
resources necessary to participate in discourse, because existing norms disallow it (for example because the 
authority of the inquirer is considered unquestionable), because communication between subject-object and the 
inquirer has not been institutionalized properly, or because she has a “weak will” (Elster 1989: 36-37, 45-48). 
86 In cases where it is difficult or impossible for the subject-object to actually participate “in die Diskurs- und 
Forschergemeinschaft” (Apel 1994a: 33), for example because she is dead, the inquirer has to approach her “als 
virtuelle Kommunikationspartner […], mit denen er sich – der regulativen Idee nach – über ihre Beweggründe 
verständigen könnte” (op.cit.: 37). 
87 Adequate interpretations of texts are also interpretations that take seriously “[die] Interessen, Zielsetzungen 
und Überzeugungen” of the subject-object (in this case, the author). 
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subject-object add up to an adequate interpretation of her behavior.88 They also do not 
necessarily explain her behavior.89 In any area of inquiry, however, explanandum is always 
also interpretandum; the subject’s relation to the object (“die Subjekt-Objekt-Relation der 
Erkenntnis”) presupposes intersubjective understanding (“die Subjekt-Ko-Subjekt-Relation 
kommunikativer Verständigung”) (op.cit.: 26):  
 
Weil jede Art objektiver Erkenntnis notwendig stets die Struktur zeichenvermittelter 
Erkenntnis von etwas als etwas hat, d.h. eines propositionalen Sachverhalts, muss die Subjekt-
Objekt-Relation der Erkenntnis immer von der Subjekt-Ko-Subjekt-Relation kommunikativer 
Verständigung ergänzt sein […]. Denn in dieser letzeren Dimension von Kommunikation 
muss der Sprachgebrauch […] festgelegt werden, und in derselben Dimension muss 
schliesslich auf dem Wege des argumentativen Diskurses Konsens (oder Dissens) über 
Wahrheitsansprüche90 erreicht werden (original emphasis, ibid.). 
 
We have to interpret, before we can explain. If our explanandum is human action we have, 
first, to make it our interpretandum; we have to ask what the action means, we have to try to 
understand it. Understanding implies here both “Verstehen der Bedeutung” (i.e. also the 
meaning (Bedeutung) of the reasons for action given by the actor) and “Erreichen einer 
Einigung über Geltungsanspruche” (i.e. also on the validity-claims (Geltungsanspruche) 
raised by the actor) (op.cit.: 18).91 Both are intersubjective endeavors. Understanding is 
established among fellow subjects, not privately.  
 
Natural scientists, who try to reach an intersubjective understanding of the behavior of non-
human beings, need to treat each other as fellow subjects. For human and social scientists 
matters are more complex. When the interpretandum is human action, there are one or more 
additional fellow subjects to consider; the one or those acting. If the accounts of these subject-
objects are excluded from the interpretative agreement on what is going on, the agreement 
will be biased: Not all relevant fellow subjects have been included in its establishment, and 
the interpretation will be inadequate.92  
                                                 
88 Just as the intentions of the author do not add up to an adequate interpretation of her text. 
89 For example, could explanans be “(die) nicht intendierten (sogenannten heterogenen) Handlungsfolgen” 
(original emphasis, Apel 1994a: 36).  
90 And other types of validity-claims. 
91 That is: If the inquirer disagrees with the subject-object they may understand one another (in terms of 
Verstehen), but they do not come to an understanding (in terms of Verständigung). The inquirer can, of course, 
disagree with the subject-object. Apel’s point is that inquirers, trying to understand the actions of subject-objects 
(in terms of Verständigung), must approach subject-objects’ reason-giving from a first person perspective; the 
inquirer must position herself as an ‘I’ agreeing or disagreeing. See also 2.3.2 and Chapter 7. 
92 But could we not recognize that the objects of the human and social sciences are subject-objects without 
granting them the status of relevant fellow subjects in the process of reaching an intersubjective understanding? 
Apel argues that we cannot: We should treat our fellow human beings, including those we make our object of 
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What about if our explanandum is not human action, but rather social structures; “(die) nicht 
intendendierten (sogenannten heterogenen) Handlungsfolgen” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 
36)? Some argue that explanations of structural reproduction or change in social life do not 
necessarily have to include references to action and reasons for action.93 Others believe 
positions of this sort make “an unhappy marriage of hermeneutics and functionalism”, and 
maintain that structural reproduction and change in social life have a micro-foundation on the 
level of human action that must be included in our explanations: “Systems models” require “a 
theory of individual and collective action” (Joas 1996: 217, 222).94 If the latter is correct, then 
studies of social structures are also studies that confront the inquirer with subject-objects that 
must be consulted as fellow subjects, i.e. if they are not consulted as fellow subjects, the 
inquirers will not be able to assess adequately whether a theory (about social structures) is 
supported by independently secure and comprehensive evidence or not.  
 
Either way, Haack is wrong in presuming, simply, that the “objects of sociological theories” 
are similar to the objects of the natural sciences in all relevant aspects (1998: 113). It is 
precisely because fundamentally different objects are involved; because of the particular 
subject-objects investigators of human action (and perhaps of social structures) are confronted 
with, studies of the natural world needs to be distinguished from studies of the human and 
social world. 
 
 
2.3.2 Apel reads Peirce:95 A realist discourse theory of truth 
 
Even in areas of study where we cannot possibly treat our objects of study as fellow subjects, 
we will, however, still have to enter the hermeneutical circle, Apel maintains: “[…] die 
                                                                                                                                                        
study, as fellow subjects with their own reasons for action, because if we do not, we will commit a performative 
self-contradiction. I discuss Apel’s argument in 2.3.3 and in Chapter 7. 
93 This is Apel’s position: “Die quasi-nomologische Sozialwissenschaft” can do without a hermeneutical 
dimension, and should, generally, be considered, together with the natural sciences, as being led by “das 
Erkenntnisinteresse an Welt-Objektivierung” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 25, 37). 
94 Joas uses the terms functionalism and systems models because his argument is framed to target Habermas’ 
attempt “to provide a synthesis between his [Habermas’] ideas, based on hermeneutics and action theory, with 
Luhmann’s functionalism” and “systems theory” specifically (1996: 219). Another possibility is, obviously, to 
defend non-functionalist causal explanations of structural reproduction and change, which do not refer to human 
actions and reasons for acting.  
95 Consider Peirce 1972, 1990. 
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Subjekt-Objekt-Relation der Erkenntnis [muss] immer von der Subjekt-Ko-Subjekt-Relation 
kommunikativer Verständigung ergänzt sein” (original emphasis, 1994a: 26). Even in the case 
of the natural sciences, the relevant fellow subjects have to understand one another in the 
double sense suggested: “Verständigung über etwas” requires “Verstehen der Bedeutung” 
(understanding what is meant) and “Erreichen einer Einigung über Geltungsanspruche” 
(reaching agreement on the validity-claims involved) (1994a: 18, 1994b: 199).  
 
The requirements of understanding, however, are not necessarily dealt with explicitly in 
actual ongoing dialogue. Understanding among fellow subjects, within scientific communities 
as well as within other communities, is very often an implicit achievement. As summarized by 
Jürgen Habermas, communication proceeds “undisturbed” if 
 
[…] the speaking/acting subjects a) make intelligible the pragmatic meaning of the 
interpersonal relation (which can be expressed in the form of a performative sentence) as well 
as the meaning of the propositional content of their utterance, b) recognize the truth of the 
statement made with the speech-act, c) recognize the rightness of the rule of which the 
performed speech-act may count as the fulfillment, d) do not bring the truthfulness of the 
parties to the communication into doubt (my emphasis, 1984: 145).96 
  
In these cases, there is what Habermas refers to as a “background consensus” based on 
“reciprocal recognition” of the involved validity-claims (ibid.). “Questions of truth”, as well 
as questions of intelligibility, rightness and truthfulness, arise only when the background 
consensus is disturbed,97 i.e. “if the validity-claims naively imputed in contexts of action 
become problematic” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 143). Thus, if A and B misunderstand each other 
(in terms of “Verstehen”) in the course of action, A might start asking B questions about 
                                                 
96 Habermas refers in this connection to “the four validity-claims”: Also “Verstehen der Bedeutung” 
(understanding what is meant), in Apel’s sense, implies “reciprocal recognition of validity-claims” (Habermas 
1984: 145). This is consistent with Apel’s elaboration of  “Verstehen” elsewhere: “Unter den diskursrelevanten 
Geltungsansprüchen verstehe ich – mit Jürgen Habermas – genau vier Ansprüche, nämlich: erstens, den 
Anspruch auf intersubjektiv gültigen Sinn […], zweitens, den Wahrheitsanspruch […], drittens, den 
Aufrichtigkeit – oder Wahrhaftigkeitsanspruch […], viertens, den normativen und inbesondere moralisch 
relevanten Richtigkeitsanspruch (original emphasis, 1994a: 23). Hence, like Habermas, Apel considers 
“Verstehen der Bedeutung” to be about “Erreichen einer Einigung über Geltungsansprüche”, even if on other 
occasions he conceptualizes “Verstehen” as a preparatory first step where no validity-claims are raised (op.cit.: 
18). Habermas, however, is also ambivalent on this point. He says in another passage: “If the linguistic rules 
used by one partner are so unclear to the other that the latter does not understand the sentence uttered, both can 
attempt to effect an agreement about the language they mutually intend to employ. To this extent intelligibility 
could be considered a discursive validity claim. But the difference is unmistakable. Truth-claims and rightness-
claims function in everyday speech and interaction as claims that are accepted with an eye to the possibility that, 
if need be, they can be discursively made good. Intelligibility on the contrary, as long as a communication in 
general proceeds undisturbed, presents a claim that has already factually been made good; it is not merely a 
promise. Therefore I prefer to count intelligibility among the conditions of communication and not among the 
validity-claims raised within communication” (1984: 146). 
97 For example when claims taken for granted are made into topic of scientific discourse. 
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intelligibility: “How do you mean that? How should I understand that? What does that 
mean?” (op.cit.: 145). If A in the course of action notices that B holds something to be true 
that is inconsistent with what A holds to be true, A might start asking questions about truth: 
“Is it really the way you say it is? Why is it that way and not otherwise?” (op.cit.: 146). If 
interaction makes visible that A and B have conflicting normative commitments, A might 
start articulating questions about rightness: “Why did you do that? Why did you not behave 
differently?” (ibid.). And finally, A might call into doubt the truthfulness of B: “Is he 
deceiving me? Is he deceiving himself about himself?” (ibid.).98 Such questions about 
validity-claims – and their answers – are what constitute discourse.  
 
Apel defends, as Habermas, a discourse theory of truth: Truth-seekers investigating state of 
affairs, disturb the background consensus and make truth-claims the object of discourse. Like 
Haack, Apel elaborates his notion of truth on the basis of Peirce’s theory of truth. Like 
Peirce’s theory of truth, Apel’s discourse theory is not an anti-realist consensus theory of 
truth, that disconnects the notion of truth from a notion of reality. “Die Subjekt-Objekt-
Relation der Erkenntnis [muss] immer von der Subjekt-Ko-Subjekt-Relation kommunikativer 
Verständigung ergänzt sein” (Apel 1994a: 26). The relation between fellow subjects 
(“Subjekt-Ko-Subjekt-Relation”) does not, however, replace the subject’s relation to the 
object (“Subjekt-Objekt-Relation”). Understanding is about something (“über etwas”). Apel’s 
prescription is, rather, to integrate:  
 
[…] perceptual criteria relating to the evidence of correspondence of our thought with […] 
facts […] [and] coherence criteria of logical inference into a grounded consensus through 
discursive arguments in the interpretation-community of scientists (my emphasis, 1994b: 
196).99  
 
                                                 
98 Habermas considers questions of truthfulness, however, to be of a different sort than questions of truth and 
rightness: They are “questions we do not address to the untrustworthy person himself, but rather to a third party. 
The speaker suspected of untruthfulness can, if need be, be examined, for example, in a judicial process, or in 
(psycho-) analytical conversations” (1984: 146). Also, truthfulness is a non-discursive validity claim: “Claims to 
truthfulness can be settled only in contexts of action. Neither hearings nor analytical conversations between 
psychotherapist and patient may count as discourses in the sense of the cooperative quest for truth. Whether 
someone truthfully expresses his intentions or in his manifest utterances only feigns the imputed intentions, must 
show up in his actions if only we continue interacting with him long enough” (ibid.).    
99 In the case of the human and social sciences, where the objects of study are, typically, subject-objects, the 
relevant fellow subjects are, however, not only the scientists. Also, even when we talk about the natural sciences, 
the equation between interpretation-community and the community of scientists is too simple. Citizens should, 
for example, be included in reasonable ways in the interpretation-community of the natural sciences (see 2.4.5). 
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“The meaning of truth” is “discursive agreement” on the outcome of inquiry faithful to 
perceptual criteria and coherence criteria in “an indefinite community of sign-interpretation” 
(op.cit.: 182-183).  
 
This indefinite community of sign-interpretation is thought of as an “ideal communication 
community”, that any real interpretation-community of scientists can only approach. Thus, the 
Peircian elaboration of “the meaning of truth” is to be understood as a “regulative idea” 
(original emphasis, Apel 2001: 2, 7). This implies that any actual intersubjective assessment, 
however thorough, considering a validity-claim to be true, is revisable in principle. Even our 
best knowledge; the outcome of discourse under close-to-ideal conditions, is fallible.  
 
Furthermore, this approach to the meaning of truth should be understood as a critique of 
Kant’s notion of things-in-themselves: “Peirce […] established the internal connection 
between truth related to reality and normatively demanded acceptability”: “the real is 
independent […] from each piece of factual knowledge”, but not “from each possible piece of 
knowledge”; the knowable (original emphasis, op.cit.: 4-5). 
 
2.3.3 Comparing Apel and Haack – elaboration, discussion and critique 
 
i) Common features 
Apel’s Peirce-inspired approach to truth resembles Haack’s Peirce-inspired “epistemological 
reconstruction”.100 Their outlines of the gradual and fallible character of any actual 
justification of truth-claims are similar. They share a certain critique of Karl Popper: Both 
regard epistemology as in need of a knowing subject – or, rather, of knowing subjects. In this 
sense, they both emphasize the social character of genuine inquiry; inquiry goes on in a 
community of inquirers. Their descriptions of the ideal epistemic community that our real 
investigations can only approach are similar. Haack’s foundherentism; her outline of the 
interplay of causal and evaluative aspects in justification, resemble Apel’s idea of an interplay 
of perceptual criteria and coherence criteria of warrant. Her critique of the Kantian notion of 
things-in-themselves resembles his. Both do not regard the notion of truth to be redundant in 
                                                 
100 The subtitle of Evidence and Inquiry is: Toward Reconstruction in Epistemology. Apel and Haack do not refer 
to one another as far as I am aware. 
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epistemology. And, finally, Apel’s critique of Rorty’s instrumentalist approach to 
argumentation,101 resembles Haack’s defense of non-cynical inquiry. 
 
ii) Epistemology with or without moral philosophy? 
 
Despite common features, there are, however, differences between Haack and Apel. For 
example, are Haack’s exclusive concerns about how to assess theories, meaning sets of truth-
claims, and how to refute epistemic and ontological relativism.102 Apel’s concerns are also 
about how to assess rightness-claims, and how to refute moral relativism – and how to 
highlight the relevance of these concerns for philosophy of science (1990: 48-91).  
 
If significant theories in fact consisted only of truth-claims, Haack’s exclusive focus on 
questions of truth, might be considered reasonable. However, significant theories confront the 
inquirer also with ought-questions. This, if nothing else, makes Haack’s narrow focus 
insufficient. In contrast to what Haack claims, an adequate reconstruction in epistemology 
requires in fact that one “venture[s] […] into ethical theory” (1998: 167). Sticking to “logic, 
epistemology, philosophy of science”, as these fields are traditionally defined, will not do 
(ibid.).  
 
Even philosophers of science who defend ideas of value-freedom in justification similar to 
Haack’s, argue that philosophers of science should venture into ethical theory.103 That is: 
Even if theoretical justification could have been kept free from values, the intervening of 
values in the context of discovery and in the context of practical application, is a reason for 
philosophers of science, whatever their view on value-freedom in justification, to take an 
interest in the discussions of moral and political philosophy.   
 
Moreover, to institutionalize genuine inquiry is a value- and interest-laden endeavor. This is 
yet another reason for philosophers of science to take an interest in the discussions of moral 
                                                 
101 Apel’s argument (that on this point is similar to that of Albrect Wellmer) is elaborated in detail in Chapter 7. 
102 See 1.2.3. 
103 Philip Kitcher argues for value-freedom in theoretical justification: “[…] there is no basis for believing that 
value judgments inevitably enter into our appraisal of which of a set of rival hypotheses (if any) is approximately 
correct” (Kitcher 2001: 41). He argues, at the same time, for a partnership between philosophy of science and 
democratic theory. Philosophy of science needs to reflect on “the value of science”, on the relationship between 
“science and values”, and on “the role that the sciences should play in a democratic society” (op.cit.: xi-xii). He 
connects his own prescriptions for scientific inquiry to Rawls’ notion of  a well-ordered society (op.cit.: 117-
136). 
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and political philosophy. 104 Haack’s position, that we ought to make inquiries because they 
are valuable from an evolutionary point of view, is inadequate, because she does not make 
any effort to support her position with evidence, but, most importantly, because this is to 
naturalize a value question: She suggests that the question of the survival of the human 
species can be removed from the domain of values, because the answer is given by evolution 
(Haack 1998: 13-14). Haack indeed stresses that truth-seeking is not only instrumentally 
valuable; it is also a moral virtue. The relationship between her (primary) evolutionary 
argument and her idea of truth-seeking as moral is, however, unclear. 
 
It is difficult to argue that truth-seeking is in everyone’s interest, compatible with all 
conceptions of the good or “schemes of values” (Kitcher 2001: 152). There would be 
occasions where not all would prefer to know the truth.105 Knowledge is not always 
“beneficial” for all (op.cit.: 147): “Having correct beliefs surely has something to do with the 
flourishing of a person’s life, but so too does feeling unhappy” (op.cit.: 154). And citizens 
with certain schemes of values may be happier “trapped by illusions” (ibid.).106 What may be 
argued, however, is that we owe each other the truth from a moral point of view. This would 
be Apel’s argument: If we claim that something is, we “promise”107 that we can justify it as 
true, or we disrespect our communicative partners.108 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 See 2.2.2. Kitcher puts it like this: “[…] we cannot set the value of apprehending significant truths on some 
higher plane, so that inquiry must inevitably take precedence over everyday concerns. […] applications of the 
thesis that knowledge is good for us are problematic […] because the impact of new knowledge on different 
groups of people may be radically different” (2001: 148). 
105 Kitcher asks those “who urge breezy dismissals of complaints about science” to imagine “that we gather 
overwhelming evidence” for the following examples, and “to reflect on the impact on our lives”: “There are 
genetic differences among groups that have traditionally been distinguished from one another, differences that 
fix limits to the ability of some people who have been targets of discrimination and that fix properties of 
temperament in those who have been dominant; there are no possible ways of compensating for these differences 
[i]. Apparent human propensities to love and care for others are actually based upon manipulative strategies that 
are typically unconscious, and this is true of the most ‘concerned’ and ‘altruistic’ as well as those who are 
obviously exploitative [ii]. Stable human relationships are only possible in situations where people believe 
elaborate myths about themselves and their place in nature (iii). Human choices, decisions, and actions are 
simple functions of physiological factors, many of them thoroughly banal and directly responsive to external 
causes (diet, regimes of exercise, and so forth [iv]” (2001: 151-152). 
106 Hilary Putnam is too unconditional when he considers “the ideal of rational acceptability” as “part of our idea 
of human cognitive flourishing, and hence part of our idea of total human flourishing, of Eudaemonia,” although 
many probably would subscribe to such a view of “flourishing” (1987: 134). 
107 Consider Dietrich Böhler’s (2003a) explication of Apel’s position (and the “Dialogversprechen”). I will 
return to this point shortly, and in Chapter 7. 
108 Whether inquiry should be institutionalized in a public institution; whether, for example, there should be a 
scientific institution, is a different question, and the concern of citizens to deliberate upon and decide. 
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iii) Redescriptions and validity-claims 
 
Like Haack, Apel dismisses Rorty’s instrumentalist outline of justification: Rorty’s 
explication of argumentation not as discourse, but as redescriptions which are more or less 
persuasive depending on the audience. As noted by Albrecht Wellmer, Rorty’s 
“instrumentalist view of arguments is parasitic on a normative, first person perspective of a 
committed participant in the game of giving and asking for reasons” (2001: 6).109  
 
Wellmer thinks, however, that Rorty’s idea of redescription captures something essential that 
is excluded from Habermas’ and Apel’s outline of argumentation as discourse on validity-
claims. The idea of redescription “broaden[s] […] this [their normative] perspective [on 
arguments]” (my emphasis, ibid.). Rorty contrasts two ways of arguing, the traditional 
inferential way of arguing, and the dialectical way of arguing. In dialectical arguments there is 
a “partial substitution of redescription for inference”, and vocabularies, not propositions,110 
are taken to be the “units of persuasion” (op.cit.: 15). Dialectical arguments are what matters, 
Rorty insists:  
 
[…] revolutionary achievements in the arts, in the sciences, and in moral and political thought 
typically occur when somebody realizes that two or more of our vocabularies are interfering 
with each other, and proceeds to invent a new vocabulary to replace both (quoted in ibid.).  
 
Wellmer disagrees: “I think that, indeed, every interesting form of argument (perhaps outside 
formalized disciplines) will have to be characterized by a partial substitution of redescription 
for inference” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 16). What Wellmer disagrees with, is the way Rorty 
sharply distinguishes between inferential and dialectical arguments: 
 
New vocabularies are useful if they lead to a better web of beliefs, better practical 
orientations, a better self-understanding; and what better (more useful) here means, cannot be 
spelled out without reference to truth and justification in their ordinary sense. Conversely, our 
truth-oriented practices (practices of justification) cannot be fully understood, if we are not 
                                                 
109 Wellmer’s, Apel’s and Habermas’ common critique of Rorty is further elaborated in Chapter 7. In this section 
I will highlight a point where Wellmer and Apel disagree. 
110 In pragmatist philosophy the basic unit of what Rorty refers to as inferential arguments is given different 
names. They are referred to, for example, as propositions, utterances, statements or speech acts (on the notion of 
speech act, se Cooke 1994: 131-132 and Habermas 1984: 138-139). In my discussion, I do not distinguish 
between these notions. What is important to note for the present purposes, is that epistemological problems need 
to be discussed with reference to knowing subjects; someone is proposing (uttering, making a statement or 
speech-acting). This implies that we talk about “natural language”: “the actual use” of language, not “formalized 
semantical systems” (Apel 1994b: 176). 
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aware that ordinary questions of truth (related to the inferential from of argument) may at any 
given point of discourse give rise to a dialectical form of argument where not only single 
propositions but the language and its inferential network, that is the vocabulary and ways of 
speaking become the object of debate (op.cit.: 17). 
 
This “converse” point is not adequately considered by Haack (ibid.). She acknowledges that 
“cognitive advance” is “often a matter of conceptual innovations marked by a new 
vocabulary”, but insists that these “innovations”, in the end, can be reduced to propositions 
that are more or less true (Haack 1998: 161).  
 
The fundamental inadequacy of her approach is, however, that the assessment of conceptual 
innovation is reduced to a question of assessing truth-claims, not that “the units of persuasion” 
referred to are only propositions and not also vocabularies (Wellmer 2001: 17). Wellmer 
criticizes Habermas and Apel for making “single propositions […] the object of debate”, and 
not also “the vocabulary and ways of speaking” (ibid.). Gunnar Skirbekk articulates a similar 
critique: Habermas’ and Apel’s elaboration of validity-claims fails to take the problem of 
“conceptual adequacy” properly into account, i.e. the problem of which vocabulary “gives a 
more adequate picture of the situation” (Skirbekk 2001: 10). The proper units of persuasion 
are, however, validity-claims; claims one can agree/disagree with on when the “background 
consensus” of the “course of action” is “disturbed”, for example when a “consensus” on 
something is made the topic of scientific investigation (Habermas 1984: 145). A single 
proposition might contain more than one validity-claim. Consider someone uttering that ‘there 
is slavery in Norway today’. One might ask whether this is true. One might ask what slavery 
means here; raise a question of intelligibility. And one might ask why, more precisely, slavery 
is considered a moral problem. Skirbekk and Wellmer ask us, in addition, to consider “the 
vocabulary and ways of speaking” when someone presents a “picture” of a “situation”, i.e. 
when we are dealing with a sequence of speech acts, a richer elaboration in certain “ways”, 
and the “object of debate” is not simply a single proposition (Wellmer 2001: 17, Skirbekk 
2001: 10). However, in such cases, the objects of debate are also validity-claims. There are no 
deep differences between assessing a proposition about slavery, and assessing a richer 
description of slavery. Confronted with a description of this sort, we could ask what the 
interrelated concepts and distinctions of the description; the vocabulary or way of speaking 
about slavery, mean (i.e. “Verstehen der Bedeutung”): We could ask a question of 
intelligibility. Or we might ask whether and how such a way of talking about slavery could be 
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justified morally. Thus, a vocabulary’s adequacy can be properly dealt with in a discourse on 
validity-claims. 
 
Just as assessing propositions, assessing vocabularies might involve participation in more than 
one discourse. Wellmer points out how:  
 
[…] argumentation may in many ways be intertwined with political struggle or a struggle for 
recognition in such a way, that arguments may win (or are imagined to possibly win) 
acceptance only after some process of re-education (as Rorty likes to say) – of male 
chauvinists, Neo-Nazis, Newtonian physicists, dead philosophers, Mullahs or foundationalists 
– has taken, or is imagined to have taken place (2001: 19).   
 
Consider Haack’s description of the (lack of) sexism in present-day academia (1998: 166-
172). This description could be questioned from the perspective of truth. Another response 
would be to question the vocabulary. As highlighted by Rorty (1998a), the term sexism was 
until recently not a term that could be considered more or less true or false, because this and 
interrelated terms feminists have introduced, did not make sense111 until a certain point in 
human history. The users of a feminist vocabulary, and those asking them what the 
vocabulary meant, i.e. questions of intelligibility, did not understand one another. The point in 
human history, when the feminist vocabulary was no longer rejected as absurd, “unnatural” or 
“irrational” (Rorty 1998a: 212); when feminists where understood as intelligible, was the 
outcome of re-educative112 feminist “political struggle[s]” or “struggle[s] for recognition” 
(Wellmer 2001: 19). To reject this vocabulary after this point in history, could mean, for 
example, that one questions the values of these struggles. To use it, as Haack does, is to 
accept, implicitly, these struggles’ values. Hence, Haack cannot justify her description of (the 
lack of ) sexism in present-day academia without referring to feminist values.113 
 
iv) Tacit knowledge 
 
The not-possible clause 
A different question is whether all dimensions of feminist practices, scientific practices or 
other practices can be articulated in language and made available for discourse at all: Can all 
                                                 
111 “Most oppressors have had the wit to teach the oppressed a language in which the oppressed will sound crazy 
– even to themselves – if they describe themselves as oppressed” (original emphasis, Rorty 1998: 203). 
112 “Arguments may win acceptance after some process of re-education of male chauvinists” (Wellmer 2001: 
19).  
113 See also 2.2.2 and the discussion of value-laden concepts and distinctions in factual propositions. 
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dimensions of human practices be deliberated upon in argumentation?114 Skirbekk (2001) 
notes that participation in several practices presupposes tacit knowledge. Kjell S. Johannessen 
gives the requirement of tacit knowledge a logical status: “Tacit knowledge is knowledge 
which, for logical reasons, cannot be adequately articulated” (1997: 208): “The adequate use 
of pieces of language, and the appropriate response to it, requires a situational understanding 
and a judgmental power which by far transcends what can be derived from the meaning 
immanent in the sentence alone” (op.cit.: 214).115 Why is tacit knowledge a precondition, 
even a logical precondition, for propositional knowledge?  
 
Johannessen, Haack and Apel’s objects of analysis are the propositions of “natural language”; 
the actual situations of language use (Apel 1994b: 176). Questions of validity are asked 
language-users in actual situations of language-use. Someone might ask Haack, for example, 
what foundherentism means (i.e. ask her a question of intelligibility). Haack’s answer would 
probably be a more or less elaborated definition of foundherentism. A brief one might be: 
Foundherentism is a set of criteria for theoretical justification emphasizing that justified 
theories are those supported by independently secure and comprehensive evidence. If Haack 
was asked to advance her definition, she might, referring to Evidence and Inquiry, provide a 
more detailed set of rules for foundherentist inquiry. It is not possible, however, to articulate 
fully how these rules should be applied in specific cases;116 there is a logical “not possible-
clause” attached to this endeavor (Johannessen 1997: 208): 
 
The idea is simple, but indeed basic. […] a definition or the expression of a rule cannot itself 
determine how it is to be applied, as it can be interpreted in various ways. From this it follows 
                                                 
114 Haack seems herself to doubt this (see 2.2.1). 
115 Tacit knowledge can be conceptualized as a burden of judgment: It is a source of disagreement between 
reasonable persons (see 2.2.2). 
116 For pragmatists, it is essential to address this problem connected with practical application. Pragmatists do not 
deny that it is possible to stick to the rules; to the “formalized semantic systems” (Apel 1994b: 176). But at a 
devastating cost: Disregarding the application of rules in actual use-situations, “holds no promise whatsoever 
when it is a question of understanding the nature of natural languages and how they are related to reality” 
(Johannessen 1997: 211). Accordingly, the logical contradiction of reducing rule-application to rule-following is 
a logical contradiction on the pragmatic level of language performance. But is it also a performative self-
contradiction in Apel’s sense (see Chapter 7)? Not all logical contradictions on the level of performance are 
performative self-contradictions. You could say during a conversation that there is sexism at your place of work, 
and that there is not sexism at your place of work, and you would contradict yourself, but the contradiction is 
between two truth-claims you raise, not “zwischen dem Inhalt einer Proposition und dem selbstbezüglichen – 
impliziten oder performativ expliziten – intentionalen Inhalt des Aktes des Vorbringens der Proposition im 
Rahmen eines argumentativen Diskurses” (original emphasis, Apel 1996: 22). The claim ‘I apply rules by 
following other rules’ is not clear-cut. The contradiction involved seems to be one between the content of a 
proposition (“zwischen dem Inhalt einer Proposition”) on the one hand, and practical application in lifeworld 
contexts on the other (not between the content of a proposition and the constitutive basis of argumentative 
discourse). Hence, it seems to be a performative self-contradiction, but not in Apel’s sense. This highlights that 
there are different kinds of “arguments from absurdity” (Skirbekk 1992a).   
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that there can be no point in formulating a new rule that lays down how the first is to be 
applied. For then the same problem will arise once more in connection with the expression of 
the new rule. It, again, can be taken or understood in various ways. And this will go on ad 
infinitum if we try to escape from the tangle by this route. […] At one stage there thus have to 
be cases of rule-application which are not determined by other rules (op.cit.: 223). 
 
How, then, do we go about when applying rules, when adequate rule-application necessarily 
requires more than rule-following? We have to rely to a certain extent on the situational 
“intransitive understanding” and our tacit “judgmental power” (op.cit.: 211). Tacit knowledge 
can be cultivated, for example, through practical experience (with other similar, but never 
identical cases), and through the study of paradigmatic117 examples. The “discretionary 
component” in our knowledge which we are talking about here, can, however, not be 
scrutinized in discourse (Johannessen 1997: 208). In contrast to what, for example, Apel 
seems to presuppose in his approach to the relationship between lifeworld and discourse,118 
there is an irreducible tacit dimension to lifeworld “contexts of action” (Habermas 1984: 143); 
a part of our “background” knowledge is not available for scrutiny in discourse (ibid.: 145). 
 
What are the implications of Johannessen’s not-possible clause? And in particular, what are 
the implications of this clause for the assessment of Haack’s argument for value-freedom? 
Johannessen’s clause does not imply that our situational judgment stands only on inevitably 
tacit ground. There is a part of “the discretionary component” in our knowledge which is 
inevitably tacit (Johannessen 1997: 208), but also a part which can be articulated and 
deliberated upon in discourse: How we apply a rule cannot be decisively determined by 
expressing other rules, but application of a rule may be regulated more precisely by 
introducing other, more precise rules.119 Moreover, tacit knowledge is not beyond assessment, 
even if it cannot be assessed in discourse. As suggested, there are non-discursive ways of 
improving it. Also, the practical effects of tacit knowledge can be assessed in discourse. Thus, 
the relationship between what can be done before rule-application, and what can be done after 
                                                 
117 Johannessen includes Thomas Kuhn among the predecessors of his tacit knowledge-perspective (together 
with, among others, Aristotle and Wittgenstein). The tacit dimension of scientific practice has been a central 
topic of elaboration also in recent contributions. Although many of these contributions should be considered, 
primarily, descriptive accounts of science-in-practice, they also seem to contain more or less implicit 
prescriptions: The idea of good science is connected to a notion of adequate use of tacit knowledge (Molander 
1993, Nydal 2002).  
118 Dietrich Böhler sums up Apel’s approach to the relationship between discourse and practice as follows: 
“Keine Praxis ohne möglichen, für ihren Sinn und ihr Geltenkönnen konstitutiven, Begleitsdiskurs. Bei diesem 
Schonvermitteltsein von Diskurs und Handlung, [...] setzt die Transzendentalpragmatik an” (2003a: 8). That 
there might be a dimension to practice that is not available for discourse is not considered.  
119 This important point is nearly lost in Johannesen’s outline of discretion.  
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is asymmetrical. Afterwards, the validity of our tacit knowledge can be assessed discursively, 
through the assessment of its practical effects.  
 
Tacit values 
The question is whether tacit knowledge is value-free, and if not, whether it is possible to 
cultivate tacit knowledge into a value-free stock (if such knowledge is not essentially value-
free). Haack, aware of the need for discretion; the use of good judgment, in theoretical 
justification, prescribes it, in an inconsistent move, to take into account the significant 
questions that inspire the investigations. However, let us say she did not make this move, 
prescribed our situational judgment in processes of justification to be value-neutral, and 
agreed to the distinction proposed here, between a discursively available and a tacit dimension 
to such judgments. How would she approach the tacit dimension? Are intransitive 
understandings value-free, or, if not, can they be made to be so?  
 
One could try and argue from an ontological or metaphysical point of view that tacit 
knowledge is beyond value considerations; that warrant of tacit knowledge is not an ontic 
question of validity.120 This presupposition is, however, questionable. Some argue that 
ontological or metaphysical knowledge is also value-laden knowledge.121 But more 
importantly: If tacit knowledge is beyond questions of validity, it is also beyond the ontic 
scope of the crossword puzzle model of inquiry (which is based on the idea that the aim of 
inquiry is to end up with valid theories). Another way of arguing for the value-freedom of 
intransitive understandings would be to say that such understandings are not simply value-free 
(because they are ontological or metaphysical and so beyond value considerations), but that 
they can be made more warranted, through cultivation of our situational judgment, to be so. 
But how would we proceed as inquirers if our goal was to free our tacit knowledge from any 
value affiliation? I have suggested two ways in which tacit knowledge can be cultivated: 
                                                 
120 See Ernst Tugendhat’s  (1994) discussion of Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic and the ontological. 
121 Consider for example Hans Jonas’ attempt to anchor “Sollen” in “Sein” (Böhler 2003b: 4): “To ground the 
good or value in being is to bridge the alleged chasm between is and ought” (Jonas 1984: 79). Another option 
might be to anchor the move beyond value consideration in phenomenology or a philosophical anthropology; to 
talk about tacit knowledge as having a phenomenological or anthropological status different from the status of 
validity-claims. This move is, however, also questionable. Consider, for example, Axel Honneth’s (1996) 
anthropological-phenomenological justification of an ethics of intersubjective recognition. A different question 
is whether Jonas and Honneth justificatory endeavors are successful. Elsewhere I have argued that Honneth’s 
attempts to bridge the chasm between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ rests on a naturalistic fallacy and controversial ideas of 
human perfection (see Holst 2004b). 
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through practical experience and through studies of paradigmatic examples.122 It might be 
argued, that our tacit knowledge would gradually be freed from its value affiliations as we 
made our inquiries in concrete cases,123 faithful to the guidelines of value-free inquiry and 
inspired by our study of paradigmatic attempts to apply such guidelines.  
 
It is, however, hard to see how this could come about. First, Haack’s guidelines of value-free 
inquiry cannot be successfully applied. Hence, if we as inquirers try to rely on the value-free 
parts of our tacit stock of knowledge only (in the spirit of Haack), we can neither be guided by 
paradigmatic examples (because there are none) nor by our own practical experience with 
value-free inquiry (because we have none). Our tacit knowledge, in other words, can be 
cultivated, but not into a value-free stock, because we have no experience of such cultivation 
(for logical reasons). Second, if, hypothetically, Haack’s argument for value-freedom had 
been valid, and we could relied on it with success, we would never be in a position, because 
of the not-possible clause, to conclude that our knowledge was a value-free stock anyway, 
because we could not scrutinize the tacit aspects of this knowledge in discourse. We could not 
say for sure that these aspects were value-laden, just as we could not guarantee that they were 
not. The problem with Haack’s argument for value-freedom from this perspective is, thus, that 
we cannot have valid knowledge warranted in discourse of whether the tacit aspects of our 
knowledge are value-free or not. Haack’s argument prescribes inquirers us to make sure of 
something they cannot make sure of.124 
 
Confirmation or truth? 
The phenomenon of tacit knowledge might also shed light on a recent debate between 
Longino and Kitcher on whether (significant) confirmation or (significant) truth should be the 
goal of scientific inquiry (Longino 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, Kitcher 2002). Longino  
 
                                                 
122 There may be more ways. The important thing here is that there is a not-possible clause concerning discursive 
cultivation of tacit knowledge.  
123 And made corrections in our procedures from one case to next, based on the post factum discourse on the 
practical effects of our situational judgments, if this discursive scrutiny showed that we in our procedures had in 
fact presupposed certain values. 
124 I do not contest Haack’s claim that knowledge is fallible. And fallibilism implies that we simply do not know 
for sure whether our theories (tacit or not) are true or right; we have no guarantees. However, if the validity-
claims involved in our theoretical proposals are scrutinized in discourse, and if they, after scrutiny, are not 
refuted, this indicates that the proposals may be true (or false), right (or wrong), even if these are fallible 
assessments. In the case of non-discursive tacit knowledge, even fallibilism (in this sense) is not an option. 
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[…] propose[s] to treat confirmation as a general term for a family of epistemological success 
concepts including truth, but also isomorphism, homomorphism, similarity, fit, alignment, and 
other such notions (2002a: 117).  
 
She prefers confirmation to truth because  
 
[…] using true and false as the primary dimensions of evaluation […] limit candidate 
representations to the sort of thing that can be true or false – linguistic entities like 
propositions or assertions (op.cit.: 113).  
 
Many “scientific theories of a phenomenon” are, however, better understood as “models of 
the phenomenon”, than as “a set of propositions of the phenomenon” (ibid.). And a model “is 
neither true nor false: Instead, its structure, or the structure of the subset of its elements, may 
be identical to a structure in the world” (op.cit.: 114). In these cases, when we are confronted 
with theories as models, notions such as “isomorphism, homomorphism, similarity, fit [and] 
alignment” are better indicators of “epistemological success” (op.cit: 117), because these 
notions are more suitable for the evaluation of the “visual, nonlinguistic representations” 
which models are (op.cit.: 115).  
 
Kitcher argues that Longino exaggerates the challenge from scientific model-based theories: 
 
[…] instead of saying that one of the aims of science is to adopt models that fit the world in 
appropriate respects to appropriate degrees, we might suggest that among the statements 
science aims to accept is a class describing this kind of fit. [...] Of course there would still be 
the challenge of assimilating the accuracy of visual representations to some notion (or close 
analogue) of truth, but it may well be possible to meet the challenge (2002: 555). 
 
Both Longino and Kitcher make reasonable points. “[S]tatements” about how models “fit the 
world” can be scrutinized in discourse, as Kitcher argues (ibid.). In genuine inquiry such 
statements should be scrutinized as thoroughly as possible. Longino are right, however, both 
in pointing out the important role of models125 and visual representations in inquiry, and in 
her emphasis on the possible non-discursive aspects of models and such representations. 
Because not only are models and visual representations crucial didactic tools in 
communication; they may also be a way to communicate tacit knowledge that cannot be 
reduced to “linguistic entities like propositions or assertions” (Longino 2002a: 113). Thus, 
                                                 
125 Models should be understood in a wide sense, not only as we know them from biology, economics or other 
disciplines conventionally figured as model-based. In the human and social sciences, narratives, metaphors or 
other symbolic expressions might be regarded as models in the sense conceived here.  
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because of the not-possible clause, Kitcher will never fully succeed in meeting the 
“challenge” of “assimilating” all he knows into a discursive framework (2002: 555). Also for 
this reason Kitcher’s argument for value-freedom126 is invalid. 
 
v) Truth and justification 
Generally speaking, Longino’s argument that “confirmation” should replace “truth” as an 
indicator of “epistemological success”, is, however, unconvincing (2002a: 117).127 It is 
correct that “truth as correspondence [...] does not seem to express the kind of success that is 
intended in talk of scientific knowledge” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 113). Longino regards Peirce 
as a philosophical “predecessor” (2002a: 3-5). Peirce’s theory of truth presents, however, an 
alternative to correspondence theories. As noted by Apel: 
 
[…] it is not the real (in itself), as it is conceived in a metaphysical correspondence-theory as 
independent of our thought in general or, more precisely, of the possible redemption 
(discursive settlement) of our truth-claims, that can serve as a transcendent criterion or 
standard of truth, but rather the ultimate consensus omnium that would necessarily constitute 
the correlate of the real, as it can be meaningfully thought of as that which would hold in the 
long run (original emphasis, 1994b: 192). 
 
The question is, however, why this consensus omnium should be regarded as true, and not 
only as justified. Why not agree with Rorty, against “Apel and Habermas”, but also against 
Haack, that “Peirce was right in telling us to talk about discourse rather than about 
consciousness,” yet maintain that “the only ideal presupposed by discourse is that of being 
able to justify your beliefs to a competent audience” (original emphasis, Rorty 2000: 9)? Or in 
terms of Haack’s crossword model of inquiry: Why is the theory that is best supported by 
independently secure and comprehensive evidence most probably true? Is it not simply the set 
of beliefs that are best justified?  
 
In some passages, Haack classifies “to believe p is to accept p as true” simply as a truism or a 
tautology (Haack 1993: 192, 1998: 189). She makes ‘accepting p as true’ the definition of 
‘believing p’. This makes ‘to believe p is to accept p as true’ a necessarily true analytic 
statement. This argument will, however, only convince those who are already convinced that 
this is how ‘believing p’ should be understood, not those (among others Rorty) who question 
                                                 
126 Similar to Haack’s argument. 
127 Longino herself is ambivalent on this point, because she also says (in the above quotation) that “linguistic 
entities like propositions or assertions” are “the sort of thing that can be true or false” (2002a: 113). 
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this understanding. Haack does not spell out why defining ‘believing p’ as ‘believing p to be 
true’ is more reasonable than a definition that does not refer to truth.  
 
In other passages Haack describes truth as “the internal goal” of believing (1998: 16); “if you 
aren’t trying to find out the truth about whatever-it-is, you aren’t really inquiring” (op.cit.: 
189). How is this to be understood? Apel explicates the connection between beliefs and truth, 
or rather, between justified beliefs128 and truth, as an internal pragmatic connection. He 
distinguishes sharply between any real justified but fallible consensus omnium and the 
ultimate, infallible consensus omnium of an “ideal communication community” (2001: 2). The 
latter is, he suggests, “a regulative idea” that is “counterfactually” anticipated in our 
argumentative practices (op.cit.: 7): 
 
For this idea of reason (“Vernunftidee” in Kant’s sense), on the one hand, in its counterfactual 
anticipation of what would be the end of the discourse of research, corresponds to the 
undeniable implicit postulate of each truth-claim proposed in a discourse – the postulate of 
being intersubjectively valid on a universal scale, that is, of being acceptable as an 
uncriticizable consensus, yet, on the other hand, it supposes from the outset that, with regard 
to reality as a whole, no factual consensus in space and time can definitely correspond to the 
expectation connected with the truth-claim  (original emphasis, ibid.) 
 
Hence, the ultimate consensus omnium has the status of an undeniable “transcendental-
pragmatic presupposition” (op.cit.: 12), undeniable because we as participants in discourse 
always already presuppose it. There are “presuppositions of serious argumentation” that are 
“non-circumventable by reflection”, that we cannot deny without being involved in a 
performative self-contradiction (ibid.).129 If we claim, for example, that something is the case, 
we claim at the same time, implicitly, that it can be justified as true.130 If we deny that it can 
be justified as true, and claim, as Rorty does, that “justification is relative to audience” or to 
“context” (Rorty 1998a: 21), we either do not participate in serious argumentation (and no 
further discussion is needed), or we deny what we presuppose131 when we claim that 
something is the case.  
                                                 
128 Even Rorty accepts the connection between what we believe in and what we find justified.  
129 A contradiction “zwischen dem Inhalt einer Proposition und dem selbstbezüglichen – impliziten oder 
performativ expliziten – intentionalen Inhalt des Aktes des Vorbringens der Proposition im Rahmen eines 
argumentativen Diskurses” (original emphasis, Apel 1996: 22). 
130 Consider also Apel’s outline of “Verstehen” as understanding the meaning of and as agreeing on validity-
claims (see 2.3.1). 
131 The question is whether such presuppositions are trandendental-pragmatic, as argued by Apel. Wellmer also 
argues that we assume, when we argue in a “committed” way, “unavoidable idealizing presuppositions about 
speaking and arguing” (original emphasis, 1993: 169). Wellmer considers it, however, misleading to present 
these presuppositions in transcendental-pragmatic terms; as a “regulative idea of an ideal communication 
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Does it matter for the assessment of the argument for value-freedom if an internal pragmatic 
relationship between justified beliefs and truth can be established, as Apel suggests? Rorty 
considers the aim of inquiry to be to end up with theories that are justified relative to context, 
not theories that are more or less true in a context-transcending sense. With this point of 
departure, one could prescribe value-freedom in theoretical justification, i.e. one could try to 
argue that theoretical justification, even if always context-relative and not truth-indicative, 
could be made without reference to values.132 This version of the argument for value-freedom 
seems, however, to be even more difficult to defend than Haack’s version. In Haack’s 
argument premise 2) is: Whether a theory is justified depends only on features indicative of its 
truth, not its significance. In this version of the argument, premise 2) would be: Whether a 
theory is justified depends only on features indicative of its justification, not on its 
significance or on the value-laden aspects of the context to which the justification is relative 
to. Thus, according to this version of the premise, anyone asserting that a theory is justified, 
presupposes that it can be justified that the value-laden aspects of the context to which 
justification is relative are not referred to. But how could this be justified? According to 
Rorty’s notion of justification: in a process of justification relative to context, which, in 
accordance with the argument for value-freedom, does not refer to the value-laden aspects of 
the context to which justification is relative. That justification does not refer to the value-
                                                                                                                                                        
community, i.e. [...][as] an unlimited community of interpretation and interaction which simultaneously 
represents an ideal ultimate goal of understanding, the realization of which would be identical in meaning with 
the abolition of all obstacles to communication” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 173). He regards this idea as 
fundamentally “post-hermeneutic”; it presupposes “a language which has emancipated itself from the conditions 
of the hermeneutic mediation of meaning”, in a “state of perfect understanding and agreement” (op.cit. 173-175): 
“The ideal communication community would have passed beyond error, dissent, non-understanding and conflict, 
but only at the price of freezing language, of the extinction of its productive energies, and thus of suspending the 
very linguistic and historical life-form of humanity” (op.cit.: 176). Wellmer considers instead the “idealizing 
presuppositions about speaking and arguing” to be “performative idealizations” (op.cit.: 169): “Whenever we 
raise a truth-claim on the basis of what we take to be good arguments or compelling evidence we take the 
epistemic conditions prevailing here and now to be ideal in the sense that we presuppose that no arguments or 
evidence that would put our truth claim in doubt will come up in the future” (1998: 142). This is not to deny that 
“as soon as we reflect upon our practice of truth-oriented communication and discourse we must, of course, grant 
that we can never exclude the possibility that new arguments or new experiences may force us to revise our 
truth-claims” (original emphasis, ibid.). On the latter point Wellmer and Apel are in agreement: Validity-claims 
are fallible. Wellmer adds, however: “This reflective awareness of the fallibility of our truth-claims might [...] 
also be understood as an awareness, that what we take to be epistemically ideal conditions might turn out not to 
be ideal conditions after all” (original emphasis, ibid.). The performative idealizations we presuppose when we 
speak and act are also fallible, according to Wellmer. This is, however, to defend a principle of generalized 
fallibilism, which is to commit a performative self-contradiction. Wellmer tends, furthermore, to present the 
regulative idea of an ideal communication community as “an imaginable state of things within human history but 
representing an eschatological utopia, because all connections with the normal discourse situation of human 
beings would be negated” (Apel 2001: 8). This, however, “contradicts all provisions given by Kant in the context 
of his critical philosophy”; “the as if-objective of a regulative idea cannot be factually reached but only 
approximated” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 9). 
132 This is a hypothetical situation: Rorty does not defend value-free theoretical justification. 
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laden aspects of the context to which justification is relative, could, however, only be justified 
in a process of justification that did not refer to the value-laden aspects of the context to which 
justification is relative, and so on and so forth, indefinitely.  
 
In other words, we cannot, relying on Rorty’s notion of justification as relative to context, 
justify that theoretical justification does not refer to the value-laden aspects of the context to 
which theoretical justification is relative, in a way we can justify does not refer to values. If 
Rorty were right; if justification is relative to context, this would, then, be an additional 
argument against Haacks’ argument for value-freedom. However, because there is an internal 
relationship between justifying something and justifying it as true, this is not a valid 
argument. Haack’s argument for value-freedom is invalid, but not because the aim of inquiry 
is to end up with theories that are more or less justified relative to context (instead of theories 
that are more or less significantly true). 
 
How would Haack respond to Apel’s outline of the relationship between justifying something 
and justifying it as true? We can reasonably speculate. On the one hand, her epistemological 
reconstruction relies on Peirce’s “transformation of transcendental philosophy” (Wellmer 
1992: 170-174). This suggests a common ground between Haack and Apel. On the other 
hand, Haack seems in several passages to defend a generalized fallibilism, i.e. “our theories 
about the world and ourselves” and our thinking about such theories should be considered 
equally fallible; the reasons for accepting her epistemological reconstruction are “no less 
fallible than those parts of our theories about the world and ourselves with which they 
interlock” (1993: 222). To subscribe to a principle of generalized fallibilism133 is, however, to 
subscribe to a principle that denies what is presupposed in the practice of subscribing, and 
thus, to commit a performative self-contradiction:  
 
Now, it is clear that the principle of fallibilism, which certainly holds with regard to all 
empirical truth-claims, cannot without logical paradoxicalness be applied to itself and, 
furthermore, is not even understandable, without presupposing [...] non-questionable and, so 
to speak, paradigmatical certainties, [...] essentially identical with [...][the] presuppositions of 
serious argumentation [...]. Now, these presuppositions [...], which are non-circumventable by 
reflection [...], include also the presupposition that the truth-claims of argumentation must be 
claims to universal validity and therefore must imply the claim for unrestricted intersubjective 
consensus with regard to their justifiability; and this idealized claim can no longer be 
                                                 
133 Also Rorty subscribes to a generalized fallibilism when he defends justification as justification relative to 
context, i.e. when he denies the internal relationship between justification and truth. Karl Popper and Hans 
Albert were, however, the original targets of Apel’s critique of the principle of generalized fallibilism. 
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questioned and made relative by the principle of fallibilism since it is a transcendental-
pragmatic presupposition of this very principle (original emphasis, Apel 2001: 12).  
 
Hence, in her attempt to elaborate the relationship between ‘believing p’ and ‘accepting p as 
true’, Haack tends to become too analytical (in some passages the relationship is elaborated as 
a truism), and too synthetical (i.e. the presuppositions of argumentation are presented as being 
just as fallible as the validity-claims argued on). 
 
vi) The morality of truth 
Apel argues, moreover, what Peirce only suggests:134 that the regulative idea of an ideal 
communication community we presuppose in genuine truth-seeking has a moral content (Apel 
1990: 80). In ideal argumentative discourse, assertions are justified by all “sufficiently 
competent or enlightened persons” as free and equal135 (Wellmer 2001: 15): The constitutive 
conditions of language use; the constitutive “formal and processual properties of 
argumentation”, implies a moral norm of equal respect:  
 
Whoever enters into discussion with the serious intention of becoming convinced of 
something through dialogue with others has to presume performatively that the participants 
allow their yes or no to be determined solely by the force of the better argument. [...] with this 
they assume – normally in a counterfactual way – a speech situation that satisfies improbable 
conditions: openness to the public, inclusiveness, equal rights to participation, immunization 
against external or inherent compulsion, as well as the participants’ orientation toward 
reaching understanding (Habermas 2000: 45, 46).136 
 
                                                 
134 See Peirce (1990: 103-114). 
135 Wellmer’s outline of the truth-idealization as performative idealization resembles Apel’s outline of the truth-
idealization as a transcendental-pragmatic regulative idea. Whereas Apel regards the moral underpinnings of this 
idealization as undeniable, Wellmer, regards them, however, as fallible: “It is obvious that the critique of 
foundationalism and of metaphysics that leads to the recognition of contingency [our reflective awareness of the 
fallibility of our validity claims and of our performative presuppositions] must affect our understanding of the 
democratic and liberal principles of modernty as well. For we can no longer assume that there is some 
Archemedian point – for example, the idea of reason – in which these principles might be grounded” (Wellmer 
1998: 146). This does not mean that Wellmer would not defend such principles: “If only we abandon the idea of 
an ultimate foundation of democratic and liberal principles [...] – and if we allow experience, historical and 
other, to enter into argumentation, then there seems to be a rich network of arguments for supporting and 
critically developing democratic-liberal principles and institutions” (op.cit.: 151). 
136 Habermas and Apel outline the precise relationship between the properties of argumentation and morality 
differently (Habermas 1999, Apel 2003). In Between Facts and Norms (1999) Habermas describes the formal 
and processual properties of argumentation, explicated as a  “discourse principle” as “morally neutral”, Apel 
sums up (2003: 17): “The ‘principle of morality’ (Moralprinzip) and the ‘principle of law’ (Rechtsprinzip) are 
now considered to emerge ‘equiprimordially (gleichursprünglich) with regard to the normative status from the 
morally neutral ‘discourse principle’ – analogously to their historical differentiation out of ‘substantielle 
Sittlichkeit’ (in the sense of Hegel)” (ibid.). Habermas comes thus close to Seyla Benhabib (1992) and Albrecht 
Wellmer’s (1998) elaboration of the relationship between discourse, morality and modernity. Apel  considers 
rather the discourse principle to be a moral principle: “’D’ [ist] Diskurs- und Moralprinzip” – it is both 
“Rationalitätskriterium, praktische Grundnorm und regulative Idee” (Böhler 2003a: 1).  
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“Formal and processual properties of argumentation”,137 such as “openness to the public, 
inclusiveness, equal rights to participation, immunization against external and inherent 
compulsion, as well as the participants’ orientation toward reaching understanding” are 
properties with a moral content (op.cit.: 45, 46). To participate in serious argumentation is to 
take on an obligation138 of treating all participants139 with equal respect.140  
 
Inspired by Peirce, Haack elaborates the justification of theories as a process whereby 
evidence is assessed relative to its truth-indicativeness in rational deliberation among 
inquirers. This process cannot, however, be conceptualized as value-free also for the reason 
highlighted here. When inquirers participate in committed deliberation, when they assert 
something seriously, they presuppose a consensus omnium with formal and processual 
properties with a moral content.141  
                                                 
137 Thus, striving towards the ideal communication community should be understood not so much as striving 
towards making our opinions approximately similar to the substantial Final Opinions of ideal post-humans in a 
post-historical, post-hermeneutical situation, as suggested by Wellmer. As human beings in history we cannot 
“imagine in the present what an approximately ideal” Final Opinion “would look like” (Habermas 2000: 45). 
“With regard to the argumentative presuppositions of general inclusiveness, equal rights to participation, 
freedom of repression, and orientation toward reaching understanding, we can [however] imagine in the present 
what an approximately ideal satisfaction would look like” (ibid.). 
138 That it can be reasonably argued that we are obliged to do something, i.e. that it can be reasonably argued that 
we cannot deny the moral content of the formal and processual properties of serious argumentation without 
committing a performative self-contradiction, does not imply that we in fact do it. The discussion on how the 
relationship between practical reason and motivation is to be understood precisely, is complex, and is not dealt 
with here (for an instructive overview, see Millgram (ed.) 2001). 
139 Iris Marion Young (1994) argues that this approach makes it difficult to argue for protection of the autonomy 
and integrity of those who cannot participate in discourse, for example the functionally disabled and children. 
Herlinde Pauer-Studer (1998) and Axel Honneth (2003) suggest something similar. For ways to handle this 
problem consider, however, Habermas (1993), Benhabib (1994) and O’Neill (1989, 1996). 
140 Dietrich Böhler, interpreting Apel, specifies the moral basis of argumentative dialogue in terms of four more 
specific promises (“Dialogversprechen”): “Eine Rolle im argumentativen Dialog zu übernehmen, also etwas zu 
verstehen geben und geltend machen zu wollen, das bedeutet, vier vorgängige – jeder Diskussion 
geltungsmässig zugrundeliegende – Dialogversprechen als verbindlich anerkannt zu haben. Indem ich Anderen 
überhaupt etwas zu verstehen gebe, was ich ihnen gegenüber geltende mache, habe ich als deren Dialogpartner – 
zumindest – viererlei versprochen: 1) die nicht begrenzbare Gemeinschaft der möglichen 
Argumentationsteilnehmer als letzte Sinn- und Gültigkeitsinstanz (selbst- und ergebniskritisch) im Auge zu 
behalten; 2) allen Anderen gleiche Rechte als Dialogpartner zuzuerkennen, was die unbedingte Achtung ihrer 
Lebens- und Freiheitsrechte einschliesst (so dass sich daraus die Menschenwürdenorm herleitet), 3) 
selbstverantwortlich für die eigenen Beiträge im Diskurs zu sein und mitverantwortlich für den Diskurs als 
Möglichkeit der Verantwortung jetzt und die Zukunft; mitverantwortlich für die – nur in situationsbezogenen, 
falliblen Diskursen mögliche – Ermittlung und die jeweils mögliche Gewährleistung von (menschen-
)rechtlichen, ökologischen, sozialen, politischen etc. Realisierungsbedingungen öffentlicher Diskurse zu sein; 4) 
mitverantwortlich für die Verwirklichung der entsprechenden Diskursergebnisse in der alltagsweltlichen, 
politischen, gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen Praxisfeldern zu sein” (original emphasis, 2003a: 26). Thus, 
according to Böhler, these promises have a transcendental moral status. Another option would be to consider 
them, or some of them, not as inferred from transcendental morality, but rather as norms justified in actual 
fallible discourse (approaching the infallible ideal of argumentative discourse presupposed in such discourse), or 
as ethical-political prescriptions. I will return to these notions; transcendental morality, discursively justified 
morality, ethics and politics, and define them and their interrelations more accurately. 
141 Apel considers this to be a pragmatist reconstruction of Kant’s “Vernunftidee” (2001: 7). Consider in this 
connection Onora O’Neill’s outline of the connection between the Categorical Imperative as The Formula of the 
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vii) Metaphysical realism 
Haack defends realism. Her elaboration of realism is, however, inadequate in certain ways 
that make her doctrine of value-freedom appear more reasonable than it is. According to Apel, 
Peirce’s argument for realism, does not rely on any recourse to Kantian “externalist 
(transcendent) metaphysics” (2001: 14) Truth-seeking can be elaborated as a process of 
interpreting perceptual evidence and ensuring coherence. The task of inquirers is to: 
 
[...] ensure the coherence of existing theories or concepts, […] [that] are based, at the same 
time, on a constant extention of the recognition of empirical facts by the account of 
perceptual evidence (which of course in perceptual judgments is always already interpreted 
evidence) (original emphasis, op.cit.: 22).  
 
Apel criticizes Habermas for introducing “a justification-transcendent”, “strictly non-
epistemic”, “metaphysical moment” when elaborating the truth-idealization; a “moment” that 
is not “covered eo ipso by the explication of terms of an unsurpassable (that is uncriticizable) 
justification by way of argumentation” (op.cit.: 14). This is, however, Apel argues, to re-
introduce “the supposition of an unknowable reality in the sense of Kant’s things in 
themselves […] whose avoidance I supposed to be a common concern” (original emphasis, 
ibid.). Haack seems to do something similar. Her moderate naturalism; her elaboration of the 
causal aspect of justification, re-introduces a notion of things-in-themselves.142 Consider how 
she explicates the process of perception:  “In perception we are in contact with something 
real, independent of our interpretations, of how anybody thinks it to be” (my emphasis, Haack 
1998: 161).143  
 
What interests me here, is the possible connection between Haack’s (after all) metaphysical 
notion of the real and her argument for value-freedom. If it was the case that a realist notion 
                                                                                                                                                        
Universal Law and as the Formula of the End in Itself: “Act only on the maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it be a universal law” and “Treat humanity in your own person or in the person of any other 
never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end” (1995: 177, 178). “Kant’s contention is”, she 
says, “that the principles we must adopt if we are not to use others will be the very principles of justice that were 
identified by considering which principles are universalizable for rational beings” (op.cit.: 179). This Kantian 
contention is the crux of Apel’s project, i.e. to elaborate reasonably, given pragmatist presuppositions, the 
relationship between context-transcending rational argumentation and the Formula of the End in Itself. 
142 Despite her declared dismissal of Kantian metaphysics. 
143 Apel links Habermas’ recent re-introduction of metaphysical realism when explicating the meaning of truth, 
to his recent re-interpretation of the ideal communication community as a fallible performative idealization, i.e. 
to his implicit reliance on a principle of generalized fallibilism. These two things also go together in Haack’s 
case: When all is fallible, “our theories about the world and ourselves” as well as our “criteria of justification”, 
metaphysical realism is re-introduced to save truth (1993: 222). 
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of things-in-themselves was needed in order to save the notion of truth, this would not 
necessarily imply that a notion of things-in-themselves was needed to save the notion of 
warranted values: The idealization we presuppose when claiming that something ‘is’, is not 
similar to the idealization we presuppose when making rightness-claims.144 Moral realism is, 
moreover, a more controversial position than epistemological realism. Many moral 
philosopers have at least given up looking for what Elizabeth Anderson refers to as 
“evaluative facts”; facts “that enable us to discern the properties of good and bad in the 
world” (1993: 1).145  
 
Haack dismisses the idea of evaluative facts. This dismissal, in combination with her general 
tendency to identify, misleadingly, ideal reason with what goes on in the ideal community of 
truth-seeking investigators, i.e. with theoretical reason, contributes to making her defense of 
value-freedom in theoretical justification appear to be the only logical option. If one dismisses 
moral realism and believes that moral cognitivism, approaching ought-questions in a rational 
way,146 implies a defense of moral realism (because one identifies ideal reason with 
theoretical reason, and believes a defense of theoretical reason implies defending an idea of 
things-in-themselves), it would be inconsistent to defend moral cognitivism. Haack defends, 
accordingly, a non-cognitivist approach to ought-questions: She considers values to be 
expressions of our subjective, unpredictable, irrational beliefs and desires.147  
 
Her hostility towards feminist epistemologists and other defenders of value-laden 
justification, is intimately linked to this non-cognitivism. Value-laden justification means, in 
her view, allowing for subjective, unpredictable and irrational influences in the context of 
justification. Consequently, arguing successfully against Haack’s argument for value-freedom 
is intimately linked to making moral cognitivism into a viable option, which means, among 
other things, to make it consistent with a dismissal of metaphysical ideas of evaluative facts.  
 
                                                 
144 See 2.4.3. 
145 It is illustrative that Habermas’ does not introduce a justification-transcendent moment in moral discourse. 
There are, however, also defenders of a moral-realist interpretation of discourse ethics, such as Christina Lafont 
(2004). 
146 Joseph Heath notes that moral cognitivism “in the Anglo-American tradition” refers to the idea that “moral 
statements have truth-values”, while Habermas with moral cognitivism refers to the idea that norms can be 
“rationally justified” (2001: 179). Here the term is used in Habermas’ sense. 
147 See 2.4.1. 
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Moral cognitivism can be defended, even if the idea of evaluative facts is indefensible, 
because moral cognitivism does not depend on this idea.148 This would be the case also if 
truth had needed a defense of metaphysical realism, in order to be saved (but this is not the 
case), because the truth-idealization and the rightness-idealization are not identical, i.e. 
practical reason cannot be reduced to theoretical reason.  
 
2.4 Assessing the fourth premise149  
 
2.4.1 Haack’s notion of values as subjective wishes or desires 
 
Generally speaking, Haack outlines ought-questions as questions of what we consider 
“desirable” and “deplorable” (1998: 129). Values express our subjective, unpredictable, 
irrational wishes or desires. This elaboration differs significantly from her elaboration of 
truth-questions. Genuine truth-seeking, is defined as seeking answers to questions of state of 
affairs warranted in rational intersubjective processes of deliberation. Truth is explicated as 
the outcome of critical communication in a community of inquirers.  
 
Haack’s crossword puzzle model of inquiry has, however, an implicit subjectivist subtext: Her 
attempt to elaborate truth-seeking as an intersubjective practice is half-hearted. She explicates, 
for example, the process in which perceptions are interpreted as a monological process. 
Meaning is presented, not as intersubjective, dialogically constituted meaning, but as 
something separate subjects attribute to what they perceive when they do their investigations 
(see Haack 1993: 74, 1998: 161). Moreover, her justification of why genuine inquiry is an 
intersubjective endeavor is primarily instrumentalist. She considers “a real community of 
imperfect inquirers” to be “a tolerable ersatz of an ideal community”, because “individual 
idiosyncracies or weaknesses may compensate for each other” in a community, and so make 
the outcome of inquiry more balanced (1998: 97-98). Understanding (qua precondition for 
communication and investigation) should, however, be conceived as essentially 
intersubjective. Understanding is established among fellow subjects, not privately (Apel 
1994a: 26). This is the primary reason why inquiry should be regarded as a communal 
practice (because it always already is). Thus, Haack’s approach to values and her notion of 
                                                 
148 See 2.4.1. 
149 Values express subjective wishes or desires. 
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truth-seeking have, after all, a problematic subjectivism in common, even if, in the latter case, 
subjectivism is the subtext and not the explicated position. 
 
Haack’s subjectivist approach to values is embedded in a rational-choice theory of action. 
Haack’s rational-choice theory may be criticized from several points of view,150 depending on 
what kind of theory it is considered to be. Considered as a general empirical theory about 
human nature and action it is unwarranted.151 People’s values are shaped in intersubjective 
processes of interpretation and communication, and they are historically and institutionally 
structured (they are not simply subjective). They may reflect a manifold of concerns (they do 
not necessarily reflect egoistic concerns), they can be reasonably deliberated upon (they are 
not simply desires, wishes or inclinations), i.e. we do not regard them simply as given goals, 
beyond scrutiny, and we do not always go about attempting to maximize their fulfillment; we 
are not simply strategic actors maximizing goal-fulfillment. Considered as a normative theory 
about how people ought to behave, prescribing us to behave as strategic egoists, Haack’s 
rational-choice theory is indefensible: The prescription is incompatible with treating all with 
equal respect (and not simply as means, if this maximizes goal-fulfillment). Considered as an 
idealization; if she has “decide[d] to interpret” people’s choices and actions as if her rational-
choice theory of action were correct, it “fails” as “explanation” of what in fact is going on 
(Anderson 2002: 371).152  
 
Haack seems to consider her rational-choice theory of action as an empirical theory (not as an 
idealization). This idea of how people in fact behave, feeds her commitment to value-
                                                 
150 I will make a few brief points about the flaws of Haack’s rational-choice theory. Thus, I will not deal 
systematically with the vast literature on rational-choice theory. This means that I will not discuss developments 
of this theory that might be more sophisticated and defensible than Haack’s elaboration. 
151 “This is a problem internal to the research program of rational-choice theory. Most rational-choice theorists 
talk as if it were a purely empirical theory of human behavior. It is supposed to provide the [...] microfoundation 
of economic theory. Academics engaged in the imperialist project of extending the theory to extra-economic 
domains [...] regard the theory as universally true [...]. The trouble with the empirical, microfoundational 
interpretation of the theory is that it has been massively falsified” (Anderson 2002: 370-371). One response to 
this problem has been to interpret rational-choice theory as conceptually true: “Ludwig van Miese argued that 
the theory is a priori true, because all action is necessarily rational when viewed from the standpoint of the 
agents themselves” (op.cit.: 371). However, rational-choice theory cannot be the “inevitable framework of 
practical reasoning”, since we are able “to imagine an alternative system of rational principles”, as outlined, for 
example, in “Kantian theory” (ibid.). 
152 “We can, of course, decide to interpret people’s choices as if they were always the product of some imagined 
set of consistent beliefs and desires. This is how a self-conscious behaviorist must see the theory, as ‘revealed-
preference-theory’ does. But this decision comes at two costs. First, the preferences we impute to people may not 
correspond to what they actually care about [...]. The theory thus fails as a psychological explanation. Second, 
the behavioristic, tautological interpretation fails as a causal explanation, since it does not offer any account of 
underlying causes (real beliefs and desires) at all”  (original emphasis, Anderson 2002: 371). 
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freedom: To allow values to influence theoretical justification, is, given her assumption that 
her rational-choice theory is a valid empirical theory, to allow for theoretical justification to 
be shaped by the idiocyncratic, arbitrary, subjective inclinations of egoistic natures. Haack 
regards “value judgments” as “essentially matters of blind, overbearing assertion, not subject 
to critical scrutiny or revision in light of arguments” (Anderson 1995: 35).153 This view is, as 
suggested, misleading. First, there is empirical evidence that people in fact make their values 
“subject to critical scrutiny or revision in light of argument” (ibid.).154 Second, when people 
fail to do so, when they do not make their values into topics of argument when asked by their 
fellow subjects to do so, this is because people lack the motivation to be rational; because of 
weakness of will, or because institutions insufficiently motivate them to be rational, not 
because it is conceptually155 impossible to defend a rational approach to ought-questions.156 In 
other words, Haack might still want to uphold her argument for value-freedom, but a valid 
argument for doing so is not that “to subordinate […] objective truth-seeking” to values, is to 
give in “to any subjective preference or inclination or any expediency or opportunistic 
consideration”, that “befog[s]” our minds (Haack 1998: 7).  
 
A less straightforward question is whether Haack conceives of her rational-choice theory as a 
normative theory about how people ought to behave. In some passages it seems as though she 
does; when she assumes that people behave egoistically and strategically, “human nature 
being what it is” (op.cit.: 12). This is either a defense of a naturalistic approach to values, or a 
normative defense of her rational-choice theory; she is saying that this is how people ought to 
behave in order not to contradict their nature. Both options are indefensible. Naturalist 
                                                 
153 According to Anderson, Haack’s notion of “value judgments” represents a “primitive emotivist view [...] no 
serious moral theorist accepts [...] anymore” (1995a: 35). There are, however, I believe, many who are not moral 
theorists that would subscribe to such a view. There are also several moral theorists that defend a more 
sophisticated emotivist view, such as Anette Baier. Consider Rorty’s reliance on Baier’s notion of sentimental 
education in his critique of moral universalism (see Chapter 7). 
154 The empirical evidence is significant. One illustrative example is Anderson’s empirical critique of Kristin 
Luker’s classic study of women’s decisions about their sexuality and contraceptive use from a rational-choice 
perspective (Anderson 2002: 379-389). 
155 Consider my earlier note, where Anderson refutes Ludwig van Miese’s conceptual argument for equating 
practical reason with the rational-choice-theoretical notion of reason, which is a version of reducing reason to 
theoretical reason. Consider also Christine Korsgaard’s refutation of the view that the fact that reasons fail to 
motivate us is an argument for skepticism about practical reason: “To the extent that skepticism about pure 
practical reason is based on the requirement that reasons be capable of motivating us, the correct response is that 
if someone discovers what are recognizably reasons bearing on conduct and those reasons fail to motivate us, 
that only shows the limits of our rationality. Motivational skepticism about practical reason depends on, and 
cannot be the basis of, skepticism about the possible content of rational requirements. The extent to which people 
are actually moved by rational considerations, either in their conduct or in their credence, is beyond the purview 
of philosophy. Philosophy can at most tell us what it would be like to be rational” (2001: 122). 
156 I initiated such a defense in 2.1.3. I will advance it in a moment. 
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approaches to values rest either on an idea of evaluative facts or on the idea that ‘ought’ can 
be derived from ‘is’.157 Haack’s rational-choice theory as a normative theory is incompatible 
with the norm of treating all with equal respect (and not simply as means, if this maximizes 
goal-fulfillment).  
 
In other passages Haack does not seem to defend rational-choice theory as a normative theory, 
however. Inquirers, for example, are in her view, to be “blamed” if they give in to wishes or 
desires when justifying theories: They “can be held responsible” (op.cit.: 15). This notion of 
responsibility is incompatible with a naturalistic approach to values. It is also incompatible 
with defending Haack’s rational-choice theory as a normative theory. “Human nature being 
what it is” (op.cit.: 12); so long as we are beings egoistically and strategically striving for 
“utility”, “fame and fortune”, why should we be blamed if we pursue pseudo-inquiry, if this, 
let’s say, makes us rich and famous – and why should we deserve “honor” and “praise” if we 
were to pursue genuine inquiry, if this, let’s say, did not in fact serve our selfish interests 
(op.cit.: 8,9,15)? Probably, according to Haack, because genuine inquiry is crucial for the 
long-term survival of the human species. This response requires, however, a more 
sophisticated rational-choice theory of action than she provides; a theory elaborating the 
relationship between our subjective wishes or desires and our objective long-term interests as 
a species. Moreover, Haack embeds her evolutionary argument for making genuine inquiry in 
a strong moral vocabulary, talking about blame, praise and honor: When inquirers are led 
astray by their wishes and desires, they are not simply behaving unwisely strategically. In 
order to express this view, she is, however, forced to introduce a moral vocabulary which her 
rational-choice theory cannot provide.  
 
2.4.2 Haack’s notion of values as virtues 
 
In addition to her notion of values as subjective wishes or desires, Haack introduces a notion 
of values as virtues, and a notion of values as moral standards. The role she prescribes for 
values as virtues in inquiry, is, however, incompatible with her defense of value-free 
theoretical justification. Value-free theoretical justification is, Haack says, something that a 
“decent” academic and a “good” person pursues (op.cit.: 14, 15), i.e. inquirers subscribing to 
her doctrine of value-freedom have “intellectual integrity”, and intellectual integrity is a 
                                                 
157 On a naturalistic fallacy. 
 75
“moral” virtue (not only an “instrumental” and an “epistemological” virtue) (op.cit.: 13). 
Hence, value-free theoretical justification is virtue-laden theoretical justification, and 
therefore is not, because the virtues in question are also moral virtues, value-free theoretical 
justification after all.158  
 
Virtues may be conceptualized as practice-immanent; as the internal goals of our practices 
(MacIntyre 1984: 181: 255). Haack’s notion of virtues is, however, equal to the Homeric 
notion; her virtues are the virtues of a “heroic society” (op.cit.: 121-130). Scientific virtues are 
outlined as dispositions which the heroic individual scientist is herself responsible for 
cultivating. Haack admits, however, that the cultivation of individual virtues depends on “an 
environment that encourages it” (1998: 11). She mentions the significance of establishing 
incentive structures; structures that rewards “the egos” of scientists when they are virtuous 
(op.cit.: 12). The scientific ethos,159 the institutionalized norms that regulate interaction, 
decisions and procedures of science, must not, however, reduce scientists to strategic egoists. 
The norms of the scientific institution should be truth-functional,160 but also compatible with 
the norm of equal respect: They should be “norms of civility” (Anderson 1995a: 199).161 
 
2.4.3 Haack’s notion of values as moral standards 
 
The moral content of the ideal speech community, inherent in its “formal and processual 
properties”, is, as elaborated by Habermas, “general inclusiveness, equal rights to 
participation, freedom of repression, and orientation toward reaching understanding” (2000: 
46). Haack’s statement that “freedom of thought and speech” are “important conditions for 
scientific inquiry to flourish”, may be interpreted as an implicit acknowledgment of the moral 
content of the rational argumentation of “flourishing” scientific inquiry (1998: 113). Haack 
does not, however, allow this and similar statements162 to modify her argument for value-
freedom. Besides, once more, her reflections are instrumental. Haack’s concern is what serves 
genuine inquiry. The connection between the norm of freedom of thought and speech and 
                                                 
158 Consider also the discussion of Longino’s feminist theoretical virtues. 
159 Consider Robert Merton’s proposal (1973). The scientific ethos should not, however, prescribe scientists to 
subscribe to a notion of value-free theoretical justification. 
160 Whether it is truth-functional to treat scientists as strategic egoists, is, among other things, a question of 
whether they in fact behave as strategic egoists (i.e. it is a question of whether Haack’s rational-choice theory is 
a valid empirical theory). 
161 See 2.4.5. An advanced proposal of scientific norms is Knut Erik Tranøy’s (1997). 
162 Consider Haack’s concern that “the possibility that inquiry by a madman bent on destroying the planet might 
succeed – and bring further inquiry to an end” (1998: 13). 
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genuine inquiry is, however, primarily performative: You cannot deny this norm, which is to 
deny the morality linked to rational argumentation, assumed when you deny it, without 
committing a performative self-contradiction.163 
 
A general problem is that Haack does not outline what justifies turning certain values into 
general moral standards, i.e. into values that are not simply subjective wishes or desires. 
There are sketchy remarks, as when she links the “moral” and “justice” to a recognition of our 
“common humanity” (op.cit.: 123). How this should be understood in more specific terms, is, 
however, not clear. Moreover, her recognition of certain general moral standards which, in 
one way or another, can be inferred from our common humanity, does not spur her into 
modifying her argument for value-freedom. Her positions is, generally speaking: Neither 
values as subjective wishes or desires, values as virtues, nor values as moral standards should, 
according to her general argument, play any role in the context of justfication. What matters is 
exclusively the truth-indicativeness of evidence. 
 
2.4.4 The question of values in inquiry: A question beyond values 
 
Haack’s sketchy distinctions between different kind of values, needs to be advanced further, if 
her argument for value-freedom is to be adequately addressed.  
 
The background consensus of the lifeworld can be disrupted when validity-claims implicit in 
our speech-acts are questioned. Discussing the role of values in inquiry is essentially a 
discussion of how to conceive of the relationship between questions of truth and questions of 
rightness, i.e. the relationship between “is” and “ought”, in Haack’s terms (op.cit.: 129). In 
her general argument, ought-questions are considered equivalent to questions about what our 
“values” are, which in turn are considered equivalent to questions of what we consider “good” 
and “bad”; “ethical or political questions” (op.cit.: 118, 119). In a discussions of values and 
inquiry, it is, however, essential to properly distinguish between what is ethically good and 
what is morally right; between “the good” and “the right”, the “comprehensive” and the 
                                                 
163 The norm of freedom of thought and speech is a transcendental-pragmatic “certainty” (Apel 2001: 12). And 
was it not a transcendental-pragmatic certainty is would still be a norm that one reasonably could regard as 
justified: It is a norm all would agree to in argumentative discourse. 
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“freestanding” (Rawls 1996, 1999), “values” and “norms”, “ethics” and “morality” 
(Habermas 1999).164 
 
i) Truth and morality165 
When we assert that something is (true), we assume an idealization of context-transcending 
argumentation that we can approximate; a truth-idealization. When we assert that something 
is right, we assume an idealization of context-transcending argumentation that we can 
approximate; a rightness-idealization. The rightness-idealization is “analogous” to the truth-
idealization (Habermas 2003: 229). There is an internal connection between justified beliefs 
and truth, whether we talk of empirical truth or moral (truth-analogous) rightness. In both 
cases 
 
[t]o make a sincere assertion or to justify a belief would not be what it is if it were not 
connected with the understanding that the assertion or belief should be acceptable to any 
sufficiently competent or enlightened person (Wellmer 2001: 15).   
 
When we claim that something is a moral ought (just as when we claim that something is the 
case), we claim at the same time that it can be justified as right (just as to claim that 
something is, is to claim that it is true), i.e. that it can be justified to all persons as free and 
equal in a context-transcending discourse. Furthermore, the regulative idea of an ideal 
communication community presupposed in committed moral discourse (just as in genuine 
truth-seeking) has a moral content; the formal and processual properties of argumentation 
implies a norm of equal respect. 
 
The truth-idealization is, however, also distinct from the rightness-idealization: “Correct 
moral judgments owe their universal validity not to their corroboration by the objective world 
like true empirical judgments, but to rationally motivated recognition” (Habermas 2003: 231); 
their rational acceptability is independent of “states of affairs that are warranted by the world 
itself” (op.cit.: 224).166 In Haack’s terms, whereas discursive justification of what ‘is’ can be 
                                                 
164 I thank readers who have had these distinctions on their mind from when I introduced Haack’s argument in 
Chapter 1, for their patience. The reason why they have not been introduced until now is that the elaborations of 
the premises in Haack’s argument for value-freedom have been discussed premise by premise. Discussing now 
her elaboration of premise 4), it is time to scrutinize her notion of values. Much of what is said in the following 
sections I have, however, already indicated in the previous discussions of this chapter. 
165 See also Chapter 7. 
166 This difference between the truth-idealization and the rightness-idealization may be the reason why Haack 
states, misleadingly,  that “moral oughts” unlike “terms of epistemic appraisal” carry a “presupposition of 
voluntariness” (1998: 18, see Chapter 1). 
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conceptualized as an “interplay of causal and evaluative aspects”, discursive justification of 
what ought to be is a question of “evaluation” (1993: 4).  
 
It should, on the one hand, be made a distinction between the moral norm of equal respect 
(and what may be inferred from it) that can be established through transcendental-pragmatic 
reflection, and fallible moral norms that are warranted as right, in serious argumentation 
approximating ideal conditions. On the other hand, what is established through 
transcendental-pragmatic reflection, can always be questioned. And if and when it is 
questioned, it must be justified in real discourse approximating ideal conditions. The real 
justification of morality will thus always depend on fallible processes of justification.167  
 
How should genuine inquirers relate to moral questions when justifying theories? One option 
would be to dismiss theories with a moral dimension. However, even if we consider the sole 
aim of inquiry to be to end up with theories in which only truth-claims are raised, this is 
impossible because:168 
 
a) Our answers to is-questions, determine our answers to can-questions, which in turn 
influence our answers to ought-question (since ought implies can, and cannot implies ought 
not). 
 
b) Theoretical virtues are virtues that may be more in accordance with certain moral norms 
than with others. 
 
c) Propositions about what ‘is’ may contain concepts, distinctions and vocabularies with a 
moral dimension. 
 
                                                 
167 Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic argument rests on a “Begründungstriade”: “Zuerst pragmatisch 
rekonstruieren, dann die Rekonstruktionsresultate einzeln in Frage stellen, schliesslich im aktuellen Dialog den 
Zweifel und uno actu die Validität des bezwifelten Resultats prüfen” (original emphasis, Böhler 2003a: 28). 
Hence, a defense of moral universalism is, contrary to what Chantal Mouffe (2000) has argued, internally 
connected to democratic dialogue on moral standards, i.e. to moral discourse – it is also for this reason not anti-
democratic to argue for moral universalism (see also Chapters 6 and 9 on the relationship between democracy, 
the rule of law and morality). In addition citizens may of course participate in other discourses than moral 
discourses. 
168 This is a summing up of the arguments against Haack’s defense of theoretical justification free from ‘values’ 
qua moral norms, presented so far in this chapter. 
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d) The burden of judgment referred to as the burden of total experience may introduce 
morality in theoretical justification. 
 
e) We do not know whether the tacit knowledge we need to rely on when assessing theories, 
has a moral dimension or not. 
 
f) In discourse on what is true, we presuppose a discourse of an ideal communication 
community with a moral content. 
 
The sole aim of genuine inquiry is, however, to end up with significantly true theories. Thus: 
 
g) Even if a) to f) were not the case, the fact that the sole aim of genuine inquiry is to end up 
with theories that are significant, i.e. that are of interest to us, confronts the inquirer with 
moral questions. Questions of significance are questions of what we assess as significant, and 
such assessments are attached to morality.  
 
a) to g) imply that theoretical justification is influenced by moral norms. Accordingly, the sole 
aim of genuine inquiry should be to end up with theories whose claims are justified with 
reference to the standard of truth as well as to the standard of morality. 
 
ii) Morality and ethics 
How should genuine inquirers relate to ethical claims when they justify theories? The answer 
is linked to what distinguishes “the ethical […] employment of practical reason” from “the 
moral” (Habermas 1993: 1), claims about what is good from claims about what is right. Moral 
norms are “deontological”, refer to “obligatory rule-following”, and can be justified to all as 
free and equal in context-transcending discourse (Habermas 1999: 255): A moral norm is 
justified when it has survived “a universalization test” (Habermas 1999: 153). This implies 
that “the ‘oughtness’ of binding norms has the absolute sense of an unconditioned and 
universal obligation” (op.cit.: 255).  
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Ethical claims always “compete with” other ethical claims (op.cit.: 153).169 The 
“attractiveness” of “intersubjectively shared values”, as opposed to norms, is that it has   
 
[…] the relative sense of an estimation of goods that has become established or been adopted 
in cultures and forms of life: serious value choices or higher-order preferences tell170 us what 
is good for us (or for me) overall and in the long run. Different norms must not contradict one 
another if they claim validity for the same circle of addressees; they must fit together into a 
coherent complex, that is, form a system. Different values compete for priority from case to 
case; to the extent that they find intersubjective recognition within a culture or form of life, 
they form flexible configurations filled with tension (op.cit.: 255). 
 
Hence, “values claim relative validity” (op.cit.: 153): They should be read “teleologically”, 
“in terms of the relative preferability of specific values or interests” (original emphasis, 
ibid.).171 In contrast to the idealization of moral justification, the idealization of ethical 
justification is, therefore, not truth-analogous: An internal pragmatic connection between 
justified ethical beliefs and universal rational acceptability cannot be established. Ethical 
claims may, however, be discussed reasonably: Ethical claims, agreement and disagreement 
can be more or less reasonable, even if always “indexed to particular communities” 
(Habermas 2003: 229).172 There is an ethical “employment of practical reason”, an ethical 
“reflective” approach to the question “What should I do?”, in addition to the “moral” and 
“pragmatic” 173 approach to practical problems (Habermas 1993: 1). Thus, in contrast to how 
they are pictured by Haack, values qua claims that are ethical (and that cannot be 
conceptualized as moral standards), are not simply subjective, unpredictable, irrational wishes 
or desires.  
                                                 
169 Rawls refers to ethical pluralism as a fact. It is an empirical fact in modern society that there are both 
reasonable and unreasonable ethical pluralism. Reasonable ethical pluralism is, however, also an anthropological 
fact: Reasonable persons will reasonably disagree due to the burdens of judgment (1996: 36-37, 54-66). 
170 See Chapter 9 for a brief outline of Charles Taylor’s distinction between weak and strong preferences or 
evaluations. 
171 “Moral norms, of course, embody values or interests, but only such as are universalizable in view of the 
particular matter at issue” (Habermas 1999: 153). 
172 “[…] values have a certain objectivity, but […] this objectivity cannot be understood realistically on the 
model of the sense in which statements of fact have empirical content. Rather, it relies on the intersubjective 
recognition of evaluative standards for which we can give good reasons by reference to a corresponding form of 
life. Conceived as intersubjectivity, the objectivity of value-judgments is always indexed to particular 
communities” (my emphasis, Habermas 2003: 229). Confronted with “questions of post-traditional justice, 
evaluative standards come into play that transcend the context of existing communities” (ibid.). 
173 The pragmatic task is “making a rational-choice of means in the light of fixed purposes or of the rational 
assessment of goals in the light of existing preferences” (Habermas 1993: 3). Rational-choice theory should be 
interpreted as a particular reflection on the pragmatic use of practical reason, not as a general empirical-
anthropological theory about human action and motivation, or a normative theory about how we ought to 
behave, as suggested by Haack. The pragmatic use of practical reason relies intimately on an adequate use of 
theoretical reason: “As long as the question ‘What should I do?’ has such pragmatic tasks in view, observations, 
investigations, comparisons, and assessments undertaken on the basis of empirical data with a view to efficiency 
or with the aid of other decision rules are appropriate” (ibid.). 
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iii) Ethical claims and theoretical justification 
One option for genuine inquirers would be to dismiss theories with an ethical dimension. 
However, even if we consider the sole aim of inquiry to be to end up with theories in which 
only truth-claims are raised, this is impossible because:174 
 
a) Our answers to is-questions, determine our answers to can-questions, which in turn 
influence our answers to questions of whether our values are reasonable (i.e. if our goals 
cannot be achieved it is unreasonable to uphold them). 
 
b) Theoretical virtues are virtues that may be more in accordance with certain values than 
with others. 
 
c) Propositions about what ‘is’ may contain concepts, distinctions and vocabularies with an 
ethical dimension.175  
 
d) The burden of judgment referred to as the burden of total experience may introduce values 
in theoretical justification. 
 
e) We do not know whether the tacit knowledge we need to rely on when assessing theories 
has an ethical dimension or not. 
 
f) To institutionalize inquiry is not a value- and interest-neutral endeavor. 
 
The sole aim of genuine inquiry is, however, to end up with significantly true theories. Thus:  
 
g) Even if a) to f) were not the case, the fact that the sole aim of genuine inquiry is to end up 
with theories that are significant, i.e. that are of interest to us, confronts the inquirer with 
ethical questions: Questions of significance are questions of what we assess as significant, and 
such assessments are attached to values. 
                                                 
174 This is a summing up of the arguments against Haack’s defense of theoretical justification free from ‘values’ 
qua values, presented so far in this chapter. 
175 It is possible to think of examples of inquiry in some of the natural sciences, for example in theoretical 
physics and mathematics, in the humanities, for example in formal linguistics, and in the social sciences, for 
example in mathematic economics, that do not seem to include concepts and distinctions that are value-laden. 
This is, however, a question for investigation, not for assumption. 
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a) to g) imply that theoretical justification is influenced by values. Accordingly, the sole aim 
of genuine inquiry should be to end up with theories whose claims are justified with reference 
to the standard of truth, to the standard of morality – as well as to a standard of ethical 
reasonableness. 
 
Ethical reasonableness in inquiry requires that inquirers critically deliberate upon their 
values,176 and revise them if scrutiny proves them unreasonable. Critical ethical dialogue is 
facilitated by the presence of participants in deliberation with competing values. 
“Impartiality” or “fairness” when confronted with ethical questions “demands attention to all 
the […] arguments that support or undermine each side’s value-judgments, not a pose of 
value-neutrality”: All relevant “arguments” should be introduced as far as possible, all “sides” 
represented as far as possible (Anderson 1995a: 42). An impartial approach to ethical 
questions requires dialogue among fellow subjects with different views on the questions in 
question. 
 
Values can sometimes be redescribed and transformed, after criticism and dialogue, into 
moral norms. Impartiality or fairness in inquiry when ethical claims are involved, implies “a 
commitment to pass judgment in relation to a set of evaluative standards that transcends the 
competing interests of those who advocate rival answers to a question” (Anderson 1995a: 42). 
Ethical claims should, if possible, be rediscribed in a way that make them acceptable to those 
initially defending them, but also acceptable, or at least more acceptable, to those who do not. 
Thus, genuine inquirers, with a reasonable approach to ethical questions, should not only seek 
arguments that both “support” and “undermine each side’s value judgments”, they should try 
and integrate the different reasonable “sides” by developing synthesized ethical standards 
“that transcends the competing interests” (ibid.). This might imply to transform values into 
norms; claims of competing comprehensive doctrines into obligatory rules.177 Feminist 
inquirers, for example, may subscribe to competing values,178 but share a normative 
                                                 
176 This requires making them explicit. Feminist inquirers’ explicit outlines of their values should be appreciated. 
Explicitness makes criticism possible. Value-implicitness makes criticism more difficult. 
177 Anderson (along with, for example, Putnam), does not distinguish between values and moral norms. 
Anderson thus makes her defense of value-laden theoretical justification more controversial than necessary. She 
excludes the possibility that some might allow for moral norms to regulate theoretical justification, even if they 
do not allow theoretical justification to include ethical considerations. 
178 See Chapter 5. 
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commitment that can be distinguished and justified from a moral point of view.179 Feminist 
inquirers, or the majority of them, may, also, share certain values; standards “that transcends 
the[ir] competing interests”, that do not, however, have the universal status of moral norms 
(ibid.). Moreover, the values of feminist inquirers may be based on truth-claims that can be 
distinguished and justified relative to the ideal standard of truth.180 
 
Is the requirement of ethical reasonableness in inquiry compatible with respecting inquirers’ 
privacy?181 Inquirers are persons with a right to personal autonomy implying that they have 
no obligation to reveal and justify their private values to others. If, however, inquirers’ values, 
for example their religious or political views, influence their investigations, and their 
investigations are institutionalized investigations; inquiry in a public institution, citizens have 
a right to justification of inquirers’ values, because citizens have a right to justification of the 
decisions and procedures of public institutions (Rawls 1996, Forst 1999).182 If inquirers’ 
religious or political views influence their investigations, these views may in turn influence 
the content of decisions and the design of procedures of public institutions. Citizens would 
then have a right to have such influences justified. 
 
As highlighted by Haack, scientific inquiry is not inherently exceptional: “Our standards of 
what constitutes good, honest, thorough inquiry and what constitutes good, strong, supportive 
evidence are not internal to science” (Haack 1998: 94).183 There are no deep differences 
between standards of genuine inquiry and standards of genuine scientific inquiry.184 Scientists 
are, however, professional inquirers who are expected to make their investigations as genuine 
as possible.185 The normative and actual legitimacy of the scientific institution is intimately 
                                                 
179 A feminist proposal of an ethic of care may consist of both values competing with other values, and claims 
that may be justified from a moral point of view (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 9). 
180 A feminist proposal of an ethic of care may rely decisively on claims about state of affairs. If, for example, 
the care values prescribed are considered to be values inherent in the mother-child relationship, this is a 
precription based on a claim about the empirical qualities of the mother-child relationship (see Chapter 5). 
181 For a discussion of the right to privacy, see Chapter 9. 
182 See 2.2.2 and Chapter 9. 
183 Or as she puts it in a recent article: “For not all, and not only, scientists are good, reliable inquirers; and there 
is no […] uniquely rational mode of inference or procedure of inquiry used by all scientists and only by 
scientists. Rather, as Einstein once put it, scientific inquiry is a refinement of our everyday thinking” (original 
emphasis, Haack 2004: 22). 
184 “Even if the community of inquirers undertakes its cooperative search for truth under the special conditions of 
an experimental engagement with nature and a communicative engagement with experts, this complex 
undertaking embodies none other than the very type of intelligence that determines our ordinary practices and 
everyday communication. There is an internal connection between the practice of inquiry and the contexts of the 
lifeworld in which it is rooted” (Habermas 2003: 222). 
185 And expect of themselves to investigate genuinely (consider, for example, scientists’ collective self-
understanding as it is expressed in the scientific ethos, see 2.4.2). 
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linked to the idea that scientific inquirers are genuine inquirers. Science, moreover, is a public 
institution,186 and citizens have a right to justification of the decisions and procedures of 
public institutions.  
 
 2.4.5 Representation, civility and democracy 
 
i) Cognitive and intellectual authority 
Haack prescribes meritocratic recruitment to professional inquiry: If what is meant with a 
democratic epistemology is “only that no one should be excluded from a scientific career on 
the basis of irrelevant considerations such as race, sex, or eye color”, this is “right” – but this 
“democratic” norm of recruitment is “right” because it is “meritocratic in its thrust” (Haack 
1998: 114). A prescription of simple, untempered meritocracy in recruitment is, however, an 
inadequate prescription – even if it could be argued that theoretical justification is value-free, 
and theories had consisted only of truth-claims. Let me, as a first step, elaborate why 
untempered meritocracy is not necessarily truth-functional. 
 
Merit should be a decisive criterion for being recruited as a professional inquirer in a public 
institution. Helen Longino, in Manifesto pointed out as one of Haack’s main opponents, 
distinguishes between cognitive and intellectual authority. There is, she says, “equality of 
intellectual authority”; everyone has an equal “capacity to participate in critical discussion 
and thus to contribute to critical understanding”. This is, however, compatible with 
“according greater cognitive authority on some matters to those one regards as having 
acquired more knowledge concerning those matters than others”: “While the criterion 
[equality of intellectual authority] imposes duties of inclusion and attention, it does not 
require that each individual, no matter what their past record or state of training, should be 
granted equal authority on every matter” (2002a: 131-133). Elizabeth Anderson argues in a 
similar way:  
 
Expertise does, of course, matter in inquiry […]. Democracy is […]  compatible with 
honoring merit in persons, with recognizing that some people are more skilled, accomplished, 
intelligent, persuasive, interesting, and trustworthy than others, and with supporting them for 
these reasons (original emphasis, 1995b: 205).  
 
                                                 
186 Science is not the only public institution where inquiry takes place. Inquiry with public relevance, takes place, 
for example, in what David Guston (2000) refers to as “boundary organizations”. 
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Genuine truth-seeking on different problems within different areas requires particular skills, 
and truth-seekers that can demonstrate such skills should be preferred to those who cannot. 
The standard is, thus, “tempered equality” among truth-seekers: Intellectual equality tempered 
by reasonable cognitive inequality (Longino 2002a: 131).  
 
ii) Tempered meritocracy in truth-seeking 
Meritocracy in recruitment to truth-seeking needs, however, also to be tempered, if for no 
other reason, at least for the sake of truth. A community of inquirers is, according to Haack, 
epistemologically preferable to an individual inquirer. “[…] in a community of inquirers some 
will be more conservative in temperament, inclined to try adapting an old theory to new 
evidence, others more radical, readier to look for a new approach”: “Real scientists” are never 
“single-mindedly devoted to truth” (Haack 1998: 97-98). In an investigating community “[…] 
individual idiocyncracies or weaknesses may [however] compensate for each other” (ibid.). If 
this is the case, it is crucial to make sure that there are inquirers with relevant complementary 
“idiocyncracies” present (ibid.).  
 
Thus, Haack suggests herself that meritocracy in recruitment to inquiry should be tempered 
by representative concerns – for the sake of truth. To have different views represented may be 
truth-functional. This is John Stuart Mill’s famous instrumental argument: “He argued that the 
truth would most likely be discovered, disseminated, and entrenched in a society that 
permitted all points of view to be expressed and criticized” (Anderson 1995b: 194, Kitcher 
2001, Longino 2002). 
 
Different differences may be conceived as relevant. Haack suggests that both “radicals” and 
“conservatives” should be present; both those who stick to the puzzle solving within the old 
paradigm (the conservatives), and those who opt for a new paradigm (the radicals) (op.cit.: 
97-98).187 Skirbekk argues that the presence of different “conceptual perspectives” or 
“disciplines” in truth-seeking gives us “a truer picture” (2001: 10). Anderson argues that  
 
[…] justification will be spurious if the community’s relations of inquiry systematically 
exclude or discount the testimony of rational inquirers who have access to a different set of 
evidence, or who would provide alternative critical perspectives that correct the biases of the 
community’s membership (1995b: 192). 
 
                                                 
187 Haack relies on Kuhn: “Kuhn says something not dissimilar […]” (1998: 103). This implies that Haack 
subscribes to a moderate interpretation of Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis (Hoyningen-Huene 1990). 
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For the sake of truth, inquirers with different “ascribed social status[es]” should be 
represented in the community of inquirers; “race” “gender”, “class” and “ethnicity” may for 
example be relevant, because such statutes influence  which “set of evidence” you have access 
to, and what “perspectives” and “biases” you have (op.cit.: 192, 205): 
 
The internal knowledge-promoting aims of the university thus calls for measures to promote 
equality of access by all groups in society to memberships in its ranks. This is an argument for 
affirmative action188 in university admissions and faculty hiring that recognizes the positive 
contributions that members of oppressed groups can and do make to enhancing the objectivity 
of research. Equality of access thorough affirmative action policies is not, therefore, an 
external political goal that threatens to compromise the quality of research. It is a means to 
promote the objectivity of that research   (1995b: 198). 
 
iii) Equal respect in truth-seeking 
Truth-seeking qua argumentation on truth-claims implies a moral norm of equal respect. Our 
equal intellectual authority is linked to our equal “capacity to participate in critical discussion 
and thus to contribute to critical understanding” (Longino 2002a: 131):189  
 
In epistemic democracies, equality means that all communicatively competent persons are 
acknowledged as having the status of inquirers: they must be regarded as reason-givers and 
reason-takers, and their speech interpreted accordingly. All inquirers have a status that entitles 
them to call upon others to explain and justify their beliefs, and to offer reasons for them to 
change their beliefs, which mean that others are obliged to listen and respond in kind 
(Anderson 1995b: 205). 
 
Thus, to approach each other as ‘reason-givers and reason-takers’, to give each other ‘the 
status of inquirers’, to treat each other with equal respect, with equal intellectual authority, is 
not only truth-functional, it is also what we presuppose as a moral norm when arguing over 
truth.190  
 
The norm of equal respect in truth-seeking, implies that no truth-seekers should be given 
“second-class” authority for example “on account of his or her race, gender, class, ethnicity, 
or other ascribed social status” (Anderson 1995b: 205): 
 
This means that the academy must structure its communicative relations by norms that ensure 
that inquirers have their say, that encourage them to pay attention to what other members say, 
                                                 
188 My discussion here and in the next sections raises difficult policy-questions, that I do not go into. 
189 Longino refers here to Habermas. 
190 Note that this is not in fact Longino’s and Anderson’s argument. They rely, in the end, exclusively on Mill’s 
instrumental argument, and argue that the norm of equal respect in inquiry is truth-functional. I thus re-
contextualize their argument in this paragraph. 
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that discourage them from systematically discounting or distorting what others say, and that 
urge them to actively respond to criticisms and alternative perspectives by appropriately 
modifying the content and methods of their studies. These are norms of civility and mutual 
respect, by which inquirers recognize each others’ cognitive authority191 (op.cit.: 198-199). 
 
Norms of civility192 should, however, not only regulate the professional community of 
inquirers; “all communicatively competent persons” ought to be “acknowledged as having the 
status of inquirers” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 205). This implies that also citizens that are not 
members of the epistemic democracy of the democratic university are to be considered as 
reason-givers and reason-takers with intellectual authority equal to the intellectual authority of 
the professional inquirers.  “In a democracy […] merit must be demonstrated to the 
satisfaction of those who offer their support: they must be persuaded by arguments and 
evidence, not bullied into submission by those who claim epistemic superiority […]” 
(19995b: 205). Those who “must be persuaded” are citizens (ibid.). Whether and how inquiry 
should be institutionalized is a question for citizens. Citizens should have their say when 
priories are made in the context of discovery193 and in the context of practical application,194 
but also when theories are assessed as more or less warranted. When presented for the 
outcomes of inquiry; for the theories that professional inquirers consider warranted,195 citizens 
should be approached as free, equal and reasonable: Professional inquirers should make 
                                                 
191 Note that Anderson’s use of ‘cognitive authority’ is similar to Longino’s use of ‘intellectual authority’. 
192 See also 2.4.2 on the institutional norms of science. 
193 Confronted with citizens asking for justification of, for example, funding-priorities, it is “better”, Rawls 
argues, to refer to the value of democratic equality, than to use perfectionist arguments. The confrontation with 
citizens may “put […] in question whether society can allocate great public resources to pure science – to 
mathematics and theoretical physics, say – or to philosophy, or to the arts of painting and music, solely on the 
grounds that their study and practice realizes certain great excellences of thought, imagination, and feeling. No 
doubt their study does this, but it is far better to justify the use of public funds to support them by reference to 
political values. Some public support of art and culture and science, and funding museums and public 
performances, is certainly vital to the public political culture; to a society’s sense of itself and its history, and an 
awareness of its political traditions. But a large fraction of the social product for the advancement of 
mathematics and science requires a basis in advancing the good of citizens generally, say by the expected 
benefits to public health and preserving the environment, or to the needs of (justified) national defense” (Rawls 
2001: 152). Rawls defines citizens as reasonable and rational persons; they have a sense of justice and ends they 
want to advance by fair cooperation (Rawls 1996: 48-54). Thus, obliging professional inquirers to justify their 
priorities to citizens as reasonable and rational persons is very different from obliging them to justify their 
priorities to consumers or capitalists. 
194 Haack suggests that there are funding-priorities, principles and policies of recruitment, as well as applications 
of the outcome of inquiry that are more “just”, “moral” or more “morally objectionable” than others (1998: 14, 
119, 167). Citizens should be included when such assessments are made: They have a right to have the decisions 
and procedures of public institutions justified. 
195 Professional inquirers are, generally speaking, obliged to respond when asked by citizens to present the 
outcome of their investigations (because citizens have a right to have the decisions of public institutions, and the 
theories on which they are based, communicated publicly). 
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serious efforts to convince “those who offer their support” on the basis of evidence and 
rational arguments; “merit” should be “demonstrated”, not simply “claim[ed]” (ibid.).196 
 
The norm of equal respect implies, moreover, that professional inquirers should treat the 
subject-objects they are studying as reason-givers and reason-takers with equal intellectual 
authority. There are not only truth-functional reasons for taking the subject-objects reason-
giving and reason-taking seriously.197 Haack acknowledges that it may be truth-functional to 
take the subject-object seriously when she links treating all concerned subject-objects to the 
requirement of comprehensiveness:198 
 
True, if we are sociologists or anthropologists trying to understand the institution of polygamy 
in this society, or of slavery in that, then talking to wives and husbands, or to slaves and 
masters, would indeed be desirable as part of our evidence-gathering (original emphasis, 
1998: 113-114).  
 
Treating all with equal respect is, however, a universally binding norm of civility: Truth-
seekers are obliged to treat their subject-objects civilized, whether they reckon it “desirable” 
as part of their “evidence-gathering” or not (op.cit.: 114). 
 
What principles of recruitment to professional inquiry does the norm of equal respect require? 
I have so far argued that meritocracy in recruitment may be tempered by representational 
concerns, if this in fact is truth-functional. Is this compatible with treating all as free and 
equal? Or is this tempering of meritocracy for the sake of truth unjust? Do we have to choose 
between what is truth-functional and what is just? Haack defends “equality of opportunity” in 
recruitment to academia: Everyone should have equal opportunities to “a scientific career” 
regardless of “irrelevant considerations” like “sex” or “race” (op.cit.: 114). Equality of 
opportunity is, in her view, truth-functional, but also just. This is a reasonable position.199 
 
                                                 
196 Cognitive inequality between inquirers and citizens will complicate their deliberations. Many scientific 
theories are not easily understood by non-experts. Citizens will, moreover, often not scrutinize the conclusions of 
professional inquiry, due to lack of time or interest, or because they trust the professionals; they believe 
professional inquirers make genuine investigations (they may, for example, consider the principles and policies 
of recruitment to professional inquiry to be truth-functional and just, and therefore trust what professional 
inquirers do). The citizen has, however, ultimately, a right to ask, and expect an argumentative response. 
197 See 2.3.1. 
198 Foundherentism prescribes justification faithful to considerations of supportiveness, of independent security 
and of comprehensiveness (see 1.2.3). 
199 See Chapter 8. 
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Haack assumes that equality of opportunity in recruitment to professional inquiry requires 
only “procedural-fairness policies” or “anti-discrimination policies”, and is incompatible with 
“affirmative action” or “preferential hiring policies” (op.cit.: 169). But letting anti-
discrimination policies regulate recruitment to academia will not secure equal opportunities if 
the candidates of recruitment have an unequal standing. To secure all candidates of 
recruitment an equal standing requires protection of freedom of thought and speech and other 
civil rights, as Haack herself acknowledges. What Nancy Fraser (2003) refers to as “parity in 
participation” requires, moreover, socio-economic redestribution and cultural recognition.200 
 
Thus, the alternative to Haack’s anti-discrimination policies is not necessarily preferential 
hiring policies. It could be anti-discrimination policies in combination with a broad set of 
policies developed to protect the equal standing of all. Preferential hiring policies are, 
however, not necessarily incompatible with equality of opportunity. Among others Ronald 
Dworkin (2000) has argued, that affirmative action may be designed in ways that are 
compatible with treating all individuals with equal respect.201 Thus, to temper meritocracy by 
representational concerns, if this is truth-functional, is not necessarily unjust.  
 
iv) Democracy in value-laden inquiry 
Value-laden inquiry cannot be equated with truth-seeking, however. Inquirers are confronted 
with ethical and moral questions in the context of justification as well as in the context of 
discovery and in the context of practical application. I have three remarks in this connection.  
 
First, it cannot be assumed that inquirers with cognitive authority in discussions of state of 
affairs are also better equipped than others in coming to conclusions that are also just and 
ethically reasonable. Cognitive inequality that is truth-functional is not necessarily functional 
in discussions of other validity-claims. Skills that might make us particularly competent to 
investigate what ‘is’ in the social or natural world, do not necessarily make us particularly 
competent to make judgments about what norms are valid or about goodness. Thus, that 
inquiry is value-laden, is an argument for taking another look at what skills we regard as 
relevant in recruitment to professional inquiry. All “members” of “a well-ordered society, that 
is, a society in which institutions are just and this fact is publicly recognized”, have, Rawls 
                                                 
200 See Chapter 8 for an elaboration of some of Fraser’s ideas. 
201 It may, however, also be designed in ways that are incompatible with the norm of equal respect (see Chapter 
8). 
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says, “a strong sense of justice, en effective desire to comply with the existing rules and to 
give one another that to which they are entitled” (1999: 274), as well as an ability to approach 
questions of justice as reason-givers and reason-takers: Justice requires motivation for justice 
as well as deliberative skills. The education of professional inquirers of a well-ordered society 
should, accordingly, focus on cultivating their sense of justice, and stress the significance of a 
deliberative approach to ethical and moral questions.202 
 
Second, the fact that inquirers are confronted with moral and ethical questions, even in the 
context of justification, calls for another look at who are recruited to professional inquiry. 
Letting meritocracy be tempered by representative concerns for the sake of truth is not 
necessarily incompatible with the norm of equal respect. A different question is whether 
living up to standards of rightness and ethical reasonableness in fact require that 
representative concerns are taken into account in recruitment to professional inquiry. In moral 
discourse all concerned are to be included as free and equal. Hence, it may be a problem from 
a moral point of view, if, for example, certain groups (such as women) are excluded from the 
moral deliberations of the community of professional inquirers, if these groups have concerns 
different from the concerns of groups that are included (such as men), due to, for example, 
differences in social situation.203 Also ethical reasonableness or ‘impartiality’ requires that 
different ‘sides’ and ‘arguments’ are taken into account. If certain groups (such as women) 
approach ethical questions systematically different from how other groups (such as men) 
approach them, due to, for example, differences in their social situation,204 it will thus be a 
problem if women are systematically excluded from professional inquiry, where inquirers are 
confronted with value-issues in addition to other issues. 
 
A third question is whether different institutional solutions; “new advisory institutions” such 
as “lay juries” (Giæver 2004: 24, 27), are required to guarantee citizens reasonable influence 
on inquiry qua value-laden inquiry. It may be argued, of course, that such institutions may 
even be truth-functional.205 The fact that inquiry, even in the context of justification, confronts 
professional inquirers with questions of norms and values, makes the case for lay influence 
                                                 
202 To cultivate in all citizens a sense of justice is a primary task for the family and for public education (consider 
also my reflections on the conditions of individuation in Chapter 9) 
203 Whether women’s social situation is different from that of men is a question of empirical investigation (see 
Chapter 4). To what extent women will veto moral norms that men will not veto, is a question that cannot be 
settled until moral deliberations have taken place where all concerned (women as well as men) participate as free 
and equal reason-givers and reason-takers. 
204 Whether this is the case, is a question for investigation and deliberation. 
205 Along the lines of John Stuart Mill. 
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stronger, however, because professional inquirers are experts in a particular field of empirical 
investigation, not on ethics and morality: It cannot be assumed that inquirers with cognitive 
authority in discussions of state of affairs are also better equipped than others in coming to 
conclusions that are also just and ethically reasonable.206 
 
2.4.6 What is the political? 
 
Haack fears that inquirers’ ethical and political views may influence theoretical justification; 
a “politicization” of inquiry (op.cit.: 119). The political can be considered as a subcategory of 
the ethical, as when Habermas (1999) distinguishes collective ethical-political notions of 
goodness from individuals’ ethical-existentialist ideas of goodness. In dealing with both, 
genuine inquirers should strive for reasonableness and ‘impartiality’ in their assessments. 
 
The term ‘political’ has, however, also other meanings. In Political Liberalism John Rawls 
argues, for example, that the distinction between the good and the right, comprehensive 
doctrines and a freestanding notion of justice, should be understood as a distinction, not 
between ethical values and moral norms, but as one between ethical values and political 
norms reasonable and rational persons of modern pluralist society can subscribe to (in an 
“overlapping consensus” (Rawls 1996: 131-172). Whether the political norms of an 
overlapping consensus are legitimate is, however, also a question of whether they are justified 
from a moral point of view.207 
 
Claims are also referred to as political claims, if they are raised in political discourse 
understood as a particular institutionalized discourse:208 Political discourse is the discourse of 
citizens that goes on in the ‘strong’ political publics where binding decisions are made 
according to formal procedures, as well as in ‘weaker’ less formalized publics of democratic 
opinion and will formation (Fraser 1992).209  Professional inquiry in public institutions should 
                                                 
206 How successful the use of lay juries in fact has been, is a different question. Øyvind Giæver argues that 
“traditional systems of expert advice work reasonably well”, and questions the value of lay juries (2004: 2). 
Giæver assumes, however, that the outcome of deliberations on values in a group of scientists “with differing 
political views” would always be less “prejudiced” than lay deliberations (op.cit.: 27). This is a questionable 
assumption. 
207 Consider Rawls’ and Habermas’ discussion of Rawls’ ‘freestanding’ notion of justice in The Journal of 
Philosophy, March 1995. 
208 This is also how scientific discourse may be conceived; as a particular institutionalized discourse.  
209 See also Chapter 7 and 9 on Nancy Fraser’s notion of politics. 
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be regulated with reference to the political discourse among citizens in the ways outlined in 
2.4.4 and 2.4.5.  
 
If the political regime in which professional inquiry takes place is illegitimate, if, for example, 
all citizens are not treated with equal respect, matters are different, however. Haack stresses 
that genuine investigations are investigations within the limits of law: A kind of inquiry she 
regards as obviously “morally objectionable” is when the inquirer operates as a “crook paid to 
find out where the sewer runs so the gang can get into the vault” (1998: 14). Whether it is 
objectionable that genuine inquirers break laws depends, however, on whether the laws are 
legitimate or not, i.e. on whether they are the outcome of just procedures.210 It is not 
necessarily objectionable for a genuine inquirer to help the gang to get into the vault in a 
totalitarian regime, if this operation, let us say, was part of a sabotage against the regime. Also 
in a well-ordered society civil obedience is allowed for, under certain conditions, moreover 
(Rawls 1999: 326-330). 
 
2.5 Assessing the fifth premise211  
 
Haack is correct when pointing out that the wishful and fearful thinking of sham reasoning, as 
she describes it, is indefensible for logical reasons. It is impossible to derive “an ‘is’ from an 
‘ought’” (1998: 129). The wish or desire that P provides no evidential support for P. Allowing 
values to influence and moral norms to regulate theoretical justification is, however, 
compatible with dismissing sham reasoning. 
 
What I have argued so far, is that significant theories have ethical and moral dimensions that 
can be assessed as more or less warranted. The aim of genuine inquiry should be to end up 
with theories whose claims are justified with reference to the standard of truth, to the standard 
of morality, as well as to a standard of ethical reasonableness. Does this imply that a theory 
consisting of warranted truth-claims, but which refers to moral and ethical claims which are 
unwarranted, is a theory genuine inquirers should dismiss?  
                                                 
210 Consider for example Habermas’ (1999) outline of the relationship between justice, democracy and the rule 
of law. A recent article by Haack has the following sentence in its introduction: “Justice requires just laws, of 
course, and just administration of those laws; but it also requires factual truth” (2004: 15). She goes on 
elaborating the conditions of genuine truth-seeking in the American legal system, and says no more about the 
relationship between justice and legal norms.  
211 The wish or desire that P provides no evidential support for P. 
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If inquirers accept a theory that refers to norms that are incompatible with the moral norm of 
equal respect they implicitly assume when they inquire and accept, they commit a 
performative self-contradiction. If they accept a theory that refers to norms that are 
incompatible with norms all would accept as free and equal in moral discourse, they 
disrespect norms of civility that are universally binding. Genuine inquiry should, however, be 
moral and performatively consistent: Genuine inquirers should not accept a theory consisting 
of warranted truth-claims if the moral claims to which it refers are unwarranted.212 This is not 
sham reasoning; this is not to deduce a conclusion about state of affairs from a conclusion 
about how state of affairs ought to be regulated, i.e. to consider an idea about what ought to be 
as “evidence that things are or are not so” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 129). This is to recognize 
that genuine inquirers are also moral persons with the obligations of moral persons, and thus 
that they should pursue inquiry within the limits of those obligations.213 If this is what 
defending a ‘democratic’ epistemology implies, I would defend a democratic epistemology.214 
 
When genuine inquirers are confronted with theories referring to claims that are ethically 
unreasonable, things are not so clear, however. Warrant comes in degrees: The theories 
genuine inquirers accept are more or less warranted. A theory consisting of warranted truth-
claims, which is ‘democratic’ in the sense suggested, but which refers to values in a ‘partial’ 
way, may be considered less warranted than a theory consisting of warranted truth-claims, 
which is ‘democratic’ in the sense suggested, and refers to values in an ‘impartial’ and 
reasonable way. The theory may, however, be considered far better warranted than a theory 
whose claims about state of affairs are questionable, but which refers to values in an 
‘impartial’ and reasonable way.215 Not in any case is sham reasoning an option for genuine 
                                                 
212 Haack implicitly suggests that genuine inquiry should be regulated by certain moral standards (see Chapter 
1). In the end, she defends, however, her argument for value-freedom in theoretical justification unmodified. 
213 The discussions of this section, as the discussions of the previous sections, raise difficult policy-questions that 
I will have to leave for another occasion (for example the question of how, more concretely, to institutionalize 
inquiry within the ‘limits’ of morality). I think Kitcher is correct when he notes that “banning” certain kinds of 
investigations (i.e. limiting the freedom of thought and speech) because they are ‘uncivil’ needs a separate 
argument (2002: 93-108). Other less controversial and not necessarily less efficient measures may be taken, 
moreover. ‘Civil’ investigations may, for example, be encouraged in the education of professional inquirers, 
through priorities in funding, and through integrating a civil code in the scientific ethos. 
214 If defending democratic epistemology implies recommending that “theory-choice” is “put to a vote”, I would, 
obviously, not defend it (Haack 1998: 113). 
215 Citizens should keep this in mind when deliberating on and deciding what kind of investigation to fund: 
Investigations based on deeply problematic ethical postulates might end op with theories that are significantly 
true. 
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inquirers: An ‘is’ cannot be derived from a claim about what we value, even if the value-claim 
is reasonable. 
 
It should be stressed that a theory that is, in one way or another, influenced by, for example, 
feminist values, may be based on warranted truth-claims. Haack tends to rule out this 
possibility. In a situation of “theory-choice” the alternative to a ‘feminist’ theory based on 
warranted truth-claims216  (op.cit.: 113), may, moreover, be a theory that is neither ‘feminist’ 
nor warranted as true, or it may be a theory that is not ‘feminist’ but based on a similar set of 
warranted truth-claims as the ‘feminist’ theory. In this situation, opting for the ‘feminist’ 
theory would not be less compatible with standards of genuine inquiry than opting for the 
empirically warranted, but not ‘feminist’, theory (it might even be more compatible with 
standards of genuine inquiry to opt for the ‘feminist’ one217). To opt for the ‘feminist’ but 
empirically warranted theory instead of the theory neither ‘feminist’ nor warranted as true, 
would, in most cases, be more compatible with standards of genuine inquiry than the other 
way around.218 The situations of ‘theory-choice’ Haack focuses on, exclusively, are, however, 
situations where the alternatives are, one the one hand, a theory that is not ‘feminist’, but 
based on warranted truth-claims – a theory which, however, cannot be value-free, even if 
Haack assumes that it can – and, on the other, a theory that is ‘feminist’, not empirically 
warranted, and a product of sham reasoning. In such cases, genuine inquirers should, 
obviously, dismiss the unwarranted and sham theory, whether ‘feminist’ or not.219 A more 
interesting case, however, is when the alternatives are, on the one hand, a ‘feminist’ theory 
based on claims compatible with norms of civility, and, on the other hand, a theory that is not 
‘feminist’ but compatible with norms of civility, and the latter is based on truth-claims that 
are somewhat better warranted than the truth-claims of the ‘feminist’ theory, whereas the 
‘feminist’ theory is based on ethical claims that are better warranted than the ethical claims of 
the theory that is not ‘feminist’. In this situation, genuine inquirers should, as a rule, maximize 
warrant, i.e. opt for the theory whose truth-claims are better warranted, even if it is ethically 
                                                 
216 A theory influenced, in one way or another, by feminist values. 
217 If, for example, the theory not ‘feminist’ were based on claims incompatible with norms of civility. Were 
instead the ‘feminist’ theory based on claims incompatible with norms of civility (i.e. if the theory in question 
were influenced by a feminist ethical-political project contradicting the norm of equal respect), while the theory 
not ‘feminist’ were compatible, genuine inquirers would, obviously, opt for the latter. 
218 If the ‘feminist’ theory in question were based on claims incompatible with norms of civility, genuine 
inquirers would dismiss both alternatives. 
219 Whether they should accept the alternative theory depends, among other things, on to what extent the 
alternative theory is based on better warranted truth-claims than other alternative theories, and on whether it is 
based on claims that do not contradict the norm of equal respect. 
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less ‘impartial’ than the alternative theory, because ethical claims, however ‘impartial’, is 
always ‘competing’ with alternative claims in a way truth-claims warranted as approximately 
true are not (see 2.4.4).220  
 
Haack’s horror scenario is that inquiry is reduced to a pseudo-inquiry the aim of which is not 
to find out how things are, but solely to facilitate a politically correct notion of goodness – for 
example a feminist notion – even if this means disregarding warranted truth-claims. This kind 
of wishful thinking might be an implication of subscribing to Richard Rorty’s (2003) 
prescription of replacing the aim of significant truth with that of ‘solidarity’ or ‘social hope’. 
Nothing of what I have said implies embracing such a prescription. Haack is wrong when she 
equates the wishful thinking of Rorty and feminists subscribing to similar prescriptions with 
the wishful thinking of Nazi and Soviet-style science, however. The wishful thinkers of the 
Nazi- and Soviet-style science ‘wished’ for things that were morally objectionable. Rorty and 
his followers wish precisely for ‘social hope’ and ‘solidarity’, i.e. they do not seem to ‘wish’ 
for something that fundamentally contradicts basic norms of civility. 
2.6 A different conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that the premises in Haack’s argument for value-
freedom are inadequately conceptualized, rest on inconsistencies and several unwarranted 
assumptions. Hence, her conclusion (6), that theoretical justification cannot refer to values, 
cannot be upheld, at least not on the basis of this argument.221 
 
I have argued, moreover, that genuine inquiry should be regulated by norms of civility where 
all are treated as free and equal. Epistemology should, in this sense, be ‘democratic’. This is 
also a feminist prescription in the sense that what is prescribed is that all persons, i.e. also 
persons who are referred to as ‘women’, should be treated as free and equal. I have, 
furthermore, specified a role for ethical considerations in genuine inquiry – for feminist 
ethical considerations as well as other ethical considerations. Whether a ‘feminist 
epistemology’ may be defensible in an even more ambitious sense, is the question I will 
address in Chapter 4, where I assess Haack’s refutation of feminist standpoint epistemology, 
i.e. the views of a group of “feminist epistemologists” who claim that epistemology should 
                                                 
220 Genuine inquirers use, however, also their good judgment in such cases. 
221 From what I have argued in this chapter, it should be clear that I for the time being do not see how a 
convincing argument for value-freedom can be made. 
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embody “some specifically feminist insight” (original emphasis, Haack 1998: 119); insights 
that are more than implications of the argument for the ‘democratization’ of epistemology. 
First, however, I want to take a closer look at the radical interpretations of the slogan science 
as social. Are they compatible with a commitment to genuine inquiry? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 97
CHAPTER 3 
 
SCIENCE AS SOCIAL AND THE ARGUMENT FOR 
VALUE-FREEDOM 
 
 
 
3.0 Moderates – in favor of value-freedom? 
 
Haack criticizes radical interpretations of the idea that science is social. These interpretations 
make theoretical justification either partly or wholly a matter of “social negotiations”, and so 
either “play down” or “ignore” warrant, and “accentuate” or “accept only” social acceptance 
as the aim of inquiry (Haack 1998: 112, 113, 114). Science as social as a radical slogan, 
targets premise 1), 2) and 3) in Haack’s argument for value-freedom. The radicals, as 
portrayed by her, claim that social acceptance and not (only) significant truth, is the aim of 
inquiry (thus denying 1), that whether a theory is justified depends on social acceptance and 
not (only) on features indicative of its truth (thus denying 2), and that one shows that a theory 
is most probably true, if this is considered something one should try to show at all, by 
demonstrating that it is socially accepted, not (only) that it is best supported by independently 
secure and comprehensive evidence (thus denying 3). In other words, radical interpretations 
of science as social make inquiry (1), theoretical justification (2) and truth-seeking (3) matters 
of social negotiation. They pave thus the way for the idea of value-laden justification; the idea 
that certain values, for example feminist values or democratic values generally, should 
influence theoretical justification. 
 
Haack’s assessment of the radical position of science as social is, however, too dismissive. 
There are radical interpretations of science as social (or rather, interpretations of science as 
social Haack refers to as radical) which are defensible. Other variants of the radical position 
are in fact indefensible. Agreeing with Haack that variants of the radical position are 
indefensible is, however, not equivalent to subscribing to her argument for value-freedom.  
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3.1 Wholly a matter of social negotiation? A re-assessment 
3.1.1 Moderates among the radicals 
 
As a first step, Haack sets herself the task of refuting the most radical position: that inquiry, 
theoretical justification and truth-seeking are wholly matters of social negotiation; that 
“scientific knowledge is nothing more than the product of processes of social negotiation” 
(1998: 112). This position disregards, in her view, the fact that justifying theories is assessing 
the truth-indicativeness of evidence; justifying beliefs as more or less true or false with 
reference to the best criteria of justification available. Hence, the most radical position ignores 
the distinction between warrant and actual acceptance: It accentuates “what at a given time 
passes for scientific knowledge over warrant” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 117).  
 
In an ideal communication community genuine inquirers will, ultimately, end up with theories 
that are significantly true. Theories we end up with following real investigations will, 
however, never be complete and final: Even our most warranted opinions are not Final 
Opinions. This is because all real theories are fallible (even those justified under 
approximately ideal conditions), but also because the empirical conditions under which real 
investigations take place, may be far from ideal. These distinctions, between ideal and real 
justification of theories, and real theoretical justification under approximately ideal conditions 
and under far from ideal conditions; two variants of what Haack refers to as the warrant-
acceptance distinction, need to be upheld.  
 
However, regarding inquiry, theoretical justification and truth-seeking as wholly a matter of 
social negotiation, is not necessarily incompatible with upholding the warrant-acceptance 
distinction. Whether there is incompatibility, depends on what more precisely the term social 
negotiation refers to. Haack defines truth as “the ultimate representation […], compatible with 
all possible experiential evidence and the fullest logical scrutiny, which would be agreed by 
all who investigate were inquiry to continue indefinitely” (op.cit.: 162). This is in a sense to 
conceive of warrant as a matter of social negotiation: It is to link the meaning of truth to the 
essentially social practice of reason-giving and reason-taking under approximately ideal 
conditions.  
 
Some of them Haack refers to as radicals, defends a notion of science as social negotiations 
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which disregards the warrant-acceptance distinction.222 Helen Longino, one of Haack’s main 
targets among the feminist epistemologists, does not, however. Longino rejects what she 
refers to as “the rational-social dichotomy” in the approach to the study of science; “the 
current deadlock between philosophers of science and sociologists of science” (2002a: 2). She 
defends instead a notion of “pragmatic rationality”, where “observation and reasoning” are 
regarded as “social”, “interactive” or “dialogical”, “that is, as activities involving discursive 
interactions among different voices” (op.cit.: 77, 99).223 A “predecessor” to Longino’s 
approach is, among others, Charles Sanders Peirce – which is also the predecessor of Haack’s 
foundherentism – and his idea that inquiry approaches “(ultimate) truth […] in the long run” 
only if it is made into “a social activity”; if it is pursued in a “community” of “critical 
interaction […] consisting of all investigators who have ever lived” (op.cit.: 5, 6).224 Thus, it 
is correct that Longino disagrees with Haack’s argument for value-freedom.225 But this does 
not imply that she rubs out, or has to rub out, the warrant-acceptance distinction.  
 
3.1.2 Misconceived concessions 
 
Having dismissed the most radical position: that inquiry, theoretical justification and truth-
seeking are wholly matters of social negotiation, Haack admits that there are two readings of  
this position that she would not deny: 
 
i) Scientific theories and theoretical concepts are “devised, articulated, developed” by 
scientists or others (1998: 113). 
ii) Theories of the human and social sciences refer to “social institutions” which would not 
exist “if there weren’t human societies” (ibid.). 
 
Haack is correct in claiming both i) and ii), and in claiming that i) and ii) are compatible with 
upholding the warrant-acceptance distinction. Neither i) nor ii) are, however, compatible with 
                                                 
222 Such as Richard Rorty. 
223 Whereas Haack fails to appreciate Longino’s rationalism, Longino may be accused of failing to appreciate the 
“interactionist socialism” and “social methodism” to which Haack has an “explicit commitment”, with her notion 
of inquiry in a community of inquirers (Kitcher 2002: 558). 
224 Longino refers to herself, moreover, as “neither metaphysically antirealist nor epistemologically relativist” 
but as a “tempered realist” and a “pluralist” (2002a: 141, 183): “Nature may be so complex that it is impossible 
for any single account of a given process to represent fully all the factors that make a difference to the precise 
course of the process. On the other hand, it may be possible that, in the long run, a unified complete 
representation of nature will emerge from the process of inquiry” (op.cit.: 141). 
225 She refers to it and briefly refutes it (Longino 2002a: 49-51). 
 100
her argument for value-freedom.226 
3.2 Partly a matter of social negotiation? A re-assessment 
 
Next, Haack attempts to refute the less radical position: that inquiry, theoretical justification 
and truth-seeking are partly matters of social negotiation. Regarding inquiry, theoretical 
justification and truth-seeking as partly matters of social negotiation, could be mistaken for 
Haack’s own position.227 She describes discussions in the context of discovery and in the 
context of practical application as negotiations between strategic egoists with unpredictable 
and irrational beliefs and desires. Thus, at least inquiry (if not theoretical justification and 
truth-seeking) is, in her view, partly a matter of social negotiation. Once more, what is at 
stake, however, is how to proceed in the context of justification. What concerns Haack, is how 
to refute misleading ideas about the implications for theoretical justification of the thesis that 
theories are underdetermined by evidence (the underdeterminaton thesis). The following four 
ideas about the implications of the underdetermination thesis are, in her view, indefensible:228  
 
i) Since theories are underdetermined by evidence, we have to recognize whatever else makes 
our theories socially acceptable as indications of warrant. 
ii) If for examples social evaluations or interests are what make our theories socially 
acceptable, social evaluations or interests are indications of warrant, since theories are 
underdetermined by evidence, and we have to recognize whatever else makes our theories 
socially acceptable as indications of warrant. 
iii) Even if we do not have to recognize in principle whatever else, apart from evidence, 
makes our theories acceptable as indications of warrant, be it social evaluations, interests or 
something else, we do so in practice. 
iv) Even if we do not have to recognize in principle whatever else, apart from evidence, 
makes our theories acceptable as indications of warrant, for example social evaluations and 
interests, we need to do so in practice, because “we have to act, and so we have to accept 
some theory [as warranted] as the basis on which to act” (op.cit.: 111). 
 
That i) and ii) are indefensible, is an implication of the warrant-acceptance distinction: What 
                                                 
226 Consider the different reasons listed in Chapter 2. 
227 That is: Even if we talk of a notion of social negotiation disregarding the warrant-acceptance distinction (and 
not a notion of social negotiation compatible with this distinction, see 3.1.1). 
228 The three interpretations of the underdetermination thesis she discusses (see 1.3.2), contain in fact four 
interpretations. 
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is accepted in social negotiations at any given time, in any given place, be it social 
evaluations, interests or something else, should not be equated with what is warranted 
independently of an assessment of how the social acceptance has come about (i.e. 
independently of an assessment of whether the conditions under which the acceptance has 
come about are approximately, or far from, ideal). If this is something we do in practice (iii), 
then our inquiries are pseudo-inquiries. But this is not something we have to do in practice 
(iv). We do not have to accept theories as warranted, as justified as more or less true, in order 
to do something in practice. That is: When acting, we assume, indeed, a background 
consensus on validity-claims. The validity-claims are, however, not considered as validity-
claims before our course of action has been disrupted, and someone has asked questions of 
validity. The implicit validity-claims of the background consensus are, obviously, not 
accepted as valid in discourse until they have been made into topics for discourse. We assume 
them in our lifeworld practices: We act “as if” something was “true”, i.e. we do not accept 
something as true as investigators, before we have investigated it (ibid.). 
 
Thus, the underdetermination thesis does not make i) to iv) defensible. The fact that theories 
are underdetermined by evidence should, however, inspire genuine inquirers to investigate 
whether whatever influences theoretical justification, apart from truth-indicative evidence, be 
it social evaluations, interests or something else, are warranted influences. Theoretical 
justification confronts genuine inquirer with ethical and moral questions; they are 
“inseparable from scientific inquiry” (op.cit.: 110).229 Thus, Haack’s argument for value-
freedom cannot be upheld, even if her refutations of i) to iv) are all valid. 
 
3.3 A good, sober sociology of science: A different suggestion 
 
3.3.1 Good science without good philosophy? 
 
Haack’s alternative to radical interpretations of science as social, is a moderate proposal of a 
“good, sober sociology of science” (op.cit.: 99). Her proposal is, however, too restrictive. 
Haack does not acknowledge that social and cultural studies of science may provide us with a 
more accurate empirical picture of scientific practices, even if some of the philosophical 
                                                 
229 In the way outlined in Chapter 2. 
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assumptions some or more of these studies are based on, are indefensible.230 According to 
Longino, there are today, roughly speaking, “two main streams” of contemporary “social and 
cultural studies of science”, one focusing on “the relationship between scientific knowledge 
and relatively large-scale professional and ideological social formations”,231 the other “often 
identified as laboratory studies or micro-sociology” focusing on “the interactions within and 
between laboratories and research programs and on the efforts required to export laboratory 
work into the non-laboratory world”232 (Longino 2002a: 7). It is misconceived and scientistic 
to claim that these studies of science show the irrelevance of philosophical concerns. On this 
point Haack is correct. 
 
It is, however, also unreasonable to assume, like Haack does, that cultural and social studies 
of science have to be false and insignificant if some of their philosophical assumptions are 
questionable. Whether a particular empirical study of science ends up with theories that are 
significantly true, is a question for investigation.233  
 
Several kinds of significant questions may be asked in empirical studies of science, moreover. 
Haack argues that genuine investigators of science should restrict themselves to studying how 
“the internal organization” and the “external environment” of science facilitate or hamper an 
“adequate correlation” between acceptance and warrant in particular cases (1998: 108). And 
such studies may, obviously, be significant. How to facilitate genuine inquiry, and how to 
hamper pseudo-inquiry, are, however, not the only significant questions sociologists, 
historians, social anthropologists and social psychologists can ask when investigating state of 
affairs in science. The scientific institution and scientific practice can be studied from several 
different interesting points of view, just as other social institutions and practices can.  
 
Science can, furthermore, be studied from other perspectives than the perspectives prescribed 
by the two streams identified by Longino. This follows from the non-exceptionalist approach 
                                                 
230 See for example Martin Hollis’ (1982), Harald Grimen’s (1990) and Adrian Haddock’s (2004) critical 
discussions of philosophical assumptions of the Edinburgh-school, the so-called Strong Programme. 
231 Longino exemplifies this stream with Barry Barnes, David Bloor and the Edinburgh-school, the so-called 
Strong Programme, and picks out Andrew Pickering’s Constructing Quarks and Steven Shapin and Simon 
Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air Pump as paradigmatic examples.   
232 Longino picks out Karin Knorr-Cetina’s The Manufacture of Knowledge (1981) and different works by Bruno 
Latour (such as Laboratory Life and Science in Action) as paradigmatic examples of this stream. 
233 The relationship between an inquirer’s philosophical commitments and the quality of the empirical studies 
she pursues is far from simple. Note for example how several critics of Michel Foucault’s philosophical 
presuppositions anyway appreciate his social and cultural analysis (Fraser 1989: 17-68, 161-190, Kitcher 2001: 
53, Longino 2002: 86-87). 
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to science both Longino and Haack defend: If scientific practice is a social practice among 
other social practices, the scientific institution an institution among other institutions, and 
scientific knowledge is not essentially different from other kinds of knowledge,234 then 
investigators of science have, several ‘streams’ developed within several disciplines to draw 
upon in their studies.235 A commitment to non-exceptionalism implies linking theoretical and 
conceptual developments in empirical studies of science to theoretical and conceptual 
developments in the study of other social practices and institutions (and, of course, the other 
way around). Thus, to turn what is often referred to as ‘science studies’ into an intellectual 
and institutional enclave,236 decoupled from philosophical discussions237 and social and 
cultural studies generally, would be problematic. 
 
3.3.2 The internal and external organization of science 
 
What then is Haack’s picture of a good, sober sociology of science, apart from her 
prescription that it should focus explicitly on factors that facilitate or hamper genuine inquiry? 
How are the internal organization and the external environment of science to be studied?  
 
Concerning the external environment, Haack is implicit and general. She says that genuine 
inquiry can only take place in a free and just society. Haack contrasts the free and just society 
where genuine inquiry is facilitated, with totalitarian regimes, “Nazi” or “Soviet”-style 
regimes, where genuine inquiry is hampered, because inquirers are not guaranteed “freedom 
of thought and speech” (op.cit.: 131). Hence, a good, sober sociology of science should, in her 
view, focus on tracing Nazi- and Soviet-style tendencies in society. However, societies that 
are not easily associated with such tendencies, for example societies regulated by liberal-
democratic constitutions that guarantee freedom of thought and speech, are not necessarily 
                                                 
234 This is neither to deny that science has empirically distinguishable traits as practice, institution and 
knowledge, to deny that the study of science confronts inquirers with particular normative problems, nor to deny 
that the warrant-acceptance distinction should be upheld. 
235 Consider for example the tradition often referred to as ‘intellectual history’ (for an outline see Thue, 
forthcoming), that does not seem to fit neatly into any of the two streams. Consider also, for example, studies of 
science inspired by Pierre Bourdieu. They may indeed be classified as focusing on the relationship between 
scientific knowledge and large-scale social formations, but would differ substantially from studies inspired by 
the Edinburgh-school. 
236 For a definition of  ”science studies”, see Enebakk (2004: 1-7). 
237 As noted by Gunnar Skirbekk in a paper on the relationship between science studies and moral philosophy, 
this does not mean that philosophical discussions should be a main issue in science studies: “[…] even if we 
think that science studies should address […] normative questions critically and scholarly, this does not mean 
that questions of normative justification should be the main issue in science studies. There are various interesting 
and legitimate research themes and research interests, also in science studies” (2004: 10). 
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free and just, according to more ambitious criteria. A good sober sociology of science should, 
for example, focus on “the relationship between scientific knowledge and relatively large-
scale professional and ideological social formations” of such societies, because such 
“formations” of various kinds may influence the process of reason-giving and reason-taking 
in ways that inspire pseudo-inquiry (Fuller 1995, Longino 2002a. 7). Consider for example 
how feminists have traced interconnections between (what is accepted as) scientific 
knowledge – even if not warranted as such – and patriarchal evaluations, interests and 
structures in societies that are not Nazi or Soviet-style regimes (see Fox Keller 1985, Alcoff 
and Potter 1993, Longino and Fox Keller 1996, Wylie 1996). 
 
Concerning the internal organization of science, Haack prescribes the good, sober sociologist 
to investigate whether the scientific community has organized competition and cooperation 
among individual inquirers optimally, i.e. in a way that inspires genuine inquiry.238 Haack 
focuses in this connection on the organizational aspects of scientific communities that are 
formal, official and relatively easily visible, i.e. on how scientific communities are formally 
organized – in specialized competing and cooperating subcommunities, to which recruitment 
is officially meritocratic, and on wishes (or fears) that are easily seen and easily measured, 
such as “fame and fortune” (1998: 9). What should concern a good, sober sociologist are, 
however, also less formal, less visible evaluations, interests and structures that may facilitate 
or hamper genuine inquiry. Evaluations, interests and structures in the scientific community 
cannot, moreover, be studied as though they were not potentially influenced by evaluations, 
interests and structures in society at large. This has been a main concern in feminist cultural 
and social studies of society; to highlight the interconnections between the patriarchal 
‘external environment’ of science and the ‘internal organization’. Hence, it is not necessarily a 
fruitful strategy for genuine investigations of the sociology of science, to operate with too 
strict divisions between internal and external, science and society, the micro-level and the 
macro-level. 
3.3.3 Debating science as social: From camps to arguments 
My notion of a good, sober sociology of science is then, in several senses, more permissive 
than Haack’s notion: I think there are more significant questions to be asked by such a 
sociology than she does, and more places to look for relevant answers. Consequently, my 
                                                 
238 In Chapter 2 I comment on the questionable instrumental approach to the communal character of inquiry and 
the inadequate rational-choice theory of action in which Haack’s prescription is embedded. 
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approach to recent contributions in empirical studies of science, and the development of 
‘science studies’, is not dismissive, even though critical. I belong, like Haack, to the moderate 
camp, in the sense that I defend the warrant-acceptance distinction, realism (as elaborated), 
and significant truth as the aim of genuine investigations. I think, however, that there are more 
allies among the scholars Haack refers to as radicals than she herself recognizes. In the end, 
moreover, vague general labels such as ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ are not very illuminating. 
What matters are the particular elaboration of and the arguments given for particular 
positions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FEMINIST STANDPOINT EPISTEMOLOGY: A 
RECONSTRUCTED CRITIQUE239 
 
4.0 Should epistemology embody some specifically feminist 
insight? 
 
In Chapter 2, I argued that genuine inquiry should be regulated by norms of civility where all 
are treated as free and equal. Epistemology should, in this sense, be ‘democratic’. This is also 
a feminist prescription in the sense that what is prescribed is that all persons, i.e. also persons 
who are referred to as ‘women’, should be treated as free and equal. I moreover specified a 
role for ethical considerations in genuine inquiry – for feminist ethical considerations as well 
as other ethical considerations. In Chapter 3 I outlined how cultural and social studies of 
science can be pursued without evading the warrant-acceptance distinction. One may, for 
example, pursue studies that focus on gender, for example studies that show how what is 
‘accepted’ as scientific knowledge in contemporary society is influenced by patriarchal social 
evaluations, interests and structures. Hence, my argument so far for a social, democratic 
epistemology (in the sense specified), has been general; I might just as well have talked about 
other concerns than feminist concerns. Thus, so far, I have argued for an epistemology that 
may be referred to as a feminist epistemology, but which does not, at least not in any deep 
sense, embody “some specifically feminist insight”, to quote Haack (op.cit.: 119). But should 
it? And what would this mean, more precisely? 
 
4.1 Why stress the feminist case? Sexism in science and society 
4.1.1 Haack’s general suspicion 
 
Feminism, as I have conceptualized it so far, is a critical project, in a general sense; feminists 
make judgments about things with reference to certain standards. Feminism is, however, also, 
                                                 
239 Several of the points made in this chapter were developed in a previous paper, “A Standpoint Theory to the 
Point?”. I wish to thank Hilary Rose, Kari Wærness, Evelyn Fox Keller and Roger Strand for comments. I have 
since 2002 been teaching at a course in feminist theory at the University of Bergen. I wish to thank my students 
for discussing the merits of feminist standpoint epistemology with me. 
 107
more specifically, critical of contemporary society. Feminists criticize, for example, practices 
of contemporary society with reference to a standard of justice (including gender justice): 
Feminists consider gender injustice to be a real problem. Haack does not deny that gender 
injustice may be a real problem in several settings, on several occasions (1998: 118-119). 
However, she suspects that there is less sexism than feminists have argued, for example in the 
“processes of academic recruitment”, and when “funding policies” are made, and that sexism 
is more seldom an explanation of “bad science” than feminist scholars have claimed (op.cit.: 
176, 203). Presented as it is, as a general suspicion, it is highly problematic. Studies, whether 
pursued by feminists or by others, should be scrutinized and assessed individually, case by 
case, with reference to standards of genuine inquiry. Feminists’ conclusions about state of 
affairs in contemporary science and society cannot be dismissed based on general 
uninvestigated assumptions about the biases of such conclusions. 
 
But can we not at least suspect there to be certain biases? Will feminists not tend to 
overestimate the presence of sexism? Overestimation of sexism may mean, for example, that: 
 
i) Human actions are presented as more determined by patriarchal social structures, cultural or 
psychoanalytical patterns than they in fact are. 
ii) The persuasiveness of patriarchal structures and patterns are overestimated. 
iii) The persuasiveness of patriarchal structures or patterns on one level (for example on a 
psychoanalytical level) is taken to prove that patriarchal structures or patterns on a different 
level (for example, on a cultural level) are also persuasive, without additional argument. 
iv) The distinction between patriarchal structures and patterns and gendered structures and 
patterns (which may or may not be patriarchal) is evaded. 
v) The emphasis on gender injustice results in an underestimation of other kinds of injustice. 
vi) The harmful consequences of patriarchal structures and patterns for individual men or 
groups of men are underestimated. 
 
Underestimation of sexism, on the other hand, may mean, for example, that: 
 
i) Human actions are presented as less determined by patriarchal social structures, cultural or 
psychoanalytical patterns than they in fact are. 
ii) The persuasiveness of patriarchal structures and patterns are underestimated. 
iii) The persuasiveness of patriarchal structures or patterns on one level (for example on a 
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psychoanalytical level) is not considered an impetus to investigate whether there are also 
persuasive patriarchal structures or patterns on other levels (for example on a cultural level). 
iv) Gendered patterns (which may or may not be patriarchal) are not investigated as possible 
patriarchal patterns. 
v) The emphasis on kinds of injustice other than gender injustice results in an underestimation 
of gender injustice. 
vi) The harmful consequences of patriarchal structures and patterns for individual men or 
groups of men are overestimated. 
 
There is no general reason to believe that the degree of overestimation of sexism among 
feminist inquirers would be very different from the degree of overestimation of, for example, 
racism among inquirers committed to anti-racist norms. The question is whether we have a 
general reason to expect that inquirers explicitly committed to, for example, anti-racism or 
anti-sexism, overestimate the degree of racism or sexism. Were this the case, it would not be 
because their commitments were made explicit: Problems of over- and underestimation are 
not solved by hiding or ignoring the commitments that are possibly biasing one’s 
investigations.240  
 
There may, however, be possibly biasing professional interests involved when feminists study 
sexism (and anti-racists study racism). If it, for example, turns out that sexism in 
contemporary society is in fact a marginal problem, why fund feminist inquirers investigating 
it? Why not concentrate on other issues? The fear of being confronted with such questions 
may tempt feminist inquirers to overestimate the problem of sexism. In addition, questions of 
truthfulness may occur: What if feminists’ engagement against sexism – an engagement often 
of a comprehensive ethical-political and deep existential kind – has been based on wishful or 
fearful thinking, rather than on theories of state affairs established on the basis of genuine 
inquiry? Have feminists been deceiving themselves? To overestimate sexism may seem a 
convenient thing to do, when confronted by such disturbing questions concerning one’s self-
understanding.  
 
However, not only feminist inquirers have professional interests and vulnerable identities. 
Inquirers investigating problems other than sexism, or who consider the problem of sexism to 
                                                 
240 See also Chapter 2. 
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be marginal, may have a professional interest in presenting sexism as marginal – and so be 
tempted to underestimate it – in order to have their investigations properly funded. Also the 
self-understanding of many scientists is at stake, moreover, if feminist analyses of the 
persuasiveness of sexism in contemporary science and society turn out to be accurate. 
 
Hence, generally speaking, we should not expect feminist inquirers to do either better or 
worse as genuine inquirers. Rather, we should scrutinize their particular contributions 
according to the same criteria as other contributions. Feminists should be treated as reason-
givers and reason-takers on par with other reasons-givers and reason-takers. This is an issue 
of what is truth-functional, but also an issue of respecting fundamental norms of civility. 
General suspicions about the intellectual integrity of feminist inquirers of the kind Haack 
notoriously raises thus disturb not only genuine truth-seeking, they are also morally 
disturbing. 
4.1.2 Sexism in the natural sciences? 
 
Haack denies in particular that sexism infects “the physical sciences” (1998: 117). Feminists 
who claim this, exaggerates “the supposed ubiquity of sexual metaphors in the writing of 
scientists and philosophers of science”: “[…] whether a cognitively important metaphor is 
fruitful, whether it makes us look in the right or in the wrong direction, is independent of the 
desirability or otherwise of the social phenomena on which it calls” (original emphasis, ibid.). 
Her position is, in short, that metaphors that reflect patriarchal norms may be truth-functional, 
even if these patriarchal norms are undesirable. Initially, Haack has, I think, a point.241 The 
point is illuminatingly explicated by Herta Nagl-Docekal in her criticism of Evelyn Fox 
Keller’s dissection of the sexist metaphors in Francis Bacon’s writings: 
 
Bacon verknüpft verschiedene Elemente – er beschreibt zum einen die Stellung, die 
Wissenschaft und Technik der Natur gegenüber einnehmen, als eine beherrschende, und er 
befindet zum anderen, dass sich das Verhältnis der Geschlechter als Analogie bzw. als 
Metaphor heranziehen lässt. Aus feministischer Perspektive geht es nun primär darum zu 
thematisieren, wie die Geschlecterbeziehung hier imaginiert ist – es geht also darum, die 
Subordination der Frau sichtbar zu machen und zurückzuweisen. Eine solche Kritik impliziert 
die Forderung: Das Verhältnis der Geschlechter muss so gedacht werden, dass es sich nicht 
als ein Modellfall für die Characterisierung hierarchischer Strukturen eignet. Der Einwand 
gegen Bacon, der daraus abzuleiten ist, betrifft freilich nur eines der beiden unterschiedenen 
Elemente seiner Reflexion – er betrifft Bacons Sicht der Beziehung von Mann und Frau, 
                                                 
241 Sexism may, however,  infect the physical sciences in ways other than through the use of sexist metaphors 
(see Chapter 2). Haack, unfortunately, does not deliberate upon this possibility. 
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während er seine Konzeption des Verhältnisses von Wissenschaft und Technik zur Natur als 
solche untangiert lässt (original emphasis, 1999: 154). 
 
That is: Bacon’s “These von der Herrschaft des Menschen über die Natur” might be correct, 
even if he were using the fact that men have power over women – a fact that can be criticized 
from the point of view of justice – as a metaphor for this “Herrschaft” (ibid.). Hence, whether 
Bacon’s thesis is correct or not is a specific problem, a problem in its own right:242 “Das 
Anliegen einer Befreiung der Frau macht es nicht eo ipso erforderlich, für andere Bereiche 
angenommene Unterordnungsstrukturen abzulehnen” (ibid.).243 However, the issue is perhaps 
not so clear. It may be, for example, that Fox Keller is correct when she claims that metaphors 
of symmetry, interrelatedness and connectedness are more cognitive fruitful for genuine 
inquiry in the natural sciences than Baconian metaphors of “Herrschaft”.244 Thus, if 
patriarchal norms of women’s subordination cause us to avoid such metaphors, because 
symmetry, interrelatedness and connectedness are something we associate with the female 
qua the subordinate, these norms are truth-dysfunctional.245 Such norms are, moreover, 
morally unjustified, because they are incompatible with fundamental norms of civility. This 
does not mean that using metaphors which utilize in one way or another the fact that 
patriarchal relations do exist (a fact that few feminists would deny), is in itself morally 
questionable. The problem occurs if the inquirer claims, more or less explicitly, that such 
relations are legitimate.246 
 
4.2 Sandra Harding’s feminist standpoint epistemology: An 
assessment 
 
The question remains, however, as to whether feminists have anything in particular to offer a 
philosophy of inquiry. In practice this seems not to be the case, according to Haack, who 
                                                 
242 I advance this point in a previous paper, “Feminism, arguments and rethoric” (unpublished). I wish to thank 
Søren Kjørup for making me think more thoroughly about this relationship. 
243 Nagl-Docekal turns this into a general point regarding the feminist critique of the hierarchical dichotomies 
described metaphorically as being like the male-female hierarchy. For example: It may be that morality should 
be based more on sentiments, less on reason. And it may be that a possible sentimental basis for morality has 
been overlooked or marginalized because sentiments have, traditionally, been associated with femininity. How 
far morality should have a sentimental basis is, however, a matter for separate argument. It cannot simply be 
deduced from the fact that the male-female hierarchy, so often used to illustrate the traditional dichotomical 
hierarchy between reason and sentiments, is illegitimate. 
244 This needs to be investigated. 
245 Patriarchal norms may moreover be truth-dysfunctional for other reasons (see Chapter 2). 
246 See also Chapter 2. 
 111
concludes: “[…] neither all, nor only, women, or feminists, favor all, or indeed any, of the 
ideas offered under the rubric feminist epistemology” (my emphasis, 1998: 124). My 
impression is that most feminists who have dealt explicitly with philosophical questions of 
inquiry, are radically or moderately less moderate than Haack; but, obviously, so too are many 
contributors who do not explicitly do philosophy from the point of view of feminism. What, if 
anything, makes feminist discussions of inquiry different in principle?247  
 
One way to argue for feminist epistemology in a more exclusive sense, would be to say, 
following the feminist standpoint epistemologists, that: Justified theories, i.e. theories that are 
significantly true or objective,248 are theories justified from a feminist standpoint. Feminist 
standpoint epistemologists regard “the standpoint of women – or of feminism less partial and 
distorted than the picture of nature and social relations that emerges from conventional 
research”, to quote Sandra Harding, one of standpoint epistemology’s defenders, and Haack’s 
main target among the feminist epistemologists in addition to Helen Longino (Harding 1991: 
121). In feminist research, Harding says, the “distinctive features of women’s situation in a 
gender-stratified society are being used as resources”, resources “that enable feminism to 
produce empirically more accurate descriptions and theoretically richer explanations than 
does conventional research” (op.cit.: 119).  
 
I agree with Haack that “women’s lives” cannot be thought of as an epistemologically 
privileged “social situation”, generating “greater objectivity” in the way Harding suggests 
(op.cit.: 142). I believe, however, that Haack misrepresents the standpoint argument by 
making it seem more unreasonable than it in fact is. In the following, I wish to outline a 
critique of feminist standpoint epistemology that takes this epistemology’s complexity into 
account 
 
4.2.1 Harding’s good reasons 
 
Let me first acknowledge where Harding and myself agree. We agree that there are more 
interconnections between a feminist commitment and philosophy than Haack acknowledges, 
even if our elaborations of these interconnection differ significantly. I consider Harding’s 
                                                 
247 Apart from what I summed up from Chapter 2 in 4.0, i.e. a feminist epistemology which is not specifically 
feminist in any deep sense. 
248 I will exemplify this position with Sandra Harding’s argument, and Harding talks about objectivity, not truth. 
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historical analysis of how feminists have altered scientific practice illuminating. I agree with 
her that many of these changes have happened for good reasons, and that there are good 
reasons for altering scientific practice further: There is considerable evidence showing that 
sexism in science is a considerable problem.249 We both, moreover, criticize the idea of value-
free justification of theories. A “kind of blindness is advanced”, Harding says: 
 
[…] by the conventional belief that the truly scientific part of knowledge-seeking – the part 
controlled by methods of research – is only in the context of justification. The context of 
discovery, where problems are identified as appropriate for scientific investigation, 
hypotheses are formulated, key concepts are defined – this part of the scientific process is 
thought to be unexaminable within science by rational methods. Thus real science is restricted 
to those processes controllable by methodological rules. The methods of science – or, rather, 
of the special sciences – are restricted to procedures for the testing of already formulated 
hypotheses. Untouched by these careful methods are those values250 and interests entrenched 
in the very statement of what problem is to be researched and in the concepts favored in the 
hypotheses that are to be tested (Harding 1991: 144). 
 
This parallels one of the critical arguments against Haack’s idea of value-freedom developed 
in Chapter 2.251 There are, in Harding’s words, “no grounds left from which to defend the 
claim that the objectivity of research is advanced by the elimination” of values (op.cit.: 146). 
“Instead”, she says, “the sciences need to legitimate within scientific research, as part of 
practicing science, critical examination” of the values that influence it (my emphasis, ibid.). 
Inquirers should subscribe to what she refers to as “historical relativism” or “cultural 
relativism (the sociological assertion that what is thought to be a reasonable claim in one 
society or subculture is not thought to be so in another)”, but not to “judgmental relativism”, 
“the claim that there are no rational or scientific grounds for making judgments between 
various patterns of belief” (op.cit.: 139, 152). We are, in Harding’s view, not to give up on 
“objectivity” in some sense (op.cit.: 138-163). Generally speaking, the latter is also my own 
position. Finally, I believe, like Harding, that there are moral “democratic”252 reasons for 
treating women and men as equals, inside and outside inquiry: There are “liberatory” 
concerns involved (op.cit.: 148, 151). Granting women and men unequal cognitive authority 
in certain cases, if this is truth-functional, is compatible with granting women and men an 
equal moral standing. As noted by Helen Longino, equality of intellectual authority is 
compatible with “according greater cognitive authority on some matters to those one regards 
                                                 
249 There are for example theories, regarded as scientifically warranted, with sexist biases (see my references in 
Chapter 3). For sociological analysis of gender hierarchy in the academy, see for example Smith 1990 and 
Brooks 1997. 
250 Like Haack, Harding does not distinguish between values and norms, ethics and morality. 
251 See 2.2.2. 
252 Even if I find her explication of the term “intellectual participatory democracy” unclear (Harding 1991: 151). 
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as having acquired more knowledge concerning those matters than others” (2002a: 131).253 If 
feminist standpoint epistemologists claim nothing more,254 it is misleading to accuse Harding, 
as Haack does, for betraying the commitment to the equality that characterizes “democratic 
epistemologies”.255  
 
4.2.2 Why grant women epistemic privilege? Harding’s eight reasons 
 
The question is whether those who ‘think from women’s lives’, to quote the subtitle of 
Harding’s book, know more about all matters; whether such thinking generally generates 
knowledge that is more probably significantly true than other kinds of thinking, because 
women are, generally speaking, oppressed. As pointed out by Haack, this idea is somewhat 
counter-intuitive: If women are oppressed, this does not seem like a good reason to grant them 
“epistemic privilege,” because “one of the ways in which oppressed people are oppressed is, 
surely, that their oppressors control the information that reaches them” (original emphasis, 
1998: 126). Harding mentions eight “grounds” that point in the opposite direction.256 None of 
them are without merit:  
 
1) To the extent that “dominant knowledge claims […] have been based primarily in the lives 
of men in the dominant races, classes, and cultures”, “[…] using women’s lives as grounds to 
criticize […]”, “can decrease the partialities and distortions in the picture of nature and social 
life provided by the natural and the social sciences” (1991: 121). Consider in this connection 
Peirce’s characterization of truth as; “the ultimate representation, the Final Opinion, 
compatible with all possible experiential evidence and the fullest logical scrutiny, which 
would be agreed by all who investigate were inquiry to continue indefinitely”, subscribed to 
by Haack (1998: 162). According to this outline of truth, any systematic exclusion of 
“experiential evidence” provided by women, is a problem that should concern genuine truth-
seekers. Not because the exclusion would necessarily make a difference in all cases, but 
because it may do so in some.257 
                                                 
253 See 2.4.5. 
254 But, as I will return to shortly, it seems to me that Harding claims something more. 
255 As though Haack suddenly considered democratic epistemologies defensible after all! 
256 For a full elaboration of these eight “grounds”, see Harding 1991: 121-137. 
257 There are several examples that the exclusion of women from scientific inquiry has made a difference. Let me 
mention one: In the first research project on Power and Democracy in Norway (1972-1982) no women were 
included in the research group and nothing was published on gender, power and democracy. In the second 
research project on Power and Democracy (1998-2003), two out of five in the research group were women (Siri 
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2) There are cases where “strangers” get to know things “natives” do not:  
 
The stranger brings to her research just the combination of nearness and remoteness, concern 
and indifference, that are central to maximizing objectivity. Moreover, the natives tend to tell 
a stranger some kinds of things they would never tell each other; further, the stranger can see 
patterns of belief and behavior that are hard for those immersed in the culture to detect 
(Harding 1991: 124).  
 
In so far as women are “outsiders to the dominant institutions in our society”, they might take 
cognitive advantage of being “strangers” in different settings (ibid.). 
 
3) “Oppressed groups have”: 
 
[…] fewer reasons to invest in maintaining or justifying the status quo than do dominant 
groups. They have less to lose by distancing themselves from the social order; thus, the 
perspective from their lives can more easily generate fresh and critical analyses (op.cit.: 126). 
 
In so far as women constitute a group of the “oppressed”, they may be said to have an interest 
in providing “fresh and critical analyses” that “dominant groups” do not: In this sense it may 
be correct to say that “women’s oppression gives them fewer interests in ignorance” (op.cit.: 
125). 
 
4) Social and political struggles, including feminist struggles, may provide new knowledge: 
“We can come to understand hidden aspects of social relations […] and the institutions that 
support these relations […] through struggles to change them” (op.cit.: 127). Harding 
mentions an example: “[…] it is only because of the fierce struggles waged in the nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-centuries to gain formal equality for women […] that we can come to 
understand that formal equality is not enough” (ibid.). It was on the basis of such knowledge – 
which would not have been provided without such struggles – that feminist struggles were 
widened and re-oriented.258 
                                                                                                                                                        
Meyer and Hege Skjeie), and several books and reports were published on gender, power and democracy. This is 
not say that interconnections between research interests and gender are simple and easily traceable. Meyer and 
Skjeie agree that gender is a significant topic of study, but work within highly different theoretical perspectives, 
on different problems. Their normative approach to power and democracy differ substantially, moreover (for a 
discussion of one of Skjeie’s arguments, see Chapter 8). 
258 Axel Honneth makes a similar point in The Struggle for Recognition. The modern struggle for “legally 
institutionalized relations of universal respect for the autonomy and dignity of persons” is conceptualized as a 
cognitive prerequisite for further struggles in “networks of solidarity and shared values within which the 
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5) Work that has traditionally been assigned to women provides its practitioners with a 
peculiar kind of original or genealogical insight:259 
 
[…] women have been assigned to kinds of work that men in the ruling groups do not want to 
do, and women’s work relieves these men of the need to take care of their bodies or of the 
local places where they exist, freeing them to immerse themselves in the world of abstract 
concepts. The labor of women articulates and shapes these men’s concept of the world into 
those appropriate for administrative work (op.cit.: 128) 
 
Thus, as practitioners of care work, women get to see the often invisible ground beneath the 
more visible layers of our social world: “Starting from the standpoint of women […] enables 
us to recover the processes through which social life in fact has taken the form we see around 
us” (ibid.). 
 
6) Care work also generates knowledge that does not easily fit into dominant dichotomous 
schemes of classification: “Women’s perspective” comes from “mediating ideological 
dualisms: nature versus culture”, “[…] intellectual work, on the one hand, and manual or 
emotional work, on the other hand”: “Women’s labor both for wages and even more in 
household production involves a unification of mind and body for the purpose of transforming 
natural substances into socially defined goods” (op.cit.: 130). Also, “the female experience of 
bearing and rearing children involves a unity of mind and body”, and can generate such 
knowledge (op.cit.: 131). 
 
7) Women might be strangers in the sense suggested – a position that provides them with the 
cognitive advantages of the stranger. Their social position could, however, just as equally be 
characterized as an “outsiders-within”-position (op.cit.: 131). They are not necessarily only on 
the outside of dominant activities and beliefs – and thus strangers – they might also participate 
at the same time as insiders. This double glance on things; “thinking out of the gap between 
the lives of outsiders and the lives of insiders and their favored conceptual schemes” (op.cit.: 
132), might also be a cognitive resource. 
 
8) The particular knowledge of women as ‘outsiders-within’, obviously requires that they are 
                                                                                                                                                        
particular worth of individual members of a community can be acknowledged” (1995: xii): Formal equality was 
needed in order to know that formal equality was not enough. 
259 Harding elaborates this point on the basis of the feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith’s reflections. 
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on the ‘inside’ as well. Recently, more women have become insiders, as the result of “shifts in 
the economy, by the so-called sexual revolution, by the increased entrance of women in 
higher education, by the civil rights struggles of the 1960s, and by other identifiable 
economic, political, and social phenomena” (ibid.). Thus, this is indeed “the right time in 
history” for the female outsider-within, and the things she may find out (ibid.). 
 
Consequently, there is something in Harding’s eight grounds for considering ‘thinking from 
women’ lives’ to be truth-functional in various situations. Saying that ‘the feminist 
standpoint’ generally generates greater objectivity, as Harding seems to say, however, is to 
say something more:260 Her ambition seems to be to correct the truth-idealization – or the 
objectivity-idealization if we stick to her own vocabulary – not merely to participate in a 
discussion about valuable heuristic devices in particular kinds of investigations.261 I do not 
think she provides good arguments for this more radical move.262  
 
Let me begin the explication of my position by emphasizing what a subscription to the eight 
grounds above does not imply: 
 
1) It is not the case that experiential evidence provided by women is generally excluded from 
contemporary scientific representations, even if there are several examples. There are, 
however, also examples of exclusion of experiential evidence provided by men – typically by 
men who are not of the dominant races, classes and cultures. To be sure, if certain groups, the 
group of women or other groups, are excluded from inquiry, this is a reason to suspect that 
there are cases of partialities and distortions in the picture of nature and social life, since this 
allows for experiential evidence generated from certain points of view to be excluded. 
However, whether the inclusion of experiential evidence generated from these points of view 
                                                 
260 Sometimes she writes as if she did not intend to claim something more. Elizabeth Anderson (2004) put much 
weight on this fact in a recent attempt to save Harding from her critics. On other occasions, Harding claims, 
however, considerably more. Also, if Harding did not claim anything more, it is unclear why she positions her 
‘thinking from women’s lives’ as an epistemological alternative (I will return to this point in later sections of this 
chapter). The latter is not commented upon by Anderson. 
261 This is, however, how Anderson describes her project: “If one’s aim is to produce knowledge that is useful to 
the marginalized in overcoming their systematic disadvantages”, Harding argues that one should “frame one’s 
research questions, devise one’s theoretical classifications, and so forth, with this aim in mind” (2004: 6).  It is 
hardly obvious why we should refer to this position (a position many would subscribe to) as feminist standpoint 
epistemology. 
262 To avoid misunderstandings: I do not subscribe to what Harding refers to as the ‘weak’ notion of objectivity. 
This notion is linked to an idea of value-freedom cruder than the one Haack defends, and, as already suggested, I 
do not think many philosophers today subscribe to it. We need rather a different notion of objectivity in inquiry – 
but not the ‘strong’ notion Harding defends, equating ‘thinking from women’s life’ with what is objective. 
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would make the representations significantly different – and whether, if different, it would 
make the representations more objective in particular cases – cannot generally be assumed. 
This is, rather, something that needs to be established from case to case on the basis of 
investigation. There is a huge difference between the claim that women’s participation in 
science might change certain theories, and the claim that their participation would necessarily 
change them all. 
 
2) Not all women could be positioned as strangers in the sense suggested by Harding. Some 
should, as she herself suggests, be considered to be outsiders-within. And some should, rather, 
be considered to be natives; insiders of the dominant institutions in our society. And most are 
perhaps both strangers, natives and outsiders-within – on different occasions. Moreover, it 
cannot be assumed generally that the claims of a stranger are more valid than the claims of a 
native. Obviously, those who participate in and identify with a practice as natives, may know 
something of this practice that those who do not participate in it or identify with it, do not.  
 
3) Women are not always oppressed, and when they are, they are not necessarily oppressed 
equally strongly, and in the same way. Furthermore, groups of women might oppress other 
groups of women, and also groups of men, for example men who do not belong to the 
dominant races, classes and cultures. Hence, some women are sometimes and, in some senses, 
in the dominant groups. These women would not have a general interest in criticizing the 
status quo or in distancing themselves from the social order. Also, when such interests can be 
traced, it cannot generally be assumed that their analyses are more objective. This is a matter 
for critical scrutiny in the reason-giving and reason-taking processes of inquiry. 
 
4) New significant questions, new vocabularies and classifications occur through social and 
political struggles, and so too new answers: Social and political struggles can contribute to 
changing established theories, and contribute to establishing new ones. The connections 
between feminist social and political struggles and contributions to genuine inquiry from 
feminist researchers are, however, but one example of this. Similar connections can be 
established between, for example, the struggles of the workers’ movement and inquiry 
inspired by the normative horizon of these struggles. Moreover, the questions, vocabularies 
and classifications generated through political and social struggles are not necessarily the only 
significant ones – and perhaps some of them are not very significant at all. As pointed out by 
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Jürgen Habermas:263 Genuine inquiry can be pursued from the point of view of significant 
knowledge interests other than the interest in emancipation – granted that all kinds of political 
and social struggles, in the name of feminism or other -isms, can be justified from the point of 
view of emancipation. The latter is, however, not necessarily the case. Harding falsely 
assumes that all struggles presenting themselves as struggles for  “emancipation” are justified 
or are, as she vaguely puts it, “progressive” (op.cit.: 161). This is, however, something we 
should investigate critically and deliberate upon. And finally, theories defended by those who 
have participated in or been inspired by feminist struggles – or indeed other struggles – are 
not necessarily more objective. This needs to be established on the basis of reasons in 
processes of genuine theory assessment. 
 
5) Care work might provide the practitioners with new significant knowledge. However, not 
all women participate in this kind of work. And if they do, this participation may influence 
their points of view more or less persuasively. And in the end, the knowledge of the care-
taker, female or not, cannot be considered to be more objective without further argument. 
 
6) Care work, whether carried out by women or not, may generate knowledge that might not 
easily fit into dominant dichotomous schemes of classification. Some of it may, however. 
Moreover, dichotomous schemes may have analytical relevance while approaching other 
practices and phenomena.264 And the fact that a representation is not dualist, does not in itself 
make it either true or significant.  
 
7) Not all women should be considered to be outsiders-within, on all occasions and in a 
similar way. They might, for example, be the stranger Harding sketches (in 2) – or a more or 
less complete native. And from none of these positions can their claims be considered to be 
less partial and distorted initially, without further investigation and critical scrutiny.  
 
8) As a result of social and cultural changes, feminist political struggles, redescriptions and 
arguments, there may now be more women who could be considered to be outsiders-within, 
and who can provide experiential evidence from this position. However, the case remains to 
be made that the claims of the outsider-within are always more objective than the claims of 
those differently situated. The fact that more inquirers can now be so positioned, since more 
                                                 
263 His theory of knowledge interests is presented briefly in Chapter 2. 
264 For an illuminating critique of uncritical feminist critique of dichotomies, see Nancy Fraser (1998). 
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women entered public institutions, such as science, yet are still experiencing peculiar kinds of 
gender injustice, neither strengthens nor weakens this burden of proof. 
 
Hence, to sum up, there are, generally speaking, two separate questions (or sets of questions) 
involved here. First, do all women have something in common? Are all women excluded (1), 
strangers (2), oppressed (3), struggling (4), care-workers (5), in situations generating non-
dualist perspectives (6), outsiders-within (7), or on their way to becoming outsiders-within 
(8)? Do women in fact share a standpoint or a social situation? Second, does what women 
have in common – if they do in fact have something in common – make their theories less 
partial and distorted? And if their theories are less partial, how is this so? Why should the fact 
that society is persuasively gender-stratified, in the sense suggested by Harding, make us want 
to correct the truth-idealization? And what, more specifically, would the corrections be? 
 
That all women can be positioned in a similar social situation is a claim that is hard to 
substantiate empirically. Harding argues, convincingly, only that some women are in a more 
or less similar social situation (as specified in 1) to 8). This has implications for how genuine 
cultural and social studies of inquiry can be pursued. In such studies, Harding’s (and similar) 
description of the gendered character of knowledge production cannot be taken as a universal 
description (and if it could, it would be fallible as any other description). The precise 
relationship between gender and knowledge production in different situations must be 
established on the basis of investigation. Also, to what extent a gendered organization of 
knowledge production causes discrepancy between warrant and social acceptance in particular 
cases, cannot be presupposed. In fact, this could not even be presupposed if Harding’s 
description of the relationship between gender and knowledge production were universal: It 
may be argued that a gendered organization of society and inquiry of a kind described in 1) to 
8) will create sexist and androcentric biases in knowledge production – there are many cases 
that prove that patriarchal norms have hampered genuine inquiry – but this needs to be 
investigated case by case. 
4.2.3 Women’s different reasoning 
 
Let us say, however, that it could be argued that all women share a standpoint that is different 
from the standpoint of men so that it makes sense to refer to it generally as women’s 
standpoint. How would this influence our answers to the second set of questions? First, one 
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would have to say something about how a perhaps valid but anyhow fallible empirical theory 
could possibly correct an infallible counterfactually anticipated truth-idealization. Even if the 
truth-idealization is counterfactual, it nevertheless presupposes the validity of certain 
empirical claims, however. In explicating the truth-idealization we talk about genuine 
inquirers as human beings with certain empirically identifiable capabilities, for example the 
capability to perceive and evaluate evidence in reason-giving and reason-taking processes.265  
 
What Harding seems to suggest is that the social situation of women in a gender-stratified 
society structures not only what women experience, but also how they experience it (op.cit.: 
123). What gives women a privileged cognitive authority is not only that they perceive 
different things and can bring different reasons into the reason-giving and reason-taking-
process of inquiry, because of how they are socially situated, but also that their perceiving and 
reasoning are done in a different way: Due to their social situation, women have particular 
capabilities as inquirers that make their inquiry more genuine. How does Harding picture this? 
Women’s and men’s different social situations give men and women different “personality 
structures” (op.cit.: 121): 
 
Jane Flax and other writers266 who draw on object relations theory point to the less defensive 
structure of femininity than of masculinity. Different infantile experiences, reinforced 
thoughout life, lead men to perceive their masculinity as a fragile phenomenon that they must 
continually struggle to defend and maintain. In contrast, women perceive femininity as a 
much sturdier part of their “self”. Stereotypically, real women appear as if provided by nature; 
real men appear as a fragile social construct. Of course, ‘typical’ feminine and masculine 
personality structures are different in different classes, races and cultures. But insofar as they 
are different from each other, it deteriorates objectivity to devalue or ignore what can be 
learned by starting research from the perspective provided by women’s personality structures 
(ibid.).  
 
It is “the perspective provided by women’s personality structure” that produces greater 
“objectivity” (ibid.). Now, what Harding could be saying here is, simply, that men’s and 
women’s different social situation (as specified in 1) to 8) above) cause different personality 
structures to arise, creating in turn differences in cognitive authority between women and 
men, because different personality structures make women and men perceive different things 
and bring different reasons into the reason-giving and reason-taking-processes. However, she 
                                                 
265 Consider the reflections in Chapter 2 on conditio humana (Otfried Höffe). Consider also the outline of the 
conditions of individuation (Drucilla Cornell) in Chapter 9. 
266 She refers here to Hilary Rose, Nancy Hartsock, Jane Flax and Dorothy Smith. 
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seems to be saying something more. The difference in personality structure should, she says, 
be thought of in terms of “different modes of reasoning” (op.cit.: 122). She exemplifies: 
 
Sara Ruddick draws our attention to the ‘maternal thinking’ that is characteristic of people 
(male or female) who have primary responsibility for the care of small children. Carol 
Gilligan identifies those forms of moral reasoning typically found in women’s thought but not 
found in the dominant Western rights orientation of ethics. And Mary Belenky and her 
colleagues267 argue that women’s ways of knowing exhibit more generally the concern for 
context that Gilligan sees in moral knowledge (ibid). 
 
This is to say that there are “distinctively female ways of knowing” (Haack 1998: 125); 
peculiar female ways of “figuring out how things are” (op.cit.: 126), understood in terms of a 
different way of reasoning with more “concern for context” (Harding 1991: 122). Hence, it is 
the ability to evaluate in processes of reason-giving and reason-taking that differs between 
women and men. This could be thought of as a different capability, or, more modestly, as two 
modes of the same capability.  
4.2.4 Should women’s different reasoning grant them cognitive privilege? 
 
Even if this is correct, however, this does not imply that we should change the truth-
idealization. It has, first, to be argued that the female way of knowing produces more 
objective knowledge. Harding’s argument is inconclusive on this point. Even if it could be 
argued that women reason with more concern for context, why should contextual reasoning 
make women’s theories more genuine? What does it mean more precisely to reason with 
concern for context, and what does it mean, precisely, when confronted by different kinds of 
claims?  
 
Initially, Harding’s idea of reasoning with concern for context is linked to how we should 
approach moral and ethical claims. She refers to Gilligan’s analysis of “moral reasoning” and 
Ruddick’s “maternal thinking” of “responsibility” (ibid.). The prescription to have a concern 
for context when we reason about morality and ethics, would, however, have implications for 
our approach to inquiry in so far as morality and ethics are involved when we make inquiries 
– but would not necessarily have implications for how genuine inquirers should approach 
truth-claims. Harding thinks that it has, however. She refers in this connection to among 
                                                 
267 “Mary Belenky and her colleagues, in investigating developmental patterns in women’s thinking about reason 
and knowledge, have pointed to gender bias in philosophic and scientific ideals and suggested its origins in 
gendered experience” (Harding 1991: 118). 
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others Jane Flax and Mary Belenky who argue that “women’s ways of knowing exhibit more 
generally the concern for context that Gilligan sees in moral knowledge”, and that this is 
connected with men’s and women’s different “personality structures” (ibid.): Women’s ways 
of knowing “produce empirically more accurate descriptions and theoretically richer 
explanations” (op.cit.: 119).  
 
Harding does not explicate what reasoning with concern for context might mean in empirical 
discourse, however. Moreover, she does not specify how reasoning with concern for context 
in empirical discourse might differ from reasoning in the domain of morality and ethics. This 
is linked to a general failure in her approach: She does not link her philosophy of inquiry to 
reflections on the different claims involved in inquiry. This is why, when she talks of 
objectivity, she sometimes seems to refer to empirical truth,268 and at other times, to the 
validity of claims more generally. I wish to concentrate on what reasoning with concern for 
context might mean in empirical discourse. This is clearly Harding’s basic concern: She wants 
to add something to epistemology in the spirit of the feminist interventions which have taken 
place in moral philosophy which stress the concern for context.  
 
Reasoning with concern for context in empirical discourse could mean, for example: 
 
i) That we should investigate theories (claims in the context of other claims), not singular 
claims.  
ii) That we should avoid idealizations. 
iii) That we should avoid abstraction. 
iv) That explanans cannot or should not refer to causal laws or mechanisms. 
v) That there is a need for discretion and good contexual judgment when approaching 
particular cases. 
 
If we by reasoning with concern for context mean i), not even Haack would disagree that we 
are dealing with the thinking that produces maximal objectivity. Contextual reasoning in this 
sense is precisely what genuine inquiry should be about; to assess claims in connection with 
other claims is a core idea of her crossword puzzle model of inquiry. Moreover, even Haack 
would not deny that we should avoid idealizations (ii), as in the sense discussed by Onora 
                                                 
268 This is why I have so far, in this spirit, interpreted Harding’s ideal of objectivity as a challenge to the truth-
idealization. 
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O’Neill,269 i.e. idealizations as “abstractions” that are not “abstractions from empirical truth” 
(2000: 72). O’Neill exemplifies her notion of an idealization with the model of “Rational 
Economic Man”, relying, she says, on “an instrumental account of rationality and a 
preference-based conception of action” (op.cit.: 71, 73). This is in accordance with what I 
argued in Chapter 2: that rational-choice theory270 is not a valid empirical theory, assessed 
according to, for example, Haack’s foundherentist criteria. This is to say that the model of 
human action on which Haack herself relies is an idealization incompatible with her own 
criteria for genuine inquiry, criteria which are contextual in the sense that idealizations would 
be considered pseudo-theories and not allowed for.  
 
As for iii), we cannot avoid abstraction altogether: Any conceptualization involves abstraction 
on some level.271 In O’Neill’s words: We cannot avoid reasoning that “brackets certain 
predicates that obtain”, even if we can and should avoid idealization; reasoning that “denies 
those predicates (asserts their absence) or asserts that absent predicates obtain” (op.cit.: 68). 
Does Harding argue that explanans cannot or should not refer to causal laws or mechanisms 
(i.e. iv)?272 Sometimes it seems as though she does.273 However, her argument that women 
have a peculiar concern for context in their reasoning because of a certain personality 
structure, is presented, in fact, in terms of a causal model: “Different infantile experiences 
[…] lead” to women’s and men’s fundamentally different relationship to “self” (my emphasis, 
Harding 1991: 121).274 As for v), even Haack acknowledges the need for discretion or good 
contextual judgment, even in the context of justification.  
 
Hence, Harding’s claim that reasoning with concern for context is what produces maximal 
objectivity, is either uncontroversial (i), ii) and v), in the sense that even Haack would accept 
                                                 
269 O’Neill introduces the distinction between idealization and abstraction in a discussion of moral reasoning. 
The point also has relevance here, however. 
270 At least not as the theory is presented by Haack. 
271 See point 6) above, where Harding discusses how women’s activities mediate the divisions and separations in 
contemporary Western cultures. This might mean that women rely on fewer divisions or separations or avoid 
them altogether, or that women would construct different divisions or separations. The first interpretation relies 
on an impossible presupposition that abstraction can be avoided. The latter interpretation is an empirical 
question. 
272 And are there differences between the natural, social and human sciences on this point? Part II (“Explanation, 
Prediction, and Laws”) and III (“Interpretation and Meaning”) in Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science 
(1995) give an overview of this classic debate among philosophers of science. Anderson doubts that feminist 
standpoint epistemologists consider it relevant to apply the standpoint approach in the natural sciences (2004: 6). 
Harding makes, however, no such reservations. 
273 Consider for example the chapter “Why Physics is a Bad Model for Physics” in Harding (1991: 77-104). 
274 A critical reflection on the role of causal mechanisms in object relations is found in Gilje and Grimen (1993: 
253). 
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it, and in the sense that it is compatible with the truth-idealization as I spelled it out in Chapter 
2, or it is inconsistent (iv), or it presupposes what is impossible (iii). It therefore seems either 
misleading to say that concern for context is a different mode of reasoning (if this is 
understood as in i), ii) and v), or it is a different mode of reasoning that is flawed (if ‘concern 
for context’ is understood as in iii) and iv).  
 
Now, what Harding might be saying, is rather that women do i), ii) and v) better than men; 
they are better at avoiding idealization, they use good judgment better, and they are better at 
connecting the assessment of singular claims with the assessment of other singular claims (in 
Haack’s terms: they take better care of the ‘coherentist’ aspect of genuine inquiry). Initially, 
such claim are dubious because not all women are in women’s situation (defined according to 
Harding’s 1) to 8) list). They are, however, also dubious because the causal mechanisms 
between being in this situation – if it indeed could be argued that many if not all women were 
in it – and a particular contextual rationality are only vaguely explicated. Hence, Haack’s 
statement that Harding’s notion of “thinking like a woman” reminds her of  “old, sexist 
stereotypes”, is not completely irrelevant (Haack 1998: 125): The idea that women think 
differently, and do it with more concern for context could be mistaken for a patriarchal 
caricature.  
4.2.5 From unequal cognitive authority to unequal intellectual authority 
 
Even if giving some people (for example women) greater cognitive authority in some cases is 
compatible with granting everyone equal intellectual authority, this is only so under certain 
conditions. One condition for compatibility between unequal cognitive authority (in some 
cases) and equal intellectual authority, is that one does not in fact argue against granting 
everyone equal intellectual authority, and thus against the norm of equal respect. One cannot 
accuse Harding of doing this. She does, however, tend to instrumentalize the relationship 
between inquiry and morality. Harding argues that “research directed by maximally liberatory 
social interests and values tends to be better equipped to identify partial claims and distorting 
evidence”; “[…] to produce empirically more accurate descriptions and theoretically richer 
explanations” (Harding 1991: 119, 148): Certain liberating interests and values (i.e. taking 
women’s standpoint) are presented as functional for the aim of making theories more 
objective and less partial, whereas it is simply presupposed that these interests and values are 
justified from a moral point of view (ibid.). However, interests and values that are truth-
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functional, are not necessarily compatible with what justice requires, i.e. that they are 
compatible, cannot be presupposed; it must be argued.275  
 
Moreover, to say that female truth-seekers are generally epistemologically privileged relative 
to male, i.e. to say that there are always cognitive inequalities between women and men, is 
incompatible with granting everyone equal intellectual authority (and if one argues that 
everyone is equal in intellectual authority, one contradicts oneself if one upholds the 
standpoint approach to issues of truth). Certainly, one might imagine more or less drastic 
implications drawn from Harding’s claim that women, because of their social situation, 
produce more accurate descriptions and theoretically richer explanations than men, i.e. more 
or less radical transformations of the truth-idealization. The implication could be that what we 
should strive to approximate in our investigations, is an ideal communication community 
consisting only of women, because theories proposed by men (and by women who, for one 
reason or another, are not in women’s situation) are always less genuine. This would be to 
argue for unequal cognitive authority and unequal intellectual authority; men would not be 
considered among reason-givers and reason-takers.  Harding does, however, clearly consider 
men among reason-givers and reason-takers. She stresses that also male inquirers can think 
from women’s lives (op.cit.: 62, 67, 68). 
 
A less drastic option would be to include men (and women who, for one reason or another, are 
not in women’s situation) in the ideal communication community, but to consider the 
epistemological privilege of women (in women’s situation) an additional criterion of truth-
indicativeness, in addition to other criteria, such as Haack’s foundherentist criteria. Let us say, 
in addition to criteria of supportiveness, independent security and comprehensiveness,276 there 
was a fourth criterion: It is a truth-indication that a theory is compatible with the claims made 
by women (whatever they were). Also, this more moderate reconstruction of the truth-
idealization would, however, be incompatible with granting everyone equal intellectual 
authority. Men would also be considered reason-givers and reason-takers, but of a secondary 
sort: Adding the fourth criterion would make it defensible to replace a theory more warranted 
                                                 
275 Harding also tends to instrumentalize the other way around: We should make our theories more objective and 
less partial because objective theories are functional for liberation, not because significant truth is the sole aim of 
inquiry. It is illustrative in this connection that Harding refers to feminist standpoint epistemology – and other 
feminist epistemologies (feminist empiricism and feminist postmodernism) as different “justificatory strategies 
[…] likely to appeal to different audiences” (my emphasis, Harding 1991: 136). This notion of theoretical 
justification is similar to Richard Rorty’s notion of “justification is relative to audience”, which I question in 
Chapter 7. See also Chapter 2. 
276 See the outline of foundherentism in Chapter 1. 
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according to the first three criteria with a theory somewhat less warranted according to the 
three first criteria, but fulfilling the fourth criterion (women preferred it, for whatever reason). 
There is thus a moral problem connected with this move. In addition there is, as suggested, an 
epistemological problem:277 Why does women’s situation make them privileged reasoners in 
all cases? Why is adding this fourth criterion generally truth-functional, i.e. what is the 
epistemological justification for transforming the truth-idealization?  
 
To consider women’s epistemological privilege as a more or less well-founded hypothesis to 
be scrutinized by men and women as equal reason-givers and reason-takers, is to subscribe to 
a norm of equal intellectual authority. This would imply, however, that women’s privilege 
would not in fact be considered as general; the privilege would be granted if there were good 
enough reasons to do so, and would not imply any reconstruction of the truth-idealization. 
The prescription would, rather, be in accordance with the truth-idealization as elaborated in 
Chapter 2, and it is unclear why one would refer to it as a precription of an alternative 
(feminist standpoint) epistemology.  
 
4.2.6 From women’s reasoning to women’s emotions? 
 
Harding might argue, however, that women’s peculiar concern for context should not be 
considered a separate mode of reasoning in a literal sense, i.e. not as I have oulined it so far, 
as reasoning, and, hence, not as a unique capability women possess as reason-givers and 
reason-takers. Rather women’s situation produces certain objectivity-functional emotions. 
Consider the following passage: 
 
One could argue also that the particular forms of any emotion that women experience as an 
oppressed, exploited, and dominated gender have a distinctive content that is missing from all 
those parallel forms in their brothers’ emotional lives. Consider suffering, for example. A 
woman suffers not only as a parent of a dying child, as a child of sick parents, as a poor 
person, or as a victim of racism. Women suffer in ways peculiar to mothers of dying children, 
to daughters of sick parents, to poor women, and in the special ways the racist policies and 
practices affect women’s lives. Mother, daughter, poor woman, and racially oppressed woman 
are nodes of historically specific social practices and social meanings that mediate when and 
how suffering occurs for such socially constructed persons. Women’s pleasures, angers, and 
other emotions too are in part distinctive to their social actvities and identities as historically 
                                                 
277 See 4.2.3 and 4.2.4. 
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determinate women, and these provide a missing portion of the human lives that human 
knowledge is supposed to be both grounded in and about (original emphasis, op.cit.: 122).278 
 
To say that women possess certain socially constituted objectivity-functional emotions, could 
be considered an empirical hypothesis to be investigated case by case in processes of reason-
giving and reason-taking among women and men with equal intellectual authority. This would 
imply no change in the truth-idealization (and no alternative feminist standpoint 
epistemology). Another option would be to add to our truth-criteria, for example the three 
foundherentist crietria, a fourth criterion: It is a truth-indication that a theory is compatible 
with women’s emotions (whatever they are). How could such a compatibility be established? 
Probably one would have to listen to what women themselves claimed to be a theory 
compatible with their emotions. However, this would be the same as adding a fourth criterion 
which says that it is a truth-indication that a theory is compatible with the claims made by 
women (whatever they are),279 i.e. this is in fact to say that women have a special capability as 
reason-givers and reason-takers, due to their emotional constitution, and that this should grant 
them a general epistemological privilege. This position is, however, morally as well as 
epistemologically problematic.280 
4.2.7 When women claim different things 
 
To add this fourth criterion; to claim that it is a truth-indication that a theory is compatible 
with the claims made by women (whatever these are), is problematic, moreover, because of 
the criterion’s indeterminate character. The indeterminacy problem arises in situations where 
women (in women’s situation) claim different theories to be genuine theories. Which women 
would we listen to? The logic of the standpoint argument suggests that it might be the women 
who best fit the eight descriptions of ‘women’s lives’, for example the most oppressed 
women. The problem would remain, however, were we confronted with conflicting claims 
among the most oppressed.  
 
In other passages – that I will return to in the next section – Harding argues that it is not 
women, but rather feminists, who produce the most objective knowledge. The problem of 
                                                 
278 What Harding says here in this last sentence, is something much weaker than what is implied by her 
standpoint argument. I discuss this argument. 
279 If one were to argue instead that another group knew better what women’s emotions were, this would be to 
argue that it is a truth-indication that a theory is compatible with what members of the groups knowing what 
women’s emotions are claim (whatever they claim). 
280 As explicated in 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 4.2.5. 
 128
indeterminacy still remains, however, because feminists do not agree among themselves, as 
Harding herself recognizes; “[…] there are many feminisms” (op.cit.: 123). Which of them 
should be allowed to settle the case? My suggestion would be that the case should be settled 
with reference to the best truth-indicative criteria available in reason-giving and reason-taking 
processes where all participants are granted equal intellectual authority.  
4.2.8 From women’s standpoint to feminist standpoint 
 
Harding may try to refute several of my critical remarks by denying that she claims that all 
women are in a similar social situation, have the same experience, the same personality 
structure, and that they reason or feel in a particular similar way. An important ambition for 
Harding in Whose Science, Whose Knowledge? is to refute the claim coming from “feminist 
postmodernism” (op.cit.: 165), that her standpoint theory rests on an essentialist notion of 
women: “Standpoint theories need not commit essentialism. The Science Question in 
Feminism281 contributed to such a misreading of their logic; in this book I contest an 
essentialist reading” (op.cit.: 121). Harding argues against nominalist as well as realist 
essentialism: What the term woman means, as well as the material basis of women’s 
experiences, are relative to social situation and historical change.282 Consider again a few 
sentences from the passage on women’s peculiar personality structure quoted above:  
 
Of course, typical feminine and masculine personality structures are different in different 
classes, races, and cultures. But insofar as they are different from each other, it detoriates 
objectivity to devalue or ignore what can be learned by starting research from the perspective 
provided by women’s personality structures (op.cit.: 121-122).  
 
This way of approaching the issue is typical: There are differences between women’s and 
men’ experiences, in addition to what might be of empirical (in-group) differences in 
women’s and men’s experiences. Moreover, according to Harding, there are such differences 
between women’s and men’s experiences (in addition to the in-group differences), due to 
empirical differences in social situation (as specified in the eight points above). Since such 
differences should not be considered essential, but rather empirical, the validity of these 
                                                 
281 One of Harding’s previous books. 
282 On what essentialism implies, see also Chapter 7. 
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claims rests on whether they are empirically warranted or not (and not on a defense of 
essentialism).283 
 
However, Harding’s case is not saved by her attempt to replace “the standpoint of women” 
with “the standpoint of feminism” (op.cit.: 121). She says: 
 
[…] while both women’s experiences and what women say certainly are good places to begin 
generating research projects […], they would not seem to be reliable grounds for deciding just 
which claims to knowledge are preferable. For a position to count as a standpoint, […] we 
must insist on an objective location – women’s lives – as the place from which feminist 
research should begin. We would not know to value that location so highly if women had not 
insisted on the importance of their experiences and voices […]. But it is not the experiences or 
the speech that provides the grounds for feminist claims; it is rather the subsequently 
articulated observations of and theory about the rest of nature and social relations – 
observations and theory that start out from, that look at the world from the perspective of, 
women’s lives. And who is to do this starting out? With this question it becomes clear that 
knowledge-seeking requires democratic, participatory politics. Otherwise, only the gender, 
race, sexuality, and class elites who now predominate in institutions of knowledge-seeking 
will have the chance to decide how to start asking their research questions, and we are entitled 
to suspicion about the historic location from which those questions will in fact be asked. It is 
important both to value women’s experiences and speech and also to be able to specify 
carefully their exact role in the production of feminist knowledge (op.cit.: 123-124). 
 
The main reason why some thinkers have interpreted Harding as saying “that standpoint 
theories and other kinds of justifications of feminist knowledge claims must be grounded in 
women’s experiences” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 123), that it is in fact women’s common 
experiences that produce epistemological privilege, is that this is what she seems to say.284 
Consider, for example, her argument from situation to experience, to personality structure, to 
mode of reasoning or emotional constitution (outlined in 4.2.4 and 4.2.6). Even in the passage 
above, where Harding argues for a feminist standpoint (in contrast to women’s standpoint), 
the subtext is that there is in fact something particularly and generally cognitively valuable 
arising from women’s experiences; “women’s experiences and what women say […] are good 
places to begin generating research projects”, and “we would not know to value that location 
[an objective location – women’s lives] so highly if women had not insisted on the importance 
of their experiences and voices” (ibid.). Her comments here may, of course, be interpreted as 
a reminder to listen to what women have to say as we listen to what men have to say, a 
                                                 
283 As suggested, Harding does not argue convincingly that these claims are warranted as empirical claims about 
all women’s situation and experiences, even though the descriptions, or some of them, may be warranted 
descriptions of many women’s situation and experiences. 
284 Anderson (2004) bases her rescue of Harding on the assumption that Harding cannot possibly be interpreted 
as saying this. I think, on the contrary, it is very hard to avoid such an interpretation. 
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reminder necessitated by a patriarchal tradition that has not granted women equal intellectual 
authority, but instead marginalized the perceptions and reasons of women. Such a reminder 
does not, however, challenge the truth-idealization; why talk of a different notion of 
‘objectivity’ and ‘epistemology’, if Harding claims nothing more than this?  
 
It makes better sense to interpret her as saying precisely “that standpoint theories and other 
kinds of justifications of feminist knowledge claims must be grounded in women’s 
experiences” (my emphasis, ibid.). She says indeed that “feminist knowledge claims”, which 
are privileged, are the outcome of a critical reflection on “women’s experiences”, in 
particular on how these experiences are “shaped by social relations” (ibid.). Objectivity, says 
Harding, is not simply provided by paraphrasing “the actual perspective of actual women – 
what they can in fact see” (ibid.). But “the actual perspective of actual women” remains as the 
privileged general starting point for “learning” (ibid.). In this passage, Harding does not deny, 
however, that all should participate in the learning-processes directing us towards feminist 
objectivity; there is, she says, a need for “democratic, participatory politics” (op.cit.: 124). But 
she does suggest a transformation of the truth-idealization where (once more) a new 
questionable criterion of truth-indicativeness is added: It is an indication of truth that a theory 
is compatible with claims that are based on critical learning from women’s experiences 
(whatever these claims are). This way of elaborating women’s cognitive authority may thus 
be compatible with granting all equal intellectual authority (i.e. all may participate as equals 
in the democratic process of learning from ‘women’s lives’). It is, however, unclear, why this 
criterion would be a truth-functional criterion. The reason may be, of course, that women’s 
situation after all produce epistemological privilege, i.e. that this is why learning from it, 
critically; as a feminist, produce epistemological privilege. If this is in fact what is claimed in 
the end, Harding’s position is (once more) incompatible with granting all equal intellectual 
authority. 
4.2.9 What is a woman? 
 
Furthermore, it is not clear why adding a criterion saying that it is an indication of truth that a 
theory is compatible with critical learning from the experience of those in a social situation 
which possess the characteristics mentioned in the 1) to 8) list above, represents a thinking 
from ‘women’s lives’ exclusively. It may be that many women are in situations which possess 
some, more or perhaps all of these characteristics. Other groups may, however, be in 
 131
situations which possess several of the similar characteristics. For example, as Harding notes 
herself, in “the U.S social order […], unemployed African American and Hispanic men” may 
be more marginalized, excluded and oppressed than “economically privileged white women” 
(op.cit.: 125). Does not her feminist epistemology imply that genuine theories are those 
compatible with critical learning from the experience of any group in the social situation of 
‘women’s lives’? If Harding is to deny this implication without contradicting herself, she 
would have to argue that women have certain particular common experiences that are not due 
to their social situation, but that are due to other things, they may, for example, be 
biologically founded.285 Some of her reflections on women’s experiences as mothers suggest 
an argument of this sort. Harding may, however, agree that what she wants to add is a 
criterion saying that it is an indication of truth that a theory is compatible with critical 
learning from the experience of all those in a social situation similar to the social situation of 
‘women’s lives’ – not only from the experience of women leading ‘women’s lives’. But then 
it is not clear why we should call the epistemology feminist, instead of, for example, socialist 
or multiculturalist;286 in other words Haack’s challenge concerning what is specifically 
feminist in feminist epistemology would remain unaddressed. 
4.2.10 Women’s oppression as truth-functional? 
 
Finally, Harding fails to face up to the dilemma connected with her standpoint argument. The 
argument that women’s social situation – or critical learning from women’s social situation – 
is truth-functional, relies on a description of women’s situation in a gender-hierarchical 
society, from which she, at the same time, says women should be emancipated, because the 
gender hierarchy is unjust. There seems thus to be a conflict between creating a gender-just 
society – where women are no longer excluded, strangers, oppressed, outsiders-within and so 
on and so forth – and what is truth-functional. Hence, whereas Harding in some passages 
argue that what is truth-functional is what is liberating, and the other way around (see 4.2.6), 
the general logic of her standpoint argument draws in fact in the opposite direction. 
 
                                                 
285 Which is compatible with her denial of essentialism, if the biological explanation is based on an empirically 
warranted theory without essentialist assumptions. 
286 Why call feminist an epistemology constructed to avoid the fact that “only the gender, race, sexuality, and 
class elites who now predominate in institutions of knowledge-seeking […] have the chance to decide how to 
start asking their research questions” (op.cit.: 124)? There are many similar passages in Whose Science? Whose 
Knowledge?. 
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4.3 Concluding remarks 
 
The feminist standpoint epistemologists have tried to argue that epistemology should in fact 
embody “some specifically feminist insight” (original emphasis, Haack 1998: 119); insights 
that are more than implications of the argument for the ‘democratization’ of epistemology. 
Sandra Harding’s proposal of a feminist standpoint epistemology has problems of an 
empirical kind attached to it (her descriptions of ‘women’s lives’ are not valid descriptions of 
all women’s lives, or only of women’s lives). It is also not clear why thinking from ‘women’s 
lives’, whatever that might mean more specifically, is truth-functional in all cases. Finally, 
standpoint epistemology’s prescriptions of cognitive inequality among inquirers seem hard to 
combine with a commitment to a norm of equal intellectual authority: Harding’s proposal has 
also problems of a moral kind attached to it. Thus, if epistemology should in fact be 
developed in a specifically feminist direction, it cannot be along the lines suggested by 
Harding’s standpoint argument. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FEMINIST CRITIQUE: THE NORWEGIAN CASE 
 
5.0 “[…] intense discussions about modernity” 
 
In her introduction to the anthology Kjønnenes møte med det moderne287 the literary scholar 
Irene Iversen places the assessment of “modernity” at the core of contemporary feminist 
discussions (1999a: 1): 
 
Since the end of the 1960s there have been intense discussions about modernity in philosophy, 
historical research and sociological theory. The discussion reflects the view that modernity 
can no longer be perceived as a pure regime of progress or reason. Since the early 1980s there 
have been sharp confrontations between postmodernists and defenders of modernity. While 
the postmodernists have criticized and even dismissed the project of enlightenment and 
universalization, the theorists of modernity, led by the German sociologist Jürgen Habermas, 
have claimed that the dismissal of modernity implies that the ideals of equality and autonomy 
as well as the possibility in principle of reflection and a self-conscious practice has been 
thrown overboard. As far as feminism is concerned, the critique of modernity has come from 
different sources and it has been lively and multifaceted. We are talking about a long tradition 
of feminist thinking that has consisted of many different debates and covered many different 
topics. We find a feminist critique of modernity already in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, while it becomes particularly strong by the beginning of the twentieth-century. It 
can be seen as a reaction against the exclusion of women in modern political thinking and as a 
defense against the attack from rationalism and individualism on women’s lifeworld. Today 
the feminist critique of modernity comes, basically, from two camps, from postmodern and 
from communitarian feminism. What unites them is the articulation of a critical analysis of 
modern self-understanding, whether expressed through liberal rights thinking, built on the 
idea of the abstract and autonomous subject, or linked to Kantian moral philosophy (op.cit.: 1-
2).288 
 
Thus, the thinking of modernity, ‘the modern self-understanding’, as it is depicted by Iversen; 
the thinking of liberals, Kant and Habermas, is a thinking that conceptualizes the self as 
disembodied and disembedded, emphasizes the capacities of human reason, considers the 
development from pre-modern to modern society in terms of progress or ‘enlightenment’, and 
defends universal principles of autonomy and equality. 
                                                 
287 The Gendered Encounter with Modernity. The translations from Norwegian in this chapter, as well as in 
Chapters 6, 8 and 9, are my own. I wish to thank participants on seminars at the Center for the Study of the 
Sciences and the Humanities and in the dr.polit.-group at the Department of Sociology, University of Bergen, 
Gunnar Skrbekk, Roberto Gargarella and Anders Molander for comments. 
288 Iversen develops her analysis of the project of modernity in Iversen and Rønning (1996) and in Iversen (1995, 
1996, 1999b, 2004). 
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What Iversen refers to as the modern self-understanding, is what Jürgen Habermas (1985) has 
defended as “the project of modernity”.289 In Chapters 1 to 4 I myself defend a feminism 
within the normative horizon of modernity.290 To do so is controversial. Several 
commentators, Norwegian291 and others292, have described the basic topic of controversy in 
contemporary feminism in similar terms as Iversen – as a debate on the merits of modernity. 
In fact, feminism is, unfortunately, very often presented as a critique of modern thought.293 
However, there are feminists who stand up for the modern imaginary;294 who are unconvinced 
by some, or even most, of the critique put forward.295 In this chapter I will elaborate fifteen 
arguments against the thinking of modernity that have been circulating in academic-feminist 
debates in Norway during the past decade, and the discussions of these arguments.  
                                                 
289 “The project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the philosophers of the Enlightenment consisted 
in their efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art, according to their 
inner logic. […] Enlightenment thinkers of the cast of mind of Condorcet still had the extravagant expectation 
that the arts and the sciences would promote not only the control of natural forces, but would also further 
understanding of the world and of the self, would promote moral progress, the justice of institutions, and even 
the happiness of human beings. The 20th century has chattered this optimism […]. But the problem won’t go 
away: should we try to hold on to the intentions of the Enlightenment, feeble as they may be, or should we 
declare the entire project of modernity a lost cause?” (original emphasis, Habermas 1981b: 9). 
290 What I refer to here as ‘modern’ thought, others refer to as ‘liberal’. Indeed, several of the arguments 
introduced in this chapter as critical of modernity overlap with what Stephen Holmes would refer to as “anti-
liberal thought” (1989: 227). However, even if Kant is often referred to as liberal, and Habermas and the author 
of Political Liberalism “agree on many philosophical points” (Rawls 1996: 373), many contemporary defenders 
of Kantian and Habermasian approaches, in more or less modified versions, would not care for the label ‘liberal’, 
as they emphasize the difference between their approaches and approaches inspired for example by Rawls, and 
present their arguments under headings like “Liberal Dialogue Versus a Critical Theory of Discursive 
Legitimation” (Benhabib 1989) and “Kant’s justice and Kantian justice” (O’Neill 2000: 65-80, “Kantian justice” 
refers to Rawls’ theory of justice). Moreover, it should be clear from what I have said, that what I refer to here as 
‘modern’ thought is are not all kinds of thinking that are not ‘postmodern’  For example, in Chapter 4 I referred 
to Sandra Harding as a critic of postmodern feminism. This does not make her a defender of modernity, 
according to the definition introduced here. 
291 Cf. Slagstad (1994), Widerberg (1994), L’orange Fürst (1995), Wærness (1995), Ve (1999a), Annfeldt 
(1999), Lundgren (2001). 
292 Cf. Young (1990, 1997), Benhabib (1992), Scott and Butler (1992), Dean (1996), Pauer-Studer (1998), 
Kymlicka (2002), Held (2004). 
293 Onora O’Neill distinguishes between “defenders of abstract rights and justice”, and “advocates of 
communitarian or feminist accounts of traditions of virtue” (1989: xi). She positions feminism as a branch of 
communitarianism, in opposition to the project of modernity. But O’Neill does herself defends this project, and 
has elaborated its relevance for feminism (O’Neill 2000). In fact, several influential feminist theorists connect 
their theorizing intimately to Kant (in addition to O’Neill, for example Nagl-Docekal 1999), Rawls (for example 
Okin 1989, Cornell 1995, 1998, Nussbaum 1999, 2000) or Habermas (for example Benhabib 1992, Chambers 
1995, Cohen 2002). 
294 Many seem to think they have to excuse themselves for doing so. Consider the title of Marcia Bacon’s book, 
Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology (1995). Consider also Johanna Meehan’s introduction to Feminists Read 
Habermas. Gendering the Subject of Discourse: “Perhaps the first question this introduction should answer is 
why feminists should read Habermas at all. Habermasian theory stands squarely in a tradition of Enlightenment-
inspired political theory and deontological ethics which many feminists have thoroughly rejected, and the 
authors anthologized here are to some extent rowing against the feminist main-stream” (original emphasis, 1995: 
1).  
295 Later in her introduction, Iversen mentions Seyla Benhabib as an example of a feminist spokes-woman of the 
project of modernity. Benhabib (1986, 1992) defends a modified version of Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics.  
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5.1 The significance of the Norwegian case 
Feminist critique is elaborated, discussed and assessed within the interdisciplinary field that is 
often referred to as ‘feminist theory’. The field has separate journals,296 conferences and 
leading figures.297 Most feminist theorists participate in other fields as well: They are also 
literary, psychoanalytical or aesthetical theorists, moral philosophers, epistemologists, 
philosophers of science, social, political, cultural or legal theorists, and publish works on 
feminism within these fields in addition to their contributions to feminist theory.298 There are 
very few Norwegian feminist theorists, if we by the term mean those who publish in the 
journals of the field of feminist theory, or on feminist theory in international journals within 
other fields or in books published by international publishers.299  
 
In spite of this, I have chosen to take as my point of departure feminist critique as introduced 
in recent Norwegian debates. By the beginning of the 1990s the Norwegian field of feminist 
research had entered what one commentator refers to as “a period of self-reflection” 
(Widerberg 1992: 286).300 In this period of self-reflection many Norwegian feminists have in 
fact engaged themselves with feminist theory. Even if this engagement has rarely resulted in 
international publications, the outcome is considerable. Numerous articles, dissertations and 
books published during the past decade and a half, address the question of what feminism is, 
                                                 
296 Such as Signs. Journal of Women in Culture and Society and Feminist Theory: An International 
Interdisciplinary Journal. 
297 I.e. figures that are considered leading representatives of – and even inventors of – different approaches 
within the field. In a special issue of the Norwegian journal for feminist research (2/93), Nytt om 
kvinneforskning, they are referred to as “stars” (the title of the issue is “Kvinneforskningens stjerner” (“The Stars 
of Women’s Research”). For an instructive and extensive overview of different approaches and its leading 
figures, see A Companion to Feminist Philosophy (2000), edited by Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young. 
The volume contains not only essays on problems conventionally dealt with within the discipline of philosophy. 
It is rather, and is also introduced as, a companion to “feminist theory” in the broad sense suggested here (2000: 
i). 
298 Some of the leading figures within the field of feminist theory are also influential figures in one or more of 
these fields, such as Martha Nussbaum (moral philosophy, political theory) and Judith Butler (literary and 
cultural theory).  
299 If the criterion is regular and not merely occasional publishing of this sort, Norway has perhaps only one 
scholar who qualifies as a feminist theorist, Toril Moi, currently professor at Duke University. Among her 
publications are Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (1985), French Feminist Thought (1987), 
Feminist Theory and Simone de Beauvoir (1990), The Making of an Intellectual Woman (1994) and What is a 
Woman? And Other Essays (1999). There are, however, other Norwegian feminist scholars with an original, 
mainly theoretical profile, such as the social anthropologists Jorun Solheim and Elisabeth L’orange Fürst and the 
literary theorist Ellen Mortensen. 
300 “[…] the time [has] come for a period of self-reflection”, Karin Widerberg stated in a programmatic article in 
1992. I give a brief history of feminist research in Norway in 5.2. 
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and discuss, in particular, the relationship between feminist critique and the modern 
imaginary. 
 
In this rich self-reflecting literature I have identified a variety of arguments against modernity 
and its modes of thinking. Many of the arguments will be recognizable to those familiar with 
contemporary feminist theory. Sometimes the reference to standards positions and approaches 
in international debates is explicit and even crucial for how the argument is framed. However, 
I will investigate and discuss whether Norwegian debates do not also have a particular 
argumentative profile that distinguishes it from how feminist debates are typically mapped in 
standard works of feminist theory.301 Several critics have interpreted the turn to feminist 
theory in the period of self-reflection in Norway as an expression of homogenization and 
increased Anglo-American and French influence, since American and French scholars are 
considered to dominate international feminist theory.302 The reflexive discourse may, 
however, also have distinctive national traits.303 This is a question for investigation.304 Are 
Anglo-American debates simply copied?  
 
In Chapter 6 I will discuss whether the profile of contemporary Norwegian academic 
feminism stands in a particular relationship to the profile of political feminism in Norway and 
its institutionalization in a ‘state feminist system’ (Hernes 1987). Is it reasonable to connect 
the self-reflective discourse in Norwegian academic feminism to the particular characteristics 
of the state feminist “regime”?305 Thus, assuming there are connections, what is elaborated in 
                                                 
301 This question is addressed in 5.6. 
302 See for example Widerberg (1994, 1998), Wærness (1995), Halsaa (1996b), Bjørhovde (1997), Ve (1999a). 
The American and French dominance is a fact. An overwhelming majority of the ‘stars’ in feminist theory are 
professors at universities in the United States. It should be added, however, that some of them do not fit neatly 
into the category of ‘Anglo-American feminist’, such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (India/Colombia 
University) and Saskia Sassen (Argentina/University of Chicago). There are also leading feminist theorists based 
outside France and the U.S., for example Rosi Braidotti (Utrecht University) and Herta Nagl-Docekal 
(University of Vienna). Many have positions at universities in Canada, Australia and Great Britain. In short, the 
field of feminist theory seems to be haunted by patterns of concentration and marginalization similar to other 
academic fields, linked to the cultural and economic power relations of the contemporary global order. 
303 There might be interesting institutional or regional variations as well. Siri Gerrard and Halldis Valestrand 
(1999a) analyze the distinctive features of feminist studies at the University of Tromsø. In the anthology Is there 
a Nordic Feminism? edited by Drude von der Fehr, Bente Rosenbeck and Anna G. Jónasdóttir, the contributors 
search for regional Nordic characteristics. Institutional and regional variations are, however, not dealt with in my 
discussions here. 
304 The peculiar national characteristics of earlier periods of Norwegian feminist research are generally 
recognized, perhaps even somewhat overstated. The second-wave feminism of the 1970s were based on 
“imported” concepts, theories and perspectives, in particular from the United States, as well as on concepts, 
theories and perspectives developed in the Norwegian research field (Hagemann 2004). 
305 Rune Slagstad defines a “knowledge regime” as “a unity of power, knowledge and value” (1998: 17, 2004). 
My focus will be on the normative basis of the ‘state feminism’ developed as part of the knowledge regime of 
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this chapter is the academic-feminist self-reflection of a state feminist regime. As such, it 
should be of interest outside Norway. Since the 1960s the United Nations has recommended 
that its member states establish “government structures that are formally charged with 
furthering women’s status and rights”, “national policy machineries for the advancement of 
women” (McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995: 1-2, 3). In this connection the Scandinavian state 
feminist system is often singled out as a model system. Leading academic feminists refer to 
the Scandinavian countries in similar terms. Norway is “my northern star”, Arlie Hochschild 
declares.306 Nancy Fraser points to the Scandinavian “social democratic welfare state” as 
more sensitive to feminist concerns than other existing political arrangements.307  In “The 
Patriarchal Welfare State” Carol Pateman singles out the Scandinavian welfare states as “the 
more developed welfare states” where “women have moved nearer to […] full citizenship” 
than elsewhere, even if they “have not yet” completely achieved it (1998: 242). Hence, 
bluntly speaking, Scandinavia’s state feminism is often considered, if not a feminist utopia, 
then at least a stop on the road to it: “The social democratic citizenship ideal” of the 
Scandinavian countries has a unique “women-friendly potential”, like Helga Hernes has 
argued (1987: 110).308 What kind of feminist critique might be expected to arise in this 
environment?  
 
5.2 The period of self-reflection – a historical perspective309 
 
Harriet Holter singles out five different periods in the development of Norwegian feminist 
research. First, she refers to a “predecessor period” from the beginning of the eighteenth-
century to the 1930s (1996: 42). In this period writings on “the woman issue” were published 
by leading figures of  “the bourgeois-liberal women’s movements”,310 and late in the period, 
also by feminists in the worker’s movement (op.cit.: 43). However, the issue had not yet been 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Labor Party state. Consider also Peter Wagner’s (1990) comparative analysis of the connections between the 
state and the development of the social sciences in France, Italy and Germany. 
306 Quoted in Brandth and Kvande (2003: 17). They refer to a lecture given by Hochschild in Trondheim in 2001. 
entitled “At the End of Global Care Chains: Children and the Global Transfer of Love”. 
307 In Fraser and Honneth (2003). 
308 I will return to Hernes’ influential assessment in Chapter 6. 
309 This is a brief outline of the research field’s central research problems and approaches in different periods, 
mainly based on Harriet Holter’s brief overview. Similarly brief overviews are written (see for example Halsaa 
2003). For an insitutionally oriented analysis of the development of the research field, see Halsaa (1996). A more 
extensive intellectual and sociological history of the research field remains to be written. 
310 Holter analyzes works by among others Camilla Collett, Aasta Hansteen, Margarete Bonnevie and Mimi 
Sverdrup Lunden. 
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linked to systematic scientific inquiries. This happened in the second “period of gender roles” 
which lasted from the 1930s to the end of the 1960s (op.cit.: 48). This period was 
characterized by “the attempt to make gender and gender differences scientific” using 
“positivist-empirical” approaches and methods (ibid.). The main focus was on sociological 
and social-psychological studies of gender roles. The notion of gender role was inspired by 
Talcott Parsons, at the same time as Parson’s structural functionalism, in particular his 
subscription to the idea of “complementarity” between women and men as “functional in and 
for society” was attacked (op.cit.: 50). Significant contributors were Erik Grønseth, Per Olav 
Tiller, Sverre Brun-Gulbrandsen, Berit Ås, in addition to Harriet Holter herself, often 
considered the founding mother of Norwegian feminist research.311  
 
Third, we can talk of a “period of patriarchy and agency” from about 1970 until the mid-
1980s (op.cit.: 52). The focus in this period was on how “material, economic and political 
structures”, in particular patriarchy and capitalism and their interrelations, created women’s 
oppression (op.cit.: 52, 54). The Nordic feminist researchers were “well-informed”, Holter 
says, and positioned themselves relative to international theory debates and the leading figures 
in these debates, such as Juliet Mitchell, Gayle Rubin, Heidi Hartmann and Ulrike Prokop 
(op.cit.: 54). However, the Norwegian researchers did not contribute “originally” in 
“international fora” (ibid.). Moreover, there were in fact very few empirical studies of 
patriarchy and capitalism as systems (op.cit.: 55).312  
 
The focus of the period of patriarchy and agency was also on studies of women as “agents”, a 
perspective often contrasted to the gender-role perspective – “women are agents, not norm- or 
role puppets”, it was argued (op.cit.: 52). From this perspective, numerous empirical studies 
of women’s lives and experiences were made focusing on work, family and everyday-life. 
Thus, the problem-oriented, empirical focus of the period of gender roles persisted, even if the 
conceptual framework had changed. The ambitions behind the agency-studies were critical: to 
reveal the patriarchal and capitalist oppression of women’s lifeworld. The scholars’ 
ideological commitments were radical-feminist and/or Marxist-feminist. Norwegian “liberal” 
feminists at the time were not engaged in feminist research, Holter notes (op.cit.: 54). This 
critical commitment was combined with a concern for women’s “dignity”: The focus were to 
                                                 
311 A special issue of the Norwegian journal for feminist research (Nytt om kvinneforskning) was published in 
1992 containing articles on her contributions. 
312 There were a few exceptions, such as some of Holter’s own contributions, and works by Hildur Ve (for 
example Ve 1977). Consider also Holter, Ve Henriksen, Gjertsen and Hjort (1975). 
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be on “women’s oppression” and “the counter-strategies against relations of dominance 
between men and women” (op.cit.: 58). The latter required sensitivity towards the “meaning” 
women attached to their situation and women’s distinct “rationality” (op.cit.: 53, 57). The 
agency-studies were influenced in this sense by the critique directed against positivism during 
the 1970s, Holter argues.313  
 
The fourth period of Norwegian feminist research Holter refers to as the “period of culture, 
context and relations” (op.cit.: 60). It lasts throughout the 1980s and is transformed gradually 
into a fifth period by the beginning of the 1990s, a period Holter simply refers to as the 
“period of the present and the future” (op.cit.: 41). The empirical focus in the fourth period 
remains on the level of the agent, more specifically on how gender is “made” and 
“negotiated” in meaningful interaction: Gender is a “relation” and a “cultural code” 
reproduced and transformed in local concrete arenas (op.cit.: 63).314 Negotiations are shaped 
and limited by “structural, cultural and personal conditions” (ibid.). Grand theories of 
patriarchal and capitalist oppression are, however, rejected. Such tendencies are considered 
unhistorical and static; unable to “describe and explain change” (op.cit.: 61). Other tendencies 
characteristic of the period of culture, context and relations are, according to Holter, a 
growing interest in “poststructuralist” and “postmodernist” theory, phenomenology, 
qualitative methodology, psychoanalysis, popular culture, sexuality and the body (ibid.). 
These tendencies are strengthened in the fifth period of the present and the future, 
characterized, however, above all by a “reflexive” turn; intensified self-critical reflection on 
the theories, concepts, approaches and basic presuppositions of feminist research (ibid.). 
Thus, Holter’s description of the period of the present and the future resembles Widerberg’s 
observation of a period of self-reflection in contemporary Norwegian feminist research. As 
noted by both, this self-reflection is accompanied by an increased interest in epistemology, 
critique of science and different branches of feminist theory. Their observations were made in 
the early and mid-1990s – and have a predictive character: Holter and Widerberg believe the 
reflexive turn will continue to influence Norwegian academic-feminist debates in the years to 
come.  
 
A few qualifying remarks are needed, however. First, a self-reflective wave in this research 
field can indeed be identified the last ten to fifteen years. However, most of what has been 
                                                 
313 For an elaboration and discussion of the debate on positivism in Norway, see Slagstad (1980). 
314 Holter mentions the social psychologist Hanne Haavind as a central exponent of the relational turn.  
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published in this period, either does not address meta-issues, or addresses them only briefly. 
Also, among those who have contributed, most have published on other issues as well, and 
most have published most often other issues than meta-issues. Thus, self-reflection and meta-
debates have not replaced empirical investigation. It is indicative that the research programs 
on gender initiated by the Research Council of Norway during this period have financed 
mostly empirically-oriented projects.315 Meta-projects are exceptions,316 a fact pointed out by 
critics (Mortensen 2002).317 Typically, questions connected to feminist self-reflection are 
raised and discussed in single articles,318 or in chapters of dissertations and books by authors 
who mostly write about other issues. Hence, it is not the case that Norwegian feminist 
research has turned into “a race for theory” and is dominated by “metatheoretical discourse” 
(Wærness 1995: 21), even if the self-reflective discourse of the research field is more intense 
and varied than in previous periods.  
 
Second, there were discussions also during the 1970s and 1980s about the basis of feminist 
critique. If we return to Kvinnekunnskap (1976),319 I kvinners bilde (1977)320 and Patriarchy 
in a Welfare Society (1984), three anthologies with contributions from central figures in the 
research field at the time, we find for example an article discussing from “a phenomenological 
and existential starting point” feminist “self-organization” and “dialogical action” for 
“emancipation”, referring to Jürgen Habermas, Max Horkheimer, Oscar Negt and Alexander 
Kluge, to Rune Slagstad and Thomas Mathiesen, to Simone de Beauvoir, Sheila Rowbotham 
and Luce Irigaray (Gulli 1977). Another contributor provides a feminist critique of 
sociological concepts, referring among others to Dorothy Smith, Ann Oakley, Jessie  
Bernhard, Kate Millett and Shulamit Firestone, to Rune Slagstad and Regi Enerstvedt (Berge 
1977).321 There are reflections on the relationship between patriarchy and capitalism in 
                                                 
315 There have been four programs: Program for grunnleggende samfunnsvitenskapelig kvinneforskning, 
Program for grunnleggende humanistisk kvinneforskning” (both 1988-1994), Kjønn i endring: institusjoner, 
normer, identiteter (1996-2002), and the one running at the present, Kjønnsforskning: kunnskap, grenser, 
endring. 
316 Kjønn i endring: institusjoner, normer, identiteter did, for example, fund 31 projects. Only 3 have a clear 
meta-theoretical dimension: “The Mind-Brain Continuum: Towards a Naturalistic Feminist Theory of 
Embodiment and Culture” (Tone Bleie), “Sexual Differences: Beyond Constructionism” (Kjell Soleim) and 
“Feminisme og liberalisme” (Kjersti Fjørtoft). 
317 Mortensen complains about the priorities of the board of the new reserach program. 
318 Or even in parts of single articles that mainly deal with other things. 
319 Women’s Knowledge. 
320 In the Image of Women. 
321 The articles in Kvinnekunnskap and I kvinners bilde are generally influenced by international feminist, 
Marxist and critical theory, Norwegian sociologists and philosophers outside the feminist research field, in 
particular the critics of positivism, and established scholars in the feminist research field, such as Harriet Holter 
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explanations of women’s oppression (Berg 1977, Kalleberg 1977, Haukaa 1984), between 
“impersonal forms” of male dominance and “how men dominate” in the concrete interactions 
of personal relationships, for example in the “exchanges between spouses” (Haavind 1984), 
and between women as oppressed and women as “altruistic” agents with “dignity” within the 
framework of a distinct and possibly progressive “women’s culture” (Haukaa 1977,322 
Sørensen 1977,323 Ve 1984324).  
 
These publications all contribute to a discussion of standards in feminist politics and inquiry. 
The discussions of patriarchy/capitalism and personal/impersonal oppression are, for example, 
discussions of the overall explanatory framework of feminist analysis. The discussion on 
altruism, dignity and women’s culture raises the question of the nature of the agent of feminist 
critique (altruistic, dignified), and the question of the moral or ethical standards of feminist 
critique (altruism, women’s culture). These cases give nuance to the prevailing view that there 
was mostly “empirically-driven theory development” in Norwegian feminist research during 
the 1970s and 1980s, as opposed to present-day “metatheoretical theory” (Halsaa 2003: 6). 
 
Third, Harriet Holter’s description of the development of the research field puts greater 
emphasis on developments in the social sciences than in the humanities. There are, moreover, 
interesting, more detailed stories to be told about particular branches of the research field, for 
example about the development of individual disciplines.325 Holter’s historical analysis 
captures however certain general trends. 
5.3 Methodological considerations 
 
The period of self-reflection in Norwegian academic feminism may be read, as suggested by 
Iversen, as a period of reflection on the relationship between feminism and modernity. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Erik Grønseth. This blend of international and Norwegian, feminist and other influences characterize 
contemporary contributions as well (see. 5.6).   
322 Haukaa discusses Berit Ås’ notion of women’s culture, see Ås (1974). 
323 The title of her article is “Arbeiderkvinner og verdighet” (“Working Class Women and Dignity”). 
324 The title of her article is “Kvinners gjensidige allianser. Altruisme som premiss for samhandling” (“Women’s 
Mutual Alliances. Altruism as a Premise for Interaction”). 
325 The contributors in Taksdal and Widerberg (1992) give overviews of the development of feminist research in 
social anthropology, political science, psychology, pedagogy, sociology and economics. Wesenberg (1995) 
analyzes the development of women’s law, Melby (1995) developments within the discipline of history, 
Malterud (1997) research on women and gender in Norwegian medicine. Iversen (2002) reflects on feminism in 
Norwegian literary theory and comparative literature. These are but some examples. To reflect in more or less 
detail on the history of the research field is central to what the self-reflective discourse of the research field is all 
about.  
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discourse on modernity introduces a set of arguments against a modern notion of feminism. 
What the arguments have in common, is that they all in one way or another question 
modernity’s standards of critique. Thus, what I have wished to investigate, is a feminist meta-
debate – feminist critique against modernity’s standards of critique and the discussion of this 
critique – not all kinds of discussions going on within the feminist research field. Thus, I have 
tried to limit my analysis to publications that contribute to meta-debate. In a sense, all that 
have been published in the research field can be interpreted as contribution to such debate. All 
publications rely on certain implicit standards of critique that can be explicated and 
deliberated upon; they all address, in this sense, meta-questions. However, the focus here will 
be on what is already explicated, the meta-discourse in Habermas’ sense, and on publications 
that contribute significantly to such discourse: What interests me is not only the meta-claims, 
but also in the argumentative defense of these claims. What kind of feminist meta-critique is 
raised against the parameters of modernity, more precisely? And why have such processes of 
meta-explication within the research field at all occurred? The latter question will be 
addressed in 5.7, as well as in Chapter 6. 
 
Most commentators agree that the period of self-reflection starts around 1990. I have searched 
systematically for relevant publications from 1990 onwards. It was, however, not a particular 
episode that triggered the reflexive wave. Rather, it seems to have been several processes 
interacting in a particular way, that made ‘something’ happen towards the end of the 1980s 
and the beginning of the 1990s.326 Thus, by beginning my search in 1990, it is possible I have 
missed publications from the end of the 1980s that are early expressions of the turn to meta-
theory.327 The danger that I will miss crucial points is less likely, however.328  
 
I stop my survey in 2002. I had to do so because of my work schedule; I do not stop in 2002 
because I have any reason to say self-reflection has come to an end. Rather, the self-reflective 
discourse seems to persist into 2003 and 2004. I have allowed myself to include relevant 
                                                 
326 I will elaborate and discuss these processes in 5.7. 
327 Nytt om kvinneforskning for example, began a series in the late 1980s with articles on ‘feminist key texts’. 
The first articles in this series fall outside my reading here, while, for example, Gullvåg Holter (1991) on Marx 
and Borchgrevink (1992) on Shulamit Firestone are included. 
328 Consider for example Hanne Haavind’s (1989) article “Rasjonalitet, makt og følelser” (“Rationality, power, 
and emotions”) where she argues that the male rationality that governs scientific practice should be replaced with 
a female rationality that is more faithful to our sentiments. This is an input to a meta-debate: It concerns the 
truth-idealization generally, and, more specifically, the critical standards of science. The point has, however, 
been repeated, developed and critically discussed on several occasions later. Lately, Hagemann has given an 
extensive account of Haavind’s article and the debate it triggered (2003: 189-216).  
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publications also from 2003 and 2004 in my discussion, as far as I have become aware of 
them and have had the time to include them. Re-printed publications, originally published 
before 1990, are excluded from my selection.329 
 
In my search for publications I have taken as my point of departure:330 
- Articles published in the journal Kvinneforskning,331 the only Norwegian journal devoted to 
feminist research. 
- Articles published by Norwegian researchers in Kvinnovetenskaplig tidsskrift (Swedish), in 
Kvinder, Køn & Forskning (Danish), and in NORA. Norwegian Journal of Women’s 
Studies.332 
- Lists of publications of established scholars in the field working on gender issues.333 
 
Reading relevant publications stemming from these three sources, and their lists of references, 
I became aware of other relevant publications.334 The publications included in my final 
selection are both journal articles, contributions in anthologies and conference reports, 
monographs or monograph-chapters, dissertations or dissertation-chapters, research reports, 
book-reviews,335 and even interviews. I do not claim that all relevant publications are 
included. From the way I have been going about, it seems possible that I may have 
overlooked contributions of interest published in discipline-specific journals and relevant 
works by less established scholars in the field.  
                                                 
329 This implies for example that some of the articles on women’s law in Tove Stang Dahl’s Pene piker haiker 
ikke (1994a) are included, while others, originally published before 1990, are excluded. 
330 The selected publications are listed in Appendix. 
331 Issued four times a year. The name of the journal was changed in 1994 from Nytt om kvinneforskning to 
Kvinneforskning. Kvinneforskning was not a peer reviewed journal until 1/2000. This may be linked to the 
relatively late academization of Norwegian feminist research: For a long time, delivering adequate knowledge to 
the women’s movement and the femocrats was more important than living up to formal academic standards 
(Halsaa 2003, Hernes 2004, but questioned by Blom 2003). The intensified reflexive discourse in the period of 
self-reflection might be read as a catching-up in light of this late academization (see 5.7). 
332 I have also searched through some international journals, Signs, Feminist Theory, Feminist Review, Gender 
Studies and The European Journal of Women’s Studies. This confirmed my prima facie impression that 
Norwegian academic feminists rarely publish on feminist theory outside Scandinavia. Of the five journals 
mentioned here, I found most Norwegian contributions in The European Journal of Women’s Studies. I have not 
systematically searched after publications on feminist theory by Norwegian researchers in other more topic- or 
discipline-specific international journals. Some of the contributors have, moreover, published significantly in 
international journals, even if they have not published internationally on feminist theory. 
333 I had acquired knowledge of the central figures from previous investigation of the field (for example Holst 
2001, 2002). Their lists of publications are often publicly available on the web (university web-sites, home-pages 
etc.). 
334 I have also looked thoroughly through several discipline-specific journals. It would be fair to say that my 
search for publications in the social sciences has been somewhat more thorough than my search for publications 
in the humanities, law and psychology, not to mention the natural sciences and medicine. 
335 Mostly, book-reviews are excluded. I have, however, included some that I found particularly well suited to 
illustrate a certain point. 
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Furthermore, I have read the publications more or less thoroughly before including them or 
excluding them from my selection of texts. The articles published in Nytt om 
kvinneforskning/Kvinneforskning have been closely read. This reading is the backbone of my 
analysis. Due to the time-limit on this project, I have been forced on other occasions to make 
decisions of inclusion or exclusion following a brief reading-through, and based on what 
titles, subtitles, introductions, abstracts, or previous knowledge about the author, suggest 
about the content of the publication.336 Had my schedule allowed it, I would of course have 
preferred to have considered all candidates thoroughly.  
 
The publications in my selection are mostly written by feminist researchers with positions337 
at Norwegian universities, colleges, and research institutes. A few of the authors are, 
however, freelance-writers,338 have positions in non-governmental organizations,339 or in state 
bureaucracy (“femocrats”).340 A few hold, at the time of writing, positions at universities 
abroad.341 
                                                 
336 The content of different publications by the same author sometimes overlaps. In cases of great overlap 
between two or more publications, I have allowed myself to include only one of them. 
337 Doctoral scholars included. I have included contributions from graduates, when they have published their 
graduate thesis as a research report (for example Rustad 1996 and Rekdal 2002), or turned parts of it into a 
journal-article or a  book-chapter (for example Solhøy 1999 and Engebretsen 1999). I have not had the time to 
go through all relevant graduate theses, even though I suspect many of them touch upon interesting reflexive 
issues. This suspicion is linked to the hypothesis that there may be a connection between the period of self-
reflection and generational patterns (see 5.7, and my analysis of some graduate theses in feminist sociology in 
Holst 2001: 173-184). 
338 See for example Owesen (2000/2001) and Spjeldnæs (2000/2001). 
339 See for example Strøm (1995), Bostad (1995) and Salimi (1997). 
340 See for example Gulbrandsen (1998) and Aas (1998). That contributors in academic publications have 
positions outside the academic field, reflect the late academization of the research field, and that there are still 
close connections between parts of the research field, femocrats and activists (see Halsaa 1996, 2003, and 5.7). 
341 For example Toril Moi (Duke University, US) and Eva Lundgren (University of Uppsala, Sweden). However, 
I concentrate on their publications in Norwegian journals or by Norwegian publishers, and thus omit several of 
their publications. Generally speaking, I have excluded from my selection of texts translated contributions 
written by feminist researchers with positions at universities outside Norway, and with no formal institutional 
connections to the Norwegian research field. This is why I have included articles by, for example, Kirsten 
Ketcher, professor at the University of Copenhagen, and Sara Heinämaa, professor at the University of Helsinki, 
from the period they were professor II at the University of Oslo (published in Norwegian journals or in books 
with Norwegian publishers), but excluded, for example, professor at the University of Minnesota Naomi 
Scheman’s contribution in Lotherington and Markussen (1999), and the contributions by Linda Alcoff (US), 
Alison M. Jaggar (US), Rosi Braidotti (the Netherlands), Ulla Holm (Sweden), Eva Lungren-Gothlin (Sweden), 
Katri Kaalikoski (Finland) and Ullaliina Lehtinen (Finland) in Preus, Vetlesen, Kleven, Iversen and von der Fehr 
(1996). Kvinneforskning has published several articles of this sort. It could be argued that these publications also 
should be included; that the authors are participating in the discussions of ‘Norwegian academic feminism’ qua 
authors of articles often translated into and published in Norwegian, by Norwegian publishers, for a Norwegian-
speaking audience. Why put so much weight on the national origin of the author and formal institutional 
connections? Would it not in fact be more reasonable to exclude for example publications in English or Swedish 
by authors born in or with formal institutional connections to Norway, published in non-Norwegian journals and 
by non-Norwegian publishers? My emphasis on national origin and formalized institutional bonds is linked to 
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Finally, a note on the term ‘feminist research’.342 Many of those whom I refer to here as 
feminist researchers, refer themselves to what they are doing as women’s research or gender 
research, or even men’s research.343 There are three reasons why I have nevertheless opted for 
the term feminist research. One is that the self-reflective discourse in the research field is very 
much a discourse on feminism: Contributors, whether they think of themselves as women’s 
researchers, men’s researchers or gender researchers when they undertake empirical 
investigations, conceptualize their meta-reflections very often as reflections on the 
implications of a feminist commitment. Another reason is that the established international 
label applied to the kind of discussions I am analyzing here is ‘feminist’.344 A third reason is 
that the term gender research345 might be taken to refer also to research carried out outside the 
field of research whose meta-debates I am analyzing here. In Norwegian kjønn346 denote both 
‘sex’ and ‘gender’, kjønnsforskning both research on ‘sex’ and ‘gender’.347 Research on kjønn 
(qua ‘sex’) is also being carried out, for example, in the fields of medicine, biology and 
experimental psychology. Contributors to these fields do not participate in the self-reflective 
discourse on feminism I am studying here, however, or at least only minimally. That is: They 
are only included if they have published reflexive pieces on feminism in the different sources 
I have searched, and not many have.348 
                                                                                                                                                        
my ambition to comment on the relationship between the reflexive turn and the political-cultural context (state 
feminism). To do so I need to focus on agents of reflexivity (so to speak) that have stable connections to this 
context. In this sense, the justification of my operational definition of ‘Norwegian academic feminism’ is 
analytical. I do not mean to position myself in a normative debate about which publications should be referred to 
as Norwegian and which should not. 
342 That is used interchangeably with terms such as ‘feminist inquiry’, ‘academic feminism’ and ‘feminist 
publications’. 
343 For overviews of men’s research in Norway, see for example Øvrelid (1996), Oftung (1997) and Slottemo 
(2000). 
344 Consider also my discussion of Susan Haack’s criticism of feminist epistemology in Chapters 1-4. 
345 The terms women’s research and men’s research are simply too exclusive. Each of them excludes, for 
example, the other. 
346 This is, however, also the case with other languages. Consider for example the German term Geschlecht. 
347 Hence, the Norwegian language is in a sense up to date with recent developments in international feminist 
theory on this point. Whereas to distinguish between the biological (sex) and the social (gender) dimension of 
the relationship between women and men was commonplace for a long time, many theorists now argue for the 
need to deconstruct this distinction, and reconceptualize what it means to be a ‘woman’ (for defenses of this 
view in Norwegian debates, see for example Solheim (1998, 1999), Moi (1999) and Lundgren (2001). Widerberg 
reflects interestingly on this point in her article “Translating gender” (1998). 
348 Looking at Nytt om kvinneforskning/Kvinneforskning it seems there were more contributors coming from 
outside the human and social sciences (broadly speaking), in the early years than of late. If we consider those 
who have contributed substantially to feminist meta-debates from outside the human- and social sciences (law 
and social psychology included), there are generally very few. There are exceptions, such as professor of 
medicine, Kirsti Malterud. She is, however, not surprisingly, working with medical problems from a sociological 
and cultural perspective, and in cooperation with human and social scientists. One of the few who has tried to 
relate ‘feminism’ to theories of sex or gender within the natural sciences, is Tone Bleie. She is, not surprisingly, 
a social anthropologist. It should also be noted that there are contributors within the human and social sciences 
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5.4 Criticism of the thinking of modernity 
I organize my presentation and discussion around arguments. There are often different 
variants of the arguments listed here. Also, the arguments are more or less elaborated, and 
contextualized in different ways by different contributors. Two contributors might, for 
example, raise similar meta-arguments against modernity while addressing, however, quiet 
different problems. Or similar arguments might be embedded in different theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks. My presentation will do fully justice neither to the rich variations in 
many of the arguments, nor to the different contexts in which the arguments are introduced. 
 
However, I shall try to give some body to the arguments. I shall begin the outline of each 
argument with a relatively thorough presentation of it and of its context, as it occurs in a 
contribution where the argument is elaborated and plays a significant role for the overall 
argument of the contribution. I go on to present, more briefly, some variations of the 
argument as it occurs in other contributions, I say something about how often it occurs, and 
about whether and in what sense it is considered controversial; present the controversy the 
argument inspires. 
 
Having introduced the arguments and how they have been debated (5.4.1-5.4.15), I discuss, 
briefly, how the different arguments challenge the standards of critique as the modern 
imaginary introduce them (5.5), outline some general characteristics of the academic-feminist 
self-reflection in Norway (5.6), discuss why this wave of self-reflection occured, and how its 
distinctiveness may be interpreted (5.7).  
 
5.4.1 The conservatism of modern thought 
In her monograph, The Feminine and Nihilism: Luce Irigaray with Nietzsche and Heidegger 
(1994), the literary theorist Ellen Mortensen positions the modern imaginary as incompatible 
with feminist transformative ambitions. Feminist projects shaped as “civil rights movements” 
                                                                                                                                                        
who work on ‘women’ and ‘gender’, but who do not participate in the reflexive wave I am analyzing here. In the 
social sciences, for example, gender is one of several standard variables in quantitative research, and, obviously, 
many of these researchers do not participate in the feminist meta-debates on the agenda here. I do not have any 
reason, based on this study, to assume anything about how these researchers – and the sex or gender researchers 
in the natural sciences who are not included in my material – would relate their project to feminism. 
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seeking “to legitimize their plight within the parameters of the Enlightenment tradition” are 
too “conservative”, she says (my emphasis, 1994: 99, 101).349 Mortensen defends instead “a 
new ethic of the feminine” (op.cit.: 11). The new ethic presupposes “a revolution in thought”; 
a reinterpretation of “the whole relationship between the subject and discourse, the subject 
and the world, the subject and the cosmic […]”, because the feminine is repressed by the 
hegemonic, binary and hierarchical, or ”phallogocentric discourses of philosophy, religion 
and science”; “the technological man-made languages” (op.cit.: 9), “molded upon a 
morphology of the masculine sexual libidinal economy”, creating “an exclusively masculine 
culture […] which systematically excludes women” (op.cit.: 10).  
 
She connects the idea of a repressed feminine to the psychoanalytic approach of Jacques 
Lacan. Lacan maintains that “the feminine does not have an imaginary of its own upon which 
the female subject might construct its mirror image” (op.cit.: 12); “within the signifying 
structures of the West, there exists no sexual difference of the subject. There is but one, the 
self-same, the masculine” (op.cit.: 10). Mortensen thinks the writings of the French feminist 
philosopher Luce Irigaray might facilitate “the revolutionary thinking” necessary for the 
feminine to be heard – because Irigaray sees “a different feminine Other, le féminin” that 
escapes “the phallogocentric discourses” captured by Lacan; “a nothing that resists 
representation” (ibid.). The point of departure of The Feminine and Nihilism is a close reading 
of Irigaray’s Amante marine de Friedrich Nietzsche: 
 
Implicit in her [Irigaray’s] inquiry into Nietzsche’s text is her search for the feminine, which 
she, like Derrida, understands within the question of écriture, as the possibility of an-other 
gaze, an-other speech, and an-other language than those which have hitherto governed 
Western metaphysical thinking. By strategically inserting herself in the openings of 
Nietzsche’s writings and by listening to the silent mater-ial ground upon which he erects his 
philosophy, Irigaray retrieves that which has been muted in his discourse. This silence then 
serves as a potentiality for her exploration of sexual difference, or, for what she refers to as le 
féminin (op.cit.: 13). 
 
For Irigaray, Mortensen says, “the subject’s Being is ultimately grounded in the materiality of 
the body which provides the matrix for the construction of every subject” (op.cit.: 14). 
Irigaray’s thinking on Being, tends however, to rely on the “division between the material and 
the spiritual” of “the subject-object paradigm” of “propositional thinking” (ibid.). It would 
thus, Mortensen argues, profit from being more closely linked to “Heidegger’s thinking on the 
                                                 
349 The statement occurs in a passage on the comedy Lysistrata. Mortensen highlights the conservative elements 
of the comedy by tracing similarities between its ‘parameters’ and the parameters of Enlightenment feminism.  
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question of ontological difference between Being and beings” (ibid.).350 Le féminin is not to 
be connected to material beings (distinguished from spiritual beings), but rather to material 
Being: Le féminin is expressing “the existential fore-structure of Dasein […], in which is 
hidden a positive possibility of the most premordial kind of knowing” (op.cit.: 35). “Assertion 
always already implies a fore-having, […] constituted prior to any assertive propositioning”; 
“theoretical statements” are “derivative” (op.cit.: 36). The new ethic of the feminine should be 
thought of as the outcome of an “existential-hermeneutical” interpretation of the feminine 
materiality of Being (ibid.), the only ethic possible, Mortesen argues, in light of “nihilism”, 
“the historical movement” identified by Nietzsche, “whereby all values” are “devalued” and 
“man” loses “the ground upon which his moral and reason-able universe” is erected (op.cit.: 
14). 
 
Underlying Mortensen’s presentation of her new ethic of the feminine are two convictions. 
One is that feminism is about facilitating change. Mortensen’s focus is on changing or 
switching language, from the technocratic to the poetic; to the “revolutionary thinking” of the 
feminine Being (op.cit.: 10). In a collection published a few years later, Touching Thought. 
Ontology and Sexual Difference, she stresses that the concern behind this focus is “the 
concern for freedom”, not as freedom is usually dealt with, “within the confines of an 
ideology of liberation and a discourse of civil rights”, but rather freedom as “ontological 
freedom” (2002: 1,2,3). The point is to set le féminin free; to “allow freedom to ‘speak’” 
(2002: 2), not emancipation as conceptualized within “the horizon of Western language” 
(2002: 3).351 This highlights the other conviction underlying Mortensen’s presentation; that 
the thinking of modernity (‘the horizon of Western language’) inadequately facilitates the 
changes feminism is trying to facilitate (‘revolutionary thinking’ and ‘ontological 
freedom’).352 
 
                                                 
350 Heidegger’s ontological questioning is connected to his readings of the Pre-Socratics. Vigdis Songe-Møller 
suggests a similar reading of Heidegger: “[…] by his interpretation of truth as aletheia and fysis (developed in 
Parmenides and Heraclitus) Heidegger suggests – at least to us today, although he was not aware of it himself – a 
feminine reading of the Pre-Socratic and consequently a feminine critique of Plato’s more masculine way of 
thinking” (original emphasis, 1996: 49). 
351  “Why settle for liberation, if freedom might be in reach? If we were to follow Heidegger’s path of thinking – 
precisely by passively approaching the danger of the open and by not shying away the call of Being – we might 
safeguard poetic appearance in its free becoming. Therein lies our true possibility of freedom” (original 
emphasis, Mortensen 2002: 118). 
352 In Touching Thought an important aim is to show that even feminists who have radically questioned the 
thinking of modernity, such as Rosi Braidotti, Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz and Donna Haraway, in addition to 
Luce Irigaray, have not questioned it radically enough, because they have avoided ontological questioning. 
Rather, Mortensen hears in their writings “echoes of either Habermas or Rorty” (2002: 115). 
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These two convictions are widely held convictions. Not infrequently the demands for change 
of a feminist sort are made the hallmark of feminism and feminist inquiry: Feminist inquirers 
argue “unanimously” for the “need for change” (Røthing 2000: 77-78).353 Feminists “research 
for change”, confronting “ideals with realities” (Skjeie 1999: 94-95).354 Often, the changes 
feminists wish to facilitate are talked about in terms of changes of different kinds; located on 
different levels. Sociologist Karin Widerberg argues for example for the importance of 
distinguishing three analytical levels when studying gender relations – the social/structural 
level, the cultural/symbolic/discursive level and the individual/psychological level/the level of 
gender identities – and believes there is need for change on all three (1992: 295).355  
 
There are also discussions about how radical the required changes need to be. Harriet Holter 
argues for example for radical social change; of “the power structures and the oppressive 
social and economic systems” (1996: 39). Ellen Mortensen highlights the need for radical 
cultural change; feminist strategies must escape “the binary system of meaning in Western 
                                                 
353 Skjeie and Hernes note accordingly: “What distinguishes feminist research from women’s research is in 
particular the degree of political explication: how essential is the project of change relative to the project of 
knowledge” (1997: 306). 
354 This way of putting the point is especially prevalent in the social sciences, in particular within the discipline 
of sociology. The self-understanding of feminist sociology is still closely linked to the tradition of problem 
oriented empiricism in Norwegian social research, often connected to Yngvar Løchen’s prescription for 
sociology, to confront ‘ideals with realities’ (Leira 1992). Scholars influenced by poststructuralism and French 
feminism, are more suspicious of talk about ‘reality’. However, to many feminist social scientists, the concept of 
social ‘reality’ is crucial, even when they work within poststructuralist philosophical frameworks. L’orange Fürst 
defends typically the relevance of Julia Kristeva for the social sciences because Kristeva (in opposition to other 
French feminists) insists on the existence of “a reality outside the text” (1999: 192). Another example is 
Widerberg (1994) who emphasizes the importance of notions of social reality and women’s ‘experience’, even 
though her reflections are influenced by poststructuralist theory (Ann Game and Joan W. Scott). Widerberg and 
L’orange Fürst are in this sense both representatives of ‘the sociological postmodernization’: They try to 
‘postmodernize’ sociology without giving up their commitment to materialism (Holst 2001). 
355 Widerberg adopts this three-fold scheme from Sandra Harding. The scheme, or some version of it, is however 
commonplace. Often particular distinctions within the scheme are highlighted for particular purposes, as when 
Harriet Bjerrum Nielsen and Monica Rudberg are reflecting on how psychological gender differs from cultural 
gender (1994: 2-3), or when Marit Melhuus, Ingrid Rudie and Jorun Solheim (1992) discuss gender as social 
relation versus gender as cultural meaning to make visible the dominant facets of the understanding of gender 
within feminist social anthropology. For even finer differentiations of the analytical levels of gender, see for 
example Anne-Kathrine Broch-Due and Tone Ødegård (1991), and Annick Prieur and Bera Ulstein Moseng 
(2000: 141-145). For a different and more philosophical typology of gender analysis, see Lundgren’s distinctions 
between empirical, analytical and theoretical gender (2001: 34-36). In general, typologies of gender vary 
between disciplines. To work on the level of biological sexual difference is considered valuable for example 
within some branches of feminist psychology (Andenæs, Johannessen and Ødegård 1992), and among 
anthropologists working on cognitive and evolutionary theory (Bleie 2003). Within other disciplines, as well as 
within other branches of psychology and anthropology, the biological approach is considered irrelevant, or even 
inappropriate, because it is considered to rely on an ‘essentialist’ notion of what a woman is (Moi 1999). 
Variations also reflect different philosophical or theoretical point of departures: As we have seen, the ontological 
subtext of sexual difference turns out to be crucial in the analyses of Mortensen (1994, 2002), and also of Soleim 
(1994, 1996), because of their reliance on Heidegger (Mortensen) and Descartes (Soleim). Another example is 
the focus on the ‘spatial’ dimensions of gender in for example Gerrard and Valestrand (1999a) and Wiestad 
(2002) connected to an interest in Donna Haraway’s ‘situated knowledge’ perspective (Gerrard and Valestrand), 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and Irigaray’s attempt to ‘locate’ the feminine (Wiestad).  
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thinking” based on “an exclusively masculine culture founded on a genealogy of the father 
and the son” (1994: 10). Sociologist Hildur Ve (1993, 1999a, 1999b) argues for radical 
psychological change in her defense of socialization and education towards care, empathy and 
responsibility, rather than towards ‘detachment’, ‘independence’, and a ‘technically limited 
rationality’; the male model of identity formation should be replaced by a more female model 
of identity formation. Others recommend changes of a more modest sort, or, alternatively, 
argue that it is possible to achieve more than is often assumed, through changes of a more 
modest sort. Political scientist Hege Skjeie (1997, 1998, 2000)356 argues for example that 
women in Scandianvia have gained more political power than has been assumed by some 
critics:357 “Social democractic” institutional reform empowers women, even if it does not 
challenge the power structures of patriarchy and capitalism along radical-feminist and 
Marxist-feminist lines.358 Several oppose the radical deconstruction of categories359 often 
associated with ‘postmodernism’ or ‘poststructuralism’.360  
 
The changes called for are also contextualized more or less constructively. Some highlight the 
possibilities for change through problem-oriented research and institutional reform.361 Others 
emphasize the obstacles. Deep-seated hierarchical cultural norms,362 gendered psycho-
analytical patterns linked to the process of subject constitution,363 the tacit, non-transparent, 
bodily aspects of gender,364 and the depth and extension of structural injustice in a capitalist 
patriarchal society,365 are not easily transformed. Added to these factors, is the fact of a 
                                                 
356 And different co-authors – Helga Hernes and the Danish political scientist Birte Siim. 
357 There has been a debate on this issue between Skjeie and Harriet Holter (1996). It parallels on several points a 
previous debate between the more optimistic Helga Hernes and the more pessimistic Swedish historian Yvonne 
Hirdman, the “Polyanna and Cassandra” of Scandinavian feminist debates on citizenship (Skjeie and Teigen 
2003: 40).  
358 Skjeie and Teigen (2003) follow a similar track when they, in a discussion with Ellingsæter and Solheim 
(2002), argue that state policies may very well target cultural repression, not only social injustice. Ellingsæter 
and Solheim argue that such policies cannot target deep-seated cultural patterns.  
359 In particular, there have been debates on how far and in what sense the category of woman can be 
deconstructed, and whether we can do without notions such as ‘truth’, ‘experience’ and ‘reality’. 
360 Cf. von der Fehr (1992, 1996), Hagemann (1994), Kvande (1998), Christensen (2000). 
361 Cf. Wærness (1995), Bojer (2002). Wærness argues against the postmodern tendency to metatheorizing and 
deconstruction, and suggests social research for reform and middle-range theory as a more promising path for 
feminist inquiry.  Bojer proposes changes in ‘the basic structure’, where the family is included, as suggested by 
John Rawls’ ‘fair’ principles of justice. 
362 Cf. Borchgrevink (1999), Ellingsæter and Solheim (2002). Borchgrevink aims to draw attention to the limits 
of formal individual rights when it comes to affording members of disrespected groups cultural recognition. 
Ellingsæter and Solheim highlight how difficult it is to transform the gendered connotations linked to different 
kinds of work. 
363 See Soleim (1994). Soleim’s interpretation of the persistence of sexual difference relies on the 
psychoanalytical theory of Lacan. 
364 Cf. de Vibe (1994), Isaksen (1996), Solheim (1998), Skramstad (1999). 
365 See for example Gullvåg Holter (1997). 
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disorderly natural and social world and unstable meaning systems, undermining our chances 
of successful instrumental planning: It is far more difficult to approach the means-end relation 
in a rational way than enlightenment feminists have assumed in their instrumental change-
talk, it is argued.366 
 
The second conviction underlying Mortensen’s elaboration – that the thinking of modernity 
inadequately facilitates the changes feminists are trying to facilitate – is also a widely held 
conviction. Many critics agree that the modern imaginary is too conservative, even if they 
might have very different views on how this imaginary ought to be transformed if anti-
feminist conservatism is to be avoided. Philosopher Linda M. Rustad argues for example that 
the liberal “equality perspective”, connecting political action to the assumption that “we 
necessarily have to be similar”, is insufficient if we are to “change women’s situation, change 
the academic understanding of knowledge” in a “feminist” direction (1999: 94, 96). Instead, 
she recommends a “politics of difference” based on the “poststructuralist” approaches of 
Donna Haraway and Joan W. Scott (op.cit.: 93, 94).  
 
Another example is sociologist Eva Lundgren, who stresses the unacceptable conservatism of 
“humanist feminism” and its basis in the idea of “the universal human” (1992: 27):  
 
Somewhat schematic, we might say that women’s research according to the humanist model 
will imply at most revisions and adjustments to the view on how society works, how goods 
are distributed and what values are prioritized (op.cit.: 30).  
 
In humanist feminism there is no talk of “deeper changes” (op.cit.: 29). Lundgren’s 
alternative to humanist feminism is not its opposite, “gynocentric feminism”, based on the 
idea that “women’s traditional role and experiences” represent “positive values” and even 
“the foundation and point of departure for women’s emancipation” (op.cit.: 28, 29). Rather, 
her ambition is to elaborate notions of “the male” and “the female” in a way that avoids the 
“essentialism” of gynocentric feminism as well as the conservatism and the exaggerated 
“constructivism” of humanist feminism. The male and the female should instead be 
considered as contextual “daily life” categories, involving both the “biological” and the 
“social” (op.cit.: 78-96). A third example is political scientist Beatrice Halsaa who in an 
overview of different political ideologies and their relationship to feminism, groups liberalism 
and conservatism together – she is, she says, using “the notion liberal political theory to cover 
                                                 
366 Cf. Holtan Sørensen (1993), Gulbrandsen (1998a), Flemmen (1999), Egeland (2003, 2004a, 2004b).  
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both liberalism and conservatism” (1996b: 185). In another passage she exemplifies 
contemporary liberal feminism by quoting a passage from the political program of the 
feminist group within the Norwegian conservative party (op.cit.: 157). Both examples 
contribute to positioning the project of liberal modernity as a conservative project.367  
 
Thus, both convictions, that feminists should struggle for ‘change’, and that they cannot do so 
adequately and remain faithful to the project of modernity, are convictions widely shared, and 
seldom questioned. Feminists are considered to have “a normatively founded ambition to 
change the oppressive gender system of society and improve women’s situation” (Bjerrum 
Nielsen 1995: 375). Feminism is considered to be “a political and social movement to change 
society […] [whose] goal is expressed in different ways; as women’s liberation and equality; 
struggle against discrimination against women and against women’s oppression” (Halsaa 
1996b: 144). However, as suggested above, there are discussions going on about how much 
change, of what kind, is needed for feminist purposes, and on whether such changes are easily 
facilitated; and there are contributors who distance themselves from certain kinds of changes, 
from too radical changes, or utopian change-talk. Additionally, there are authors who 
complain that discussions on the connection between feminism and the ambition to change are 
too few, too partial, too shallow, or generally more complex than often assumed. Accepting 
the prevalent view in feminist circles that change is something to be valued, social 
anthropologist Tordis Borchgrevink reminds her audience: “There are types of changes that 
are neither pleasant, intriguing nor entertaining. That any change is as good as any other is a 
truth in need of modification” (1995: 337). She goes on to reflect on troublesome 
ambivalences connected even to changes that at least for women seem to be good; changes 
resulting in “more power and money for women” (ibid.). Political scientists Hege Skjeie and 
Helga Hernes ask for more deliberation on normative issues when feminists make proposals 
for change: 
 
A weakness of some of the policy-oriented women’s research, […] has been that it to a lesser 
degree has initiated a fundamental discussion about the meaning of competing cultures of 
justice, and of institutional conflicts of norms, for the legitimacy and efficiency of equal status 
politics (1997: 375). 
 
                                                 
367 Halsaa’s primary concern is not to engage in “metatheoretical” debates, but to intervene from a “state 
feminist” point of view undertaking “empirically oriented and applied research” (2003: 6, 1999: 15). As far as 
she is engaged herself in such debates, she emphasizes the relevance of radical-feminist analyses of patriarchy 
and socialist perspectives, against “poststructuralist criticism” of “grand narratives” (2003: 23, 1996b). 
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Harriet Bjerrum Nielsen and Monica Rudberg, authors of Psychological Gender and 
Modernity, have a similar concern when they note how “confusing […] the story of gender 
is”; a “simple labeling” of phenomena and developments as “progressive” or “regressive” 
often “misses the mark” (1994: 1-2). The social scientists Hanne Davidsen, Susanna M. Solli 
and Elisabeth Waaler (1996) ask for subtler epistemological considerations, in a discussion of 
feminist ambitions to change science.368 Still others criticize the change-talk of being too 
abstract. They call for more concrete proposals of how, for example, scientific practice might 
be changed.369  
 
Finally, there are some contributors who seem to deny altogether that feminism is linked to 
the ambition to change. However, they do so only in connection with making subtler points 
and distinctions. Professor in history, Kari Melby, defines feminism as “negotiations of 
female identities and counter-identities” (1997: 31). This avoidance of explicit change-talk, or 
rather, this more careful way of articulating the connection between feminism and the 
ambition to change, reflects Melby’s reluctance to make the “Enlightenment” feminism of 
“equality” between women and men, which is a notion of change in a certain way and in a 
certain direction, essentially more relevant “in an emancipatory context”, than a feminism of 
“difference” which emphasizes the value of “women’s culture”. It also reflects a distinction 
she draws between the “scientific” approach to the study of female and male identities, and 
different “political” approaches to feminism, where more aggressive change-talk might be 
legitimate (Melby 1997: 31-61).370  
 
Another example is Ellen Mortensen who opposes what she refers to as “the dynamic 
imperative” of feminist theory; “the subject of feminist theory” that  
 
[…] posits herself as an active, dynamic, meta-theoretical and subversive being, who is 
thought capable of subverting – and thus perfecting – the entire edifice of Western patriarchal, 
phallic thinking, be it in aesthetics, in epistemology or in ethics (2002: 7-8).  
 
This is to say that feminists talk too much and are too hasty about change-facilitation, instead 
of moving, with Nietzsche and Heidegger, “into proximity with a different terrain of thinking. 
                                                 
368 More specifically, their article is a critique of Karin Widerberg’s Kunnskapens kjønn. Minner, refleksjoner og 
teori (1994). 
369 Cf. Widerberg (1994), Gulbrandsen (1995, 1998a), Lotherington and Markussen (1999). 
370 For an elaboration of her view on the relationship between academic and political feminism, see Melby 
(1995). 
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A thinking which evokes a tragic, existential mode of thought where the domains of death, 
destruction and, yes, passivity might be embraced” (op.cit.: 16). However, Mortensen herself 
also argues for revolutionary changes, in culture and in our scientific approaches – she wants 
feminists to ‘move’ into ‘a different terrain of thinking’. 
 
Very few seem to think that the thinking of modernity adequately facilitates the changes 
feminists struggle to achieve, even if there are some defenders who think only relatively 
minor revisions are needed,371 and several contributors who emphasize that modern thought, 
combined with other modes of thought, would together provide the necessary achievements. 
According to the historian and social philosopher Rune Slagstad, a proper feminism would 
unite a “liberal-individualist ideology of emancipation“ with “the expressive critique of 
romanticism” inherent in different “communitarian” proposals (1994: 50, 54).372 The historian 
Gro Hagemann reflects along similar lines:373 Even though she insists that liberalism is 
lacking “space to reflect on the social context of the individual and hence recognize 
difference”, she also emphasizes how “the individual project of emancipation [in feminism] 
finds its legitimacy within liberalism and its abstract individualism and universality” (1997: 
29), and how an exaggerated communitarian emphasis on the value of community and 
solidarity might degenerate into a “nostalgic”, conservative “restoration” (1999: 341). Thus, 
in Hagemann’s view, liberalism is crucial for a proper feminist radicalism. The conservative 
danger lies, rather, in an exaggerated communitarianism.374 
 
Also, what is wrong, more specifically, with modern change-talk is a subject of disagreement, 
even if many agree that there is something wrong. For one thing, not all agree that the changes 
prescribed by the thinking of modernity are too moderate; that it is too much a thinking of the 
status quo. Some argue in fact that it prescribes changes that are too radical, from a normative 
point of view,375 or from the point of view of what is possible.376 This is in fact to say that 
feminism ought to or need to be more conservative than defenders of modernity suggest, even 
                                                 
371 Cf. Raaum and Skogerbø (1993), Raaum (1995), Bojer (2001), Bugge Tenden (2002), Holst (2002b, 2002c). 
Some of them argue, however, that these minor revisions may have major implications for how we investigate 
and assess the gender relationship.  
372 Slagstad mentions Seyla Benhabib’s communicative ethics as an interesting synthesizing proposal. 
373 See for example Hagemann (1994, 1997, 1999, 2003). 
374 For similar reflections on the possible connections between communitarianism and conservatism, see for 
example Solheim (1997), Nagel (1999), Ketcher (2001), Holst (2002c). 
375 Wærness (1990, 2004) argues that radical modern individualism is community-undermining. 
376 See the references above to discussions of obstacles to change. These obstacles are, many argue, not taken 
into considerations by the theorists of modernity (see for example Holtan Sørensen 1993, Gulbrandsen 1998a, 
Flemmen 1999, Egeland, 2003, 2004a, 2004b). 
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if this is almost never spelled out in such terms.377 In addition, there are different views on 
whether the changes should be directed by other aims than the normative aims of modernity. 
Many link, for example, the modern imaginary to the struggle for ‘equality’ and 
universalism’, and argue that what are needed instead are changes towards more appreciation 
of ‘differences’ and ‘context’.378 Finally, there are disagreements on what kind of changes the 
thinking of modernity is inadequately conceptualizing and facilitating. Marxist-feminists 
think for example that this thinking fails to give a proper account of the structural changes 
feminists ought to be in favor of,379 while defenders of an ethics of care380 as well as 
defenders of poststructuralist approaches381 think it fails to give a proper account of the 
cultural changes feminists should strive to facilitate. 
 
5.4.2 The patriarchal project of modernity 
i) Modern history – a history of patriarchy  
In Irene Iversen’s comments on the project of modernity (5.0), defenders of modernity are 
depicted as defenders of the institutional and cultural outcomes of modern Western history: 
They regard modernity as a real sociological configuration, as a progressive configuration; 
they tend to believe that there has in fact been enlightenment. In her article “Refleksjoner over 
kjønn og stat”382 professor in history, Ida Blom, not only questions this optimistic view. She 
also suggests that the thinking of modernity has influenced the actual historical development 
in Europe: Its proponents got more or less what they wanted in this part of the world. Thus, 
their diagnosis about progress should not surprise us. The diagnosis is, however, partial and 
inaccurate, Blom argues. Modern history is in fact a darker one, especially if we approach it 
from the point of view of women. 
 
The argument is made in the section of the article where Blom takes a closer look at “the 
meaning of gender” in the development of “the democratic welfare states” in Europe (1998: 
25). Her focus is on “the institutional basis” for “citizenship”, i.e. for the development of 
individual rights (ibid.). Gender inequalities in the granting of rights can, she notes, be linked 
                                                 
377 But some do, like Nina Karin Monsen (2000). Her self-consciously conservative positioning is, however, 
exceptional. 
378 Cf. Jensen (1990b), Øvrelid (1996a), Valestrand and Gerrard (1999a), Bolsø (2002). 
379 Cf. Gullvåg Holter (1991, 1997), Gulli (1992), Ericsson (1992b). 
380 Cf. Martinsen (1997, 1999). 
381 Cf. Mühleisen (1999, 2000, 2003). 
382 “Reflections on gender and state”. 
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partly to the fact that military duties have been considered the duties of men. Women have not 
had these duties, and thus have not been considered legitimate right-holders. However, this 
state of affairs should not be considered inevitable or “logical”, Blom insists (op.cit.: 26). For 
one thing, there are several examples of women serving as soldiers. More importantly, women 
have played a crucial role “behind the lines”, even if they have not participated in combat 
(ibid.). Moreover, there is no clear connection between men’s participation in combat and 
their rights as citizens. There are many examples of soldiers who have not been granted full 
citizenship. Thus, other factors must be added to explain women’s subordinate status in the 
state.  
 
The most crucial other factor, Blom argues, is the division between “private and public” on 
which the “democratization of the state” in Europe has depended (op.cit.: 29).383 Previous to 
democratization, some women, at least in the elites, had considerable “family based power”, 
power acquired through marriage and motherhood (op.cit.: 27). Democratization meant 
“moving […] the basis of power” away from the family, “from the private to the public” 
(op.cit.: 29). This moving away is prescribed by the philosophers of modernity; they consider 
it a basic prerequisite for Enlightenment. Blom refers in this connection to Locke’s Two 
Treaties of Government. Politics should be practiced in the public sphere, Locke argued. 
However, Blom notes, the public was not a domain for women. Locke considered individuals 
to have different rights as “public and private persons” (ibid.). Only men, however, were 
granted rights as public persons. Blom goes on to present Rousseau’s Le Contract Social 
(1762), and his claim, parallel to Locke’s, that only men are citizens or legitimate 
“contractors” (ibid.). Rousseau developed this idea in Émile, where he argued that boys were 
to be educated into “free, independent, responsible individuals”, equipped for citizenship, 
whereas girls were to be made into “women whose main aim in life was to serve their 
husband and raise his children” (op.cit.: 29, 30). This idea of gendered characters was later 
adopted by Kant. Men denoted “the active, strong, extrovert, rational and instrumental”, 
women “the passive, weak, submissive, adaptive, emotional and intuitive” (op.cit.: 30). This 
idea of gendered characters was old, but it was strengthened by the institutionalization of the 
public-private-distinction, as Locke, Rousseau and Kant prescribed it. To be sure, 
democratization did not leave women completely powerless. They still had, for example, 
significant influence in the private sphere, in particular as mothers. Their power was, 
                                                 
383 See also 5.4.10. 
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however, inevitably limited, as issues of most significance were deliberated and decided upon 
in the public sphere, where women were excluded. 
 
Thus, Blom’s argument in this passage rests basically on two claims. First, that the thinking of 
Locke, Rousseau and Kant384 have contributed to the shaping of modern European history; 
there are interconnections between theory and practice, even if we cannot talk of a simple, 
one-way causal relationship. Second, that this history is less progressive than assumed in this 
thinking – where it is talked optimistically about ‘democratization’ – especially, if we look at 
it from within a feminist horizon.385 Several contributors consider there to be interconnections 
of this sort. The historian Elisabeth Gulbrandsen recommends feminists to take a closer look 
at postmodern thinkers such as Rosi Braidotti and Donna Haraway in their approach to 
“science and politics”, when confronted by the “global environment and development 
crisis”(1998a: 56),386 because it is, among others things, the conceptualizations and 
prescriptions of the modern imaginary that have led to this crisis. Another example is 
sociologist Øystein Gullvåg Holter, who argues that there are interconnections between “real 
socialism”, as it existed in “the state capitalist countries”, for example in Eastern Europe and 
“ideological”, dogmatic “Marxism” (1991: 68).387 This is a kind of Marxism that considers 
Marx’ theses to be “universally valid”, based on “a-historical and non-sociological 
categories”, and is, in an “extreme” way, Gullvåg Holter says, faithful to the prescriptions of 
the “great narrators” of “bourgeois Enlightenment”, who thought that the enlightened, 
“modern individual” had a “monopoly on truth”, that he could “without prejudices […] view, 
understand and conceptualize other epochs and other societies”, thinking “the light from 
theory” would “shine” on the “masses still in the dark” (op.cit.: 68, 69).388   
 
Gullvåg Holter’s sarcastic comment on the optimism of the Enlightenment thinkers is 
somewhat different from, but nevertheless related to, the second claim put forward by Blom: 
He emphasizes their optimistic view on what their universalistic philosophy could achieve in 
history, and its paternalistic and authoritarian subtext. Blom questions the modern optimistic 
                                                 
384 Blom recognizes that these are very different thinkers. Their emphasis and elaboration of the public-private-
distinction is, however, similar. 
385 For conceptualizations of this point, very similar to Blom’s, see for example Melby (1997a, 1997b), Telste 
(1999), Hagemann (1997, 1999, 2003) and Nagel (1998). 
386 Gulbrandsen’s article is on different ways of thinking about science policy. 
387 In contradistinction to “critical Marxism” based on “historical and sociological method” (Gullvåg Holter 
1991: 69). 
388 For more variants of this argument, see for example Martinsen (1997), Fyhn (1999), Hellum (1999), von der 
Lippe (1999), Meyer (1999), Ve (1999a) and Annfelt (2000). 
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diagnosis of what has in fact happened during the past century, i.e. that we can simply talk 
about it in terms of democratization.389 That the thinkers of modernity underscore the darker 
side of modernity, is also accentuated by other commentators. One example is social 
anthropologist, Elisabeth L’orange Fürst, who in a discussion of “poststructuralism and 
French feminism”, focused on Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray and Helen Cixous,390 stresses the 
limited results of living up to “bourgeois-egalitarian demands” (1998: 176, 178). “Equality 
feminists”, by equating these demands with “feminist” demands, and applauding their 
fulfillment as “progressive”, have contributed, she says (with Cixous), to an unfortunate 
“legitimation” of “the existing system” and modern “hierarchies of power”, instead of 
encouraging women to explore and emancipate “otherness”, i.e. “the suppressed and 
marginalized femininity”, outside “the dominant conceptual scheme” of “phallogocentrism” 
(op.cit.: 178, 179).391  
 
Another example is Tordis Borchgrevink who indicates the limits of rights as a normative 
notion. When defenders of modernity enthusiastically sum up the spreading of rights, they 
tend to exaggerate what rights actually give us: 
 
Complete membership in a culture is not given to anyone, it goes without saying, but, 
fortunately, we have equality and tolerance as a court of appeal for the unworthy. In this court 
what is offered, however, are only rights, and rights make no-one a cultural insider. One is not 
made equal by the right to be different (Borchgrevink 1999: 13). 
 
Finally, Hanne Haavind emphasizes the ideological features of the thinking of “modern 
society” in which “the concept of person is broadened to include women and [to] promote 
their [women’s] access to individual rights, to political representation, to work, to money, to 
education” (Haavind 1998: 247).392 This optimistic perspective of “societal change […] 
make[s] every new cohort of women capable of seeing themselves as progressing along a 
pathway of greater access to social arenas” (op.cit.: 248). However, Haavind argues: 
                                                 
389 This diagnosis is related to the optimism Gullvåg Holter talks about: Modern history is an outcome of the fact 
that the bourgeois-liberal philosophers’ idealist thinking has in fact influenced real practice. 
390 And their relationship to Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan. 
391 For variants of this argument, more or less inspired by French feminism, more or less critical of ‘bourgeois-
liberal’ normative ambitions and optimistic history-writing, see for example Widerberg (1990), Rudberg (1996), 
Andersen (1997), Birkeland (1997), Songe-Møller (1999c), Flemmen (1999, 2000), Bolsø (2002), Brandser 
(2002), Mortensen (1994, 1999, 2002), Findal (2002),  Sangholt (2002), Gressgård (2003). The article by 
L’orange Fürst to which I refer is a rather descriptive account of poststructuralism and French feminism. The 
author emphasizes, however, her sympathy for such ‘difference-feminist’ reflections in her conclusion (L’orange 
Fürst 1998: 198, and elaborates and deliberates further on her position in other works, for example in L’orange 
Fürst 1995).  
392 For similar reflections, where she answers her critics, see Haavind (2002b). 
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Power is rendered invisible when men and women acknowledge each other. In cultural 
contexts where integration is idealized and male dominance is made less legitimate,393 gender 
as a reason for social arrangements is concealed. The results are still gendered, but without a 
cause. A woman increases the probability that she will be valued positively as a woman if she 
herself co-operates, so that her subordination looks like something else – something she 
desires. Mutual confirmation of identity cannot be achieved be realizing gender stereotypes, 
but through being individual and unique. The reciprocal positive message between the male 
and the female is a double bind: both are dependent on having the other co-operate in having 
her submissiveness and her dominance appear to be something else (op.cit.: 265).394 
 
Many contributors point out or assume Blom’s two concerns. However, Blom’s first concern 
is a modest one. She does not consider history to be blueprint of philosophy: History is 
influenced by a complex web of different social, cultural and ideological factors, 
Enlightenment philosophy is only one.395 This is indeed the common way to look at it. Blom’s 
second concern is nuanced, moreover, by her recognition of the modern regime of universal 
rights as progressive, also from a feminist point of view, even if this is only part of the story, 
and blown out of proportion by modern observers. Having analyzed the history of  gender and 
state in modern Europe, she concludes that the state has shown a potential to “care for the 
individual and support the individual’s opportunities for autonomy” through the expansion of 
political citizenship and the development of the welfare state (1998: 43). Thus, the state has 
what Blom refers to as a “feminine side” from an “instrumental” point of view (ibid).396 In 
addition there is its “feminine” side from an “institutional” point of view: Despite the private-
public-distinction prescribed by the thinking of modernity, issues of “the family/private 
sphere” have been turned into issues of “the state/the public”(ibid.).397 The outcome, at least 
in Scandinavia, has been “state feminism, an alliance between women inside and outside the 
political system, and between women and the state” (ibid.).  
 
Several contributors portray, like Blom, the Scandinavian experience as modifying the dark 
image of modern history assumed in much feminist analysis: Scandinavian social democracy 
                                                 
393 Here she is referring to the Nordic countries. 
394 For very similar ideological demasking see Ericsson (1992b), Prieur and Taksdal (1993), Johannessen (1994), 
Holter (1996b), Ellingsæter and Solheim (2002). 
395 See also Blom (1999), and Melby’s (1996, 1997) historiographic comments on Blom’s work.  
396 A basic question in her article is: “Is it possible that masculine values, defined as physical strength, power and 
control are the basis of the notion of the state, or has the notion also feminine characteristics, defined as care and 
peaceful development?” (Blom 1998: 24). 
397 Blom describes this institutional development as a process of femininization. 
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is depicted as having a women-friendly potential.398 That modernity has brought progress is 
also pointed out by others, for example by contributors who stress the greater scope for 
personal freedom and reflexivity following cultural individualization and de-
traditionalization.399 Thus, sometimes, the analyses of progress of the thinkers of modernity 
are in fact subscribed to.400 However, other kinds of perspectives are also drawn upon to 
conceptualize progress, for example in contributions where modern thought is positioned not 
as being too optimistic, but rather as being too pessimistic. The media scientist Wencke 
Mühleisen notes how Habermas’ reflection on the bourgeois public sphere represents “a 
perspective of decline”, a “melancholic historical narrative” (2000: 4, 24). Thus, to 
conceptualize what she considers to be the creative and liberating aspects of contemporary 
popular culture, Mühleisen relies instead on postmodern cultural theory.401 Other contributors 
note the similar pessimistic character of Habermas’ theory of modernity, but stress instead the 
aptness of Habermas’ theory on this point.402 Most often, however, critique of modernity as a 
sociological configuration is articulated without reference to the philosophers of modernity.403 
 
ii) The modern canon of patriarchal thinkers 
Ida Blom’s points; that the influence of the thinkers of modernity on state of affairs is 
unfortunate, and that these thinkers underscore the darker side of modernity, are connected 
with a widely held related assumption, namely that they are patriarchal thinkers: They 
actively defend patriarchal relations or indirectly contribute to reproducing such relations, or 
both. It is because the thinkers of modernity directly or indirectly accept patriarchy that their 
influence in history is so unfortunate. It is because they consider patriarchy compatible with 
enlightenment that they fail to recognize patriarchy as the dark side of modernity.  
 
                                                 
398 The terms ‘state feminism’ and ‘woman friendly’ are introduced by Helga Hernes. These notions will be more 
closely examined in Chapter 6. See also van der Ros (1996a, 1996b), Leira (1998), Morken and Selle (1998), 
Skjeie and Siim (2000), Hernes (2001), Skjeie and Teigen (2003). 
399 Cf. Bjerrum Nielsen and Rudberg (1994), Bjerrum Nielsen (1996), Marhrdt (1996), Gentikow (1998), 
Hellesund (2002), Mühleisen (2003, 2004). 
400 Cf. Raaum (1995), Solheim (1997), Hagemann (1997, 1999), Fjørtoft (1999, 2002), Bojer (2001). 
401 For a similar concern see de Vibe (1993), Bjerrum Nielsen and Rudberg (1994). To be sure, the point of these 
contributors is not to replace pessimism with optimism, but rather to highlight the ambivalences and gendered 
character of modernity.  
402 Cf. Jensen (1990a), L’orange Fürst (1995). 
403 The alternative philosophical sources are numerous. It is noteworthy that from the philosophical canon figures 
such as Foucault (see for example Solli 1999, Songe-Møller 1999c, Bolsø 2002, Markussen 2002), Nietzsche 
(for example Mortensen 1994, Owesen 2000/2001, Brandser 2002, Sangholt 2002) and Arendt (for example 
Svenneby 1994, 1999a, 2002, Erichsen 2002, Nicolaysen 2002, Halvorsen 2002) get a far more constructive 
reception than Habermas, Rawls and Kant, who are rarely considered relevant for feminism. 
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The patriarchal character of “political liberalism” is elaborated as a main point in the article 
“Mangfoldets problem: Om kvinner og menn i politisk liberalisme”404 by political scientist 
Ann Therese Lotherington (1999). Lotherington’s point of departure is an analysis of the 
works of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant. What “we find, despite great disagreements on 
other issues”, is, she says:  
 
[…] a common understanding of gender […]: For them men were citizens/persons/individuals 
and were ranged above women, not considered citizens/persons/individuals. Status as person 
or individual was strongly connected to rights that only men had. Thus, the universal and 
gender neutral notions (individual, freedom, citizenship, rights and consent) were valid only 
for men (1999: 176-177). 
 
 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant considered the legitimate state in terms of a social 
contract: 
 
Their point was to introduce new principles for legitimate government: principles of freedom, 
equality and consent. The state should be governed by a political community (fraternity) of 
equal parties (men) that were naturally born free and equal. State legitimacy was to be based 
on agreement or consent (op.cit.: 177). 
 
What this social contract assumed, however, Lotherington notes, is what Carol Pateman has 
referred to elsewhere as “the sexual contract”: While “the idea of the social contract made it 
possible to understand men as free and equal, […] the thinking of the sexual contract implied 
men’s right to dominate women and women’s duty to submit to men” (op.cit.: 180).  
 
Moreover, like Blom, Lotherington assumes that the patriarchal thinking of classical liberal 
philosophy has contributed to creating modern patriarchal society.405 She argues, furthermore, 
that “contemporary liberal/contract theoretical thinking” remains as patriarchal as the classical 
liberalism that has informed and inspired it: Even if “the sexual contract” is often made 
invisible, it is still very much of “relevance” (op.cit.: 185). Thus, its seemingly gender neutral 
notions are “based on men’s experiences” (op.cit.: 183),406 Lotherington says, referring to 
Ann Phillips. The notions of individual, freedom, citizenship, rights and consent are still not 
construed so that women, or others that are “different”, may be included:  
                                                 
404 “The problem of pluralism: Women and men in political liberalism considered”. 
405 Up until today this thinking remains “the basis of contemporary liberal democracy and the dominant Western 
understanding of freedom, justice, and so on” (Lotherington 1999: 177). 
406 See also 5.4.7. 
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Liberalism, as it has been delivered to us historically, has equipped us with a hierarchical way 
of thinking without tools for constructive treatment of pluralism and difference. In this way 
the same biases are reproduced in our contemporary theories (op.cit.: 188), 
 
she goes on, referring to Seyla Benhabib. Lotherington’s conclusion is that we should ideally, 
from a feminist point of view, replace liberalism with something else, “better abstractions”, or 
even more preferable, we should stop looking for “better abstractions and rather admit that 
society consists of women and men with a manifold of wishes about their way of life” (op.cit.: 
189). However, she consider this difficult, even impossible,  
 
[…] both because we ourselves are bearers of this philosophical tradition, and because we 
need to communicate with others inside the same tradition. We talk about words and concepts 
that are part of the vocabulary of everyday life. We must, therefore, relate to them, but make 
sure not to forget their patriarchal history (op.cit.: 188). 
 
Similar outlines of the patriarchal commitments and presuppositions of representatives of the 
project of modernity can be found in several contributions. Sociologist Lise Widding Isaksen 
criticizes the hierarchical, dichotomous thinking of the modern Western canon. Within this 
tradition, body, nature and passion, associated with femininity, are rated below mind, culture 
and reason, associated with masculinity. This has, she argues “contributed in legitimatizing 
patriarchal control over women” (Widding Isaksen 1994: 21).407 To lift this patriarchal 
control, Widding Isaksen argues for a positive reevaluation of the marginalized associated 
with the feminine.408  
 
Cultural theorist Berit von der Lippe’s ambition is to “deconstruct” gender as “a significant 
organizing principle” and “an integral part” of “the deep structure” of society (1999: 52): 
“Our culture’s understanding of morality and ethics, theory of science and notion of human 
being” is fundamentally “a patriarchal undertaking” (op.cit.: 111). In this connection, she 
elaborates and criticizes the patriarchal approach exposed in the works of Rousseau and Kant:  
 
Even if neither Rousseau nor Kant can be accused of legitimitazing for example rape, they 
both move on a border-line with regard to violence, sex and oppression: Both regarded 
women’s submissiveness and obedience as evidently right. Not only are these great 
                                                 
407 For similar critiques of the hierarchical, gendered dualisms of the Western canon, in works inspired by French 
poststructuralism and psychoanalysis (see for example Songe-Møller 1990, 1995, von der Fehr 1991, Soleim 
1994, Malterud 1996, 2002, Owesen 2000/2001, L’orange Fürst 1995, 1999, 2002, Findal 2002). 
408 More specifically, she argues for a positive reevaluation of women’s care work. 
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philosophers, they are in a certain sense more: Rousseau received his breakthrough after the 
French revolution and its slogans of freedom, equality and fraternity. Kant is not only a critic 
of reason; he is also a philosopher of morality with a high status in contemporary academic 
discourses (1999: 72). 
 
As alternatives to the modern patriarchal “understanding of morality and ethics, theory of 
science and notion of human being”, von der Lippe mentions contemporary feminist theorists, 
such as Donna Haraway, Evelyn Fox Keller, Michelle LeDoueff, Adrienne Rich, Rosi 
Braidotti, Vandana Shiva, Lorraine Code, Nancy Hartsock and Sandra Harding, who, despite 
their internal differences, agree that “man – the universal subject – is dead” (op.cit.: 104). And 
without the presumption of “an autonomous subject”, von der Lippe concludes,  
 
[…] everything is possible – for both women and men. If we today admit our perspectives are 
‘situated knowledges’,409 that is, if we recognize the opportunity to make partial solutions 
instead of global theories, we have the possibility to build alliances across gender and 
ethnicity, […] to live in a landscape with differences around us and within us […] on the basis 
of a non-hierarchical perspective (op.cit.: 104-105).410 
 
Many contributors share the view that the modern imaginary is deeply patriarchal, and thus, 
that it cannot, at least not in any straightforward sense, be engaged in the service of feminist 
projects. However, this view is often modified in different ways. Several assume or argue that 
the thinkers of modernity can be of use to feminists, in more or less radically reconstructed 
versions. Tove Stang Dahl (1994) anchors, for example, her program of women’s law in 
Kant’s moral reflections on autonomy and integrity.411 Economist Hilde Bojer (2001) defends 
a feminist theory of social redestribution based on Rawls’ theory of justice.412 Political 
scientist Edle Bugge Tenden (2002) suggests that Rawls’ notion of self-respect should be the 
basis of sexual harassment law.413 Some argue for constructive use of Mary Wollstonecraft in 
contemporary feminism,414 a few defend explicitly a ‘liberal feminism’,415 while several 
emphasize, generally speaking, the significance of framing feminist demands in terms of 
rights.416 Philosopher Else Wiestad initiates a “dialogue with an androcentric philosopher”, 
Kant (1996: 83). She reflects on why she does so: 
                                                 
409 She borrows the term from Donna Haraway. 
410 Von der Lippe says of her position: “My ambition here is primarily to highlight rudiments of a radical 
feminist epistemology” that picks up  “Foucauldian threads and a more Marxist inspired feminism” (1999: 98).  
411 On the other hand, she is very critical of conventional liberal approaches to law. 
412 Or rather Susan Moller Okin’s and Martha Nussbaum’s feminist reconstructions of Rawls. 
413 Relying on Drucilla Cornell’s feminist interpretation of Rawls. 
414 Cf. Nagel (1993, 1999), Ryall (1993), Holden Rønning (1993), Wiestad (1993). 
415 Cf. Raaum (1995), Holst (2002). 
416 Cf. Grannes (1995), Wesenberg (1995), Børresen (1995), Widerberg (2000b), Skjeie and Teigen (2003). 
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Depending on our goals and selected points of departure we may today interpret and criticise, 
but also reinterpret and reformulate what we criticise in patriarchal philosophy. We can even 
use it as elements within new theoretical frameworks. The question is, do we have to 
completely reject androcentric thinking as one-sided and impossible to universalise? Or may 
certain parts of it be transformed and re-coded, and thereby incorporated in a new gender 
transcending theory? (ibid.) 
 
Thus, even if several contributors to Norwegian feminist meta-reflection do in fact 
“completely reject androcentric thinking as one-sided and impossible to universalise”, there 
are also several who, like Wiestad, try to “transform” and “recode” it (ibid.).417 Some, in this 
endeavor, rely on feminist theorists such as Seyla Benhabib and Ann Phillips: In contrast to 
Lotherington and others, who use these figures in dismissive readings of modernity,418 they 
interpret them rather as critical re-constructors.419  
 
Several authors also assume or argue that modern thought can be of use, if reconstructed and 
combined with other kinds of thinking: Modern thought can, in Wiestad’s terms, be 
“incorporated” into a “new gender transcending theory” (ibid.). But it is also sometimes used 
in more unexpected ways. Elisabeth L’orange Fürst (1995) makes use of Habermas’ notion of 
communicative rationality in her search for ‘the emancipatory minimum’ in women’s 
lifeworld;420 ‘a rationality of the gift’ inherent in women’s household work,421 that challenges 
the imperializing instrumental rationality of capitalist production.422 Social anthropologist 
Jorun Solheim is in an original move both relying on and criticizing Seyla Benhabib’s 
distinction between the concrete other and the generalized other, when elaborating two 
concepts of modern identity, one based on the idea of  “the abstract individual”, “equal” in an 
“ideal and universal” sense, considered disconnected from “concrete differences” (1998: 81), 
and the other based on a notion of  “the qualitatively different and distinct with each and 
                                                 
417 In contradistinction to, for example, Stang Dahl who argues for an extention of Kantian moral philosophy; in 
order to grant women the status of autonomous persons, Wiestad uses the “Kantian ethics of feminine pleasure” 
developed in Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (1762) in the development of a 
feminist ethics of care, paralleling the thoughts of Carol Gilligan and Anette Baier (1996: 86, see also 5.4.13) 
418 Benhabib is, for example, often considered a represenative of a feminist ethics of care critical of or even in 
opposition to the modern focus on ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ (see for example Schmidt 1998, Ve 1999a, 1999b, 
Fjørtoft 2002). 
419 See for example Raaum (1995) on Phillips, Hagemann (1994), Iversen (1999) and Stamnes (2000) on 
Benhabib. 
420 She refers, among others, to Ulrike Prokop, Oscar Negt and Alexander Kluge. 
421 L’orange Fürst analyzes the cultural connections between women, notions of femininity and the making and 
providing of food (see also 5.4.12). 
422 L’orange Fürst does not defend a feminism transcending gender, but a feminism re-conceptualizing and 
positively reassessing femininity. 
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every one of us as a social being” (op.cit.: 82). These two concepts, identity based on a notion 
of equality and identity based on a notion of intimacy or closeness, are, Solheim argues, 
concepts on  
 
[…] different levels of abstraction. I can therefore not agree totally with Seyla Benhabib423 
when she in the discussion of modern ethics of care vs. universal ethics puts the ideas about 
‘the concrete other’ vs. ‘the generalized other’ as a possible continuum. We talk here about 
ideas on different levels, they belong to different logical types (original emphasis, op.cit.: 87). 
 
Moreover, there are contributors who emphasize that some of the thinkers of modernity have 
much of value to offer feminists, even if others have not. The historians Gro Hagemann and 
Klas Åmark (1999) argue, for example, that the liberal contract tradition can be used to justify 
illegitimate power relations, as in the case of Thomas Hobbes defense of the absolute rule of 
Leviathan. But it can also be used to justify revolt against illegitimate rule, as in the political 
philosophy of John Locke.424 Some authors consider classical liberal philosophers as a 
progressive force in their time, despite the patriarchal features of their thinking.425 In the 
contemporary setting, however, more radical approaches are needed.426 Others suggest the 
opposite: They stress the significance and sophistication of contemporary liberalism, and 
contrast it with the less sophisticated classical liberalism.427  
 
Furthermore, some recognize indeed that the thinking of modernity is persuasively 
patriarchal. However, they note that most other alternative approaches available are equally 
inadequate for feminist purposes: The thinking of modernity needs to be ‘transformed’ and 
‘recoded’, just like other kinds of thinking that were originally articulated and shaped without 
                                                 
423 She refers to Seyla Benhabib’s Situating the Self. Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary 
Ethics. 
424 Hagemann and Åmark also represent a tendency found in some contributions to position liberalism primarily 
as a historical project which aims have been more or less achieved, and thus, with limited relevance today. See 
also Ellingsæter’s (1999) overview of different notions of patriarchy, where ‘liberal feminism’ is connected to 
the period of gender roles, before the second-wave feminism of the 1970s. 
425 Beatrice Halsaa (1996) who in several passages equates liberal with conservative ideology (see 5.4.1), admits 
that classical liberal philosophy played a progressive role at the time of its genesis. This is also noted by Hege 
Skjeie and Helga Hernes who emphasize the crucial role of “the feminist engagement as a liberal individualism 
confronting patriarchal norms and practices” in nineteenth-century Norway (1997: 363). Brita Gulli credits John 
Locke for giving the problem of “patriarchal authority” more thorough consideration than many contemporary 
liberals (1992: 11). 
426 Turid Markussen argues that the time now has come to analyze and criticize the “more subtle ways gender- 
based injustice and oppression works”, in particular in a country like Norway where typically liberal feminist 
demands have already been achieved through “law and other political efforts” (2002: 235). 
427 Cf. Teigen (2000), Bugge Tenden (2002), Holst (2002a, 2002b), Fjørtoft (2002). 
 167
considering feminist concerns.428 This seems to be the rationale behind a certain tendency 
among some contributors to rely as far as possible on the works of female theorists and on 
theory that is explicitly feminist.429 
 
5.4.3 The abstractions of modernity 
 
In her dissertation Women’s Human Rights and Legal Pluralism in Africa. Mixed Norms and 
Identities in Infertility Management in Zimbabwe (1999), professor of women’s law, Anne 
Hellum, singles out three approaches to human rights law. In addition to the “universalist” 
and the “culture-relativist” approach, there is the so-called “pluralist” approach that she 
herself uses in her study “of how people manage their procreative problems in Zimbabwe” 
(op.cit.: 411).  
 
The universalist approach is represented by “the liberal political and philosophical discussion 
about women’s rights and human rights” that focuses on “the apparent incommensurability of 
individual rights and collective rights”, for example in African women’s “identities as 
members of an extended family network” typically regarded as “a major obstacle to the 
implementation of women’s human rights” (ibid.). This is the approach of the United Nations 
Women’s Convention, where “a hierarchy of values which sets women’s individual rights up 
against the rights of the group”, has been established (ibid.). The approach is, Hellum argues, 
premised on a mixture of “modernization theory“, “liberal Western feminist jurisprudence” 
and the “centralist legal theory which is the dominant doctrinal position in Western legal 
science” (op.cit.: 413, 414). Modernization theory, like “Rostow’s liberal political and 
economic theory”, assumes that it is “the traditional customs and practices” that are “the 
major barrier to economic development” (op.cit.: 413). Development is considered “an 
imitative process”, during which the less developed countries gradually assume the qualities 
of more developed Western countries (op.cit.: 414).430 The proponents of “modernization” 
claim, falsely in Hellum’s opinion, that “international human rights like gender equality, self-
                                                 
428 Widding Isaksen, for example, criticizes philosophy and sociology in general for their suppression of the 
body, nature and passions, i.e. all that is associated with the feminine. This goes for the thinking of modernity, as 
defined here, but also for canonical figures in the history of philosophy, such as Descartes and Plato, and the 
sociological classics, Karl Marx, Emile Durkeheim and Max Weber. 
429 Consider for example the contributions of Karin Widerberg and Hanne Haavind. 
430 Ester Boserup had criticized “the inherent gender bias of international law and development policies”, and 
pointed out “the need for an international and national legal framework that would combat the differential 
treatment of women and men in the Third World” (Hellum 1999: 413). Boserup’s criticism, however, Hellum 
notes, left the notion of development as “an imitative process” essentially untouced (op.cit.: 414). 
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determination and freedom are and must be the same everywhere, […] regardless of time and 
space” (ibid.). This is also how “the problem of difference” is typically dealt with in Western 
“centralist legal theory”: “The problem of difference is resolved on the basis of the idea of the 
existence of overriding norms and values; […] coherence and harmony between different 
norms and values is ensured through the establishment of a hierarchy of values and sources”, 
of the same kind in all contexts: It is a position that is interested in “the similarities between 
human beings, groups and situations, regardless of their different social and cultural contexts” 
(ibid.). A strategy of “same” treatment is also prescribed by liberal feminists: “Liberal 
feminists have worked to reform the law and to remove legal barriers to women being treated 
the same as men in the public and private sphere” (op.cit.: 412). They have however, correctly 
according to Hellum, been criticized “by a difference-oriented Western feminist 
jurisprudence” that emphasizes “the male bias […] inherent in the gender neutral equal status 
discourse”,431 and by “American, African and Asian feminists” who have shown how liberal 
feminism “assumes a privileged ethnocentric universality” (ibid.). 
 
However, she goes on, the universalist approach should not be replaced by the relativist 
approach: 
 
[…] the culture-relativist approach regards different value systems as unique and 
incompatible units. Culture relativists deny that conflicts between values from different 
traditions can be settled in any reasonable way. What is reasonable is itself a product of 
particular cultures and societies. Overriding standards for the resolution of value conflicts do 
not exist (op.cit.: 418). 
 
The problem with such an approach, according to Hellum, is that it excludes the possibility of 
“dialogue and change” (ibid.). On the one hand, her study of the management of procreative 
problems in Zimbabwe shows the limits of the universalist approach:  
 
On the basis of the data collected for the purpose of this study it can be assumed that the 
beneficiaries of the modern family law that embody equal access to procreative measures in 
marriage and equal rights upon divorce are the Christian, urban, middle-aged and middle-
class women (op.cit.: 415).  
 
The “large groups of childless women” resort, however, to “procreative remedies that are 
embodied in extended family relationships” (op.cit.: 415). For these groups of women it 
                                                 
431 Hellum relies in this connection on the ‘difference-oriented’ perspective developed by the pioneer in 
Norwegian women’s law, Tove Stang Dahl. 
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would be better to rely on “family-based and gender-specific solutions to procreative 
problems” (op.cit.: 417): “[…] the mechanical adoption of international human rights 
principles in general, and the non-discrimination principle in particular”, contribute to 
“uprooting” these solutions, and might “excerbate rather than alleviate their [the women’s] 
problems” (ibid.).432 On the other hand, however, the relativist approach is equally 
inadequate, as it tends “to see international human rights law and African customs and 
practices as essentially separate and incompatible systems of norms”, when in fact, if we 
study how “families, chiefs, healers and community courts” interpret customs as well as 
human rights based legislation, the significant point is “how the different norms and values 
are merged in ways which lead to more situationally based outcomes for the parties” (op.cit.: 
419-420). Thus, we have, Hellum argues, “a situation where a wide range of international and 
legislated norms are merged with local norms, perceptions and values in complex chains of 
human relationships”, in other words, “as demonstrated by this study, a basis for dialogue and 
change” (op.cit.: 420). This is precisely the situation that is captured by the third “pluralist, 
processual and contextual” approach (op.cit.: 421):  
 
In an attempt to reconcile conflicting human rights values like gender equality and cultural 
diversity in a dynamic, flexible and situation-sensitive manner, the emerging pluralist 
alternative is trying to define a space between universalism and relativism […].[…] it offers 
an in between solution, and places conflicting values within a cultural context while 
simultaneously giving rise for dialogue and change. Pluralists recognize the existence of 
primary values. They accept that conflicts among primary values can be resolved by 
appealing to some reasonable ranking of the values in question. As regards conflicts between 
human rights values like gender equality and the protection of culture and custom the answer 
lies in analyzing the conflicting values in the social and cultural context in which the 
individuals concerned live and act (ibid.). 
 
                                                 
432 This might also be recommendable in other parts of the world: “In all parts of the world we are witnessing the 
erosion of human relationships through excessive focus upon the individual. The fact that women’s quest for 
dignity and protection comes into conflict with the conceptualization of the spouses as two free and autonomous 
individuals is not an exotic African phenomenon. For example, whether the mutual obligation to support each 
other in the marriage is compatible with the principle of gender equality has been the subject of intense 
discussion in connection with the ongoing reform of the Scandinavian marriage laws” (Hellum 1999: 415-416). 
In this connection Hellum draws also on works by the influential Norwegian sociologist of law, Vilhelm Aubert, 
and by Scandinavian women’s law scholars, such as Tone Sverdrup and Kirsten Ketcher in addition to Stang 
Dahl. In Aubert’s view “the fragmentation of Family Law into Women’s Law and Children’s Law in Norway 
shows how the family has been undermined as a basic social and legal institution. In Aubert’s view, unless the 
underlying socio-economic trends are reversed, it is improbable that the unfortunate side-effects of the rights-
oriented individualism that characterizes the present legal situation can be reversed by legislation or court 
practice” (op.cit.: 415). The women’s law scholars emphasize “the need of a legal framework that transgresses 
the dichotomous divisions between women as individually waged workers and women as family caretakers” 
(ibid.). 
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This implies, Hellum says, a “grounded theory” perspective combined with “the 
methodological perspective of  taking women as the starting point”;433 “theoretical 
generalization” about “how individual justice is achieved by specific groups of women in 
specific situations and contexts” is constantly connected to “empirical knowledge about 
women’s lived experiences and local practices and procedures” (op.cit.: 32). 
 
In Hellum’s argument there are several stages that deserve closer consideration. In this 
connection I want to focus on two related claims – that modern thought about what is right 
and just is too abstract, and that its prescriptions for justice therefore need to be corrected by 
empirical knowledge about the concrete cases in which the prescriptions are to be applied. 
These two claims occur, together, in several of the contributions. Elaborations similar to 
Hellum’s can be found in contributions which discuss the justification and implementation of 
rights in non-Western cultures as well as in increasingly multi-ethnic Western societies.434 
Professor in sociology, Kari Wærness (1995), discusses a different problem, relying however 
on a similar argument. She criticizes what she, along with Susan Bordo,435 regards as “a race 
for theory” in contemporary academic gender studies: “We need to consider the degree to 
which this serves not the empowerment of diverse cultural voices and styles, but the academic 
hegemony of metatheoretical discourse” (op.cit.: 21), she says. Feminists should concentrate 
less on elaborating, defending and dissecting abstract notions and standards, and more on 
doing concrete empirical research and “middle-range”-theorizing436 (op.cit.: 20). Normative 
problems should be dealt with and resolved as they occur in ongoing research: 
 
Using sociological imagination and methods, concepts and theoretical approaches that we are 
already familiar with, focusing on what could be important from the perspective of women’s 
politics and result in social criticism, those of us doing women’s studies have several tasks 
ahead of us. We need […] relevant knowledge about […] the increased significance of the 
market economy, the crisis of the welfare state, the increasing unemployment and the 
developments in biotechnology […]. For me this kind of research into […] ordinary women’s 
lives […] is the main answer to the postmodern challenge […], because there is less risk of 
generalizing in the way postmodernists are warning us about, […] avoiding internal-
theoretical discourse (op.cit.: 22). 
 
                                                 
433 In addition to Stang Dahl, Hellum’s theoretical source of inspiration on this point, is Ulrike Prokop’s critique 
of a “public equality policy […] becoming increasingly detached from the female lifeworld” (Hellum 1999: 
417). 
434 Cf. Bredal (1994), Haugestad (1995), Borchgrevink (2002), Jacobsen and Gressgård (2002), Thorbjørnsrud 
(2003). 
435 She refers to Bordo’s article “Feminism, Postmodernism and Gender-Sceptisism”. 
436 She refers to Robert Merton. 
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This parallels Hellum’s approach: Relativist and postmodernist critique of “the great 
narratives” target the abstract moral principles defended in the thinking of modernity (ibid.), 
but not the context-sensitive, empirically well-grounded approach to normative problems 
Hellum and Wærness defend.437 An example of this move from a different context is 
professor in philosophy Vigdis Songe-Møller’s (2000/2001) discussion of the feminism of 
Simone de Beauvoir and Toril Moi, one of Beauvoir’s present-day interpreters. This is a 
feminism, Songe-Møller argues, concerned with “the opposition between freedom on the one 
hand and alienation and oppression on the other” when asking what it is to be a woman, to be 
embodied as a woman, to be in a woman’s “situation”438 (op.cit.: 231). However, freedom, 
alienation and oppression should not be reduced to topics of abstract academic debate:439 
“Only the study of concrete situations, of concrete experiences of what it is to be a woman, 
can give an answer to the question [what is a woman]. And the answer will never contain any 
universal, or normative, definition of woman” – of what it is to be free, alienated or oppressed 
in a woman’s situation – “but will always be connected to given, social contexts” (ibid.).  
 
Yet another, still different, example is Harriet Bjerrum Nielsen and Monica Rudberg’s 
analysis of the interconnections between the normative horizon of the modern imaginary and 
the particular “experience of modernity” from a “male, middle-class perspective” (1994: 50). 
Their presupposition is that “universal morality” might be transformed if women’s 
experiences and moral orientations were to be included in the picture, in ways, however, that 
are not easily grasped: 
 
In the last phase of modernity we see several contradictory signs […]. On the one hand, the 
tendency for both traditional female responsibility (towards the family) and traditional male 
responsibility (towards society) is in the process of disappearing. On the other hand, there is 
the tendency for the morality of care to make an advance into public life and for universal 
morality to enter family life. We do not know if the result will be that men and women will 
develop though integrating the weakly developed side (women’s care values will become 
universal/public, men’s autonomy will provide a breath of fresh air in family relations) or 
whether we are moving towards a fin-de-siècle society of self-centered aesthetes in which 
both men and women have their gender-specific life-styleprojects (ibid.). 
 
                                                 
437 For reflections similar to Wærness’ on this point, see Kaul (1998), Sørensen (1999), Ve (1999a), Syltevik 
(2000).  
438 “In line with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty she [Beauvoir] talks about the body as situation” (original emphasis, 
Songe-Møller 2000/2001: 230-231). 
439 She refers to Moi’s criticism of “the theoretical machinery” and “the fantastic level of abstraction” in 
contemporary feminist theory (Songe-Møller 2000/2001: 230). 
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Finally, in a study inspired by Michel Foucault’s notion of discourses (discourses that 
“constitute truth and reality”) and Bruno Latour’s analysis of “science in action”, philosopher 
Cathrine Egeland traces the “conditions of production” of the norm of “gender equality” 
(2001: 53, 56, 58, ). Criteria of what is true, real, right and scientific are, she argues, often 
presented as universal, beyond “culture”, when they are in fact cultural “products” of 
particular “discourses” in “action”, constituted by the modern “culture of no culture” (op.cit.: 
57). The norm of gender equality is, in her view, a special case of this general pattern. The 
feminist defenders of modernity present gender equality as universal, objective and impartial, 
when it is in fact a normative product of certain discursive “conditions”, and more 
specifically, of what is allowed for within “the frame of phallogocentrism”.440 Instead of 
maintaining and defending abstract norms of this sort – which is to defend an illusion, as they 
are all culturally embedded – feminists should focus on clarifying their genealogy, their 
embeddedness in complexes of “power/knowledge” (op.cit.: 66), and on “limited destabilizing 
interventions in the practices establishing and regulating gender identity” (op.cit.: 64), as 
prescribed by among others Judith Butler.441 Again, what is recommended, is to correct, even 
replace, the abstract morality of modernity with concrete political interventions and context-
sensitive studies of what is actually going on in social life.442 
 
Thus, we see a critique of modern abstractness in very different contributions; in Wærness’ 
defense of a kind of problem-oriented empiricism from ‘the perspective of women’s politics’, 
but also in Egeland’s deconstructive but normative endeavor, that of “undermining the 
hegemonic gender norms” (op.cit.: 63). Generally speaking, the critique is common, even 
common-sense: Most contributors accept that the modern view is too abstract. Fewer 
elaborate on what exactly is abstracted away, and why, more specifically, abstraction 
generally, and the abstractions of the modern view in particular, are indefensible.  
 
Some, however, articulate elaborated dissent. In a discussion of gender in economics, Kristin 
Dale argues that several of the “assumptions” made in influential economic theories, as well 
as the “use” of such theories can be criticized from a feminist perspective (1992: 248).443 
                                                 
440 She refers to the works of Luce Irigaray. 
441 In her book Gender Trouble. 
442 In Egeland’s case, what are recommended, however, are not simply empirical studies: Neither Irigaray’s 
notion of phallogocentrism nor Foucault’s notion of discourse are meant as simple empirical notions. This also 
goes for Songe-Møller/Moi/Beauvoir’s notion of ‘women’s situation’ (see 5.4.14). 
443 She refers to Vilfred Pareto, John Maynard Keynes, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Amartya Sen, Kenneth J. 
Arrow and John Roemer as the central figures in the development of theory and philosophy in economics in the 
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However, these theories should not be dismissed simply because they are abstract, 
“deductive” and “axiomatic” (op.cit.: 247). On the contrary, feminists can use such theories 
for their own analytical purposes, for example when they study how different goods are 
distributed between women and men, if the assumptions are rearticulated.444 Jorun Solheim’s 
points out that “generalization and abstraction” are fundamental in all “human thinking”, also 
in “thinking” from a feminist perspective (1999: 86). Thus, she urges feminists not to dismiss 
the abstract “logic of equality” on which the “universal criteria“ of the “ethics of rights” is 
based, simply because it is abstract:   
 
The fundamental quality of equality is to be an abstraction from the embodied and concrete. 
To equate something with something else implies to put aside substantial, physical qualities 
and distinctions – the concrete appearance of things. This does not mean that these qualities 
and distinctions disappear, the concrete […] is suspended to introduce a new level of meaning 
– a meta-level where equality is established exactly ‘in abstracto’. […] In much of 
contemporary feminist/postmodern debate this point seems to be missed – equality vs. 
difference is elaborated as a flat opposition on the same level. This creates a pretty strange 
discussion, where what is forgotten is that generalization and abstraction are fundamental 
aspects of all human thinking. […]. Equality […] implies in other words a shift in the level of 
meaning through meta-communication, a re-presentation of the concrete in an ideal form or 
abstract category. […] Equality is an ideal unit – a regulative idea if you want – it does not 
‘correspond’ to anything of substance in the world (original emphasis, 1999: 85-86). 
 
 
Thus, a few commentators, such as Dale and Solheim, counter the feminist main-stream, and 
defend explicitly the abstractions of modernity. In addition, there are commentators who 
defend different abstract moves in other connections. One example is the critical article on 
Karin Widerberg’s Kunnskapens kjønn445 in which Hanne Davidsen, Susanna M. Solli and 
Elisabeth Waaler defend a feminist sociology that eschews naive “phenomenological” 
theorizing based on women’s everyday experiences: There are no everyday experiences 
shared by all women, and experiences occur never “in natura”; they cannot be “described 
without being interpreted”, they argue (1996: 100). Instead, “theoretical sociology needs to 
abstract the social forms446 of interchange and tension” between individual and society, to 
facilitate “epistemological breaks”447 with the notions and knowledge of “the lifeworld” 
(op.cit.: 109). Another example is sociologist Hildur Ve who reacts to “postmodernists” who 
                                                                                                                                                        
twentieth-century, whereas Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, T.R. Malthus, David Ricardo and 
Karl Marx are introduced as the founding fathers of the discipline. 
444 For example “individuals” not “households” should be the unit in studies of distribution, or the welfare of 
women and children will be overlooked (Dale 1992: 250). 
445 Widerberg’ book is introduced thoroughly in 5.4.5. 
446 Referring to Georg Simmel’s notion of social forms. 
447 Referring to Pierre Bourdieu. 
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deem “the idea of a universal female identity” as “essentialist” (1999a: 133). To give a 
definition of women’s situation and perspectives is not necessarily to claim anything about the 
essence of women’s situation and perspectives; few of us are “Platonists”, she adds (op.cit.: 
137). “Categories are what we make them to be” (ibid.). Having “certain purposes in mind” it 
is “legitimate do discuss women as a category” which has “certain characteristics” different 
from those of “the category of men” (ibid.). To abstract in this sense, to create categories that 
include some things and exclude others, is how we “use language” (ibid.). 
 
The argument that abstract morality should be replaced by a normative approach that is 
empirically grounded, depends on the presupposition that abstraction, or a certain kind of 
abstraction is problematic, but also on the assumption that prescriptions, the normative, can be 
transformed by fuller descriptions, by empirical elaboration. The latter assumption is also 
questioned, at least indirectly, by some of the contributors. Political scientists Hege Skjeie and 
Helga Hernes (1997) emphasize the difference between describing and prescribing in 
feminism. They define feminist inquiry as “a knowledge project”” and as a “project of 
transformation […] coupled to a normative ambition” (op.cit.: 366), i.e. as projects that need 
separate consideration. In Norwegian feminism the latter project has suffered; they argue that 
the debate on normative issues has been too limited. Comparing international and Norwegian 
debates on gender in political science, they conclude that: “[…] whereas this debate [the 
international debate on democracy] has much to offer women’s research in Norway, when it 
comes to explicit normative reflection, Norwegian women’s research can offer in return much 
reflection on the experiences with” concrete “strategies” (op.cit.: 373). The importance of 
distinguishing between empirical descriptions and moral argumentation is also stressed by 
philosopher Camilla Serck-Hanssen in her dismissive reading of an attempt to synthesize 
Kantian moral philosophy and feminist care ethics:448 
 
To the extent the duty to treat others as ends in themselves is similar to the duty to care, we 
have both a wholly different justification of why care is important when making moral 
assessments, and not least a wholly different understanding of care. For Kant it would be 
absurd to oblige someone to feel anything. Thus care has an intellectual character. Obviously, 
Kant agrees that care also has an empirical character that is experienced and felt and that 
might even help us as we strive to become superior moral beings. However, the connection to 
this feeling is a contingent fact, and moral evaluations can therefore never be justified simply 
by reference to it (2000/2001: 225). 
 
                                                 
448 Serck-Hanssen comments on Herta Nagl-Docekal’s article “Feminist Ethics: How it Could Benefit from 
Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, in Re-reading the Canon. Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant. 
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Thus, Serck-Hanssen argues, moral norms cannot be justified by referring to contingent 
empirical phenomena like our sentiments.449  
 
5.4.4 Critique of the modern autonomous subject 
Linked to the argument that the thinking of modernity is too abstract, is a varied and 
widespread critique of the modern idea of the autonomous subject. In her book Ekte kvinne? 
Identitet på kryss og tvers450 sociologist of religion Eva Lundgren’s ambition is to facilitate 
the emergence of what she refers to as a new “paradigm” within feminist studies (2001: 24). 
Central to this new paradigm is a defense of a “hermeneutical”, “contextual” notion of the 
“actor”, the “subject” or the “I” as “embodied”, “social”, “relational” and “interacting” 
(op.cit.: 24, 26, 28, 30). In her elaboration of this new notion of the subject, Lundgren relies 
on a magnitude of philosophical and sociological sources, from Gadamer, Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, Merleu-Ponty and Mead to contemporaries such as Richard Senneth, Charles 
Taylor and Seyla Benhabib.451 Together they give a “modern-critical” portrayal of the self 
which, according to Lundgren, differs from and is preferable to the “modern” portrayal of the 
self drawn within “the Enlightenment project” (op.cit.: 278, 281).452  
 
The Enlightenment notion of the self relies on “the Cartesian dualisms”; between “nature” and 
“culture”, the “subject” and the “body”, as well as an “inner-outer” distinction: Behind outer 
social, cultural and biological differences there are considered to be “individual persons” with 
“a substance, an identity”, with “inherent characteristics and qualities” common to “all 
humans” (op.cit.: 278, 279). What is unfortunate in these dichotomous abstractions is that 
those who rely on them consider them not as abstractions but as perfect representations, when 
in fact “real life, human beings of flesh and blood, daily life” are not “dual” in the sense the 
Cartesian dichotomous scheme suggests. Moreover, the dichotomous abstractions are 
                                                 
449 From the Kantian perspective Serck-Hanssen and Nagl-Docekal have in common. 
450 Real Woman? Crisscrossing Idenitity. 
451 She refers also to Norwegian philosophers and sociologists, such as Jakob Meløe, Kjell S. Johannessen and 
Willy Guneriussen. 
452 Lundgren’s critique of modernity is also introduced as an alternative to the postmodern notion of the subject, 
exemplified by Judith Butler: “In postmodern theories the individual subject is either determined by collective 
discourses, or disconnected from the collective level and thus self-absorbed (an individualist individual); it is 
reduced to non-relational non-identity. […] the focus [is] on what the individual is in itself, whether it is a 
product of the collective or an aestheticized surface independent of the collective” (original emphasis, 2001: 
280). The notion of the individual ‘in itself’ that postmodernists, paradoxically, adopt from the discourses of 
modernity (i.e. essentially the notion is not ‘post-‘ at all), is what Lundgren wants to challenge. 
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inadequate qua abstractions. Lundgren stresses that “analytical distinctions are by definition 
simplifications” (op.cit.: 39); there is no such thing as a complete representation. The fact that 
real life is more complex and less ordered than the Cartesian scheme orders it to be, is not in 
itself a problem for the proponents of this scheme, unless of course they fail to recognize that 
the scheme is in fact a simplified conceptualization and ordering of real life. The problem is 
rather that the Cartesian “analytical distinctions” are not suited to feminist investigations 
(ibid.). Lundgren’s critical point is “methodological”: It is impossible to adequately 
understand “the creation of meaning and identity”, in particular the meaning of gender and 
gender identity, on the basis of these distinctions; they “close, shut, yes, limit or simplify to 
the extent that they confuse more than guide” feminist inquiry (ibid.). 
 
Tied to the Cartesian approach to human beings as something “in themselves”, as “detached” 
and “isolated” from one another, is the notion of individual autonomy (op.cit.: 293): The 
modern self-identical subject is framed as autonomous. Indeed, the human person is more or 
less autonomous; “outer” social, cultural and biological factors might facilitate but also limit 
his or her possibilities of deliberating, deciding and acting autonomously. However, our 
capacity for “reason”, conceived by the modern as a “quality” that is “inherent” and shared by 
“all humans”, also gives us qua human individuals a unique capacity for autonomy (op.cit.: 
169). Lundgren argues that the thinking of modernity misconceives and exaggerates the 
possibility of “detached “ individual self-government: “’I’ can never be master of my own 
house, as the household consists of others with concrete wishes, needs, demands – and who, 
thus, remind me that I myself have all these things” (op.cit.: 26). This argument for the 
possibility of autonomy is also a premise when defenders of modernity argue that individual 
autonomy is our right. Lundgren characterizes the moral emphasis on “autonomy”, “rights 
and justice” as “male”: To become men in our society is intimately connected with adopting 
this moral approach (op.cit.: 169). When “moral judgments” are made on the basis of 
“abstract and universalizing principles and rules”, when “the moral imperatives are respect for 
other human beings, reciprocal non-interference and the equal worth of persons”, and when 
we deal with “an ethic of justice or rights” based on a “liberal and humanist notion of a 
human being, characterized by individualism and autonomy”, then we speak of a “male moral 
voice” (op.cit.: 169, 170). Carol Gilligan has defended instead the supremacy of a “different 
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female voice”, based on her studies of girls’ moral socialization (op.cit.: 169).453  The 
“different” voice is characterized by  
 
[…] contextualism, particularism, care and responsibility. […] moral judgment is not to be 
based on principles deduced from reason, but also on sentiments like empathy. All human 
beings stand in the middle of a network of relations, and the notion of human beings is thus 
relational and not individualist. The moral imperatives are […] primarily that we should care 
and not hurt each other or ourselves (ibid.). 
 
Lundgren emphasizes that her own “moral-philosophical” ambitions are limited (op.cit.: 45). 
Moreover, she does not subscribe generally to Gilligan’s approach, which in her view 
encourage women in effect “not to protest or confront those harassing them as well as not 
demand respect and rights, but instead  take on a huge responsibility for caring” (op.cit.: 
170).454 However, like Gilligan, Lundgren defends a “relational” notion of the self, in 
opposition to modern ideas, and argues that the relational character of the self has moral 
implications: 
 
Basic notions like joy, grief, life-spirit, dignity, shame, shamelessness, honor and so on, says 
something not only about how a human being relates to reality on an abstract level, in 
principle. The notions refer to norms and values that are considered important to adhere to or 
oppose, and in every day life they are intimately connected with our embodiment. […] they 
are norms and values that cannot be disconnected from human embodiment […], and the large 
universes of symbols and social organization of which the living embodied subjects are part. 
Grief, joy, dignity and so on are words related to what it means to be an individual in a 
particular context, with a certain identity (op.cit.: 300-301). 
 
Thus, Lundgren for one thing does not want the discussion on “norms and values” to be 
governed by the modern “male” vocabulary of “autonomy”, “justice” and “rights” (ibid.). 
More importantly, she argues that the decision to “adhere to” or “oppose” “norms and values” 
cannot be made on the basis of modern abstract reasoning (ibid.). To do what is right and 
good is something we learn in embodied discourse and interaction where we meet one another 
as concrete persons with “concrete wishes, needs and demands” (op.cit.: 26). 
 
Lundgren’s critique of the modern subject contains several elements, which are elaborated in 
different ways by other contributors. First, there is the critique of the abstractions on which 
                                                 
453 In her book In a Different Voice Gilligan criticizes Lawrence Kohlberg’s model for moral development, 
which connects moral maturity with the adoption of ‘an ethic of justice and rights’, for reflecting boys’ moral 
socialization. 
454 In addition, she argues that Gilligan, like Nancy Chodorow, Evelyn Fox Keller and others who rely on the 
social-psychological object-relation theory, still works within the Cartesian dualist scheme (Lundgren 2001: 188-
189). 
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descriptions of the modern subject are based. Many contributors raise similar concerns, 
whether they consider abstraction generally suspect,455 or whether they, like Lundgren, 
disapprove of the particular categorizations and distinctions relied on in the construction of 
the modern subject. In an article on “life and caring in the light of Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology of 
Spirit’”, philosopher Ingunn Elstad criticizes “the contract theorists” for making “the isolated 
individuals” or the “individual, self-sufficient man” their “only scope” (1992: 147, 156, 157, 
158):456  
 
Hobbes […] thought that humans should be regarded initially as mushrooms, as not being 
involved with each other at all. For Hobbes, modern society is thus the coming-together of 
alienated individuals (op.cit.: 156).457 
 
This, however, is a “fiction”, Elstad argues: “Consciousness knows itself only as it is 
recognized by others” (ibid.). This was the central insight of Hegel. However, she goes on,  
 
[…] the concept of mutual recognition, where sociality and individuality simultaneously 
presuppose each other, continues to make symmetrical relations the basis of society […]. […] 
the concept of symmetry is not complemented by a conception of dialectically productive 
asymmetry (ibid.) 
 
Thus, what Elstad calls for, referring among others to the Norwegian philosopher Kari 
Martinesen and the Swedish philosopher Ulla Holm,458 is the notion of a subject that 
recognizes that it is embedded in inevitably “asymmetrical relations” which oblige us to 
“care” for each other:  
 
Caring is the universal structure necessary for keeping each individual alive from birth, […] 
the only activity in modern society which takes account of vulnerability and dependency as 
realities throughout life (op.cit.: 158).  
 
                                                 
455 See 5.4.3. 
456 In addition to Hegel she refers to Aristotle and Marx in elaborating this point, but also contemporary theorists 
such as Charles Taylor, Benjamin Barber and Seyla Benhabib. 
457 Hobbes is often referred to when the modern subject is under attack, sometimes elaborately: ”[…] Hobbes’ 
mechanical model of human nature does [not] include the traits traditionally ascribed to women, like for example 
sociability, nursing and care for helpless and dependent persons. In the Hobbesian universe the individual – man 
– is primarily motivated by fear of being deprived of satisfying his desires, which are anti-social and boundless 
[…] human beings are naturally lonely, […] social relations are not natural”  (original emphasis, L’orange Fürst 
1995: 196). 
458 And her Modrande och praxis (1995). Also referred to is Hans Jonas: “[…] the consciousness of asymmetry, 
in its form of responsibility for the weak, seems to transcend the mere self-consciousness of mutual recognition. 
It is the dependent person who demands, while the one who has power, becomes obliged, as Hans Jonas puts it” 
(Elstad 1992: 161). 
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Another example of critique against the abstract construction of the modern subject is the 
literary scholar Drude von der Fehr’s critical analysis of Richard Rorty’s notion of “identity 
as narrative practice” (1995: 168). Feminism, according to Rorty, is about women’s struggle 
to invent “new moral identities for themselves by getting semantic authority over themselves” 
(op.cit.: 167): The feminist project has moved into the domain of “discourse ethics” (op.cit.: 
168). Von der Fehr argues against this reduction of the subject’s “experience” to “a linguistic 
happening” (op.cit.: 174): “There is something about experience that cannot be articulated and 
something with our thinking that cannot be reduced to cognition” – there is “non-discursive 
experience” (op.cit.: 174, 175). Rorty’s perspective makes it impossible to position human 
beings in “particular” surroundings, in “time” and “history”, and to account for “something as 
material and concrete as the body” (op.cit.: 173). This, again, makes it impossible, according 
to von der Fehr, to conceptualize women’s situation and oppression adequately (op.cit.: 175). 
To embrace the disembedded, disembodied subject, to subscribe to a dichotomous thinking 
that detaches reason and ethics from concrete situations and the experiences of the body, is 
“to give in to the seduction that defines the whole complex of masculinist discourses at the 
heart of the Western philosophical tradition” (op.cit.: 176). 
 
There are, in the material I have surveyed, numerous articulations of similar concerns. 
Feminists need to challenge the picture given in “economic theory and moral/political 
philosophy” of the individual as “an isolated island” (Ve 1999a: 142). Liberalism 
misconceives the individual: “The individual is made abstract, is disconnected from his 
contexts. […] The bourgeois individual has forgotten that human beings are part of the 
interpersonal world” (Martinsen 1997: 23); “rights liberalism” lacks an adequate notion of 
“the self “ as “fundamentally socially constituted” (Slagstad 1994: 53, 57).459 Thus, what is 
criticized is a notion of the subject which ignores the intersubjective constitution of selves460 – 
their embeddedness in symmetrical relations of recognition, but also, in Elstad’s terms, their 
                                                 
459 Slagstad makes a distinction between “the social-ontological motive” and “the normative motive” in 
communitarian critiques of liberalism (Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor): The social-
ontological motive concerns the “atomistic approach to the self or the subject”, the normative motive concerns 
the notion of “rightness”, a standard of moral validity, disconnected from “common values in a substantial 
sense” (of “procedural principles” as independent from any particular notion of “the good life”) (1994: 54).  
Slagstad subscribes, it seems, to the communitarian social-ontological but not the normative critique: “One can 
accept that the self is fundamentally sociologically constituted, without thereby saying goodbye to the ability to 
critical reflect on the sociological context to which one is anyhow attached” (op.cit.: 57). Slagstad refers in this 
connection to what he considers to be promising feminist intermediate positions in the liberalism-
communitarianism debate; Seyla Benhabib and Marilyn Friedman. 
460 See for example Gaarder (1990), Hagemann (1994, 1997), Andenæs (1995, 1992), Andersen (1997), Røthing 
(2000), Jacobsen and Gressgård (2002). 
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embeddedness in asymmetrical relations between care-takers and dependents461 – and their 
concrete embodiment.462 This may be read as empirical criticism; the descriptions given of 
human beings are considered to be misleading.463 Sometimes, however, it is also framed as a 
critique from a phenomenological, anthropological or ontological point of view: The thinking 
of modernity leaves out the constitution of subjects and sexual difference on this more 
fundamental level, it is argued.464  
 
If we return to Lundgren’s critique of the modern subject, we see that it also contains critique 
against the proposed autonomy of the modern subject. Modern autonomy is both impossible 
and morally suspect. Once more, we are dealing with a very common critique. The argument 
that autonomy in the modern sense is unachievable, is connected to the critics’ notion of what 
is possible and impossible, given the embedded and embodied character of human beings. The 
idea is that our embeddedness and embodiment limit our freedom to think and act 
independently. As summarized by the historian Ingunn Moser: 
 
[…] the modern liberal subject: the independent, autonomous, centered, identical, verbal, 
authoritative subject […] has already been deconstructed and exposed: human beings are not 
masters of their own households – or of their bodies – in this way. He is not in control of 
shaping either himself or his history (1998: 49). 
 
Individual autonomy is an ideal that cannot be upheld, because it is impossible to achieve. 
Hence, the normative individualism defended by the moderns is flawed: They claim that 
something ought to be that cannot be. Moreover, to keep insisting on modern autonomy, 
“freedom of choice” and detachment as an ideal, when the ideal is in fact unachievable, is, 
several argue, also irresponsible from a moral point of view: To do so would contribute to 
“strengthening, rather than weakening oppression and injustice” (Jacobsen  and Gressgård 
2002: 212).”Individual and group are inevitably interconnected” (op.cit.: 214). “Simply 
ignoring” the social ontology465 of groups will not make “the effects” of “group differences” 
disappear “in everyday life and interaction” (ibid.). It will simply make it more difficult, or 
                                                 
461 See for example Martinsen (1990, 1997, 1999), Skjønsberg (1996a, 1996b), Schmidt (1998, 1999). The idea 
that relations between human beings are inevitably asymmetrical is, however, not necessarily linked to explicit 
care-ethical considerations, see Asdal (1998), Borchgrevink (1999), Jacobsen and Gressgård (2002). 
462 See for example Bjelland (1993), Prieur (1994), Widding Isaksen (1996), Flemmen (1999), Prieur and 
Moseng (2000), Bolsø (2000), Birkeland (2000), Bleie (2003). 
463 Most of the examples presented so far focus on the process of intersubjective construction of selves. Other 
contributors focus on the macrostructural embeddedness of subjects (for example Holter 1996, Ellingsæter 
1999).  
464 See 5.4.14 for a separate treatment. 
465 To use Slagstad’s (1994) term. 
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even impossible, to conceptualize and criticize, if necessary, these effects, or address them in 
practice.466  
 
However, modern autonomy is considered immoral not only because it is ideological.467 Were 
modern autonomy, independence, detachment and freedom of choice in fact achievable, 
striving to achieve them would still be indefensible, from a moral point of view. This critique 
of autonomy, and again we talk of a widespread conviction, seems to have several sources:468 
To idealize modern individualism and freedom of choice is, it is argued, to idealize the homo 
economicus of an oppressive capitalist life form (5.4.11, 5.4.15),469 a positivist epistemology 
(5.4.5),470 an impossible and indefensible universalism471 and an unjustified private-public 
distinction472 (5.5.7, 5.5.10), to embrace instrumental rationality, egoism and narcissism 
(5.4.12),473 as well as to dismiss norms of solidarity and collectivity (5.4.8),474 and of political 
and social equality (5.4.9),475 even if autonomy and freedom-talk might work successfully as 
part of strategic moves in certain contexts, and when elaborated in a certain ways (5.4.6).476 I 
come back to these criticisms, and deal with them separately.  
 
There are, however, also contributors who question and oppose from different angles the 
prevalent moral critique of individual autonomy, there exists a counter-discourse. Here I want 
to point out three concerns emphasized in this counter-discourse. There are, for one thing, 
contributors who deny that the subject is in fact described by the thinkers of modernity in the 
way critics claim. The critics consider the modern notion of the subject to be over-abstract: 
human beings are described as disembedded and disembodied, in accordance with the 
hegemonic dichotomous schemes of Western culture, putting everything associated with the 
                                                 
466 See also Sinding Aasen (1991), Gulli (1992, 1994), Brækhus (1995), Eeg-Henriksen (1998), Borchgrevink 
(2002), Brandth and Kvande (2003), Skjeie and Teigen (2003). 
467 Because, for example, it renders it possible and acceptable to talk about “women’s preferences” for “gender 
typical choices” in terms of “real preferences”, and thus as outside the scope of legitimate political action, when 
in fact the realness of these preferences are an “illusion” because of the “social reality” of groups and 
“patriarchal social structures” (Teigen 2004: 88, 90). 
468 Apart from the arguments already referred to: That the modern autonomous subject is fundamentally different 
from the feminist agent for change (5.4.1), that the ideal of autonomy is embedded in an inherently patriarchal 
tradition of thinking (5.4.2), and that it is based on abstractions that are too abstract or abstract in the wrong way 
(5.4.3, 5.4.4). 
469 Cf. Gaarder (1990), Widerberg (1993), Gullvåg Holter (1997). 
470 Cf.  Lie (1990), von der Fehr (1991), Rudberg (1996a, 1996b), Lie (2002). 
471 Cf. Annfelt (1999), Erichsen (2002), Gressgård (2003). 
472 Cf. Hopland Engebretsen (1999), Moi (2000/2001), Lilleaas (2004). 
473 Cf. Skjønsberg (1996a), Martinsen (1997), Ve (1999). 
474 Cf. Nilsen (1992), Mathiesen (2000), Wærness (2001).  
475 Cf. Gulli (1992), Leira (1996), Kvande (1998).  
476 Cf. Melby (1997), Skjeie and Siim (2000), Teigen (2003).  
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masculine above anything associated with the feminine. Some contributors note, however, 
that there are figures working from within the modern imaginary who elaborate what human 
beings are in ways that avoid some or all of these pitfalls, such as Jürgen Habermas477 and 
Seyla Benhabib,478 or even John Rawls.479 
 
Second, there are contributors who deny that the modern notion of human beings is 
indefensible: They rely on modern thought in their reflections on the subject, seemingly 
undisturbed by what critics claim are unfortunate normative implications of such reliance. 
Some explicate why they are so undisturbed, whether they, minimally, simply establish as a 
matter of fact, that the modern idea of the constitution of self is compatible with what critics 
claim it is not compatible with, or whether they, more ambitiously, develop in more precise 
terms why this idea does not have the unfortunate normative implications that critics claim it 
has.480 The reason could be either that they do not consider the implications often regarded as 
unfortunate as less unfortunate than assumed, or not unfortunate at all,481 or that they think the 
implications are different from what critics claim, and defensible – be it because they regard 
the critics’ outline of the notion of the subject in the thinking of modernity as misleading,482 
or because they regard the implications drawn from this outline (that may be correct) as 
misleading.483 Or, finally, the reason could be that they deny altogether that there are so many 
                                                 
477 Cf. L’orange Fürst (1995), Fjørtoft (2002), Stamnes (2002). 
478 Cf. Hagemann (1997), Schmidt (1998), Iversen (1999a). 
479 Hilde Bojer, for example, stresses how a reconstructed version of John Rawls’ liberal theory of justice (i.e. 
into which elements of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen’s capability approach is integrated) is compatible 
with approaching individuals as shaped by social structures and cultural patterns. The fact that “women’s 
position in society is fundamentally related to the division of labour within the family, and to society’s 
organization of childcare”, that “the gendered division of labour and women’s unpaid work on childcare […] 
[are]constraints on economic capability” (2002: 3), “that character traits and preferences that are supposed to be 
typically feminine or typically masculine are shaped by the gendered society both women and men grow up in” 
(op.cit: 9), does not, for Bojer, imply that she cannot make Rawls her ally. Rawls says, she quotes: “It has always 
been recognized that the social system shapes the desires and aspirations of its members; it determines in large 
part the kind of persons they want to be as well as the kind of persons they are. Thus an economic system is not 
only an institutional device for satisfying existing wants and desires but a way of fashioning wants and desires in 
the future” (2002: 9): It is precisely because human action is structurally embedded that Rawls focuses on 
reorganizing the basic structure of society when prescribing conditions for personal liberty. Another example is 
Edle Bugge Tenden (2002) who connects Rawls’ principles of justice with his notion of human beings whose 
basic primary good is self-respect. 
480 I will return to this in 5.4.5-5.4.15. 
481 One example is Nina Raaum (1995) who recognizes that liberal feminism’s reliance on a public-private 
distinction might contradict certain proposals for radical participatory democracy, and is incompatible with 
anchoring laws and policies in notions of an ethically superior women’s culture. However, these characteristics 
of liberalism are, in her view, examples of its virtues, not its vices.   
482 As already mentioned. 
483 Consider for example Elin Svenneby’s (1993) embracing assessment of the Enlightenment feminism of Mary 
Wollstonecraft. 
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specific normative implications of describing human beings in one way or another.484 
Furthermore, those who make use of, for example, liberal theory in their elaboration of 
feminism, are more often concerned with which laws and policies are legitimate, than with 
how the constitution of human beings might be conceptualized adequately, i.e. they read and 
use liberalism primarily as a normative theory, not as an elaborated social-ontological 
proposal. In addition, there are contributors who stress the distinction between normative 
arguments and descriptive elaborations of what human beings are.485 
  
Third, several contributors do indeed single out freedom, independence, “autonomy”486 and 
“liberation”487 as included in and even central to the normative horizon of feminism. Some 
connect this orientation to the modern motif, even if they might be critical of other facets of 
this motif. One example is Tove Stang Dahl who elaborates the history of women’s law as a 
struggle for women’s “freedom as a legal good”, inspired by Kant (1994: 157).488 On the basis 
of Stang Dahl’s women’s law approach, Jane Elizabeth Wesenberg also emphasizes 
“freedom”, “liberation” or “emancipation” as key terms in feminism (1995: 27): 
 
A more equal distribution of social and economic rights […] contributes […] to more 
freedom. The right to money and time and a more equal assessment of different kinds of 
work, are conditions for freedom of action and expression for both women and men. Equal 
status and equal pay are an important basis for liberation (1995: 27). 
 
Another example is philosopher Elin Svenneby (1999) who explicates ”freedom and equal 
status in a philosophical-historical and gender-political perspective,”489 working with the 
notions of freedom developed by Edith Stein, Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir and in 
Enlightenment philosophy, as in the works of Mary Wollstonecraft. A third example is Toril 
Moi who in her introduction to the Norwegian translation of Simone de Beauvoir’s The 
Second Sex links Beauvoir’s notion of  “existential freedom” to the fulfilment of  “concrete 
liberties” as prescribed in the slogan of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment 
philosophers; freedom, equality and fraternity (2000: xix). Svenneby’s and Moi’s 
                                                 
484 This has been one of my concerns (see Holst 2002c). 
485 As pointed out in 5.4.3: Some commentators question, more or less explicitly, whether and how far normative 
arguments can be corrected by adding empirical context. 
486 Gulli (1992: 16). 
487 Nilsen (1995: 396). 
488 Stang Dahl is critical of liberal gender-neutral jurisprudence, and argues for laws to be conceptualized in a 
way that takes women’s and men’s different life situation into account (1994: 28). However her account of 
freedom reflects “a Kantian inspired ethic about the moral duty to recognize all as fellow legislators”, as she puts 
it in article originally published in 1988 (see Stang Dahl 1994a: 91-105). 
489 To quote the subtitle of her book. 
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contributions highlight, however, a general tendency: Defenses of individual freedom are 
often, most often, linked to thinking other than the thinking of modernity. Hege Skjeie and 
Birte Siim (2000) connect their defense of freedom with a material basis, with the social-
democratic citizenship ideal, in opposition to the liberal. Several of the contributions inspired 
by poststructuralism are also deeply concerned with the conditions for individual liberty. 
Social anthropologist Turid Markussen sums up “queer” feminism, feminism inspired by 
Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, as a feminism desiring  
 
[…] greater variety in gender- and sexuality categories and in ways to live together. ‘We have 
to promote new forms of subjectivity,’ Foucault says, and refers to the need for emancipation 
not only from the state, but also from the forms of individuality the state encourages (2002: 
252). 
 
Finally, there is indeed a certain continuity in the discourse prevalent during the 1970s, on 
feminism as women’s liberation or emancipation from capitalism and patriarchy. Sociologist 
Ann Nilsen makes liberation the crucial aim of feminist struggles: 
 
Finally, I want to get back to the concept of liberation, a concept that in many people’s 
vocabulary has been replaced with more recent and fashionable words and expressions. Is a 
continual debate on what we ought to be liberated from – and what we ought to be liberated to 
– imaginable? (1996: 396). 
 
However, this discourse is more often than not thought of as contradictory to the thinking of 
modernity, not as its continuation. 
 
 
5.4.5 Epistemology and methodology  
Several authors link the modern imaginary to inadequate approaches to epistemology, theory 
of science and methodology, and develop alternative feminist approaches. An extensive 
outline of this sort is Kunnskapens kjønn. Minner, refleksjoner og teori (1995)490 by Karin 
Widerberg, professor in sociology. Inspired by the memory-work method developed by the 
German feminist sociologist Frigga Haug, Widerberg presents, in the first part of her book, 
personal memories about gender, sexuality and knowledge. Her conviction is that a feminist 
approach – to anything – needs to remain connected, even if in subtle and complex ways, to 
women’s experiences, also Widerberg’s own experiences as a woman. Widerberg 
                                                 
490 The Gender of Knowledge: Memories, Reflections and Theory. 
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characterizes her memories of her childhood and adolescent experiences of “reading” as 
memories of a “room of pleasure”; “body and brain” are “one” (op.cit.: 65). “Reading” is 
connected with becoming “wiser” through community and intersubjective “understanding”; 
the feeling of “pleasure” and interconnectedness between body and brain can be “shared” and 
“strengthened” through this sharing (ibid.). The sharing is gendered: Reading, understanding, 
becoming wiser and “the intimacy based upon” these practices, happen in “a room of women” 
(op.cit.: 65-66). In contrast to this room of female intimacy, collectivity, desire, wisdom and 
understanding, there is in Widerberg’s memories of childhood and adolescence “a room of 
knowledge” closely connected to her “classroom” experiences (op.cit.: 66). In the room of 
knowledge to succeed is “an individual and lonely project”, what matters is to distinguish 
oneself from the crowd, not to share and understand one another (ibid.). Moreover, in the 
room of knowledge there is no place for the female body. To enter this room as a woman is to 
“choose” to be “brain”, “to leave the body behind” (op.cit.: 67). The room of knowledge is a 
patriarchal, heterosexualized room where women are not granted the privilege of having equal 
intellectual authority and a concrete, sexual body at the same time. 
 
The division between the two rooms, “brain and body, knowledge and sexuality” within an 
overall framework of “women’s oppression”, still haunt her, she says, as a grown-up 
academic woman (op.cit.: 112). Because even if Widerberg has chosen to be brain, in 
becoming a sociology professor, she has never accepted the price, that is to leave her body 
behind. Also, even if she had accepted it, the division would still inevitably haunt her. At the 
university, where female bodies are not cared for, women “expect” to be “treated as brains” 
only (op.cit.: 111-112). “We know”, however that  
 
[…] men just like women cannot totally exclude what they see and how things are outside the 
university walls. I know that at the university a man can, from one moment to the next, think 
about me or treat me as a body. [And] what I experience outside the university setting reminds 
me continually of this; that I am, in the end, woman = body (op.cit.: 112).  
 
Widerberg’s adult memories feed this knowledge: She experiences the contradiction of being 
female and intellect at the same time. However, her adult memories are also memories of non-
acceptance of this division, of feminist struggle and optimism. Inspired by “feminist theory 
and politics” women have developed “a room of women” within “the room of knowledge”, 
materialized in the development of feminist studies at universities, “women’s organizations, 
female networks and so on” (op.cit.: 109, 110). This room of women has, Widerberg says,  
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[…] much in common with the room of women I had during childhood and adolescence. Here 
we were once again friends that chatted about what concerned us, based on intimacy. To share 
and give and understand were a common project. It was like coming home, to a place where 
body and brain were one. And this also shed light on the room of knowledge that I had 
entered, a room that I had perceived to a certain extent as a room of understanding. Not only 
were men in focus in this room, but also the ways of understanding reached were male and 
identical with those [ways of understanding] that had dominated the class rooms of childhood 
and adolescence (competition and individualism) (op.cit.: 110). 
 
The latter part of Kunnskapens kjønn is a discussion of how this “room of women”, the 
“feminist academic project”, can progress (op.cit.: 17): Widerberg wants a female enclave 
within the “room of knowledge” that is fundamentally hostile to it, in order to change the 
room of knowledge itself (op.cit.: 113). Recent developments in feminist theory might 
facilitate this project, by highlighting and clarifying how women can start “producing 
knowledge on their own terms”, being “body” and “brain” at the same time (op.cit.: 117). 
This requires inquiry guided by “principles of intimacy” not “principles of distance”; feminist 
scientific investigation should remain close to women and their everyday experiences (op.cit.: 
118).491 Because, Widerberg argues, women are in fact positioned to share certain experiences 
of oppression. We can talk about a common “female subjectivity” (op.cit.: 147): 
 
1. The relations of work in developed capitalist societies “position women in concrete work 
that they mediate into abstract work” (op.cit.: 149). “Most women” in “our society” have 
experiences with work of this sort, in the labor market, or “at least as mothers or heterosexual 
partners” (ibid.). These are experiences of intimacy, with others and with the material. They 
influence what women “want and wish for […] [them]selves, others and society”, how and for 
what they are “struggling”, and the scope of their “solidarity”: Whereas male workers 
typically care for themselves and each other, female workers care also for the dependent, 
those who rely on them as care workers (op.cit.: 150). Moreover, in their concrete work 
women meet other women. This is another way of experiencing intimacy among women. 
 
                                                 
491 Roughly speaking, Widerberg says, there are two understandings of the notion of experience. Either 
experience is thought of as something corresponding to “reality (sense impressions etc.)”, this is the “positivist” 
notion, or it is equated with our “interpretation” of it; with what it “means” to us (as “text”), or one tries to 
synthesize the two understandings by means of a “dialectical maneuver” of one kind or another (1995: 119). 
Widerberg aims for the latter, relying on the somewhat different mediating maneuvers of Frigga Haug, Dorothy 
E. Smith, Ann Game and Joan Scott. 
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2. Women are socialized to be subordinate. The female body is put under stricter social 
control than the male body, Widerberg argues. This peculiar “normalization” of women’s 
bodies causes women’s subordination to become “internalized” (op.cit.: 151). Women are not 
only oppressed by others, they also participate actively in their own oppression, since the role 
of being subordinate is internalized into a part of their selves. 
 
3. Women are sexually vulnerable. This is “an experience women in many cultures are 
positioned to share”; “the female subject is constituted by this” sexual “asymmetrical” 
vulnerability (op.cit.: 152). Sexual violence is an extreme expression of this vulnerability. 
Other expressions are fear of violence, and the persuasive repression and normalization of 
female sexuality. 
 
4. Women are physically vulnerable. Men are physically stronger than women – this gives 
women an experience of a peculiar physical vulnerability.492  
 
5. Women are psychologically vulnerable, as a result of their sexual and physical 
vulnerability, but also because they give birth; “the vulnerability […] of having children is an 
experience women in our culture are positioned to share” (op.cit.: 157). 
 
Even if these five points all refer to experiences of oppression, they are at the same time 
experiences that might give women “power and strength to […] struggle for change and 
emancipation” (ibid.). Women’s vulnerability and their experiences with concrete work and 
its mediation, might enable them to be emotionally equipped for intimacy, make them more 
open to others,  and thus endow them with “strength” and “well-being”, Widerberg notes 
(op.cit.: 158). Moreover, women’s experiences of being close to other women might give 
                                                 
492 Widerberg refers in this connection to the sociology of Georg Simmel. He connects women’s physical 
vulnerability, and their fear of being abused economically and personally as an implication of this, to women’s 
conservatism; their defense of traditional conventions. More than formal law such conventions of decency and 
respectability protect the weaker part by holding back “the pure natural relation” (1995: 153). Simmel wrote 
about this in 1908, in “Der Streit” in Soziologie. Is his analysis still relevant today? Cultural conventions might 
still have more to say than formal juridical norms, Widerberg says. However, contemporary conventions are less 
protective of women. On the one hand, “family life, school, sport and the military position men as physically 
strong and women as physically weak”; “the institutions of society” contribute towards making “the natural 
difference” far more “natural” than it is (op.cit.: 155). On the other hand, the protective conventions are erased 
by “the ideology of gender equality”: It is no longer politically correct to subscribe to the idea that men, because 
of their superior physical strength, should protect women. Thus, egalitarian “ideology” combined with the retreat 
of the traditional ethos about what is decent and respectable, might in fact make contemporary women more 
physically vulnerable than Simmel’s female contemporaries (ibid.). See also 5.4.8. 
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them “pleasure, power and strength – despite their oppression. Memories of intimacy are part 
of our bodies, we know how it can be, and this makes us […] try to make things so” (ibid.).  
 
In addition to the dimensions of female subjectivity listed above, there is, moreover, a meta-
dimension, she says, that “cuts through”, “interacts with” and “neutralizes” the other five 
(ibid.): 
 
[…] not […] to feel at home in one’s position (Woman) or in the alternative (Man), but 
instead search for and want to be ‘another’ other or another in ‘another’ way, I think is what 
most characterizes […] female subjectivity in a society committed to the idea of gender 
equality (ibid.).  
 
It is the five dimensions and this meta-dimension of female subjectivity which together 
constitute a basis for female “solidarity” (op.cit.: 159),493 and which, according to Widerberg, 
should have an impact on how feminists conceptualize “objectivity” (op.cit.: 160). 
“Traditionally” objectivity has been linked to a “positivist” approach to knowledge production 
(ibid.). This approach has “distance” as one of its aims; from the topics, from the research 
“objects” (as they are not considered to be “subjects”) and in the analysis (ibid.). 
“Intersubjectivity and reliability” are other aims: The researcher should try not to “influence” 
the research process and the outcome of it, so that other researchers would come to similar 
conclusions (ibid.). Furthermore, the approach is characterized by a lack of interest in the 
research subjects’ subjectivity: One is interested in what they actually do, not in what they say 
they do, and different techniques are thus used to control the “validity” of their answers, in 
order to find out “how things really are” (ibid.). The ideal is “the natural sciences”; the 
difference between producing knowledge about things and knowledge about human beings is 
not addressed critically.494 Objectivity from “a feminist perspective” looks different, 
Widerberg argues (op.cit.: 162.). She elaborates four suggestions, which in her opinion are 
faithful to women’s experiences and the feminist aims of solidarity and emancipation, and 
which look forward to a different scientific practice based on the interconnectedness of 
“body” and “brain” and on “principles of intimacy”: 
                                                 
493 Widerberg stresses, however, that we need to be aware of changes in the basis of this solidarity, as well as 
generational and class differences in the development of female subjectivity, in order to avoid “static analyses” 
and “essentialism”: “Solidarity that has different experiences and differences in the same experiences as a point 
of departure, is the only fruitful strategy if we are to build and use female subjectivity in a society where women 
live different lives” (1995: 159). 
494 This was addressed, Widerberg notes, on a meta-theoretical level by the critics of positivism during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Contemporary postmodernists are addressing it even more radically. Both groups of critics have, 
however, been reluctant to spell out the implications of their critique for research practice, in her opinion. 
 189
 
1. Embodied objectivity is a notion developed by Donna Haraway, and by this Haraway 
means “quite simply situated knowledges” (ibid.). Objectivity does not refer to “the false 
vision of limitless transcendence” (ibid). All perspectives are “partial”, “specific” and 
“embodied”: To be objective is to recognize and address the situatedness of one’s knowledge 
claims, and to take “responsibility” for the consequences of one’s claims (ibid.). Haraway 
talks about this as a perspective “from below” (ibid.). However, this does not mean that 
subordinate positions do not also need to be critically examined. There are no “innocent” 
positions (ibid.). Rather, positions from below are preferable because “they are least likely to 
allow a denial of the critical and interpretative” aspect of all knowledge (ibid.). According to 
Widerberg, this does not lead to relativism. Haraway stresses that “partial, […] critical 
knowledge claims are embedded in networks based on political solidarity and common 
epistemological conversations” (op.cit.: 163). This is, Widerberg concludes, a prescription for 
intimacy modified by “critical methods and interpretation” in a collective (ibid.). 
 
2. The collective aspect of knowledge production is further elaborated by Helen Longino:495 
She talks about collective objectivity as a standard of valid knowledge. Longino’s point of 
departure is a criticism of feminists who equate rationality and masculinity; this is “to grant 
rationality to men”, and to rob women of a “human quality” (ibid.). Rather than dismiss 
concepts of rationality and objectivity, feminists should reconstruct them. Scientific 
knowledge is produced in an interactive collective, not by isolated individuals. Scientists 
modify each others’ “observations, theories, ways of reasoning etc:” Objectivity depends on a 
“social context” (ibid.) Accordingly, what is more or less objective is “the community of 
inquirers, not the individual inquirer” (ibid.), Widerberg notes. To produce objective 
knowledge, a community must fulfill at least four requirements, Longino argues: There must 
be common standards of criticism, commonly accepted ways of living up to these standards, 
real critical dialogue, as well as “equal distribution of intellectual authority among qualified 
practitioners” (op.cit.: 164). However, “emotions” also play a crucial role in knowledge 
production. (op.cit.: 165). Emotions are the foundation of understanding. The point is that 
they are not reliable as the only basis for action, as they too are “one-sided” (ibid.). This is 
why critical dialogue is so crucial. We do not have to choose between “autonomy” and 
“attachment”, we can opt for “intersubjectivity”, understood not as a “gender neutral term” 
                                                 
495 Widerberg refers to the article “Feminist Critiques of Rationality: Critiques of Science or Philosophy of 
Science?”. 
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Widerberg notes, but as dialogic “interaction” between “individuals and groups” with 
differently “positioned knowledge claims” (ibid.). In this way, Longino and Haraway reach a 
similar conclusion, emphasizing “intimacy” in knowledge production, and the role of the 
collective in guaranteeing pluralism in criticism (ibid.).  
 
3. Moreover, Longino emphasizes that objectivity does not only concern “the level of 
justification”, but also “the level of discovery”: Scientific inquiry should give “a 
representative picture of the questions that may be asked” (op.cit.: 162). In Sandra 
Harding’s496 terms, objectivity should be strong. Knowledge might well be confirmed, but it 
is not objective if only certain questions are asked, and not all the questions that are relevant. 
To fulfill this requirement, “different groups and positions must be represented in the 
community of inquirers” (op.cit.: 164). Also, “we” (women) must insist on being “outsiders-
within”, never become complete insiders, and consider “differences as a creative resource in 
scientific knowledge production” (ibid.).  
 
4. Finally, there is Evelyn Fox Keller’s497 notion of dynamic objectivity. Static objectivity is 
the traditional positivist objectivity based on the subject-object separation; this separation is 
considered the basis of objectivity. This notion of objectivity corresponds, Fox Keller says, to 
“male subjectivity”, drawing on psychological object relations theory as developed by Nancy 
Chodorow (op.cit.: 166). This theory considers our individuation as an outcome of the 
separation from the mother, a separation that is more “dramatic” for boys since they cannot be 
like her, and thus, must “break the ties” more “drastically” (ibid.). Fox Keller’s alternative is 
an objectivity that would correspond more closely to girls’ psychological development. Girls 
are going to be “like their mothers”, and so do not have to “break the ties” as boys are 
“forced” to do (ibid.). Hence, female subjectivity is more influenced by the intimacy and 
connectedness upon which a dynamic objectivity needs to be based. To aim for dynamic 
objectivity is to aim for “maximal authenticity” in “the understanding of the world”, to 
recognize “the integrity” of our environment and how we are connected to it, and to consider 
“subjective experience” as a foundation for knowledge” (op.cit.: 166-167), Widerberg 
concludes. 
 
                                                 
496 Widerberg refers to The Science Question in Feminism and Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?. 
497 Widerberg refers to Reflections on Gender and Science. 
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There are many elements in Widerberg’s project worth considering more closely.498 Several 
of her crucial claims are also stated somewhat ambiguously.499 Here, I want to focus on her 
overall proposal; that a feminist commitment has particular implications on the levels of 
epistemology, philosophy of science and methodology, implications that amount to a critique 
of the prescriptions laid down by the thinking of modernity. There is a general tendency in the 
material I have surveyed either to connect this thinking to a defense of “value-freedom”500 
and “positivism”,501 defined more or less as Widerberg defines them, or, more commonly, to 
treat the debate on value-freedom and positivism as it was conducted prior to feminist 
interventions, as a debate going on within the parameters of this thinking.502 Either way, 
feminism is linked to epistemological doctrines and methodological approaches different from 
those defended by the thinkers of modernity, whether these (feminist) doctrines and 
approaches are positioned as particular versions of the critique of positivism, or as 
transcending the whole debate on positivism. Widerberg outlines feminist epistemology as a 
sophisticated version of standpoint epistemology: Knowledge-production must not lose touch 
with women’s experiences and female subjectivity and the peculiar cognitive resources this 
subjectivity provides, even if the ultimate aim is objectivity – embodied, collective, strong, 
dynamic – reached through critical, democratic dialogue between situated knowers.  
                                                 
498 I will return to several of them. Whether women have common experiences, i.e. whether and how we can in 
fact talk of female subjectivity in the way Widerberg does, is discussed for example in 5.4.8 and 5.4.14. How to 
conceptualize the relationship between reason and sentiments when making judgments is discussed in 5.4.12; 
how to consider the relationship between the individual and the collective is discussed in 5.4.8; and the 
discussion on how to consider the relationship between private memories and perspectives and public concerns is 
elaborated in 5.4.10. The critique of the modern autonomous subject has already been elaborated (5.4.4).  
499 Her main sources of inspiration, Frigga Haug, Dorothy Smith, Ann Game, Joan Scott, Sandra Harding, Donna 
Haraway, Evelyn Fox Keller and Helen Longino defend different positions in epistemological debates, as 
highlighted by Widerberg herself. A reasonable reading of Kunnskapens kjønn, in my opinion, would be to 
emphasize Widerberg’s reliance on Haug, Smith and Harding, and thus to read her position as a version of a 
feminist standpoint epistemology (see Chapter 4). This is reasonable considering the overall argument of the 
book, Widerberg’s other contributions (for example Widerberg 1992, 1993, 2000a, 2003), and other 
commentators’ interpretation of her (for example Rudberg 1996a, 1996b, Davidsen, Solli and Waaler 1996, 
Hopland Engebretsen 1999).  
500 For example, Asdal (1998: 149). 
501 See for example  Mortensen (1994), Egeland (2001). 
502 The latter is Widerberg’s position (1995: 161).  She recognizes that the critique of positivism in the 1960s and 
1970s – highly influenced in Norway by the works of Habermas – provided crucial “meta-theoretical” elements 
to the development of feminist epistemology (ibid.). The challenge now, she argues, is to develop these 
elements, make them relevant for feminist projects, and establish more concrete “criteria for research practice” 
(op.cit.: 161). Ann Therese Lotherington and Turid Markussen argue along similar lines: “Feminist theory of 
science” differs from “hermeneutic understandings of science”, they argue, referring to Donna Haraway, because 
it is more “political” (1999: 21). Hermeneutics does not address “power and hierarchy” in the relationship 
between “subject and object” in the production of knowledge; “the ethical dimension” is lost (op.cit.: 21-22). 
Kristin Asdal makes a parallel point. The critics of positivism recognized (her example is Hans Skjervheim), she 
says, that human beings are not “merely objects, but also fellow subjects” (1998: 149). However, “nature” also 
does not consist of “merely objects”: “What we have defined as nature” is very often “someone”, “inappropriate 
or peculiar kinds of others”, who have, however, not been granted status as subjects in scientific representations” 
(op.cit.: 150). 
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There are several other proposals that rely in one way or another on standpoint arguments.503 
However, as in the case of Widerberg, such proposals are seldom based on standpoint theory 
exclusively. When discussing the epistemological basis of feminist archeology, Ericka 
Engelstad ends up with “an ambiguous position which sees the importance of all three 
epistemologies: empiricism, standpoint and postmodern” (1991: 504).504 Feminist empiricists 
argue that “scientists have practiced science in an inadequate way”; to “produce better, more 
objective science” uncontaminated by patriarchal “bias”, one needs simply to “adhere” more 
strictly to the established “methodology of science” (ibid.). Feminist standpoint theorists 
argue that “the feminist perspective or ‘standpoint’ is a morally and scientifically preferable 
grounding for our interpretations and explanations of natural and social life” (ibid.). Feminist 
postmodernists argue that “knowledge is historically contingent, that there is no single, 
ultimate truth” (ibid.). Like the empiricists, Engelstad emphasizes the value of established 
scientific methodology and the role of “empirical constraints” in inquiry; “empirical ‘reality’” 
provides a “limit to the possibility of limitless interpretations” (op.cit.: 508). Like the 
standpoint theorists, Engelstad stresses the moral and scientific value of seeking knowledge 
from women’s perspective, even if she distances herself from considering women to be 
cognitively privileged in any general decisive sense, and from “essentialist”, “universal” 
approaches to “Woman” (op.cit.: 504). And when seeking insight from the postmodernists, 
Engelstad turns to Haraway, who in her view avoids the relativism505 haunting other 
postmodern proposals: 
 
Another feminist postmodern theorist, D. Haraway, would ‘argue for a doctrine and practice 
of objectivity that privileges contestation, deconstruction, passionate construction, webbed 
connections, and hope for transforming systems of knowledge and ways of seeing’. Further 
refining this position she [Haraway] advocates, ‘positioned knowledges’: ‘politics and 
epistemologies of location, positioning and situating, where partiality and not universality is 
the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims’. This partial, positioned 
knowledge, shows objectivity as ‘positioned rationality’, and cannot escape accountability 
and responsibility (op.cit.: 504-505). 
 
In contributions that rely more exclusively on a ‘postmodern, ‘poststructuralist’ or 
‘posthumanist’ perspective, the dismissal of relativism is often very explicit: Going post- in 
                                                 
503 Cf. Lie (1990), Engelstad (1991), Barth (1996), Rustad (1996), Rudberg (1996a, 1996b), Bratteteig and Verne 
(1997), Gulbrandsen (1998), Gerrard and Valestrand (1999a, 1999b), Lie (2002). 
504 She refers here to Sandra Harding’s classification of feminist epistemologies. 
505 In her critique of relativism, Engelstad relies, among others, on the archeologist and feminist philosopher of 
science Alison Wylie, and on Richard Bernstein’s Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, 
and Praxis. 
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one’s approach to science is not to accept moral or epistemological relativism.506 Historian 
Kristin Asdal points out that Haraway’s idea is not to position the “units” studied in science as 
“discursive constructions” considered as “ideological” constructions (1998: 158). Haraway’s 
idea is, rather, that discursive constructions are “real constructions”, and that what constructs 
and what is being constructed in “scientific discourse” are both humans and non-humans 
(ibid.). This approach paves the way for “a friendlier and more solidaric knowledge” (op.cit.: 
162).  
 
It is also typical that Asdal does not make a point of targeting feminist standpoint approaches 
in epistemology, even if she does not herself rely on them. Generally speaking, contributors 
who criticize the epistemology associated with the modern imaginary from whatever feminist 
perspective, seem to share many of the concerns elaborated in Widerberg’s Kunnskapens 
kjønn: namely, that all knowledge is relative to its social and historical context; that 
patriarchal structures and norms have been and still are a crucial part of the context in which 
knowledge is produced; that human sentiments and bodily desires play and should play a 
crucial role in knowledge production; that intimacy with, feelings of solidarity and relatedness 
to that which one is studying, in whatever scientific discipline, is just as important as critical 
distance; that knowledge is produced in communities not by isolated individuals; that better 
knowledge is produced in democratic not in hierarchical communities; and that all this goes 
not only for the production of scientific and other kinds of expert knowledge, but also for the 
production of everyday knowledge.507 The differences between the various critical proposals 
are more often those of emphasis than of argument. Some emphasize their reliance on 
postmodern approaches,508 others tone down this reliance and highlight their second thoughts 
about it.509 Some find it urgent to address the charge of essentialism in talk of women’s 
experiences and the connection between such experiences and knowledge production, while 
others consider the charge of essentialism to be essentially misunderstood.510 And some are 
more afraid than others of being charged with relativism: Some emphasize and elaborate more 
                                                 
506 Usually this anti-relativism is assumed to be something that the feminist critique of science has in common 
with the thinking of modernity. The exceptions are certain contributions where “liberal” epistemology is 
considered to be a “relativist” position (Rustad 1999: 94). 
507 This is one reason why many contributors use terms such as ‘epistemology’, ‘theory of knowledge’, ‘theory 
of science’ and ‘philosophy of science’ interchangeably. 
508 Cf. Gulbrandsen (1995), Lotherington and Markussen (1999), Annfelt (2002). 
509 Like Widerberg and Engelstad. 
510 Many find it more urgent than Widerberg, and are reluctant to talk about common facets of women’s 
experiences and female subjectivity. 
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than others their reliance on a notion of objectivity and their commitment to feminism and, to 
a lesser or greater degree,511 to other egalitarian commitments.  
 
In Kunnskapens kjønn, the feminist critique of science and epistemology is also linked to 
methodological questions, and to the more concrete question of how to go about doing 
science: Widerberg wants ‘principles of intimacy’ to influence our thinking on what 
knowledge is, our thinking on how we go about seeking knowledge – but also on our concrete 
research practices. Several of the critical epistemological proposals make similar connections 
between principles of inquiry and concrete prescriptions. It is one of the problems with main-
stream epistemology, they argue, that it turns epistemology into an activity in the abstract. In 
addition there are contributions that focus more strictly on methodological issues.512  
 
What methods and what application of these methods are adequate, given the feminist critique 
of science? This is a question of how we should go about things, if we are to acquire 
knowledge about the world. It is, however, also a question of morality and ethics. A 
fundamental assumption in contributions critical of modern epistemology, is that the 
conditions of objectivity – of a stronger, embodied, collective, more dynamic objectivity – are 
perceived as being inevitably intertwined with conditions of emancipation.513 This 
interconnection should, it is argued, be reflected also on the more concrete level of method. It 
is in this context that Widerberg introduces memory-work as a valuable method in feminist 
sociology. Another example is sociologist Ann Nilsen’s outline of “retrospective life course 
interviews” as a feminist method, inspired by among others Ann Oakley514 and Dorothy 
Smith (1992: 22). This is a “research procedure” that makes it possible to avoid making a 
“sharp distinction between subject” – the researcher – and “object” – upon who research is 
done – but regards them instead as fellow subjects, Nilsen argues (op.cit.: 24). The aim is that 
“both parties can gain the insight and knowledge necessary to reveal how the ‘relations of 
ruling’ affect our everyday lives” (ibid.).515 The presupposition of this endeavor is, however, 
“an attitude of solidarity” which “implies a combination of care in a wider sense and respect 
                                                 
511 Some talk extensively about the connection between feminism and the struggle against all kinds of 
oppression. Others’ focus is more exclusively on gender and the oppression of women. 
512 Cf. Nilsen (1992, 1996), Syltevik (1993, 2000), Thagaard (1996), Christensen (1997, 2000), Sørensen (1999), 
Haavind (2000a, 2000b), Sørensen and Grimsmo (2001), Lilleaas (2004). 
513 To use Widerberg’s terms. 
514 Oakley’s article “Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms”, is the point of departure for Nilsen’s 
reflections. 
515 Smith’s term (i.e. ‘relations of ruling’). 
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for the person interviewed”; care in combination with “creating a space for the knower’” 
(op.cit.: 25)   
 
There is a counter-discourse – though not a very explicit one – which targets the dominant 
notion of a relationship, of the kind elaborated here, between feminism, epistemology and 
methodology. One topic of debate is how the contributors who intervene in epistemological 
debates conceptualize feminism as a normative project.516 Other topics of debate include how 
far and in what sense a feminist commitment should be related to change in epistemological 
principles and scientific methodology. Even in some of the contributions mentioned above as 
being critical towards conventional approaches in science, there are contradictory signals. 
Consider for example Ericka Engelstad, who clearly “sees the importance of” the “successor 
science” approach of “feminist empiricism”, even if she tries to synthesize this approach with 
more science-critical feminist approaches (1991: 504). Most contributions seem, moreover, to 
trust, on many occasions, data that is the outcome of investigations made in accordance with 
conventional scientific methodology and theories of knowledge.517 A few argue also explicitly 
against feminist standpoint epistemology as well as postmodern proposals. Social 
anthropologist Tone Bleie elaborates in detail such an argument, criticizing both Haraway and 
the standpoint theorists, and concludes: 
 
I am myself to a large extent in agreement with Nussbaum and Kay518 in that asserting the 
fundamental positionality and relativization of different knowledge regimes is rather 
destructive for feminist inquiry’s ability to establish an adequate understanding of human 
development, and ghetto-izes gender research in a culture-deterministic position, which is not 
considered adequate from a scientific point of view outside our own institutions and meeting 
points (2003a: 34-35).519 
 
Another example is an article by philosopher Mathias Kaiser (1990), in which he argues that 
feminist scientific critique, such as that developed by Sandra Harding, implies in effect that 
one is embracing relativism:  
 
                                                 
516 Consider again the detailed critique of Widerberg’s proposal in Davidsen, Solli and Waaler (1996). Consider 
also the contributions dismissing the postmodern feminism, upon which much of the meta-critique of science is 
more or less reliant (for example Wærness 1995, Sümer 1998, Solheim 1998, 1999, Ve 1999a, Moi 1999). 
517 This is, however, not necessarily highlighted. Consider, for example, how Elisabeth Gulbrandsen (1998) 
subscribes, on the one hand, to the postmodern critique of science as elaborated by Donna Haraway and Rosi 
Braidotti, yet on the other rests her argument on the empirical works of Hege Skjeie based on conventional 
scientific methodology. 
518 She refers to Martha Nussbaum’s Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach and to Judith 
Kays’ article “Politics Without Human Nature?”. 
519 Bleie links her defense of established scientific epistemology and methodology to a defense of recent “neo-
Darwinian biology and research on cognition” (2003a: 44).  
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Now, if one’s opinion is that scientific points of view are systematically biased towards a 
gender specific perspectivism, then the ideal of objectivity is seemingly threatened. […] The 
answer must then be relativism: knowledge, criteria of objectivity, progress, scientific 
method, truth etc. are relative to social definitions, conceptual schemes, historical epochs etc., 
or precisely, gender. Relativism has however (at least) one decisive weakness that makes it 
not very attractive for feminist philosophy of science: it is useless as a philosophy for 
emancipation. If we accept that empirical reality is a matter of fact in that it can be described 
as the oppression of one (powerless) group to the advantage of another (power) group, 
relativism has no support to give the powerless position other than the insight that the position 
which characterizes the identity of, and is put forward by, the power group cannot have 
universal validity. However, relativism cannot say that the power groups are wrong and lack 
legitimacy. […] To the extent that feminist theory will attach itself to women’s political 
struggles and thereby unite theory with action, relativism is […] an impossible option. It 
cannot be the (whole) point that men tend towards one kind of knowledge and women 
towards another. It must also (still) be possible to say that one kind of knowledge is better or 
more truth-like than another. If this objectivist element is not taken care of – in one way or 
another – one loses the legitimacy to take the power position away from the oppressor 
(original emphasis, 1990: 223-224). 
 
Some contributors express similar concerns, even if their argument is less elaborated than in 
Bleie’s and Kaiser’s articles, where a critical assessment of feminist critique of epistemology 
is the main objective.520 Additionally, there are contributors who, relatively independent of 
the wider epistemological debate, emphasize the value of quantitative methods and statistical 
data, in face of what they consider to be a prevalent view: that feminists should prefer a 
qualitative approach.521 
 
Finally, there is the question as to whether some or even most of, for example, Widerberg’s 
demands to feminist epistemology and methodology are compatible with, or even developed 
interestingly within the framework of the project of modernity. The notion of objectivity as 
sketched by Widerberg in Kunnskapens kjønn is inspired by, among others, Helen Longino’s 
epistemological reflections,522 even if other sources of inspiration clearly play the decisive 
role in her proposal. Engelstad’s reference to Richard Bernstein may be read as a concession 
                                                 
520 Cf. Raaum and Skogerbø (1993), Serck-Hanssen (2000/2001), Blom (2003). 
521 Cf. Dale (1992), Wærness (1995), Sørensen (1999), Skjeie and Teigen (2003). There are also other variants of 
the debate on methods. Bjørg Aase Sørensen (1999) and Hildur Ve (1992a) recommend and pursue what they 
refer to as “action research”, where the researcher aims to both do research and act on the basis of that research. 
The researcher might, for example, aim to do research on the everyday problems of workers in an enterprise and 
at the same time intervene and try to solve their problems, together with the workers and those in charge of the 
enterprise. Annick Prieur (1992) argues that the tradition of action research in Norwegian sociology, to which 
feminist sociologists have contributed, might end up as “uncritical” research, because the researcher needs to 
cooperate with those in power (for example, those in charge of the enterprise where workers have different 
everyday problems), and thus, that a less intervening science, even if presumed to be less political, might 
nevertheless be more critical.  
522 Longino’s proposal for a feminist epistemology is inspired by, among others, the works of Charles Sanders 
Peirce and Jürgen Habermas, see Chapters 2 and 3. 
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to the thinking of modernity (1991: 505).523 Several feminist critics of modern epistemology 
highlight, moreover, a degree of continuity from the critique of positivist science, as this was 
developed by defenders of the modern imaginary, to their own projects, even if they maintain 
that there are differences, of a more or less fundamental nature. And, in some cases, these 
differences are introduced as only minor corrections to the modern critique of positivism. One 
example is Gro Hagemann’s attempt to articulate an intermediate position between 
positivism, on the one hand, and, on the other, radical prescriptions for a science based on a 
specific “female rationality” of “sentiments”, different from the reason and science of men 
(2003: 201, 202).524 Another example is philosopher May Thorseth’s contribution. Her 
ambition is to highlight the value of “the ideal of argumentative rationality” as developed by 
Jürgen Habermas and Karl Otto Apel, and Longino’s very similar idea of a reasonable 
“interactive dialogic community” (1994: 20). Thorseth asks why Longino labels her 
epistemological proposal feminist: 
 
As Longino argues, subjectivity is conditioned by social and historical location and our 
cognitive efforts have an affective dimension. According to Longino, scientific knowledge 
concerns language and rationality. This is constructed by individuals in interaction with each 
other in ways that modify their observations, theories, hypotheses and patterns of reasoning. 
Longino takes this to be a feminist insight, because it is the outcome of a dialogue not 
constructed by individuals, but by an interactive dialogic community. However, as far as I can 
see, this is the ideal of argumentative rationality: Free, open discussion, no coercion upon 
arguments set forth. The generality of argumentative rationality is also reflexivity: All 
arguments, my own included, might be turned against me. So far, I cannot see how a valid 
argument can be made that this kind of rationality is a feminist insight (original emphasis, 
ibid.). 
 
Thorseth nevertheless ends up questioning the modern ideal of “universal consensus”: 
“Longino points to certain problems concerning pluralism and consensus, and she does not 
believe in a universal consensus. To the extent that I reject the rhetoric of conformism, I agree 
with Longino.525 […] the conformist civilizing project, […] seems to presuppose an abstract 
and value-neutral rationality”526 (op.cit.: 21).  
 
                                                 
523 In Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, Bernstein argues for an approach to reason and science inspired by 
among others, Jürgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt. 
524 This is, Hagemann argues, the most “drastic” interpretation of Hanne Haavind’s proposal for a feminist 
epistemology (2003: 202). 
525 Thorseth is, however, somewhat “unsure” of her position (1994: 21): She “would like to work [it] out in 
further detail” (ibid.). 
526 Despite Apel’s and Habermas’ ambitions to achieve the opposite. 
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5.4.6 Feminist strategies  
In an article on “the affirmative action controversy”, social scientist Mari Teigen argues for a 
new set of “discursive strategies” when making a case for affirmative action (2000: 63, 72); 
for “differential treatment procedures to achieve a more balanced composition of individuals 
according to group characteristics” (ibid.). Her case is affirmative action for women. One 
strategy relies on Ronald Dworkin’s interpretation of liberalism. It is one’s right, according to 
Dworkin, to be treated as an equal, with the same respect and concern as anyone else (“a 
principle of individualism”), not equality of treatment (“a principle of equal treatment”), that 
is “fundamental” for the liberal position, he says (op.cit.: 68, 72).  This move “contributes to 
detach the tight (and tacit) connection between justice and merit selection”, and “paves the 
way”, Teigen argues, “for gender equality objectives to come in and influence the formulation 
of selection criteria” (op.cit.: 72).527 Traditionally, liberals, such as Jon Elster (op.cit.: 66-
67),528 have argued that affirmative action policies are incompatible with liberal principles. 
Dworkin’s position thus represents “a particular challenge” to the opposition to affirmative 
action as it is so “distinctly placed within the liberal theory tradition” (op.cit.: 73).  
 
A second discursive strategy, according to Teigen, are “the gender difference arguments”; the 
“resource argument” – “that men and women should be more evenly distributed in decision-
making positions, so that gender-based differences can be utilized to the benefit of society”, 
and the “interest representation argument – “that the interests of men and women are 
contradictory, thus the continuation of male dominance implies a repression of the needs of 
women” (op.cit.: 69, 73): 
                                                 
527 “An individual right to equality must be understood in terms of two different sorts of rights, or equality 
principles [Dworkin argues]. First, there is a principle of equal treatment, reserved for some basic rights, i.e. the 
right to free speech and the right to an equal vote. Second, there is the general right of every individual to be 
treated as an equal, which implies the right to be treated with the same respect and concern as anyone else. The 
right to be treated as an equal should not, however, preclude institutions from selecting candidates according to 
the legitimate goals of that institution, Dworkin argues. Dworkin presents a defence of affirmative action in 
education […]. Affirmative action is a necessary tool for universities to fulfill their public responsibility, 
Dworkin argues. Higher education institutions have a commitment towards the wider community, if for no other 
reason than that they are publicly financed. Besides, student enrolment purely based on merit selection puts too 
much emphasis on backward-looking achievements and too little on forward-looking promise, he maintains. The 
assumption of a direct correlation between merit achievements and future contributions is poorly documented, 
Dworkin claims. Universities should choose a student body that, as a whole, will make the greatest future 
contribution to the legitimate goals their institutions have defined” (Teigen 2000: 68). 
528 “A theoretical approach to the resistance to affirmative action is provided by Jon Elster (the liberal objection). 
He stresses the primacy of two principles – one of ‘ethical individualism’, the other of ‘ethical presentism’. […] 
According to the first […], all persons should be judged individually and not on the basis of characteristics of the 
group to which the person belongs (groups do not count). […] Ethical presentism means that practices from 
previous times should be of no relevance for the distribution of goods today (the past does not count). On this 
basis […] Elster establishes a direct opposition between affirmative action and a liberal point of view” (Teigen 
2000: 66-67).  
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These approaches replace an emphasis on discrimination with an argumentation saying that 
women are not only equally qualified with men according to standard criteria, but that more 
women in male-dominated areas will contribute to new perspectives and ways of solving 
problems, and in this way everybody wins. The idea is that the support for affirmative action 
is dependent upon a shift in perspective, from an emphasis on measures to counteract 
prejudice against women to a stressing of the institutional advantages of including women 
(op.cit.: 73). 
 
The difference argument has had a “particularly strong position” in Norwegian debates, 
Teigen notes (op.cit.: 74). The argument has been criticized for putting too much emphasis on 
gender relative to other differentiating principles. However, she maintains, referring to Anne 
Phillips,529 “even though individual women’s interests vary, interests may well be gendered; 
[…] women, probably more adequately than men, will represent the interests of women” 
(ibid.). The argument has also been criticized, for example by Anna Jonasdottir,530 for having 
an “inherent” problem: “Within the frames of utility the presence of women revolves around 
what they ‘offer in return’. According to Jonasdottir, the difference argument is based on a 
degrading discourse, where the position of women remains that of ‘the other’ – the one whose 
position needs to be justified” (ibid.). Teigen considers, however, the Norwegian case 
“generally” to be an argument against Jonasdottir’s “warning”: “In spite of the strong position 
of difference arguments in Norwegian politics, demands of proof for what they offer in return 
as women are mostly not present in the public debate” (original emphasis, ibid.).531 
 
Finally, the third discursive strategy recommended by Teigen, is the adoption of a “social 
justice perspective”, such as the one defended by Iris Marion Young532 or Francoise 
Gaspard,533 from which “an imbalance in the distribution of positions of power and influence 
between men and women emerges as itself a problem of democracy” (ibid.). By this move, 
one avoids debates on whether individuals are discriminated against, on whether recruitment 
is meritocratic, and on whether women contribute anything in particular, Teigen argues. 
Again, Norway is a good example:  
 
The inclusion of women in political decision making in Norway illustrates how the discourse 
has changed from a question of why there are so few women, and what women may 
                                                 
529 And her book The Politics of Presence. 
530 For example in her book Love, Power and Political Interests. 
531 “When it comes to the new credo of economic life, continually repeating the benefits of difference/diversity, 
there may still be good reasons for warning about possible counter-effects, however” (Teigen 2000: 74). 
532 In her book Justice and the Politics of Difference. 
533 Gaspard’s ambition is to justify the demand of the French “parity movement” for “50/50 representation of 
men and women inscribed within all laws and regulations” (Teigen 2000: 70). 
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contribute, to a situation where gender equality is what is ‘natural’. […] Today, an argument 
for pure merit selection to political positions would probably be briskly rejected. Such 
arguments rather emerge as illegitimate views with the intention of holding on to power 
positions of men. Hence, we may say that in Norwegian politics today the ‘burden of proof’ is 
on those opposing affirmative action (op.cit.: 74-75). 
 
Also, in Norway today, Teigen sums up, the debate on affirmative action is “pragmatic”, in 
the sense that “all arguments are relevant as long as they lead to gender equality” (op.cit.: 75). 
 
Teigen treats Dworkin’s defense of equality first and foremost as a strategic resource in the 
argument for affirmative action policies. Dworkin’s defense can be turned into a “relevant” 
argument, because it can be construed as compatible with the notion of “gender equality” 
allowing for affirmative action (ibid.). The question of argumentative validity is secondary: If 
Dworkin’s argument was not compatible with a defense of affirmative action, this would be, it 
seems, first of all primarily a reason to dismiss his argument, not affirmative action policies; 
gender equality that allows for affirmative action is assumed to be a just cause. That other 
discursive strategies – “the gender difference arguments” and “the social justice perspective” 
(op.cit.: 73, 74) – are defended whether they are compatible with Dworkin’s argument or 
not,534 strengthens the impression that his defense of equality is treated primarily as 
something of “pragmatic” use (op.cit.: 75); as something that might facilitate a particular 
political agenda.535 
 
There are more examples of a primarily strategic approach to the arguments provided by the 
thinking of modernity. Some of these emphasize optimistically the “relevance” of these 
arguments (ibid.); modern arguments are valuable strategic tools.536 Other arguments are 
however also relevant, such as the difference argument, also mentioned by Teigen, i.e. not 
only liberalism and the thinking of modernity are approached strategically. Contributors 
frequently describe feminist struggles as sometimes relying on the difference argument, at 
other times on liberal ideas of equal rights, linked to what is rhetorically effective in different 
                                                 
534 Teigen is clearly aware of this. She even highlights the argumentative differences between Dworkin’s 
prescriptions for affirmative action policies, and what is allowed from a social justice perspective. 
535 My point here is not to argue that Dworkin’s position is defensible from an argumentative point of view, or to 
argue that affirmative action policies are not. My point is that the question of the validity of Dworkin’s argument 
is of secondary significance in “The affirmative action controversy”. 
536 Cf. Holter (1996), Kaul (1998), Widerberg (2000b). Holter, Kaul and Widerberg all highlight the significant 
strategic role of arguments of “justice” (Holter), “equality” (Kaul) and of “liberalism” and “gender-neutrality” 
(Widerberg) when defending feminist norms. Others use concepts and distinctions from the normative thinking 
of modernity as analytical devices to capture empirical gender relations. One example is Gro Hagemann and 
Klas Åmark (1999) who use the notion of ‘contract’, as developed in the modern contract tradition from Hobbes 
and Locke to Rawls, in empirical analysis. 
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situations.537 Professor in history Kari Melby analyzes “the strategies of femininity” in the 
Norwegian organization of housewives and the Norwegian union of female teachers; how the 
two organizations have related to and used “the equal rights strategy” and “the difference 
strategy” (1997: 53):538 
 
On the one hand this [discussion on women’s politics] was […] founded on ideas of gender 
complementarity, on the other hand […] [on the idea of] gender equality. Several distinctions 
are used to describe the two trends; equality-difference […], individualism-relationalism, 
individualism-communitarianism. […] These are distinctions that reflect a feminist dilemma 
spurred by the Western Enlightenment tradition based on demands of universal and individual 
human rights anchored in an abstract concept of equality. The question has been […], how 
women have accentuated or toned down their difference from men as part of their feminist 
strategies (op.cit.: 34). 
 
There is a “dilemma” here;539 one cannot accentuate and tone down the female difference at 
the same time (ibid.). However, in practice, Melby argues, women can sometimes highlight 
their femininity, sometimes emphasize how they are men’s equals, relative to what serves 
their interests and aims and to what is possible and meaningful in the cultural and political 
context in which their strategies are developed.  
 
Melby’s particular concern is to highlight the limits of liberal strategies in women’s politics; 
the argument for women’s rights and equality is not always relevant. Sometimes the effective 
rhetoric is what Hege Skjeie refers to as “the rhetoric of difference” (1992: 100).540 Several 
contributors suggest that liberalism and the thinking of modernity generally has lost its 
strategic relevance: Feminists should make their case in other vocabularies. Feminists need to 
make a new “creative space for thinking for women”, feminism should be based on “a ‘belief’ 
or a narrative that can serve women’s interests” (von der Fehr 1995: 167): The modern 
vocabulary of women as “rightful […] moral subjects” no longer moves us (ibid.).541 Modern 
                                                 
537 Cf. Brækhus (1995, 2000), Rasmussen (1999), Skjeie and Siim (2000), Haukanes (2001), Skjeie and Teigen 
(2003), Hagemann (2003), Halsaa (2003). 
538 The (translated) title of this analysis is The Strategies of Femininity. Norwegian Organization of Housewives 
1915-1940 and Norwegian Female Teachers’ Union 1912-1940. 
539 Even if Melby suggests later in her presentation that the dilemma can be solved, if equality is defined not as 
“sameness”, and it is recognized that demands for equality are connected to the fact that there are “real 
differences” between women and men; “it is the actual differences between women and men that give the 
demand for equality meaning” (1997: 56). She refers in this connection to Joan W. Scott’s argument. 
540 Skjeie accentuates the crucial role of the difference argument for the inclusion of women in Norwegian elite 
politics. Others who emphasize the strategic significance of the difference argument are, for example, Melby 
(1996, 1997) and Skilbrei (2002). 
541 Von der Fehr refers to Richard Rorty’s argument in his essay “Feminism and Pragmatism” (1991). Von der 
Fehr is critical of Rorty’s anti-realist notion of women’s identity (see 5.4.4), but subscribes to Rorty’s claim 
about the inadequacy of feminist struggles conceptualized within the modern vocabulary. 
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“political manifesto[s]” are “called into question […] in the wake of the disintegration of all 
grand narratives […]” (Mortensen 2003: 121). Some welcome this development, as they 
believe it widens the scope for thinking feminist strategies anew.542 Some worry about the 
persuasiveness of “fashionable” postmodern vocabulary in contemporary feminism (Solheim 
1998: 26).543 Others note that the modern imaginary maintains its grip on us in research and 
on other social arenas – unfortunately.544 
 
As Teigen stresses in her explication of the affirmative action controversy, Norwegian 
political feminism is developed within a “pragmatic” political culture (2000: 75):545 Those 
arguments are considered salient that work to the advantage of the feminist cause. This is also 
a common approach in academic feminism: The instrumentally oriented discussions on 
feminist strategies are extensive and varied. One group of authors contributing to these 
discussions, are those who identify with political feminism, i.e. those who see their role as 
feminist researchers as primarily facilitating the agenda of the women’s movement, feminist 
politicians and femocrats.546 Indeed, feminist activists and bureaucrats participate themselves 
in the academic discourse on feminist strategies, assuming a similar relationship between 
science and politics.547 However, there are also femocrats who argue for a new ‘contract’ 
between academic and political feminism, different from the old ‘state feminist’ contract; a 
contract which is up to date with the postmodern feminist critique of science (Gulbrandsen 
1998a, 1998b).548 Contributors who occupy academic positions and rely on postmodern 
perspectives seldom translate their reflections into concrete proposals of institutional reform 
or new policies, even if there are exceptions.549 What is worth nothing, however, is how these 
contributors often position their assessment of theory, concepts and politics as “strategic”; 
                                                 
542 Cf. Asdal, Brenne, Gulbrandsen, Moser and Refseth (1998), Bjerrum Nielsen (2000), Windern Owesen 
(2000/2001), Markussen (2002), Egeland (2004a, 2004b). 
543 Cf. L’orange Fürst (1995, 1999), Iversen (1996), Moi (1999), Bleie (2003). 
544 Cf. Loga (2002), Gressgård (2003). Therefore, Ann Therese Lotherington, notes: “To dismiss the notions of 
liberalism entirely will be […] problematic, because we are ourselves bearers of this philosophical tradition, and 
because we have to communicate with others within this same tradition” (1999: 188). 
545 See also Chapter 6. 
546 Cf. Haukaa (1991), Wærness (1995), Halsaa (1996), Eeg-Henriksen (1998), Fyhn (1999). Janneke van der 
Ros (1996b) gives an elaborate analysis of the role of the femocrats, bureaucrats working with feminist issues. 
547 Cf. Stabel (1992), Oftung (1995), Krane Bostad (1995), Strøm (1995), Salimi (1997), Skotnes (2004). 
548 Gulbrandsen refers among others to Donna Haraway and Rosi Braidotti. 
549 At least if we include contributors who rely on postmodern perspectives in addition to other approaches. 
Consider for example Bugge Tenden’s (2002) proposals for a change in the Norwegian sexual harassment law, 
and Berit Brandth and Elin Kvande’s (2003) proposal to extend the period of paternity leave after the birth of a 
child. 
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what they investigate and search for, are very often feminist “strategies”.550 But this focus on 
“strategy” runs parallel to their critique of “technical” means-end thinking (Mortensen 1994, 
2003). Thus, what is called for are different, more subtle post-ways of thinking strategy. 
 
To approach arguments exclusively from a strategic point of view, is not to consider their 
validity: Whether an argument is considered useful is relative to its strategic effectiveness in a 
particular context. The contributors who argue against relativism, because, for example, they 
consider this position to be generally self-contradictory,551 or because they are concerned in 
particular with the contradiction between a feminist commitment and a relativist stand,552 at 
least implicitly, dismiss reducing arguments to purely strategic moves. Additionally, there are 
the postmodern contributions who talk about feminist politics in terms of ‘strategies’, at the 
same time as raising a radical critique of attempts to reduce human relations to instrumental 
relations.553 This indicates that talking about approaching theory and politics ‘strategically’ in 
the context of postmodern theorizing does not necessarily mean prescribing a means-ends 
approach. The strategy-vocabulary used in this setting is, it seems, rather a way of 
conceptualizing theory and politics in a manner that recognizes both the fundamental 
discursive constitution of subjects554 and the possibility of embedded and embodied, effective 
but ethical practice – this is what is referred to as ‘strategic’ practice – as ‘subjected’ persons; 
that is as subjects inevitably constituted by the power-knowledge networks of discourse.555 
 
A few other things need to be stressed, moreover. First, it is not only the modern motif that is 
approached instrumentally in the strategic discourse on feminism. As in the case of Teigen, 
the ‘pragmatic’ assessment of an argument as ‘relevant’, or irrelevant, is more a general way 
of looking at things. Teigen’s contribution is also an example of another more general 
                                                 
550 Cf. Holtan Sørensen (1991, 1993), Christie Mathiesen (1993, 1998), Asdal and Brenna (1998), Moser (1998), 
Birkeland (2000). Melby’s discussion of ‘the strategies of femininity’ can be read into such a postmodern 
discourse on strategy as far as it rests on, among others, Joan W Scott’s approach. Consider also Cathrine 
Egeland’s discussion of Gayatri Spivak’s “Marxist” but “deconstructivist” notion of “strategic essentialism”: 
“Class consciousness is something you take on strategically – We are workers! – with the aim of abolishing the 
basis of class consciousness, that is the class in itself”, Egeland argues with Spikvak, and suggests that feminists 
should approach the category of women in a similar way (original emphasis, 2003: 14). 
551 Cf. Solheim (1990), Engelstad (1991), Schmidt (1999), Serck-Hanssen (2000/2001). 
552 Cf. Kaiser (1990), Blom (1995), Ve (1999). 
553 This is, in fact, an objection often raised against the thinking of modernity, see 5.4.12. 
554 Authors often referred to in this connection are Michel Foucault and Judith Butler. 
555 Cf. Flemmen (1999), Eng and Markussen (2000), Bolsø (2002), Markussen (2002). Generally speaking, it is 
obviously important to recognize the context in which a term is introduced. Consider for example Tove 
Thagaard’s use (1996) of the term ‘negotiation’ to analyze the interaction between couples. Clearly, 
‘negotiations’ here should not be understood in terms of a rational-choice notion of bargaining, but rather in 
terms of a sociological notion of meaningful, normatively oriented interaction.  
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tendency: Arguments might be viewed primarily from the perspective of rhetorical 
effectiveness. Their validity might, however, also be taken into account. Teigen clearly tries 
to make the three discursive strategies more efficient by trying to refute arguments that have 
been raised against them. Finally, contributions that focus on strategic means-end 
considerations in their approach to feminism often either assume that there are valid ends 
from an argumentative point of view – be it moral norms, legal rules or political decisions – 
or they discuss, if only briefly, why the ends they struggle to achieve are justified ends. 
Generally speaking, one cannot simply deduce from the fact that a contributor concentrates on 
strategic issues to the fact that she thinks that all issues can and should be discussed only in 
strategic terms. 
 
5.4.7 The problems of universalism 
The anthology Forståelser av kjønn556 edited by Arnhild Taksdal and Karin Widerberg 
contains articles on how the different disciplines within the social sciences approach gender. 
Several of the articles deal elaborately and critically with the universalist stance of modern 
thought.557 I will focus on the article on gender in psychology, “Kjønnet som forsvant? Om 
betydningen av kjønn i psykologien” (1992)558 by Agnes Andenæs, Birte Folgerø 
Johannessen and Tone Ødegård. One of the main targets of the authors is “the androcentrism” 
of psychology – its false universalism – when “cultural norms of masculinity” are positioned 
as universal norms of what is “human” (op.cit.: 52, 61). Androcentrism haunts main-stream 
psychological theories of “social learning”: 
 
While Freud operates with gender specific ideals of personal development (normal femininity 
and masculinity), the learning theorists operate with a supposedly gender-neutral ideal of 
personal development.559 Lazarus560 emphasizes for example that behavioural therapy has the 
same therapeutic goal for women and men, namely self-conscious behaviour. […] the goal put 
forward by the learning theorists lay (and still lies) closer, however, to the cultural ideal of 
masculinity than to the cultural ideal of femininity. The ideal of masculinity is made into the 
norm of humanity, and the ideal of femininity is nearly positioned as the opposite of the ideal 
of self-conscious behaviour (op.cit.: 56) 
                                                 
556 Understandings of Gender. 
557 Such as the article by Marit Melhuus, Ingrid Rudie and Jorun Solheim on gender in social anthropology, and 
the article by Arnlaug Leira on gender in sociology. 
558 “The Disappearing Gender? About the Meaning of Gender in Psychology”. 
559 The authors also criticize Freud’s psychoanalytical approach, his “biological determinism” and his 
positioning of women as men’s subordinates because of their anatomy, personality and “natural” social position 
(1992: 54). Thus, Freud’s thinking is patriarchal – but not because of its androcentrism. 
560 They refer to Arnhold A. Lazarus’ article “Women in behaviour therapy”. 
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Main-stream psychological theories of cognition and cognitive development, such as the 
theory of Lawrence Kohlberg are also considered to be androcentric.561 Kohlberg analyzes 
gender differences in personality development, in particular how boys and girls relate 
differently to moral questions. Generally speaking, girls concentrate more than boys on 
“being attractive, good and socially accepted”, less on seeking “power, prestige and 
competance” (op.cit.: 58); “girls focus upon good-girl ideal-self morality” (op.cit.: 59). The 
consequence is that girls enter what Kohlberg refers to as stage three, “the good boy/good girl 
stage”, in moral development earlier than boys – there are six stages in all (ibid.). The 
problem is that they remain there longer. Many girls never leave it, even as grown-ups. They 
continue to consider “other people’s opinions” about what they do as “decisive”, and 
“interpersonal relations” as “primary” (ibid.). During stages four, five and six “one 
increasingly conceives of norms and rules as relative”, until one finally ends up making moral 
decisions “independently, […] on the basis of universal principles of justice such as freedom, 
equality and mutuality” (ibid.). More boys than girls reach these stages, and they do it faster, 
Kohlberg argues. Andenæs, Folgerø Johannessen and Ødegård criticize Kohlberg’s approach, 
drawing on Carol Gilligan’s critique in In a Different Voice published in 1982: 
 
She [Gilligan] studies the content of girls’ deliberations on moral dilemmas, and points out 
how unreasonable it is that masculine ideals and boys’ development are made the norm used 
to assess girls’ moral development and moral capacities. This makes us deaf to the difference 
girls make, to ‘the other voice’. She also redefines the understanding of the individual so that 
it refers to persons in relations more than to autonomous selves (original emphasis, ibid.).562 
 
Once more, the problem is that of false universalism and androcentrism; “the male is made 
the standard of comparison” (op.cit.: 63).  
 
To accuse modern thought of androcentrism is extremely common. Many of the descriptions 
and prescriptions it introduces as universal are, it is argued, really descriptions and 
prescriptions seen from a male point of view.563 Often the charge is made more general: The 
exclusion of women’s experiences and views is linked to the overall exclusion of the 
experiences and views of all people who do not fit into the category of the adult, independent, 
                                                 
561 The authors refer to an article by Kohlberg and Edward Ziegler of 1967, “The impact of cognitive maturity on 
the development of sex-role attitudes in the years four to eight”. 
562 Consider the discussion of the modern autonomous subject in 5.4.4. 
563 Cf. Songe-Møller (1990, 1994, 1997, 1999c), Melhuus, Rudie and Solheim (1992), Wesenberg (1995), Barth 
(1996), Ellingsæter (1999), Lotherington (1999). 
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male, Western bourgeois. Thus, the exclusion of ethnic minorities,564 of those who need 
care,565 of the working class,566 and of children,567 also makes the universalist speak of the 
modern imaginary false. 
 
Another way of questioning universalism is to argue that claims cannot be valid for all: 
Modern universal consensus is unachievable; any defense of universalism is inevitably a 
defense of false universalism. Several authors argue that what we consider to be true about 
the world is relative to context: “The world is accessible to us”, but how we perceive it 
depends on “our experience and background and the historical context we are in on a 
particular point in time”, Ann Therese Lotherington and Turid Markussen assert (1999: 22).568 
What we regard to be “real” and “true” is relative to “language and discourse”, pedagogy 
scholar Trine Annfelt maintains:569 “Truth and reality are […] produced through discursive 
practice. […] The aim of inquiry is not to come close to reality, but to show how, and explain 
precisely why existing reality came to count as reality” (1998: 9). Ethnologist Tone Hellesund 
subscribes to a “constructivist” approach to knowledge, and “constructivism is also to a 
certain extent about relativism”, she adds (2002: 75): 
 
Constructivism is […] about relativism, meaning epistemological anti-realism. A certain kind 
of epistemological relativism570 or anti-realism seems to be a fundamental part of the 
postmodern paradigm, and epistemological relativism refers to the meaningless of talking 
about an absolute reality that we cannot know anything about. Processes of knowledge are not 
drifted by forces in nature – knowledges are always social products, ‘they are products of 
historically and culturally situated interactions among actors. Knowledge, outcomes of 
scientific investigations included, is, according to this understanding, never reflections of 
‘reality’ or purely realistic maps portraying real phenomena’ (ibid.).571 
 
                                                 
564 Cf. Bredal (1994), Borchgrevink (1999), Jacobsen and Gressgård (2002). 
565 Cf. Widding Isaksen (1992), Christensen (1997), Martinsen (1997), Schmidt (1999). 
566 Cf. Ve (1999), Skilbrei (2004). 
567 See for example Bojer (2002). 
568 See 5.4.5 for elaboration of variants of this argument. 
569 Annfelt refers to Foucault. 
570 A ”total ontological relativism” is a ”somewhat more problematic” position, Hellesund maintains, and 
stresses that ”discussions of whether there is a world, a reality, outside the discourses, outside the scientifically 
conceivable, fall far outside the scope of this project” (2002: 75). She subscribes, however, to the view that 
”there is nothing in the world that determines or necessitates a particular configuration of conceptual categories” 
(ibid.). 
571 Hellesund quotes the Danish psychologist and feminist theorist Dorte Marie Søndergard, who works within 
the postmodern paradigm. Other names referred to in Hellesund’s discussion of her constructivist position are 
“antihumanists” such as Michel Foucault, Niklas Luhmann, Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, and “humanist” 
constructivists such as Alfred Schütz, Jean Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and Toril Moi (2002: 72-89). 
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Several contributors stress the impossibility of universal consensus on a particular set of 
claims about the world; of descriptions of systems and groups of people. The idea of a 
universal gendered power system that pervades all societies and cultures is often criticized.572 
“Such a perspective makes it difficult to theorize both the vast historical variation in women’s 
situation, and the parallel variation relative to ethnicity/race and class”, sociologist Anne Lise 
Ellingsæter and co-author Jorun Solheim argue (2002: 29). Social anthropologist Christine M. 
Jacobsen and sociologist Randi E. Gressgård maintain that “what in feminist politics and 
theory are stressed as being general female experiences and values, are really linked to white 
North American middle-class women’s particular lifeform”, and question “universalizing 
theories and so-called grand narratives” (2002: 206).573 Jacobsen and Gressgård connect the 
“ethnocentrism” of “grand narratives” to “liberalism” (ibid.),574 as do several others.575 
 
Many contributors dismiss universal descriptions of female experiences and values along the 
lines suggested by Ellingsæter and Solheim, Jacobsen and Gressgård in the above passages, 
because such descriptions necessarily exclude empirical variations. Defenders of general 
descriptions of women and women’s situation are sometimes referred to as ‘essentialists’, or 
said to defend ‘essentialism’.576 Those inspired by “poststructuralism and French feminism” 
dismiss essentialism on the basis of a particular theory of meaning and language (L’orange 
Fürst 1998: 176): 
 
He [Derrida] […] dismisses the belief in ‘reality’ as representable as a kind of essence and 
thereby also dismisses essentialism. […] reality is produced as writing and discourse. […] 
This thinking of identity […] is based on […] a false idea, namely that true, self-identical 
meaning is at all possible. The belief that we can immediately identify the essence of 
something in itself, is erroneous, because wherever there is meaning, there is difference. 
Where we can identify something, there is distance. This distance characterizes knowledge 
generally, whether written or spoken. […] Meaning is unstable. Meaning is produced again 
and again in a process of difference and displacement. […] Meaning is displaced in an endless 
process. […] there is no ultimate reference where difference has come to an end (original 
emphasis, op.cit.: 179, 180, 181). 
 
 
                                                 
572 See also the critique of patriarchy, outlined in 5.4.11. 
573 Such questioning has become “more common” within “feminist theory and practice” (Jacobsen and Gressgård 
2002: 206). 
574 Representing liberals in their discussion are Susan Moller Okin and Will Kymlicka, and Norwegian 
intellectuals such as the social anthropologist Unni Wikan. 
575 Consider also the presentation of Anne Hellum’s argument for a pluralist approach to women’s law 
elaborated in 5.4.3. 
576 Cf. Gullvåg Holter (1991a), Bjerrum Nielsen and Rudberg (1994), Davidsen, Solli and Waaler (1996), 
Gressgård (2003), Eng and Markussen (2000), Svare (2001), Stenvoll (2002), Mühleisen (2004). 
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Thus, the term ‘women’ has no “ultimate meaning” (op.cit.: 181). Poststructuralists accuse 
defenders of general descriptions of women and women’s situation of relying, if only 
implicitly, on a notion of “ultimate reference[s]”; they “make difference into sameness” 
(original emphasis, ibid.). At other times, accusations of essentialism are less specific: 
Descriptions of women’s life or the oppression of women may be referred to as essentialist 
simply because they are considered to exclude significant empirical variations, or because 
they rely too heavily on biological explanations of gender difference.577  
 
Finally, there is the view that not all will agree on claims about what ought to be.578 Group 
variations in moral ideas, for example, between women and men,579 working-class and 
middle-class women,580 Western women and non-Western women,581 highlight the fact that 
universal moral consensus is unachievable. Some link their dismissal of moral universalism to 
the poststructuralist critique of essentialism: Moral universalists consider moral norms to have 
“ultimate reference[s]” (ibid.). Arguments against the possibility of moral universalism are, 
moreover, often linked to emotivist582 approaches to morality; it is portrayed as depending on 
our sentiments. We will never all feel the same about an issue; our “values, experiences, 
hopes, dreams and fantasies” will differ (Jacobsen and Gressgård 2002: 199). Last but not 
least, the critique of the possibility of moral universalism is also challenged by elaborations of 
politics as a struggle between “opposite interests”, i.e. interests than cannot be 
universalized;583 some will inevitably loose, and some will win in the political “struggles” for 
“redistribution” and “definition” (Halsaa 2003: 9, 13). Politics, in short, is considered to be a 
struggle for cultural and social hegemony: There are no real universalizable interests, or at 
least fewer than the thinkers of modernity assume.584 
 
Thus, because universal consensus is impossible to achieve, aiming to achieve at it is idle, or 
worse, an expression of denial; the genuinely knowledge-seeking subject is diverted into 
                                                 
577 Cf. Moi (1999), Rustad (1999), Lie (2002). 
578 Consider also the critique of abstract morality in 5.4.3. 
579 Cf. Wærness (1990), Holtan Sørensen (1991), Oftedal Telhaug (1992), Ve (1993), Mathiesen (2000). 
580 Cf. Pettersen (1999), Ve (1999a), Skilbrei (2002). 
581 Cf. Gerrard and Valestrand (1999a, 1999b), Berg (2004). 
582 See 5.4.12. 
583 See also Brita M. Gulli’s elaboration of conflicts and power in 5.4.9. 
584 This point is made for example in contributions influenced by the realistic school in political science (see 
Østerud, Engelstad and Selle 2003), by the republican political thinking of Hannah Arendt (see Loga 2002, 
Brandser 2002, Svenneby 2002), in works influenced by Marxism and radical feminism (such as Halsaa’s 
contributions), and in contributions relying on poststructuralism and psychoanalysis (for example Egeland 
2004a). 
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becoming an ideology-producing subject, who is unable to grasp the real mechanisms of 
oppression.585 Were it possible to achieve general agreement on what is right, moreover, this 
would not necessarily be desirable or reasonable. Several authors interpret the aim of moral 
universalism as an oppressive normalizing prescription. To think, feel and value the same 
things and live in the same way are not things we should seek to accomplish. We should 
instead learn to “live in a landscape of differences around us and within us […] founded in a 
non-hierarchical perspective” (von der Lippe 1999: 105).586 Other commentators elaborate on 
what they consider to be the unfortunate normative implications of the modern idea of 
universal truth, and look for alternative criteria in “research and science” that might give us 
“new and different knowledge in and about the world, localized, partial, critical and solidaric 
– better justified knowledge” (Asdal, Berg, Brenna, Moser and Rustad 1998: 5). 
 
Many would prefer, however, not to give up on universalism.587 Some maintain that modern 
universalism has a core that is not androcentric, or generally false. Political scientist Nina 
Raaum connects for example, her feminist liberalism with the “liberal” notion of “natural 
rights”: “The idea is that all individuals are born free and with equal ‘natural rights’” (1995: 
23). Camilla Serck-Hanssen (2000/2001) links feminism as a moral project to Kant’s 
transcendental defense of human beings’ equal worth. Others stress the validity of the modern 
standard of truth, and that it, on the basis of this standard, is possible to “say that one kind of 
knowledge is better or more truth-like than another” (Kaiser 1990: 224).588 The main problem, 
according to these commentators, is not that the standards of critique defended by the thinkers 
of modernity are androcentric or generally false, but that we fail to live up to them in our 
actual practices. Political scientist Eli Stamnes relies on the tradition of critical theory 
stemming from Max Horkheimer, Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, and its idea of an 
“unfulfilled human potential” to be used when we “criticize existing practices”; the “potential 
of emancipation” as ”normative yardstick” when assessing “different practices” (2000: 9). 
Such defenses of the universality of modern standards are often accompanied by a critique of 
theories which claim that particular groups, such as women, share certain common 
experiences, interests and values, and, because of this, subscribe to and should subscribe to 
                                                 
585 Such reflections can be found in contributions inspired by for example Marxism (see the elaboration of 
Gullvåg Holter’s argument in 5.4.11), or psychoanalysis (for example Soleim 1994, Hamm 2001, Granaas 2004). 
586 Berit von der Lippe refers to Donna Haraway and Teresa de Lauretis. 
587 See also my defense of moral universalism in Chapter 7. 
588 For more examples, see 5.4.5. 
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their own standards of critique.589 Carol Gilligan’s critique of Lawrence Kohlberg’s model of 
moral development, on which Andenæs, Folgerø Johannessen and Ødegård (1992) base their 
criticism of androcentrism, is questioned and dismissed by several contributors.590  
 
Not only the idea that modern universalism is false is questioned. Questioned is also the claim 
that it is unachievable, i.e. to the extent that modern articulations of standards of critique are 
androcentric, ethnocentric or heterosexist or in other senses expressions of false universalism, 
they could in fact be made universal. This point is sometimes made in terms of an immanent 
critique of the thinking of modernity; the thinking is considered to be based on a universal 
core that is often blurred by particular thinkers influenced by the patriarchal prejudices which 
have pervaded historically the culture and structural organization of societies591 – and 
continue to do so.592 Other contributors attempt to articulate universal standards of critique 
relying primarily or at least considerably on other intellectual resources than what we talk of 
here as the thinking of modernity. One example is philosopher Arne Johan Vetlesen’s defense 
of a “morality” which “is, prior to reflection and discourse” as a “product of living with 
(close, significant) others”; which is inspired by Aristotelian ethics and Emmanuel Levinas’ 
notion of “nonsymmetrical and unconditional” moral responsibility (1996: 101). Another 
example is philosopher Kari Martinsen’s attempt to articulate general ethical insights about 
“love” and “care for others” as “the most fundamental in our lives” and “the most natural of 
all”, based on the phenomenological reflections of the Danish theologian K. E Løgstrup 
(1997: 8).593 A third example is Turid Markussen who explores the Foucauldian notion of 
“life” as the “irreducible other” of power, “the space for opposition against power where 
power is”, as “a basis for ethical reflection and political resistance” (2002: 241, 242).594 All in 
all, there is significant opposition to the idea that we cannot reach agreement on standards 
when we discuss what is right or true, often connected to an expressed dismissal of 
                                                 
589 Consider for example Kari Elisabeth Børresen’s defense of universal human rights (1995a, 1998, 1999a), and 
Brandth and Kvande’s (2003) argument that men and women are equally capable of, and obligated to, care for 
children. 
590 Cf. Bjerrum Nielsen and Rudberg (1994), Solheim (1999). 
591 Consider Anne Birgitte Rønning’s (1999) assessment of John Stuart Mill and Tove Stang Dahl’s assessment 
of the Kantian tradition.  
592 Consider Kjersti Fjørtoft’s  (2002) and Else Bugge Tenden’s (2002) assessment of John Rawls, or Hege 
Skjeie’s (2004) assessment of contemporary human rights debates. 
593 Martinsen’s perspective of care is elaborated as a critical alternative to modern theories of justice. 
594 Markussen does so in specific opposition to Nancy Fraser’s Habermas-inspired critique of the inadequate 
treatment of the question of legitimacy in Foucault’s approach to power. 
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‘relativism’:595 Even if many would not embrace universalism, at least not explicitly, very 
few, if any, embrace relativism as a viable critical position.596  
 
When modern univeralism is defended as being achievable, contributors often concentrate on 
clearing up what they consider to be misunderstandings about what a defense of it implies. 
Some stress, for example, that modern universalism is compatible with fallibilism. To 
embrace it is not to defend any idea of eternal, non-correctable knowledge. “All we assume to 
know (cognitions) is hypothetical and open to correction”, Drude von der Fehr notes in a 
presentation of Charles Sanders Peirce’s epistemology (1990: 85).597 May Thorseth asserts 
along similar lines that Jürgen Habermas’ and Karl Otto Apel’s “communicative consensus 
theory of truth” implies that “truth and rightness are ideals within the communicating 
community, [which] […] means that all theories (statements, propositions) must be open to 
argument in principle – and thereby become revisional” (1993: 16). Other commentators 
emphasize the distinction between the moral and the ethical.598 Even though the thinkers of 
modernity defend moral universalism, that we can agree on common moral norms and 
procedures, ethical universalism, universal values – unanimous conceptions of the good life 
among citizens – are in fact not regarded as achievable: “[…] women’s lives are so varied that 
it is difficult to unite around common women’s interests and women’s needs”, without 
suppressing a “minority”, perhaps even “a significant minority” of women who consider their 
“interests” and “needs” to be different, Nina Raaum argues (1995: 30, 35). Her view, that 
ethical universalism is hardly or not at all achievable, is however compatible with, even an 
argument in favor of, universal liberal norms: “Precisely the fear of an unlimited political 
authority, where a small majority can run over a significant minority, is one of liberalism’s 
justifications for limiting the public (and protecting the private) through procedural rules and 
individual rights” (op.cit.: 35).  
 
Modern thought’s proposed reliance on indefensible generalized descriptions of systems and 
groups of people, is also questioned. Such thought does not, for example, it is argued, assume 
                                                 
595 Cf. Rudberg (1996), Sümer (1998), Lie (2002). 
596 Those who come closest are those who elaborate deconstructive or ”undermining” strategies of critique 
(Egeland 2004a: 185), inspired by poststructuralist theory. 
597 Von der Fehr compares Peirce with the feminist standpoint epistemology of Alison M. Jaggar (1991: 88). She 
considers Peirce to be less ”dogmatic” than Jaggar due to this fallibilistic approach: “A feminist science cannot 
[…]  work on the basis that women possess a peculiar cognitive knowledge. To assert this, is to express a faith, a 
faith which cannot continually be checked experimentally and scientifically methodically, and which brings us 
sooner or later to Cartesian dogmaticism” (ibid.). 
598 As elaborated in 2.4.5. 
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a general theory of patriarchy or women’s situation. This view, that it does not, is often raised 
in fact as a critique against it: Thinking about “power” in terms of “rights” is “inadequate” 
when it comes to “the analysis of gender power as a societal phenomenon – it does not 
capture the categorical character of this power as a ‘particular’ dominance relationship” 
(Ellingsæter and Solheim 2002: 21).599 Generally speaking, several contributors rely on 
general notions of gender power, women’s situation or experiences. They thus question, at 
least by implication, the critique of modern thought that relies on a dismissal of such 
notions.600 The claim that such notions are essentialist, in the sense that this term is used by 
poststructuralist theorists, is also countered, implicitly – when contributors defend general 
descriptions of women’s situation without commenting on this poststructuralist objection,601 
or explicitly – when alternative theories of meaning are introduced and subscribed to.602 
 
There are, moreover, several intermediate positions between claiming modern universalism to 
be achievable, on the one hand, and relativism on the other. One has already been mentioned: 
To assert that there are universal standards of what is right and true, but relying on intellectual 
resources collected from other imaginaries than the modern one. Additionally, there are 
contributors who dismiss universalism as conceptualized by certain thinkers of modernity, but 
defend it as conceptualized by others.603 Furthermore, there are contributors who do not deny 
that there are standards of what is right and true, even if we cannot refer to them as ultimately 
universal: People with overlapping basic worldviews and experiences, might, for example, 
agree on certain common critical yardsticks, even if agreement on these standards cannot be 
considered achievable in all contexts. Gro Hagemann argues along such lines when she 
maintains that people living in the historical situation of “the modern subject” would agree on 
the validity of the universal ethos of individual freedom and equality, because this situation 
has made possible critique as “justification of institutions, practices or traditions transcending 
the local context” (1994: 31, 33): The ethos of modernity is universal – but only when 
considered from the point of view of modernity as a particular historical situation.604 
                                                 
599 See also 5.4.11. 
600 There are also phenomenological and ontological conceptions about women’s situation, see 5.4.14. 
601 Cf. Wærness (1995), Nilsen (1995), Syltevik (2000). 
602 Cf. Sümer (1998), Rustad (1999), Ve (1999), Holst (2002). 
603 One example is Eli Stamnes, who dismisses modern critical standards as far as they are conceptualized as 
“external” criteria (2000: 8). She relies on thinkers of modernity who defend a notion of “immanent critique”; 
who use “the subject’s/object’s self-image and self-justification” to criticize what is “in fact” going on (ibid.). 
Other examples are those who consider liberalism to have been a progressive force in the past, and those who, on 
the contrary, emphasize classical liberalism’s lack of sophistication when compared to contemporary liberal 
arguments (see also 5.4.2). 
604 Hagemann refers in this connection to Seyla Benhabib. 
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Professor of women’s law, Kirsten Ketcher, moves in the same direction when she justifies 
“women’s basic rights” with reference to “real circumstances” in “a modern world” which 
makes the justification of individual rights possible:  
 
Basic rights are based on a common value orientation transcending national laws and national 
arrangements. A concept of basic rights can thus be seen as an answer to an increasing 
internationalization of law that makes a common legal basis necessary. Basic rights might 
possibly be conceived of as a juridification of a set of basic values that characterize Western 
democracies in particular. These values spread, however, and tend to become universal (2001: 
145). 
 
Finally, there is, as pointed out by some critics,605 the phenomenon of implicit reliance on 
universal standards of what is right and true, even if this reliance is not necessarily 
commented upon by those who rely on them. Ellen Mortensen is concerned with the 
conditions for freedom within the phallogocentric order of the modern human condition, 
implicitly suggesting that freedom is something achievable, and something we should all, 
ultimately, strive to achieve, even if she explicitly dismisses all universalist talk as false and 
“Eurocentric” (2002: 3), or as a “verbal flow” that “ends up signifying nothing” (op.cit.: 100). 
Christine M. Jacobsen and Randi E. Gressgård criticize, on the one hand, the false 
universalism of “Western-liberal values of autonomy and freedom of choice” (2002: 199). On 
the other hand, they consider Western feminism to be “ethnocentric” when it does not 
acknowledge properly Muslim women’s right to choose ways of life that are at odds with 
Western ideals of the good life; when they “choose against the conventional, Western 
understanding of freedom” (op.cit.: 202), appealing thus to an inter-cultural standard of 
“autonomy and freedom of choice” (op.cit.: 199). 
 
That the universalist stance of modern thought is undesirable or unreasonable is also 
questioned, by the commentators that subscribe more or less whole-heartedly to a feminism 
inspired by such thought. Modern moral norms are not obstacles to pluralism, on the contrary, 
it is argued, they guarantee it: They are fundamental prerequisites for our free thinking and 
acting as citizens and private persons.606 To say that people are equal, is not necessarily to say 
                                                 
605 Cf. Kaiser (1990), Engelstad (1991), Holst (2002). Consider also Tordis Borchgrevink (1999) who sketches 
an argument of performative self-contradiction in her critical reading of Hulda Garborg’s subscribing to the 
misogynist views of Otto Weininger: By doing so, Garborg implicitly accepts social conditions, i.e. a misogynist 
social arrangement, that deprive her of the authority to subscribe to Weininger’s ideas, or any other ideas, 
Borchgrevink notes. 
606 I read this as a core idea in Elin Svenneby’s argument for a “radical humanism” (1999: 205). See also for 
example Raaum (1995), Bugge Tenden (2002), Skjeie (2004), Repstad (2004).  
 214
that they are same. Elisabeth L’orange Fürst points this out in a discussion of French 
feminism, i.e. in a passage where she reflects on what kind of equality-centered feminism 
French poststructuralist feminism opposes: 
 
The discussion between equality feminism versus difference feminism refers to issues 
connected with the same versus the other/different. In Norwegian the word has different 
meanings: equality as the same (sameness) and equality as equal worth (equal). Difference 
(which French feminism pleads for) conflicts with the former meaning, but not the latter (my 
emphasis, 1999: 178). 
 
The distinction between the moral and the ethical is once more crucial to uphold, some 
contributors maintian: Moral universalism is defensible from a perspective of pluralism, even 
if ethical universalism or “sameness” is not (ibid.). The strength of liberal theories of justice, 
Hilde Bojer sums up, is precisely that they articulate universal principles “[…] independent of 
the final good, enabling human beings to pursue their own good, whatever that may be, […] it 
is always rational to want them whatever else one wants” (2002: 10). The point is to create 
morally defensible political arrangements that are compatible with different notions of the 
good life among citizens, not to put one notion of the good above others. As ethnologist Hilde 
Danielsen argues, arrangements are “just” when all people, both women and men, have “equal 
conditions to develop their potential as human beings”, “their individual capacities and 
collective communication and interaction” (2002: 90, 91, 93).607 Others stress the value of 
objectivity in truth-seeking, in a modern meaning of the term: To strive to approach truth is 
something we both can and ought to do.608 
 
5.4.8 Individualism and the good community 
In her article “Forførelsens spill fra det tradisjonelle til det moderne”,609 ethnologist Kari 
Telste compares a traditional “Casanova” or “seducer of women” –  the “mythologized” Ole 
Tollefsen Myre from Hallingdal,610 with the nickname “Blank-Ola”, operating early in the 
18th century – with a modern seducer, the artist Hans Andersen with his nickname 
“Borgenstjerne”, living i Kristiania611 around year 1900 (1999: 43-44). One of Telste’s main 
conclusions is that the implications for the women exposed to Borgenstjernes’ modern 
                                                 
607 She refers to Seyla Benhabib and Iris Marion Young. 
608 Cf. Raaum and Skogerbø (1993), Sørensen (1999), Bleie (2003a, 2003b) (see also 5.4.5). 
609 “The Game of Seduction from the Traditional to the Modern”. 
610 The name of a country-side district in the eastern part of Norway. 
611 The name of Oslo from 1877 to 1925. 
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seduction were different from and arguably worse than the implications for those seduced by 
Blank-Ola two centuries earlier. Because, whereas Blank-Ola was “bound to values anchored 
in codes of honor”, Borgenstjerne could work seemingly “free and unbounded” (op.cit.: 60):  
 
To be sure he [Borgenstjerne] was punished612 […] for economic fraud, but society does not 
seem to have taken [his] […] broken marriage vows seriously, even if there were legal rules 
saying that men who broke the marriage vow could be punished with prison if so demanded 
by the woman. Evidently, women had exactly the same expectations regarding the vow as 
before. Now, what they lacked (around 1900), was the means to force the man to stand by his 
vow (ibid.). 
 
This observation contradicts, Telste notes, optimistic analyses of developments in modernity, 
such as that of Marshall Berman613 who sees modernity “in a positive light” in contradiction 
to “the ugliness and brutality” of traditional societies (op.cit.: 45). But life in the “traditional 
world” was in fact not so “narrow-minded” as Berman presents it, and the modern 
“emancipation from social norms and values” are not unequivolly positive, at least not if 
assessed from a women’s perspective (ibid.). What happens in modern society, Telste argues, 
with reference to Seyla Benhabib614 and Agnes Heller615, is that “the values anchored in the 
concept of honor” have been dismissed (op.cit.: 60). There has been: 
 
[…] a development where norms are gradually becoming more abstract and nuanced. People 
can no longer receive support from institutionalized norms of action to decide what is right 
and wrong, but have to make moral deliberations to a greater extent than before. Moral 
deliberations often take as their point of departure existing practices and customs, but open for 
the possibility of questioning them, accepting, dismissing or choosing between them. Moral 
questions are being priviatized as principles of conduct are made a question of what each can 
decide in accordance with her own conscience and perspective.616 When the validity of 
existing models of action are weakened in this way, breaking norms may no longer 
necessarily lead to loss of honor, to shame, and sanctions imposed by the community (ibid.). 
 
This had severe consequences for women who, around 1900, were not guaranteed “freedom 
and equality” – like men were, at least ideally – “women’s status was essentially hierarchical 
and unchanged” (op.cit.: 61).617 Thus, a woman still had to “place her honor in the hands of a 
man and wait for him to make her a woman by means of marriage” (ibid.). However, due to 
modern de-traditionalization, this was now a far more risky thing for women to do: The 
                                                 
612 In court. Both Blank-Ola and Borgenstjerne had to appear in court several times because of their activities. 
Telste’s article is (among other things) based on a systematic study of these court cases. 
613 In his book All that is Solid Melts into Air. 
614 She refers to Situating the Self. Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. 
615 She refers to The Power of Shame. A Rational Perspective. 
616 For the discussion on the relationship between public and private, see 5.4.10. 
617 Telste refers in this connection to Carol Pateman’s The Sexual Contract. 
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Casanovas seducing them no longer felt committed to “collective values” (op.cit.: 62). This 
disruption of collectivity left women more vulnerable than before. 
 
I want to focus on three claims made in Telste’s argument. First, that the project of modernity 
is a project of individualism, and that it is a project incompatible with collectivism. Second, 
that individualism has unfortunate implications, particularly for women, while collectivism 
has fortunate implications, particularly for women. Third, that collectivism needs to be 
anchored in what Telste refers to as ‘collective values’. 
 
The claim that the thinkers of modernity embrace individualism at the cost of, or at the likely 
cost of, community is an extremely common observation.618 Modern individualism is, 
however, given different interpretations. Telste emphasizes the modern individual’s freedom 
to choose as a cultural ethos, i.e. the ethos of “autonomy and freedom of choice” (Sinding 
Aasen 1991: 42), the “liberal credo” of “personal freedom” (Borchgrevink 2002: 147, 148). 
With modern individualism she also refers to the conceptualization of the individual as a 
rights-holder, and links it to the institutionalization of individual rights as legal rights. Several 
commentators connect modern individualism to a notion of individual rights.619 This notion is 
sometimes elaborated in general terms, i.e. in terms of people’s rights as persons or citizens, 
and thus of women’s rights as persons and citizens. The basis of “liberal-feminism” or 
“individual feminism” is that “liberal political principles about the equality and rights of the 
individual should apply to women just as they apply to men”, Beatrice Halsaa says (1996: 
153). On other occasions the notion of individual rights is linked more specifically to their 
institutionalization in national laws, or connected with and discussed in relation to 
international conventions of human rights. There are, for example, studies which elaborate 
and assess the historical and contemporary development of civil, political and social rights in 
Norway,620 in Scandinavia621 and in Europe and the United States,622 and studies which focus 
                                                 
618 Cf. Sinding Aasen (1991), Levin (1992), Gulli (1994), Elstad (1994), Andenæs (1995), Gulbrandsen (1995), 
L’orange Fürst (1995, 2002), Andersen (1996), Aslaksen (1996), Melby (1997), Flemmen (1999), Schmidt 
(1999), Ellingsæter and Solheim (2002), Brandth and Kvande (2003), Hagemann (2003). 
619 Cf. Skar (1990), Aamodt (1990a, 1990b), Svenneby (1992), Skjeie (1992, 1998, 1999, 2004), Hagemann and 
Krogstad (1994), Johanessen (1994), Iversen (1995, 1996), Leira (1996), Melby (1996, 1997), Haavind (1998), 
Rasmussen (1999), Helle-Valle and Talle (2000), Haukanes (2001), Hennum (2001), Aslaksen (2000/2001), 
Skjeie and Teigen (2003). 
620 Cf. Nagel (1998), Raaum (1998), Ellingsæter (1999a), Skjeie and Teigen (2003). 
621 Cf. Leira (1996), Skjeie and Siim (2000).  
622 Cf. Larsen (1997), Blom (1998). 
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on the implications of The European Convention of Human Rights and of the United Nation’s 
Women’s Convention.623  
 
Individualism is, however, also given other interpretations: Defending modern individualism 
might be equated with defending instrumental rationality, egoism, capitalism, or an abstract 
notion of the subject.624 These different meanings attached to modern individualism are not 
always distinguished. To the contrary, it is very often presented as a multi-faceted cluster of 
supposedly interrelated ideas referred to as individualist and positioned in opposition to 
collectivism.  
 
Also collectivism has some different distinguishable meanings. In the article referred to 
above, Telste conceptualizes the conflict as one between individualism and recognizing the 
authority and responsibility of collectives, not only of individuals. Modern individualization 
tends to focus exclusively on the authority and responsibility of the individual: “Moral 
questions are being privatized as principles of conduct are made a question of what each can 
decide” – and not a question of what people “can decide” collectively or of the direction taken 
by “the sanctions of the community” (1999: 60). This view is shared by Ann Nilsen, who 
contrasts modern “private” problem-solving with a vision where “women”  – and not each 
and every woman as a private person – are given a voice on the basis of the “opinions” they 
“share”, “dilemmas” they face, and “values” they consider it “worth making efforts for”, and 
of the possibility of finding collective solutions that are not “private”, but “intrinsically public 
and system based” (1992: 239, 240).625 A somewhat different expression of this view, is Karin 
Widerberg’s argument in favor of group representation in science: “[…] different groups and 
positions need to be represented in the scientific community for objectivity to be guaranteed”, 
she maintains (1995: 164).626  
 
However, Telste also talks about a rather different conflict between modern individualism and 
collectivism: one between individualism and the idea that individuals think about what is 
                                                 
623 Cf. Grannes (1994), Haugestad (1995), Ketcher (2001), Skjeie (2004). 
624 Consider the short systematic overview in 5.4.4 on the relationship between the critique of modern 
individualism and other arguments critical of modernity.  
625 ”Is it reasonable to assume that these women’s views are representative of women in general? Even if they 
are not, and my empirical material is biased in terms of social background, education and levels of occupation, it 
may still be assumed that a large number of women in our society share the opinions of these women as to the 
dilemmas faced and values worth making efforts for” (Nilsen 1992: 239). 
626 Because people who belong to different groups see different “questions” as “relevant” (Widerberg 1995: 
164). See fuller elaboration in 5.4.5. 
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good for the group they belong to; orient themselves towards “collective values”, such as “the 
values anchored in the concept of honor” in the pre-individualized world in which the seducer 
Borgenstjerne operated (op.cit.: 60, 62). Many contributors commit themselves to an ethical 
collectivism that is considered to conflict, severely or more modestly, with modern 
individualism.627 Kari Wærness defends, for example, an ethic of “caring” for others, a 
“feminine” ethos in “the traditional sense: based on sensitivity, reciprocity, intersubjective 
relations and responsibility – ‘the voice of the mother’”628 (1990: 35). This approach is 
contrasted to moral approaches focused on “principles”: 
 
An access to morality through principles […] results in strife and war, because people will 
stick to their principles and defend them. Principles that are to be strictly followed create 
distance between people. Universalization of rules and principles […] [should be rejected], 
because situations are never so similar that they can be completely governed by the same 
principles. Instead it is the attitude of care that […] is universal and accessible to all humans 
when it comes to analyzing what it implies to approach another human morally (original 
emphasis, ibid.). 
 
Sociologist Else Skjønsberg’s point of departure is “a critique of the market-economic, 
mechanical and binary thinking, on which our dominant economic and scientific paradigm or 
understanding of reality is based” (1995: 13). This understanding of reality rewards, she says, 
“self-interest, individualism, power and competition”, “values” that are not in “the interest of 
community” (ibid.). However, 
 
[…] parallel to the mechanical, hierarchical worldview and the technical/instrumental 
rationality that defines the individual as self-made and private consumption as the ultimate 
end, runs a strong undertow of a totally different way of thinking and acting […] [that] is 
influenced by common interests, consideration of others, cooperation, responsibility and 
reciprocity (ibid.). 
 
Also contributors inspired by poststructuralist theory, French feminism and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis argue against liberal individualism, for solidarity and collectivity. In an article 
on Luce Irigaray, geographer Inger J. Birkeland recommends, for example, an “ethics of 
sexual difference” prescribing “responsibility for the other”, with the exercise of 
“motherhood” as model (2000: 211). The “ethics” is introduced as a contrast to “equality 
feminism” and liberal gender neutrality that conceptualizes “human rights” without taking 
“the differences between women and men” into account (op.cit.: 191, 192, 211).  
                                                 
627 For more elaboration of collectively oriented ethical proposals, see in particular 5.4.12. 
628 She paraphrases the American philosopher Nel Noddings in Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and 
Moral Education. 
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In other contributions, the lack of collectivity is conceptualized in yet a different way. The 
focus here is on the flaws of individualist notions of justice which ignore the group-level 
implications of social arrangements, in contrast to collectivist notions of justice which assume 
that groups, not only individuals, owe something to each other.629 The conflict is articulated in 
discussions about social redistribution. Mari Teigen argues, for example, that a just society 
secures “equality of outcome”, meaning “equality in distribution on the group level” of 
“power, influence and resources”, not only equality of opportunity among individuals (2004: 
86, 87).630 The concern is also raised in discussions about cultural recognition however, as 
argued by Christine M. Jacobsen and Randi E. Gressgård: 
 
In contrast to [Will] Kymlicka631, who sees groups as significant first and foremost for 
developing individual autonomy, [Iris Marion] Young632 considers individual and group as 
intimately interconnected, that is, they constitute one another mutually. Considered in this 
way, culturally based group rights are not oppressive as such […]. Group rights can, on the 
contrary, be an efficient means to achieve justice, for oppressed groups in particular (2002: 
214). 
 
The contributors may have different kinds of collectives in mind when they oppose modern 
individualism and collectivism. Telste elaborates the conflict between individualism and the 
ethos of “traditional” communities (1999: 43).633 Others refer to the conflict between 
individualism and sustaining family relations. Philosopher Sidsel Aamodt explicates the 
conflict as discussed by Hegel: 
 
The relationships within the family are, in virtue of being relationships between family 
members, universal or ethical in themselves; the ethical having to do with the relationship of 
the single family member to the whole family as a substance. The family as natural ethical life 
is therefore not to be fully understood as relationships of love and affection between single 
individuals. In Hegel’s opinion this would make their actions accidental and not substantial. 
To act as family member implies, then, obeying laws and customs without questioning them, 
so that the ethical frame of mind in the family is piety to the family spirit, or to the family 
gods (original emphasis, 1994b: 139).634 
 
                                                 
629 See also the elaboration of Brita M. Gulli’s argument on this point in 5.4.10. 
630 See also Mundal (1994), Kaul (1998), Rogg (1991, 2001), Skjeie and Teigen (2003). 
631 They refer to Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. 
632 They refer to her Justice and the Politics of Difference. 
633 See also Melby (1997), Kollhøj (1999), Mellemsether (1999). 
634 Aamodt questions Hegel’s prescriptions for dealing with the conflict between modern individualism and 
family life, but subscribes to the idea that there is a conflict. For other elaborations of this conflict, see Stang 
Dahl (1992), Wærness (1998b), Sverdrup (2000). 
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There are, moreover, authors, such as Inger J. Birkeland, who emphasize the conflict between 
individualism and the ethical qualities of the mother-child relationship.635 Social 
anthropologists Siri Gerrard and Halldis Valestrand (1999a, 1999b) accentuate the 
significance of sustaining local communities,636 others accentuate, like Jacobsen and 
Gressgård, the need to recognize ethnic group ties.637 Several commentators are concerned 
with the conflict between modern individualization and globalization and sustaining national 
communal ties, for example in discussions assuming a relationship between national solidarity 
and the development of welfare states.638 The conflict might, however, also be elaborated as 
one between individualism and global solidarity.639 In addition, there are contributions that 
defend republican ideas of active citizens participating in a political community. Such ideas 
are introduced as alternatives to liberal individualism and privatism, and occur, for example, 
in analyses of Scandinavian social democracy,640 in contributions that reflect on the feminist 
relevance of Hannah Arendt,641 but also in works inspired by poststructuralist theory642 on 
how to make democracy more inclusive and citizens more active. Finally, modern 
individualism is often considered to conflict with recognizing the values of female 
communities and practices, whether one has in mind women’s communities generally,643 or 
particular feminine communities, such as the women’s movement,644 women’s 
organizations645 or female-dominated professions.646  
 
As the quotations above indicate, elaborations of the conflict between modern individualism 
and collectivism very often conclude with statements about the need to make modern thought 
more collectivist, or to replace it with a wholly different outlook. Contributors seldom present 
the conflict in neutral terms, or end up by defending original articulations of modern 
individualism against collectivist challenges. Thus, when Gro Hagemann asks whether 
“feminism” contains “the potential to transcend the limits of liberalism with regard to the lack 
                                                 
635 Cf. Oftedal Telhaug (1992), Barth (1996). 
636 See also Nørve (1995), Fredriksen (1997), Fyhn (1997, 1999), Engelskjøn (1999). 
637 Cf. Borchgrevink (1999), Talle (2001), Thorbjørnsrud (2003), Berg (2004). 
638 Cf. Leira (1998), Skjeie and Siim (2000), Skjeie and Teigen (2003). 
639 Cf. Wærness (2001), Sørensen (1999), Ellingsæter and Solheim (2002). 
640 I focus on these analyses in Chapter 6. 
641 Cf. Brandser (2002), Erichsen (2002), Nicolaysen (2002).  
642 Consider the many contributions inspired by Donna Haraway’s radical-democratic ideas, such as Asdal, 
Brenna, Gulbrandsen, Moser and Refseth (1993), Asdal and Brenna (1998), Indahl (1998), Lotherington and 
Markussen (1999), Egeland (2001, 2003).  
643 Cf. Halse (1992), L’orange Fürst (1995), Widerberg (1995), Sümer (1998). 
644 Cf. Halsaa (1995, 2003), Østerud, Engelstad and Selle (2003). 
645 Cf. Selle and Berven (2001), Wollebæk and Selle (2001). 
646 Cf. Christensen (1997), Martinsen (1997), Skilbrei (2002). 
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of moral commitment towards a community“ (1997: 27), her framing of the question is very 
typical.647 The general opinion in several of the contributions is indeed on the side of 
collectivism. The problem of liberal jurisprudence, professor in criminology Thomas 
Mathiesen argues, is that it lacks “care” and the “solidaric, holistic understanding of human 
beings” that women bring with them: Law needs to be “socialized” by women (2000: 114). 
Scholar in theology, Åse Røthing, wants to replace ethical models that stress “rationality and 
impartiality” with “ethical imperatives” based on “understanding and solidarity” (2000: 92, 
93). And to return to some of the examples given above: Widerberg argues for giving groups 
authority and responsibility; Wærness argues that care ethics should replace the modern 
yardstick of justice, thus subscribing to Nel Noddings’ program; Teigen wants groups to 
replace individuals as the primary normative units in our thinking on social redistribution; 
Jacobsen and Gressgård introduce Iris Marion Young’s theory on the relationship between 
cultural recognition and recognition of groups, as a critique against Will Kymlicka’s position 
that recognition of groups is legitimate only in as far as it facilitates the individual’s exercise 
of autonomy. The general opinion is, in short, that the modern imaginary is too individualist. 
 
Related to this view, is another point Telste accentuates in her analysis of seduction: That to 
stress community and solidarity is particularly valuable for women’s emancipation. The point 
is not only, as Hagemann frames it in her question, that feminism has collectivist resources to 
offer critics of modern individualism. The point is also that collectivist motivations of care 
and responsibility, found for example in the practice of mothering elaborated by Wærness and 
Birkeland, in Karin Widerberg’s “room of women” (1995: 65), have something of 
significance to offer feminism. The point is that collective agents, such as the women’s 
movement or “women’s public space” (de Vibe 1994: 77), are crucial if women’s interests are 
to be pursued, while collectivist notions of justice are necessary, as Teigen argues, if we are to 
defend affirmative action for women, and also necessary, as Jacobsen and Gressgård argue, if 
we are to defend non-Western women’s right to live according to their own conception of the 
good life. 
 
The third claim made in Telste’s argument upon which I wish to focus here – that a 
collectivist orientation is about appreciating ‘collective values’ – is significant because it 
                                                 
647 For a similar framing of the question see for example Slagstad (1994, 1996), Christie Mathiesen (1998), 
Schmidt (1999). My point here is this: It would be very untypical to raise the concern that feminism may be 
conflicting with liberal ideas about commitment towards the individual. 
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reflects a demand for an ethical notion of the collective. People in Telste’s traditional 
community shared a cultural outlook, a worldview, traditions and practices. They were bound 
together by common values seldom questioned. Telste contrasts this notion of community 
with modern society, which is not a community according to such demanding criteria: People 
are bound together by law and “abstract” norms and “principles of conduct” that “each can 
decide in accordance with their own conscience and perspective” (1999: 60). They can “no 
longer receive support from institutionalized norms of action in deciding what […] [is] right 
and wrong,” but have to make “moral deliberations” which “often take as their point of 
departure existing practices and customs, but open up the possibility for questioning them, 
accepting, dismissing or choosing between them” (1999: 60). The distinction between these 
two types of social order is found in many contributions, i.e. the distinction between ethical 
communities where we meet one another as concrete persons, and the loose modern order 
where our ties are abstract and impersonal. The theology scholar Ulla Schmidt elaborates it as 
follows: 
 
[According to] the perspective of justice […] [the] basis of morality is primarily linked to 
individuals who are isolated from one another at the outset, [and] choose to enter into 
contracts that imply obligations towards others and rights that they can claim. Fundamentally, 
individuals are therefore free and create […] for themselves the rights and obligations that are 
laid upon them. These rights and obligations are universal and impartial, as they are based on 
a mutual contract. Therefore, they cannot discriminate against certain individuals or groups on 
the basis of specific considerations.648 The perspective of care represents a basically different 
way of conceiving of morality and the ethical individual. From within this perspective, one 
considers interpersonal relationships and the concrete context in which the individual is 
enclosed to be essential for moral understanding, which is linked to certain understandings of 
how human life unfolds. From the point of view of this understanding, individuals are not 
primarily free and independent, but dependent and interwoven in relations (original emphasis, 
1999: 66-67). 
 
It is this ethical community, the social order based on Schmidt’s “care perspective”, which 
some contributors consider to be suppressed by modern individualism; it is this “other voice” 
that needs to be heard when the moderns have had their say (op.cit.: 66). This is needed not 
only because the other voice is valuable in itself, but also because all abstract social orders 
need to be based on concrete collectives, so that solidarity and “intimacy” do not disintegrate 
(Solheim 1998: 95). Jorun Solheim establishes this connection in the following way:   
 
The time of Enlightenment is therefore also a time of cultural disintegration […]. God is 
dead, human beings are free and unbounded, cast out into the empty air. In such times, […] it 
                                                 
648 See 5.4.9 for further discussion of the latter point. 
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is logical that first-order (moral)philosophical  questions tend to center around new 
integrative mechanisms – which hold a society of atomized individuals together, and hinder 
disruption and extermination. The modern social order builds its basic notions of integration 
on ideas of contract and voluntariness […] [that] depend on the idea of ‘the invisible’ third – 
the integrating meta-level above the interacting individuals: the invisible hand of the market, 
the discursive community (parliament), the general will and the sovereignty of Leviathan. 
[…] But there is also another underlying level of integration, where ‘intimacy’ takes on a new 
shape as a bodily/symbolic integrative mechanism. We are dealing here with what we might 
call a structural inversion, where the ‘corporal’ connection of the family is gradually 
replacing patriarchy as the symbolic integrative mechanism, [and] […] [a] new ideal of 
femininity, the loving, all-embracing mother-woman, […] is raised symbolically to the social 
(not to mention the cosmological) level, as a general […] notion of totality. At the same time 
this modern female ideal of intimacy works indirectly as a social integration principle, by its 
being linked to a conception of Bildung. Female intimacy is to improve the man, nurture him 
and cultivate him (original emphasis, 1998: 94-95). 
 
 
Solheim is indeed critical of the gendered organization of this ‘intimacy’ so fundamental to 
the modern order. She considers, however, an “underlying level of integration” of this 
intimate kind to be necessary in order to uphold such an order (op.cit: 94). The task for 
feminists is to “de-gender” intimacy, not to struggle against intimacy as such (op.cit.: 99). 
 
Whether individualism lies at the heart of the project of modernity is really not a topic for 
debate among the contributors. Given their discourse, it would not make sense to claim, 
simply, that this project is too collectivist or needs to be made more individualist. What is 
disputed, however, is what kind of individualism is fundamental to the project of modernity. It 
is a long way from professor in theology Kari Elisabeth Børresen’s defenition of “democracy 
and human rights” as the core of “modern feminism” (1998: 221, 233), to Kari Martinsen’s 
(1997) harsh attack on the citizen of political liberalism and the calculating actor of economic 
liberalism, as the two agents of an individualist lifeform that encourages egoism, narcissism 
and instrumentalism.649 Some authors also connect modern individualism closely to the way 
in which it is elaborated in classical liberalism, as individual “natural rights” (Raaum 1995: 
21).650 Others accentuate more recent elaborations. Edle Bugge Tenden takes, for example, 
John Rawls’ notion of “self-respect” as a “primary good” as her point of departure (2002: 
167),651 while professor in pedagogy Karen Jensen elaborates the “dialogical” individualism 
of Jürgen Habermas (1990: 17). 
                                                 
649 See also 5.4.11 and 5.4.12. 
650 See 5.4.2. 
651 She relies in particular on Drucilla Cornell’s feminist interpretation of Rawls in The Imaginary Domain and 
At the Heart of Freedom. 
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Somewhat disputed is also the hegemonic presupposition that modern individualism 
necessarily conflicts with collectivism. Philosopher Kjersti Fjørtoft argues against those who 
consider “care” and “justice” to be incompatible perspectives (2002: 42): 
 
[…] [I] will argue that both perspectives need to be integrated into a dialogical model. We 
need normative and institutional arrangements that will secure equal justice for all, but such 
arrangements also need to be confronted with the needs, interpretations and interests of the 
concrete human beings concerned (ibid.).  
 
Fjørtoft’s dialogical model is based on Habermas’ idea of “democratic discourse”, Seyla 
Benhabib’s reflections on the relationship between the generalized and the concrete other in 
moral theory, and on Iris Marion Young’s definition of “autonomy” as “the possibility to look 
at oneself as participant in democratic practices” (op.cit.: 43, 46, 49-50). Mari Teigen 
interprets Martha Nussbaum’ feminist liberalism and Nancy Fraser’s normative ideas of 
deliberative democracy and “parity in participation” to be compatible with a perspective 
where groups are considered the primary normative units (2004: 92). 
 
Several authors admit, moreover, that modern individualism has made possible crucial gains. 
Individualist ideas have played a crucial role for example in struggles for emancipation, 
women’s struggles and other oppressed groups’ struggles to have their “human worth” and 
“human rights” confirmed (Moxnes 1999: 4):652  
 
Freedom is a basic notion in the natural rights tradition. […] In women’s law focus has been 
in particular on the protection of individual freedom […]. The negation of freedom is force, 
necessity and dependence. Women’s law has worked to reveal to what extent women are 
exposed to infringement against their freedom in their daily lives. Protection of values such as 
dignity and integrity are essential in this connection, and are the basis of autonomy and self-
realization (original emphasis, Wesenberg 1995).  
 
Indeed, general statements about what feminism is are made very often in the language of 
modern individualism, even if this reliance is not always explicitly recognized. For example, 
the vocabulary of rights is used not only by confessed liberals. Beatrice Halsaa, who defends a 
radical-socialist feminism,653 defines feminism in the following way: 
                                                 
652 There are several explicit appreciations of modern individualism that take the form, for example, of general 
statements about the importance of human rights, even if such appreciations are often made with significant 
reservations, see for example 5.4.4. 
653 See 5.4.11. 
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What do we mean when we talk about feminism? I take as my point of departure that the 
struggle for women’s rights has always had two sides to it; one ideological, theoretical and 
intellectual, and the other more practical, action-oriented and political (1996: 142).  
 
Moreover, some accentuate, in fact, the relative lack of individualism when key thinkers of 
modernity write about issues with particular relevance to women’s freedom and equality. 
Consider, for example, the critique of Rawls’ view that his individualist principles of justice 
should not apply to the family.654 Consider also the critique of liberals that do not defend the 
implementation of women’s human rights in religious organizations.655 Finally, the 
collectivist thought suggested as adequate for modifying or replacing modern individualism 
are also criticized. Some criticize, for example, feminist care ethic proposals, either because 
they are oppressive to women, in the sense that they tend to reproduce what are considered 
patriarchal stereotypes of women,656 because they idealize women’s culture, and contribute to 
making men and their practices essentially less ideal than women and their practices,657 or 
because they prescribe a conception of the good care-ethical life for all, and disregard the fact 
that people, both men and women, might have other plans for their self-realization, which 
they should also be allowed to pursue in a just society.658 Not many investigate critically the 
idea of making groups the primary normative unit.659 But there are a few. Edle Bugge Tenden 
argues, for example, that feminist jurisprudence should not have “women’s perspective”, but 
the individual’s “right to freedom” as its critical yardstick (2002: 164): 
 
To include women’s perspective (as something different from men’s perspective) in law 
implies that we accept at least implicitly, certain kinds of behavior as given. [Drucilla] 
Cornell660 will not, however, deny that inequalities in power between women and men are 
present in real life. Her point is that such descriptions of reality – descriptions of the gender 
power relationships that feminists wish to change – should not be written into law as a 
premise. We might then end up with a law that cements inequalities instead of abolishing 
them. Cornell tries, in line with this argument, to deduce a concept of equality and a right to 
freedom from sexual harassment that can be justified independent of women’s perspective 
(ibid.).  
 
Moreover, many point out that there are certain kinds of collectives that need to be 
deconstructed and reshaped, and perhaps replaced, i.e. collectives that are not worth 
                                                 
654 Cf. Bojer (2001), Fjørtoft (2002), Holst (2002b). 
655 Cf. Børresen (1995b, 1998), Ketcher (2001), Skjeie (2004). 
656 Cf. Davidsen, Solli and Waaler (1996), Andenæs (1998), Solheim (1998).  
657 Cf. Aarseth (1995), Oftung (1995, 1997), Øvrelid (1996b, 2000), Slottemo (2000). 
658 Cf. Raaum (1995), Holst (2003). 
659 See, however, Chapter 8. 
660 Bugge Tenden is inspired by the arguments of John Rawls and Amartya Sen in addition to Drucilla Cornell. 
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defending, even if other collectives are. There is, for example, the critique of national or 
religious myths which are considered to reproduce gender stereotypes that suppress individual 
and cultural variations among women and men.661 Critique is also raised against over-
idealized descriptions, for example of the women’s movement,662 of the practice of 
mothering,663 and of traditional communities664 i.e. descriptions that underestimate what may 
be oppressive facets of these collectives. 
 
The definition of collectives as ethical communities were people share values and 
worldviews, as it for example is advanced in Telste’s article, is also addressed critically. Some 
contributors emphasize, for example, the significance of the collective orientation of the 
modern social order; its attempt to combine solidarity with respect for pluralism. Consider, for 
example, how sociologist Karen Christensen reflects on the normative basis of the welfare 
state: 
 
The welfare state thus relates to citizens as single individuals, and it should modify […] 
market forces […] on the basis of ideological ideas of equality, equal worth, justice and 
rights. […] we see a movement from a state that helps the poor to a state that provides basic 
security for all citizens. Welfare in the context of the welfare state does […] not really refer to 
happiness, but is about creating a minimum standard for all (1997: 2).665 
 
And, finally, some critics consider even the modern notion of a morality to be too 
comprehensive. This point is sometimes framed as immanent critique: Key contributors to the 
modern canon have elaborated morality so that a more or less articulated ethical subtext 
remains, one which privileges men’s perspectives above women’s perspectives, it is 
argued.666 This line of critique is, however, also prevalent in contributions inspired by 
poststructuralist theory. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse, Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of nihilism and Hannah Arendt’s reflections on goodness, political 
scientist Jill Loga analyzes both Aristotelian and Kantian approaches to morality in 
Norwegian public debates as expressions of “the power of goodness in the political sphere” 
(2002: 32):667 
 
                                                 
661 Cf. L’orange Fürst (1995), Flaskerud (1999), Skjeie and Siim (2000), Andersen (2002).  
662 Cf. Gullvåg Holter (1993), Gentikow (1998), Blom (2003).  
663 Cf. Bjerrum Nielsen (1996), Birkeland (2000), Kvande and Rasmussen (2003). 
664 Cf. Skar (1990), Børresen (1995a), Øverland (1996).  
665 For similar reflections, see for example Raaum and Skogerbø (1993), Moxnes (1999), Svenneby (1999a). 
666 Consider the discussion of the problem of false universalism in 5.4.7. 
667 See also Meyer (1999) and Egeland (2004a). Consider again also 5.4.7, and the critique of modern 
universalism as unachievable and undesirable. 
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[…] the discourse [of goodness] attempts to become legitimate by referring to moral 
philosophy and ethics, by, for example, accentuating the Aristotelian virtues […] [or] the 
categorical imperative […]. The discourse thus ‘invites’ certain moral philosophers into the 
discourse, or it gives legitimacy to certain philosophers (op.cit.: 38). 
 
The problem, according to Loga, is not that the thinkers of modernity do not care about 
sustaining communities based on common values. The problem is rather that they, along with 
other thinkers, defend a social order based on certain values considered to be “good”, at the 
expense of other values, which are labeled “destructive, oppressive and evil” (op.cit.: 32). 
 
 
5.4.9 Equality and power 
In her analysis of Norwegian gender equality policies during the 1970s, entitled Moderskapets 
frigjørelse?,668 social scientist Brita Gulli introduces two notions of equality, the social-liberal 
emphasizing “equal treatment” and the feminist emphasizing “redistribution” (1992: 9). She 
defends the latter (op.cit.: 21).  
 
Social liberalism is the more “social” inheritor of liberalism (op.cit.: 11). The basic idea of 
liberalism is that all individuals have certain natural rights, “despite social differences and 
ties”, and previous to the establishment of political government (ibid.). These natural “civil 
rights”, consisting of the right to private property and the right to contract, were to be secured, 
liberals argued, by the establishment of a “political authority” based on “consent” (ibid.). 
“Thus classical liberalism contained important ideas of individual autonomy” and 
“democratic government”, Gulli notes (ibid.). Basically, however, liberalism should be 
understood as the articulation of legal preconditions for the development of the market 
economy:669 All were to be “treated equally” and “neutrally” as owners and contractors 
(ibid.). The aim was “equality in competition” (ibid.). That is, all men, not women, were equal 
in this sense. Women, without natural rights, were positioned by liberals in the private sphere 
under the rule of men, i.e. under “patriarchal authority” (op.cit.: 12).670 This has characterized, 
Gulli adds, the liberal tradition ever since. The state was not to intervene in private markets or 
in the private sphere of marriage and family. 
 
                                                 
668 The Emancipation of Motherhood. 
669 See 5.4.11. 
670 See 5.4.10. 
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Compared to liberalism, the more “equality-oriented” social liberalism puts more emphasis on 
giving individuals “equal opportunities, equal access to resources” (op.cit.: 13). The idea is 
that “equal legal rights” are a “necessary, but not sufficient” precondition for equality (ibid.). 
Also “substantial reforms aiming at equal opportunities” are needed (ibid.). Social liberals 
recognize that there are differences between groups in society, also between women and men, 
but they do not regard these differences as the result of differences in power. Hence, 
substantial reforms are introduced, as “an offer to individuals” of which they can “choose” to 
make use (op.cit.: 14). The point is to create “equal access to resources”, so that individuals 
can have “real equal opportunities” in order to “compete” among themselves (original 
emphasis, ibid.). However, this is not “necessarily” a prescription for “redistribution” (op.cit.: 
15). All are to be given equal opportunities up to a certain level – the base-line level that 
makes real their formal freedom to compete on equal terms – but this might still be 
compatible with significant “relative” inequalities between groups, for example between 
women and men (ibid.). Gulli mentions in this connection John Rawls’ difference principle 
distribution: Only those inequalities are acceptable that are “to the advantage of the worst-off” 
(op.cit.: 14). This principle does not preclude the possibility that such inequalities may be 
even more to the advantage of the better-off, she argues 
 
In line with “a more egalitarian tradition in political theory”, feminists have emphasized 
redistribution in order to reduce relative inequalities, and aimed at an “equality of outcome” 
(op.cit.: 15). Their point of departure is that there are inequalities in resources between 
women and men – and between other groups in society – as a result of systematic inequalities 
in power: Men have not only “more” power than women, they have also power “over” women 
(ibid.). Even if there are differences and power inequalities among women, women are not in 
the “same position” as men, and are positioned as men’s “subordinates”, due to the gendered 
organization of labor and the unpaid work of the household, and because of patriarchal 
relations that shape sexuality and biological reproduction (ibid.). Thus, men’s and women’s 
situations are considered to be fundamentally unequal.671 For men and women to be equal, 
redistribution of “money”, “work” and “power” is necessary, to secure equality of outcome 
(op.cit.: 17). Equality of outcome requires “differentiated treatment” of groups, not equal 
                                                 
671 Consider the discussion in 5.4.7 on general descriptions of women’s situation. 
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treatment, because groups are on an unequal footing from the outset (ibid.):672 “Equal 
treatment of women and men based on gender neutrality as a principle, irrespective of actual 
differences, will only reproduce inequalities”; the principle of gender neutrality is an 
expression of “patriarchal ideology”, and not a tool in the struggle against patriarchy (op.cit.: 
18). Very often there will be “conflicts of distribution” between groups, “a zero-sum game”: 
Whereas social liberals search for policies that will be “in the interest of all”, feminists 
recognize that policies most often serve the interests of one group to the disadvantage of 
another (op.cit.: 14, 17). Also, the ultimate feminist aim is not the social liberal in the sense 
that women and men are to become similar or even “the same” (op.cit.: 17). Women are to 
become “autonomous”; feminists struggle for women to “emancipate” themselves on their 
own terms (op.cit.: 16). And emancipation in this sense requires, Gulli argues, material 
redistribution in order to achieve equality of outcome, but also critique of cultural “barriers” 
that limit women’s participation in public life, and a dismissal of the public-private distinction 
defended by liberals and social liberals alike: Market relations, family life and personal 
relations are not private and non-political, but matters for public political debate and decision-
making.673 
 
There are several identifiable claims in this argument. I will deal with three of them in this 
paragraph:674 
 
i) Gulli associates liberal equality with a regime of equal treatment incompatible with the kind 
of differentiated treatment necessary for achieving, for example, equality between women and 
men: Women and men cannot be treated equally, since their position in society is unequal. 
Rather, they need to be treated differently in order to become equal. This is something liberals 
not at all, or only inadequately, allow for. Several contributors make similar remarks. Jane 
Elizabeth Wesenberg brings attention to this point, when she contrasts liberal rules of equal 
treatment with the goal of “actual equal treatment and equality between women and men” 
(1995: 19)  
 
                                                 
672 Consider 5.4.8 for the discussion on whether the individual or the group is the primary normative unit. Gulli 
seems to be somewhat ambivalent on this point. On the one hand, she defends an individualist principle of 
autonomy, on the other hand she defends equality of outcome between groups. 
673 See 5.4.10. 
674 Some are dealt with elsewhere. The argument that justice implies equality on group-level, not simply equality 
among individuals is discussed in 5.4.8. The argument that the liberal idea of equality prescribes normalizing 
ideas of sameness, and represses individual and cultural differences, is dealt with in 5.4.7. The relationship 
between feminism and critique of capitalism is explicitly addressed in 5.4.11. 
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[…] formal equality before the law gives no guarantees against discrimination in practice. It is 
not automatically the case that rules of equal treatment and equality materialize in actual 
equal treatment and equality between women and men, be it individually or collectively 
(ibid.).675  
 
Or, as Ann Therese Lotherington puts it: “We do not see the inequality, because all (abstract) 
individuals are to be regarded as equal and treated equally” (1999: 185).676  
 
A few stress, however, the moral significance of the equal treatment principle, i.e. to treat 
equal cases equally is, it is argued, fundamentally just. In a passage critical of feminist care 
ethics, Nina Raaum notes, for example: 
 
Last but not least; politics may perhaps be in need of more solidarity and cooperation, but that 
does not mean that ethical ideals of care are desirable in all connections. While appreciating 
equal treatment and the rule of law, this author at least would become frightened if too much 
care and informal networks were to rule out formal rules and hierarchies (original emphasis, 
1995: 37).677 
 
Others maintain that liberal equality cannot be reduced to a doctrine of equal treatment, and 
that this doctrine, interpreted in the wider context of liberal egalitarianism, is consistent with 
policies for differentiated treatment. Mari Teigen maintains, for example, that “individualism 
and not a principle of equal treatment […] is fundamental for the liberal position” as 
explicated by Ronald Dworkin, and that “individualism”, interpreted as “the right to be treated 
as equal to and with the same respect as others”, very often requires differentiated treatment 
such as affirmative action arrangements (2000: 72). Another example is law scholar Else 
Anette Grannes who in an analysis of the United Nations Womens’ Convention argues that 
“human rights norms” of treating everyone equally qua humans, i.e. as having “equal rights”, 
is compatible with “temporary special measures” for a particular group, such as women, and 
necessary to achieve “real equal status” for the members of this group (1995: 34, 35). 
 
ii) Gulli argues that liberals defend an indefensible norm of equal opportunities, which is 
compatible with huge relative inequalities in power and resources, and in conflict with 
granting everyone equality of outcome; trying to ensure that all members of society, in the 
                                                 
675 She refers to Tove Stang Dahl. In a work originally published before 1990, Stang Dahl puts it this way: “By 
subscribing to […]  positive discrimination of women to achieve real equality, many women come into conflict 
with the liberal ideology of equal treatment” (re-published in Stang Dahl 1994a: 30-31). 
676 See also for example Gaarder (1990), Gulbrandsen (1995), Moser (1998), Ellingsæter (1999b), Ellingsæter 
and Solheim (2002). 
677 For similar reflections see Holst (2002b). 
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end, get a more or less equal share of power and resources. This argument is very often the 
subtext of contributions influenced by Marxism or by radical-feminist theories of 
patriarchy,678 but few elaborate it as thoroughly as Gulli does. One who does so is, once more, 
Mari Teigen, who links her argument for certain policies of affirmative action to the 
Norwegian sociologist Gudmund Hernes’ notion of “equality of outcome”, a notion different 
from notions of “equal treatment” and “equal worth” defended by liberals (2003: 16, 17): 
 
Gudmund Hernes’ notion of equality of outcome comes close to an ideal of equal sharing. 
Equality of outcome is based on an idea of justice that dismisses socially determined 
distributions. The focus is more on […] implications than on […] procedures. Lack of gender 
balance becomes then an indicator of […] [in]justice, at the same time as gender balance 
becomes the aim of a just distribution. Justice is then not simply about counteracting 
discrimination, but about securing an equal distribution between women and men of attractive 
positions – of power, influence and status (op.cit.: 17). 
 
There are authors who, at least implicitly, question the validity of ideas of equality of outcome 
that focus more on “implications” than on “procedures” (ibid.), as they adopt their notion of 
equality from theorists, such as John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas.679 Several question, 
moreover, at least implicitly, that liberal equality is not concerned with outcome. Kirsten 
Ketcher argues, for example, that human rights thinking grants everyone an equal right to a 
set of “primary goods”;680 “that is, goods that are to secure each person a life in dignity and 
integrity with the possibility of self-development” (2001: 146): It grants everyone equality of 
outcome, of certain goods, on a certain level, as a condition for real equality of opportunity; 
for an equal “possibility of self-development” (ibid.).681 There are, however, no contributions 
that criticize in detail the notion of equality of outcome as prescribed for instance by Gulli and 
Teigen.682  
 
iii) Gulli argues that inequalities in power between women and men are so significant that to 
simply grant people “freedom of choice” as an “offer”, as liberals would do, is inadequate 
(1992a: 14) :683 The structural and cultural power of men will make women choose ways of 
life that cause them to remain in a subordinate position, instead of ways of life that would 
                                                 
678 Cf. Gullvåg Holter (1997), Pettersen (1999), Sørhaug (2002). 
679 Cf. Fjørtoft (2002), Halvorsen (2002). 
680 Ketcher refers to Martha Nussbaum and John Rawls. 
681 See also for example Bojer (2001), Bugge Tenden (2002), Skjeie (2004). 
682 I return to this point in Chapter 8, however. 
683 To grant them equal opportunities, to be used in whatever way they choose (compatible with others’ equal 
right to freedom of choice), i.e. the debate sketched in ii) is closely linked to the debate sketched here (in iii). 
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emancipate them. There are several contributors who argue that it is inadequate to subscribe 
to a norm of equal freedom of choice, at least under present conditions.684 The underlying idea 
seems to be, however, that there might be social and cultural conditions – not shaped by 
illegitimate power as contemporary societies are – under which a norm of equal freedom of 
choice would be defensible. But what, more specifically, these conditions are, is seldom made 
explicit, even if general prescriptions are made, based for example on Marxist perspectives685 
or on a poststructuralist critique of contemporary culture as patriarchal and heterosexist.686  
 
There are, however, counter-arguments articulated. Some authors argue that the thinking of 
modernity, generally speaking, does not prescribe a notion of equal freedom of choice under 
present conditions.687 Others stress why it is crucial, from a moral point of view and from the 
perspective of how we gain adequate knowledge, to take seriously people’s own points of 
view. This point is for instance highlighted in discussions on the value of qualitative 
methodology. Liv Emma Thorsen elaborates, for example, in a study of the cultural 
constructions of gender in everyday life, the need to achieve a “balance” between “solidarity 
with those interviewed”, the duty of researchers to retell their ideas about themselves “from 
within”, and “critical” distance from their “lifeworld” in qualitative “life course interviewing” 
(1993: 46, 47). Sociologist Tove Thagaard addresses directly and critically the idea that 
“women’s choices” in modern Norway do not also reflect what they “feel like” choosing: 
Women’s “motives” should not be considered as simple expressions of “male dominance” 
(1996: 29). Women might “fancy” being or be “more competent” than men when it comes to, 
for example, “looking after children”, and thus have “their identity [confirmed] by doing it” 
(op.cit.: 29, 30), even if such choices also contribute to “a reproduction of a relationship of 
dominance between man and woman” (op.cit.: 30). 
 
5.4.10 The public and the private 
 
Brita Gulli criticizes liberals for considering the private sphere of family life and intimate 
relations as a non-political sphere. Feminists, on the other hand, have criticized the public-
                                                 
684 See also Gaarder (1990), Benum (1992), Holter (1996), Ellingsæter (1999), Bolsø (2000), Haavind (1992, 
1994, 2000). 
685 Cf. Holter (1996), von der Lippe (1999), Ellingsæter and Solheim (2002). 
686 Cf. Eng and Markussen (2000), Mortensen (1999). 
687 This is how I read for example Skjeie and Teigen (2003) and Teigen (2004). 
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private distinction and struggled to make “issues that have traditionally been considered 
private” public and political (Gulli: 1992: 16). As noted by Kjersti Fjørtoft, feminists have 
generally tended to question the liberal distinction between the public and the private from 
two angles:  
 
Justice feminism focuses on how the public-private distinction has contributed to exclude the 
family and the intimate sphere from the institutions of society that are to be assessed from the 
point of view of justice (equality, freedom and community). Justice feminists claim that a just 
society presupposes that relations within what was previously conceived of as the private 
sphere also need to be regulated by just norms. Care feminism on the other hand focuses on 
how the public-private distinction has contributed to underestimate and trivialize what have 
typically been women’s moral experiences. These are experiences connected with care work, 
reproduction and activities in the household. What characterizes moral experiences of this 
kind is in fact that they are based on sentiments, empathy, trust and care. Care feminists claim 
that relations of care have significant moral qualities, and that these qualities need to be 
recognized […]  (original emphasis, 2002: 24-25).   
 
According to Fjørtoft, politicizing the private from a feminist point of view is about making 
oppressive (gender) relations in the private sphere a case for critical public scrutiny (‘justice 
feminism’) or about making private (female) virtues into public virtues (‘care feminism’). The 
critique of the public-private distinction put forward by the media scientist and cultural critic 
Wenche Mühleisen in the article “Feminisering, kjønn og sex i fjernsynsoffentligheten” 
(2000)688 can be interpreted as a particular mixture of justice and care arguments. 
 
Mühleisen argues that talk-shows on television, by including what has traditionally been 
coded as private, and thus as foreign to the public sphere, have contributed to “extending the 
notion of the public sphere” to “include essential aspects, topics and qualities” in ways that 
feminists should welcome (op.cit.: 19). This approach opposes the typical pessimistic stories 
of modern societies, such as the one told by Jürgen Habermas.689 Habermas associates the rise 
of the mass media with “decline”, according to Mühleisen (op.cit.: 4). He refers critically to 
developments where distinctions between “state and society, the public and the private” have 
become blurred, as “re-feudalization” (op.cit.: 24). What contributes to re-feudalization is “the 
inclusion of so-called private sphere topics” and “private stories” in public debate (ibid.): This 
is “a threat against the ideal tasks of the public”, in Habermas’ view (ibid.).  
 
                                                 
688 “Feminization, Gender and Sex in the Public Sphere of Television”. 
689 She refers to his Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Similar stories of decline are told, Mühleisen argues, by 
Richard Senneth and Pierre Bourdieu. 
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To be sure, television talk-shows introduce “so-called private topics” to the public, Mühleisen 
observes (ibid.). To introduce such topics is, however, not essentially illegitimate. On the 
contrary, it might be a good thing if “the tabloid gossip” of the talk-shows were to transform 
“private secrets about child abuse or sexual abuse” into “public issues” (op.cit.: 10). Without 
the relations that belong to the private sphere being made public, they cannot, in Fjørtoft’s 
terms, be assessed from the perspective of ‘justice feminism’. “Lesbians and homosexuals” 
and other sexual minorities, culturally “stigmatized” groups, “freaks”, “losers”, who are 
“coming out”, telling their “private stories”, “confessing”, admitting”, might “correct” the 
“prejudices” of “the audience”, prejudices which, without correction, might cause injustice 
(op.cit.: 11, 12). Moreover, influential feminist positions can also contribute to reproducing 
sexual-cultural prejudices, if left unchallenged: “Nordic feminism”, embracing “the nuclear 
family”, emphasizing the relations between femininity and “motherhood”, and between 
sexuality and “conventional heterosexuality”, needs to be reminded of the variety in sexual 
practices and ways of life (ibid.). Also, in Nordic feminism, sexuality is often conceptualized 
in terms of the problems it causes for women; “its negative implications” (op.cit.: 12). 
However, without a language to describe sexuality as pleasure, also for women, feminists may 
contribute to reproducing the “old-fashioned bourgeois patriarchal morality” limiting 
women’s sexual freedom instead of challenging it, Mühleisen argues (ibid.). Thus, from the 
point of view of justice, there is good reason for feminists to approach “the excessive sex-talk 
of the talk-show” from a somewhat less “politically correct” perspective (ibid.). 
 
Feminists to whom Fjørtoft refers as care feminists, want the public sphere to be influenced 
by sentiments; by affective qualities that characterize the female lifeworld. Mühleisen raises a 
similar concern, even if her focus is not on the feminine, ‘so-called private’ sphere as a sphere 
of care, but as a sphere of sexual, expressive bodies.690 Once more, we talk of a concern not 
allowed for within the strict public-private parameters of the modern imaginary, in 
Mühleisen’s view: Habermas conceptualizes public discourse as “rational critical discourse”; 
the public is the space of reason, the “affective” is a quality of the private sphere (op.cit.: 4, 
8). Making the public sphere more “intimate”, more influenced by the affective – more 
“feminine”, as critics often say, since they associate the affective with femininity (and the 
rational with masculinity) – is to facilitate the “decline” and “refeudalization” of the public 
sphere, would be Habermas’ point (op.cit.: 7). However, Mühleisen argues, he thereby 
                                                 
690 Consider also 5.4.13. 
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overlooks the importance of “emotionality” and “expressivity” in public deliberations (op.cit.: 
5). Habermas’ notion of the ideal public conceals the fact that we think and behave as citizens 
as – more or less rational – embodied, affective, expressive beings: “Habermas’ denial of 
desire, subjectivity and affectivity” makes his “theory of communication”, “his understanding 
of the subject” – and indeed his normative notion of what is suitable in public – mistaken 
(ibid.).  
 
It is common among the contributors, to target the distinction between private and public, 
whether explicitly and elaborately, or, as in most cases, briefly and without much discussion 
or modification. To question the private-public distinction is often identified as a “slogan” 
that unites feminists: “The personal is political” (Danielsen 2002: 93).691 Mühleisen’s way of 
framing her questioning, as I have elaborated it above, is typical in the sense that it often 
involves critique from the perspective of justice feminism as well as from the perspective of 
care feminism in one and the same contribution,692 even if the emphasis is mostly on one 
perspective rather than the other. There are many examples of critique of the private-public 
dichotomy associated with the modern imaginary expressing the concern for gender justice, in 
the material I have surveyed.693 One example is Kari Melby’s outline, in her article on the 
historiography of women’s history in Norway:  
 
On the one hand, many theses dealt with women’s organized activity: in unions, in the 
women’s rights movement and in other interest organizations. On the other hand, public 
debate on questions that concerned women in particular was analyzed: questions that 
concerned their position in working life, their rights as citizens, questions connected with 
women’s sexuality and reproduction, and education […]. To define such inquiry as political 
history challenges however established definitions of political practice. It implies a definition 
of the political as more than what happens inside the political apparatus of power and in party 
politics. It implies understanding interest-based and union-based activity as political, also 
when women were actors, and to understand public debate about fundamental questions 
concerning the organization of society as political, also when it concerned regulation of the 
gender relationship (1996: 191). 
 
Ann Therese Lotherington links her critique of the private-public divide, from a perspective 
of justice feminism, more explicitly to a criticism of liberal political philosophy: 
 
                                                 
691 See also Lie (1990), Taksdal (1992), Hagemann and Krogstad (1994), Widerberg (1994), Rogg (2001), 
Malterud (2002), Strand (2002), Lilleaas (2004), Paulson (2004). 
692 In the case of Mühleisen, there is more talk about ‘emotionality’ and ‘expressivity’ than ‘care’. The logic of 
her argument is, however, similar to the logic of those who question the private-public distinction from the 
perspective of care feminism. 
693 Consider for example Brita Gulli’s argument in 5.4.9 on this point. 
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The sharp distinction made by the classical contract theorists between the public and the 
private as well as their assessment of the private as politically irrelevant, has been on the 
feminist agenda for a long time. The struggle to make the private political; the slogan of 
second-wave feminism in the 1970’s, also aimed to make visible the oppression of women in 
the family sphere (1999: 186). 
  
Justice-based criticism of liberalism’ private-public dichotomy, occurs also in readings that 
are less dismissive of liberalism than Lotherington’s.694 Anne-Hilde Nagel stresses, for 
example, the relevance of the feminist liberalism of Mary Wollstonecraft because it departs 
from conventional liberal thinking on this point:  
 
She [Wollstonecraft] does not see the private as something lying outside the state, and calls 
for public regulation also in the private sphere. She does not, in other words, consider the 
right to privacy to be protected at any cost, but links rights also to family life at home, where 
wives should be protected by law against tyrannical husbands, and women should have the 
same right to dispose of their own property as men (1999: 139). 
 
A critique of the private-public distinction with emphasis on the care-feminist perspective, is 
developed by Irene Iversen in her analysis of Jürgen Habermas’ notion of the public sphere:695  
 
When one re-reads Habermas’ description of the preconditions for the development of the 
bourgeois public, it might seem as though he has forgotten one of his own premises: that the 
family […]is the ‘sphere for the intimate self-creation of humanity‘. What he develops is a 
notion of the human abstracted from traditional privileges, as well as an abstraction of the 
bourgeois male ideal. But the citizen could be found exactly where the citizen, according to 
Habermas, is taught and trained to become a reflecting and responsible individual, in the 
intimate sphere (original emphasis, 1999a: 7).  
 
Hence, there are, according to Iversen, values which have been silenced in the intimacy of the 
feminized private but which should be publicly recognized, because they are humanity’s 
preconditions. Ulla Schmidt argues along similar lines when she asserts that feminist care 
ethics, in the tradition of Carol Gilligan, should correct, if not replace, the liberal 
understanding of public justice (1999: 67).696  
 
In addition to reasoning of this kind, emphasizing justice or care, several contributors try 
showing their point; that personal stories may have public relevance, by telling stories from 
their private lives they consider to be relevant. One example are sociologsists Berit Brandth 
                                                 
694 Cf. Bugge Tenden (2000), Bojer (2001). 
695 Note the differences beween Iversen’s and Mühleisen’s critique of Habermas on this point, even if the logic 
of their argument is similar. Iversen’s argument can be connected with the line of reasoning elaborated in 5.4.12, 
Mühleisen’s concern is discussed more thoroughly in 5.4.13. 
696 For more examples see 5.4.12. 
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and Elin Kvande, who use their positive personal experiences of sharing responsibility for 
children with the children’s fathers, to argue in favor of particular state-initiated policies 
towards the family, and for “including a children’s and father’s perspective, in addition to the 
perspective of gender equality, on the care work of fathers” (2003: 13). Another example is 
Monica Rudberg’s (1996a, 1996b) use of personal experiences of being a woman, in her 
argument for a new feminist way of producing scientific knowledge.697 Several commentators 
elaborate their personal history, the intellectual history of women’s research and the feminist 
movement in Norway as being intimately intertwined.698 
 
It is hard to find any contributions that elaborately and without reservation defend the 
distinction between private and public that is strongly associated with the thinking of 
modernity.699 Several extend their criticism to include other intellectual traditions, however. 
Inadequate conceptions of the private-public distinction are a general problem, linked to the 
gendered, hierarchical dichotomies that have shaped Western culture and society. Within this 
scheme, everything which is associated with the masculine: reason, culture, spirit – the public 
and political – is rated above everything which is associated with the feminine, such as 
sentiments, nature, body – as well as the private and non-political.700 
 
A few argue, however, that the inadequate private-public distinction can be transformed from 
within the modern imaginary itself: Prevalent ideas of what is public and private, political and 
non-political, need to be transformed if they are to become consistent with the standards of 
morality defended by the thinkers of modernity in other connections. This immanent critique 
is most often raised from the perspective of justice feminism, for example when 
commentators criticize John Rawls’ approach to the family. Rawls is accused of writing as if 
the family should not be organized according to his principles of justice, even if he, in other 
passages, refers to the family as part of the “basic structure”, and thus as an institution to be 
included in “the class of institutions to be regulated by his principles of justice” (Fjørtoft 
2002: 29).701 The immanent critique is, however, also raised from the perspective of care. 
Iversen’s use of Habermas in the quotation above is one example: The values of the private 
                                                 
697 For an elaborated example see also the presentation of Karin Widerberg’s Kunnskapens kjønn in 5.4.5. 
698 Cf. Bjerrum Nielsen (1999), Lie (1999), Halsaa (1999), Solheim (1999), Aas (1999). 
699 Raaum (1995) is, however, one example. 
700 See L’orange Fürst (1998), Sampson (1999), Songe-Møller (1999c), Wiestad (1999). 
701 See also Bojer (2001), Bugge Tenden (2002) and Holst (2002c). 
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sphere should be recognized as public values, since they are preconditions for reasonable, 
responsible performance in the bourgeois public sphere.702 
 
Furthermore, there are contributors who stress the value of privacy,703 even if this emphasis is 
not necessarily linked to a rehabilitation of the thinking of modernity. An original elaboration 
of the significance of privacy for feminism, is Tordis Borchgrevink’s defense of women’s 
right to inhabit “the fearful empty place” beyond the dichotomies of man/woman, 
male/female (1995: 131). A similarly minded proposal is Karin Widerberg’s attempt to move 
beyond the gender dichotomy by revaluing the “abject”704 status given to those in our culture 
who do not find comfort in traditional femininity, or in being absorbed by phallogocentric 
logic (1990: 65). The right to privacy is also defended as a crucial civil right, by those who 
highlight the significance of modern individual rights, even if such defenses are seldom 
contrasted critically with the feminist slogan of making the personal political.705 Some, 
though few, emphasize the limits to law- and policy-making, for example social scientist Dag 
Leonardsen who argues for limiting the “interfering, paternalistic state”, and for focusing 
more on public deliberation and “action” in addressing “problem-definitions”, “conflicts 
between different ends” and “rationalities” (1990: 56, 61).706 Often when the limits of politics 
are recognized, they are, moreover, recognized with a subtext of regret, as when Anne Lise 
Ellingsæter and Jorun Solheim discuss the means of transforming the gendered power 
structures of work: 
 
The framework of interpretation and categories of the social world arising from political 
debate, […] shape what we regards as socially acceptable and desirable. In this way the 
regulative state is significant from the point of view of gender equality. The effects that 
formal regulations have when it comes to solving the problems identified, are, however, a 
different story. The relationship between political regulation and social practice is a topic that 
is increasingly debated, for example in feminist literature on the welfare state. […] regulations 
in politics of gender equality [are found] within the framework of the political power 
tradition, they address individual rights and the distribution of women and men within 
different institutions. […] we think such political measures will have limited effects when it 
comes to changing gender-segregated working life. This does not imply a critique of the 
measures in themselves, but is rather an attempt […] to raise a debate precisely about the 
limits of politics (original emphasis, 2002: 53) 
 
                                                 
702 See also Bjerrum Nielsen and Rudberg (1994: 52) and Holst (2002c: 134-135).  
703 See also my discussion of privacy in Chapter 9. 
704 Widerberg is inspired by the analysis of Julia Kristeva. 
705 An exception is Raaum (1995). 
706 See also Raaum (1995), Egeland (1999), Øvrelid (2000), Holst (2002a), Bugge Tenden (2002), Mortensen 
(2002). 
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Ellingsæter and Solheim’s concern here is not so much the normative limits of politics and 
government, but to discuss why political measures, regrettably, are bound to be inefficient in 
certain areas. Critique against attempts to mix scientific practice with a personal-political 
agenda in the feminist research field, is more often raised: The personal is not always 
scientifically relevant, it is argued.707  
 
5.4.11 Capitalism and patriarchy 
In his article “Kjønn og klasse i et formanalytisk perspektiv”708 the sociologist of work 
Øystein Gullvåg Holter introduces a sociological perspective based on Marx’ notion of 
“social form” (1991: 3). Gullvåg Holter’s aim is to compare “production of surplus value” and 
processes of “exploitation” in “the two main forms of capitalist patriarchy” in the twentieth-
century; “masculine” industrial capitalism, which accepts male dominance, and the 
“androgynous” capitalism of “the new information society” where gender equality makes the 
standard (op.cit.: 4, 18). Exploitation, which is the cause of “reifying and asymmetrical” 
working conditions and life processes, needs to be analyzed in the light of the “concrete 
development of the economy of commodity and different value forms shaped by this 
development” (op.cit.: 9, 17). In this connection Gullvåg Holter criticizes the “social 
categories” of “modernist” social analyses,709 because they are “essentialist” and introduced 
on a “formal abstract” level, disconnected from the “real abstract level”, the “real basis of the 
social form of which they [the social categories] are part” (op.cit.: 8, 9): 
 
Jon Elster, who regards Marx’ historical concept of exploitation as a subcategory of his own 
a-historical classification of distribution, […] takes the concept (the concept of exploitation, 
the concept of injustice etc.) considered as universal, i.e. from an utterly modern point of 
view, as the point of departure for his analysis. […]When [Anna G.] Jonasdottir710 explicates 
what exploitation of women might mean, she follows in Elster’s and ‘analytical marxism’s’ 
footsteps. She thinks ‘love power’ is the basis of women’s exploitation, but she is discussing 
this power in abstracto […] (original emphasis, op.cit.: 8) 
 
 
Gullvåg Holter defends a Marxist feminism that is not simply “analytical”; preoccupied with 
the “abstract” connections between concepts, as if there were concepts valid for every 
                                                 
707 See 5.4.5. 
708 “Gender and Class in a Form-Analytical Perspective”. 
709 The “analytical Marxism” of Jon Elster is Gullvåg Holter’s prime example (1991: 9). He considers analytical 
Marxism to be “an extreme variant of the bourgeois philosophy of Enlightenment” (ibid.). 
710 He refers to Anna G. Jonasdottir’s analysis of patriarchy and capitalism in Love, Power and Political 
Interests. 
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“historical form of society” (op.cit.: 9). His point of departure is Marxism as “qualitative 
social analysis”, as “value theory” and “commodity analysis”, focusing on “the connections 
between economic reification” and the “conceptual essentialism” of the “bourgeois 
philosophy of Enlightenment” (ibid.). Elster and Jonasdottir operate on the “fictive-universal” 
level of formal abstractions, he argues (op.cit.: 10).  
 
Within the framework of Gullvåg Holter’s Marxist feminism, these formal abstractions are 
analyzed rather as “symptoms of”711 real abstractions (ibid.). A different set of normative 
concepts is relied on in this analysis. The problem is no longer “distributive inequality” 
between “classes”, “races”, and “women and men”, as in “bourgeois” social analysis, but 
rather “reification”, “exploitation”, “alienation” and real “asymmetry” (op.cit.: 17). 
“Distributive inequality is a far to narrow a concept”; it does not capture the oppressive social 
implications of the patriarchal-capitalist hierarchy of value forms (ibid.). The thinking of 
modernity – also in the disguise of analytical Marxism – “reduces” the broader concept of 
exploitation to a concept of distributive injustice, replacing talk of “qualitative social change” 
with technocratic talk about quantitative change within the parameters of contemporary 
androgynous capitalism (op.cit.: 18). 
 
We are confronted again by an argument that contains several points of interest for further 
examination. I will consider three of them here.712 
 
i) Gullvåg Holter introduces the thinking of modernity as accepting the sufferings and 
injustices caused by the capitalist system. Many are convinced that this is the case; that 
accepting modern thought is accepting the norms of capitalism. There is, according to Hildur 
Ve, a close relationship between “the ideas within moral/political philosophy about 
autonomous persons who are capable of making their minds up and defending their opinions 
against pressure from others”, and “economic ideas about market freedom as a liberating 
force”; modern “individualization” as such on the one hand, capitalist “commodification and 
alienation” on the other (1999: 128, 142). Anne Hellum likewise positions the liberal 
conception of human rights and economic modernization theory within an undifferentiated 
                                                 
711 “[…] to put it in a rather simplified and Freudian way” (Gullvåg Holter 1991: 10). 
712 I deal with the relationship between individual and group in 5.4.8, the critique of the modern project as 
culturally repressive and normalizing in 5.4.7. The critique of instrumental rationality is dealt with in 5.4.12. An 
argument that has much in common with Gullvåg Holter’s argument introduced here, is Gulli’s argument, 
elaborated in 5.4.9. 
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cluster of normative ideas (1999: 45, 413-414). In a presentation of liberalism, Gro Hagemann 
introduces the liberal political heritage and the economic theory of Adam Smith as two facets 
of the same worldview (1997: 31). In her analysis of gendered metaphors and rhetoric in the 
history of philosophy, Berit von der Lippe (1999) sees the development of liberal democracy 
and the development of capitalism as two expressions of the same repressive cultural logic. 
Harriet Bjerrum Nielsen and Monica Rudberg exemplify the modern idea of individual 
autonomy as introduced in the works of Marshall Berman, with the visions of the good life as 
expressed by the former general manager of the Swedish firm Volvo, Per Gyllenhammer, in 
an interview with SAS flight magazine, Scanorama (1994: 39).  
 
Even among those who accept that a defense of political liberalism implies a defense of 
economic liberalism, there are several who recognize, however, at least in occasional 
passages, that “the ethics of rights” and “ideas about market freedom” can be distinguished 
(Ve 1999: 140, 142). In her presentation of liberal-feminist ideology where liberal views are 
generally linked to right-wing politics, Beatrice Halsaa is in the end somewhat ambivalent: 
 
There are significant differences between the notion of freedom as understood by the social 
liberals and the market liberals; the first are concerned with freedom meaning freedom from 
poverty etc., while the latter focus on freedom from public regulation (1996: 185). 
 
Kari Martinsen also turns, ultimately, to the vocabulary of rights and to Kantian formulations 
of “human dignity” and persons as “end[s] in […] [them]selves” in order to give the full 
picture of the proper normative basis of care work in the welfare state, even if in her overall 
argument she lets her critique of modern ideas and of capitalism run together (1999: 260).713 
 
ii) Gullvåg Holter regards the capitalist system as a morally flawed system: Capitalism is a 
way of organizing society that is hard or even impossible to combine with a concern for 
justice, decent values and the aim of women’s liberation. Many argue likewise, sometimes 
very explicitly, such as criminologist Kjersti Ericsson who explicates the development of “a 
                                                 
713 Her overall argument is, accordingly, that the concern for justice needs to be replaced by a concern for care. 
In the end, however, her concern seems to be rather that care must be added to justice, because justice by itself is 
insufficient: “[…] cannot law built on universally valid obligations about human dignity and where the body is 
never treated as a means, but as an end in itself, also lead to a development where research interests, academic 
prestige and economic thinking are given priority over the vulnerable body? Can obligations work as abstract 
ideas that do not give protection in actual situations? […] Because one does not see the other as someone that 
concerns me, if I let myself be ruled by the idea of human dignity or the idea of the right attitude to the body. A 
restrictive law for a good case is […] not enough in itself” (Martinsen 1999: 260). But even if such a law is not 
sufficient, Martinsen seems to presuppose that such a law is necessary. 
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social morality based on utility and efficiency”, “the separation of production and 
housework”, the link made between “man and the male” and “the public sphere”, and between 
“woman and the female” and “the private sphere” – and the oppression of women that is the 
outcome of these developments – as implications of “the development of capitalism” (1992: 
32, 33, 34). Women’s emancipation, moreover, presupposes “revolutionary” changes, 
Ericsson argues; a “fundamental” transformation of “the economy and organization of 
society” (op.cit.: 41). Critique of capitalism is, however, just as often a frame of reference that 
is taken for granted. Anne Hilde Nagel’s positive reception of the political philosophy of 
Mary Wollstonecraft is illustrative on this point. Nagel is careful to position Wollstonecraft 
not in “the Anglo-Saxon tradition”, stemming from Adam Smith and John Locke, which 
stressed the significance of “freedom”, “liberties of the market”, “private ownership” and 
“free trade”, but rather in “the French tradition” stressing “equality”, “democracy” and “social 
rights” (1999: 138, 139). Given the dominant negative assessment of capitalism, to 
disassociate Wollstonecraft from the ideas of economic liberalism is crucial, or she can hardly 
be considered to be a philosopher of feminist relevance, i.e. the disassociation is a 
precondition for giving a reception that is positive.  
 
The critics of capitalism stress different problems. Some concentrate on explicating the 
relationship between capitalist exploitation and unequal distribution of power, positions and 
income. One example is sociologist Gunn Elisabeth Birkelund who, on the basis of Erik Olin 
Wright’s neo-Marxist class analysis and John H. Goldthorpe’s neo-Weberian approach to 
inequality, discuss the interconnections between class, gender and “capitalist power”, 
“leadership power” and “expert power”, utilizing income statistics and job distribution data 
(2002: 175, 179, 181).714 Others follow Gullvåg Holter and stress the qualitative problems of 
capitalism as a specific socio-cultural form; the problems of commodification and alienation. 
Such problems are sometimes elaborately addressed and criticized,715 other times presumed 
by reference. Many refer for example, often briefly, to Carol Pateman’s radical critique of 
contractual relations in The Sexual Contract.716 
 
It is hard to find contributors who explicitly defend the capitalist organization of the economy. 
There are, however, many who subscribe to societal models that rely crucially on the 
                                                 
714 See also Wærness (1998a), Sørensen (1999). 
715 Cf. Gulli (1994), Heen (1995), Gullvåg Holter (1997), Pettersen (1999), Sørhaug (2002), Egeland (2004a). 
716 Cf. Halsaa (1992), Hagemann (1997), Hagemann and Åmark (1999), Lotherington (1999), Ellingsæter and 
Solheim (2002). 
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existence of markets and private ownership. Consider, for example, the commentators who 
argue in favor of a reformist welfare state.717 
 
iii) Gullvåg Holter wants to replace a feminism of the modern imaginary with a feminism that 
puts the critique of capitalism and patriarchy at its center; “liberal feminism” should be 
replaced with “Marxist feminism”, “socialist feminism” and “radical feminism”, to quote 
Beatrice Halsaa’s scheme of different feminist ideologies (1996b: 152-161, 166-173). Just as 
several contributors defend the relevance of Marxism for feminism,718 there are many who 
make use of radical feminist conceptions of patriarchy or related ideas of gendered power 
systems.719  
 
A few contributors note, however, that it is possible to criticize both capitalist power relations 
and patriarchal power, without subscribing to Marxist or radical feminist political programs 
and social analyses. Such arguments are typically linked to a dismissal of crucial aspects of 
such programs and analyses. Several authors criticize, for example, radical-feminist notions of 
patriarchy as a universal gender system: “The problem of such theories of patriarchy” are that 
they rest, ultimately, on a single core claim: that “there has never existed a single known 
society where women as a group have had ‘full’ power over men as a group”, as historian 
Kristin Natvig Aas points out (1993: 27): 
 
What [Gerda] Lerner720 forgets is that there has also never existed one single known society in 
which men have had ‘full’ power over women. Universal gender-based distributions of power 
hardly exist, and have, accordingly, no value as a basis for power theories. Power is and 
remains a notion with many facets. […] asking open questions about who has power over who 
in which situations, one is more likely to reach a better understanding of the power balance 
between the genders (op.cit.: 40).721 
 
And many at least assume that Marxist theory and politics are not something to which 
feminists should subscribe. Nina Raaum’s description of the feminist movements of the 1970s 
is illustrative:  
 
                                                 
717 Cf. Brækhus (1995, 2000, 2002), Haavet (1995), Leira (1996, 1998), Christensen (1997), Kitterød (1999), 
Petersen (2002). 
718 Consider the examples listed in ii). 
719 Consider the examples listed in 5.4.7. 
720 She refers to The American historian Gerda Lerner’s book The Creation of Patriarchy. 
721 For a critique of radical-feminist universalist notions of patriarchy, see also Fossestøl (2000), Haukanes 
(2001), Bjerrum Nielsen (2003), Lorentzen (2004). 
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The liberals that were in the periphery of theoretical discussions in women’s research at the 
time, argued that discriminating norms and institutions could be most effectively transformed 
through gender equality reforms, giving women the chance to pursue their rights on an equal 
footing with men. This […] strategy […] was criticized by the new women’s movement and 
women’s research that were inspired by a tradition more critical of society. The socialist-
feminists focused on the capitalist system and women’s relationship to production and 
reproduction, while the radical-feminists considered the hierarchical gender system of society 
(and state), that is patriarchy, as the key problem (1995: 26-27). 
 
Explicit and elaborated refutations of Marxism are, however, rare.722 Some contributors 
inspired by poststructuralist theory emphasize the problematic materialist bias in Marxist 
social analysis; its relative disregard for the problem of cultural recognition of marginalized 
groups. They do, however, not dismiss Marxist critique of capitalism as such, but rather a 
feminism that is based on Marxist materialism exclusively.723 Research into gender relations 
based on Marxist and radical-feminist assumptions are also accused of being politically 
prejudiced. Marxists and radical feminists tend, it is argued, to turn their theories of power 
into dogmas that they then maintain despite empirical change and variation.724 
 
5.4.12 Rationality, femininity and sentiments 
In social anthropologist Elisabeth L’orange Fürst’s Mat – et annet språk. Rasjonalitet, kropp 
og kvinnelighet (1995)725 the main ambition is “epistemological” and “foundational”; to read 
“food” as a “language” that tells us something about “rationality, identity and social 
distinctions”, in particular “femininity and masculinity”, and so about “work, reproduction 
and socialization” (1995: 12).  L’orange Fürst’s empirical material is texts and existing 
studies from different relevant disciplines: social anthropology, psychology, comparative 
literature and theology, in addition to fiction. In this material, she finds traces of a peculiar 
“form of rationality”, “an everyday rationality” connected with the female lifeworld (op.cit.: 
14). By rationality she means both “value orientation” and “action type”, i.e. “ways to relate 
to the world mentally, bodily and emotionally”(ibid.). Hence, her notion differs both from 
“the traditional philosophical” notion of rationality and from rationality as a “game 
theoretical” term (ibid.). The everyday rationality of the female lifeworld is, in short, a 
                                                 
722 See, however, how Helga Hernes links her elaboration of state feminism to a critique of Marxism (discussed 
in Chapter 6). 
723 Cf. Meyer (1999), Mortensen (2002), Gressgård (2003). 
724 Consider for example Nina C. Raaum and Eli Skogerbø’s criticism (1993) of Beatrice Halsaa, Bjarne 
Øvrelid’s criticism of Hanne Haavind (2000), Hanne Davidsen, Susanna M. Solli and Elisabeth Waaler’s (1996) 
criticism of Karin Widerberg and Gro Hagemann’s (2003) criticism of the Swedish historian Yvonne Hirdman’s 
analyses of what Hirdman refers to as the ‘genus system’ (see Chapter 6). 
725 Food – a Different Language. Rationality, Body and Femininity. 
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rationality of “ambiguity” (ibid.). Ways of valuing and acting in this setting are often 
“essentially ambiguous” – they are “amphibolic”,726 “non-voluntaristic”, “spontaneous” and 
“reflective”, “manifest” and “latent”, “intended” and “unintended” at the same time (op.cit.: 
16).  
 
In her conceptualization, L’orange Fürst relies on Marxist theory of knowledge,727 
phenomenological theory and psychoanalytical theory.728 The “action” she focuses on is 
“mothering”, considered as a form of “work”, exemplified by “making/serving food”, and on 
girls’ and young women’s socialization into “mothers”, the making of a feminine identity 
suited for a mother’s work (ibid.). What characterizes the work of mothers is its mediating 
character; it “mediates between nature and culture, body and language” (op.cit.: 17). 
Moreover, it is “relational” work, it requires “sensitivity towards the other and the other’s 
needs” (original emphasis, ibid.). It follows “a relational logic” of “other-orientation”; it 
implies “no unitary self-orientation” (original emphasis, ibid.). On this basis L’orange Fürst 
highlights the significance of ambivalent understandings, and of dismissing “paradigms” of 
“unitary” and “dualist” thinking that separate “body from soul, reason from emotions, and ego 
from alter” (ibid.). In this connection she discusses dialectical as well as poststructuralist 
approaches. Her project can thus be read, she says, “as a discussion of modern and 
postmodern positions”, where she relies on Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Dag Østerberg, Jacques 
Derrida, Helénè Cixous, and above all, Julia Kristeva (op.cit.: 17-18). 
 
In short, L’orange Fürst’s project, as she describes it in a later work, looking back on her 
earlier efforts, is to leave behind the “general theory of the human being, more or less 
explicitly understood as a strategic-rational actor that maximizes its own interests”, 
prominently defended in the rational-choice theory of Jon Elster,729 “[…] a certain kind of 
rationality that characterizes a certain kind of action, characteristic of the system of capitalist 
production of commodities”,730 and to develop “a totally different theoretical framework, […] 
when approaching what a human being is as well as […]  epistemology”, a framework that 
does not have “the connotations of maximization, ego-centeredness, strategic behavior, 
                                                 
726 She refers to the Norwegian sociologist and social philosopher Dag Østerberg’s Fortolkende sosiologi 
(Interpretative Sociology). 
727 See also 5.4.11. 
728 See also 5.4.14. 
729 See L’orange Fürst (2002: 35) for the reference to Jon Elster.  
730 See 5.4.11, and the critique of capitalism as social form. 
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exploitation etc., which characterize to a lesser degree, I still wish to maintain, women’s 
practices and ways of thinking, rather than men’s” (original emphasis, 2002: 27, 28).  
 
Several contributors present proposals of an alternative rationality similar to L’orange Fürst’s, 
even if all proposals are not equally elaborated and sophisticated.731 Generally speaking, the 
main ambition of these proposals is to replace or at least add to the instrumental rationality, 
egoism and narcissism of the modern imaginary with ideas of a different way of acting and 
thinking, modeled on ethically valuable practices in the everyday life of women. These 
feminine ways of acting and thinking are valuable because they enable us to be true to our 
sentiments and desires,732 and because they are ways of acting and thinking which are 
fundamentally oriented towards others; they are practices of care, responsibility, solidarity 
and altruism.  
 
There are numerous examples and variants of this argument. The rationality of “liberalism” is 
the rationality of treating other people and our environment simply as means to service our 
own selfish ends, “at the cost of standing together and solidarity”, Linda Rustad concludes her 
proposal for a new normative basis for feminist politics (1999: 94). Liberalism’s focus on 
what is “useful” (Hagemann 1997: 33), “the technical-instrumental understanding of life” of 
“liberalism” that disregards all other values than use value” (Martinsen 1997: 22), puts 
“individuals” and not “relations at the center, so that, in our movement towards others, we 
become obsessed with ourselves” (Martinsen 1997: 32).733 The rationality of the project of 
modernity is thus equated with the rationality of rational-choice theory, with rationality as a 
“game-theoretical term” (L’orange Fürst 1995: 14). It is linked, moreover, to the idea “that 
subject positions […] are taken exclusively to be an outcome of the rational calculation of a 
fully informed actor” (Flemmen 1999: 132), and thus to a naïve notion of introspective 
transparency: “[…] this peculiar form of masculinist, humanist self-deceit based on the idea 
that Human Beings’ intentions control everything in the world” (Asdal and Brenna 1998: 
                                                 
731 The theoretical richness of L’orange Fürst’s proposal is lost in my brief presentation here. 
732 Women are not only to be considered as “active participants” relating to “reasons”, they should also be 
recognized as “subjects” with “desires” (Bjerrum Nielsen and Rudberg 1994: 72,79,80). See also for example 
Widding Isaksen (1992, 2002), Andenæs (1995), Andersen (1996, 1997), Flemmen (1999), as well as the 
critique of the modern subject (in 5.4.4). 
733 For similar statements, see for example Oftedal Telhaug (1992), Widerberg (2001), Wærness (2004). 
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28).734 Finally, the rationality of modern thought allows for, it even inspires, egoism and 
narcissism. 
 
Such descriptions and contextualizations of modern rationality lay the ground for elaborations 
of how sensitivity to our sentiments, or alternative rationalities more sensitive to our 
sentiments, should add to or even replace modern rationality. Kari Martinsen (1997) argues, 
for example, for a rationality of care, linked to Carol Gilligan’s analysis of women’s different 
moral voice and to Sara Ruddick and Virginia Held’s ethics of motherly practice, as well as to 
the moral philosophy of K. E. Løgstrup and Emmanuel Levinas.735 Professor in science 
studies, Knut Holtan Sørensen, argues for the development of a women-friendly technology 
based on “care values”; a technology that is “influenced by care” and make us become more 
“caring” (1991: 224, 225). This is meant as a supplement to a technology of “masculine 
qualities”; based on men’s rationality, linked to the significance of values such as 
“objectivity”, “precision” and “distance”, and the emphasize on “distinguishing” sharply, for 
example, between what is claimed in an argument and who are claiming it (op.cit.: 216). 
Relying on feminist psychoanalytical and poststructuralist theory,736 Monica Rudberg 
contrasts the female approach to knowledge with the male; “the female epistemophilic 
project”737 or “research-passion” differs from the male (1996b: 301): 
 
The female epistemophilic project does not begin with a father’s categorical prohibition, and 
therefore it might never become as obsessive and monolithic as the male passion for 
knowledge – just like the girl’s solution of the oedipal conflict does not seem to be as total as 
the boy’s, but results in a sort of bisexual wavering between mother and father. The male 
metaphors of knowledge centering around penetrating gazes will perhaps never be really 
appropriated by her (op.cit.: 301-302) 
 
The female epistemophilic project “might be seen as […] more oral (is that why we love 
interviewing?) […], less tormenting than the male one. […] it is also less defensive and 
therefore with the possibilities of becoming less boring and more pleasurable” (op.cit.: 302-
303). The female approach to knowledge should not replace the male standard, but influence 
and temper it, because “the passionate monomania of Frankenstein”, of the male inquirer 
                                                 
734 This is a point often highlighted in contributions on psychoanalysis (see for example Engelsrud 1992, 
Solheim 1994, Bjørby 2001). 
735 See also Widerberg (1990), Berggren (1993), Rudberg (1996a, 1996b), Aslaksen (1996), Ve (1999), Wiestad 
(2002). Consider also the elaboration of Wencke Mühleisen’s argument in 5.4.10. 
736 Among those referred to are Judith Butler, Rosi Braidotti, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, in addition to 
Norwegian contributors, such as Toril Moi, Harriet Bjerrum Nielsen and Karin Widerberg. 
737 ”’Epistemophilia’ is originally a Freudian term, where the human urge to gain knowledge is associated with 
the child’s sexual curiosity” (Rudberg 1996b: 285). 
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“absorbed” in his research, leaves no room for concern for others (ibid.). The female inquirer 
knows that “she cannot leave her newborn and helpless child – and if she did, who would take 
care of Frankenstein?” (ibid.). Also the female other-oriented epistemophilic project must be 
tempered, however: A woman needs “to keep her passions at a manageable size, so that she 
will not vanish completely. […] her epistemophilic project is both about recreating the 
maternal relation as well as her breaking out of it” (ibid.). 
 
The idea of an alternative female rationality is, however, disputed. Some criticize the 
empirical foundation of this idea: “The care ethicists ignore […] that women are different: all 
do not live in marriage” or as “mothers” (Raaum 1995: 36-37). Hence, to maintain that 
women act and think in a different way from men is based on stereotypes and prejudices of 
both women738 and men.739 Other authors criticize not so much the idea that there can be 
found traces of an alternative idea of rationality more sensitive to our emotions in the human 
lifeworld, but rather the claim that they can be found in particular in women’s ways of acting 
and thinking: 
 
I contradict Carol Gilligan: I do not think is has been established that moral agency is 
(‘typically’, it must be added) one thing for a female agent and another for a male. In short, I 
defend a unitary notion of moral agency and moral performance, one neutral as to gender. 
Yet, for all its being unitary and disputing systematic gender difference, the notion advocated 
is not one-sided or otherwise narrow. Far from it, my notion of moral agency sees diversity as 
crucial […]. My focus, briefly put, is on the significance of the interplay between different 
faculties (such as emotional and cognitive ones) in each individual agent, again irrespective of 
gender (original emphasis, Vetlesen 1996: 100). 
 
Still others focus on what they regard as a moralistic and voluntaristic subtext of the critique 
of modern individualism, egoism and instrumentalism. This critique tends to replace subtle 
analysis of human interaction and social institutions with prejudiced assumption about the 
inner psychological states of the agents; of their ‘egoism’ or ‘altruism’, it is argued.740 
 
In addition to these discussions of the empirical and social-theoretical adequacy of the 
proposals for an alternative female rationality, there are also discussions on the standards of 
validity they prescribe. Some are critical of alternative criteria of scientific warrant and truth: 
Research, also feminist research, should be regulated by the rationality standards of modern 
                                                 
738 Cf. Steinfelt (1990), Borchgrevink (1995), Solheim (1998, 1999). 
739 Cf. Aarseth (1995), Fossestøl (2000), Slottemo (2000), Lorentzen (2004). 
740 Cf. Lundgren (2001), Loga (2002), Nicolaysen (2002). 
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thought.741 Other commentators stress the problems of feminist care-ethical proposals. They 
are critical because they consider such proposals to be based on stereotypic descriptions of 
women and men, and to reproduce the gender dichotomy,742 because they disagree with the 
care-feminist conception of what is ethically valuable,743 because they are critical of allowing 
moral norms to be influenced by particular values,744 or because they dismiss an emotivist 
approach to normative questions.745  
 
Moreover, there are contributors who are highly critical of the dominance of instrumental 
rationality in modern society, and of ideologies inspiring consumerism, privatism and egoism, 
from the perspective of modern thought. L’orange Fürst express in fact this view, even if 
ambivalently,746 when she points out the similarities between Jürgen Habermas’s notion of 
communicative rationality and her own proposal of an alternative rationality:  
 
Habermas is, as I read him, one of those who have worked with a theory of counter-
rationalities in relation to the technical-instrumental system-world, capitalist production if 
you want. The problem […] is the mechanism he [Habermas] regards as characterizing 
capitalism, namely […] a permanent expansion of the subsystems regulated by means- end 
rational[ity] […] (my emphasis, 2002: 28). 
 
Øystein Gullvåg Holter makes a parallel point. He criticizes idealized feminist descriptions of 
“women’s work [as] alternative work regulated by non-economic principles (emancipatory 
minimum in the mother-child relationship and so on)”, as the source of an alternative female 
other-oriented rationality (1995: 58). That is: He does not deny that alternative rationalities of 
this sort may regulate the activities of the female lifeworld. He criticizes, however, the 
process of  “repressive devaluation”; the process in which the sources of such rationalities, 
such as “the relationship between mother and child”, are placed “outside modernity […], 
made old, archaicized, […]”; are disconnected from the political economy of modern societies 
(original emphasis, op.cit.: 61). Counter-rationalities should be considered as the marginalized 
outcome of modernity, not as pre-modern or pre-social residues.747 Avoiding associating the 
rationality of modern thought exclusively with instrumental rationality, is also the aim of 
                                                 
741 Cf. Sørensen (1999), Bleie (2003a, 2003b). 
742 Critique of dichotomous, heterosexist approaches to gender is the core of the ‘queer theory’ subscribed to by 
several authors, see for example Eng and Markussen (2000), Mortensen, Bjørby, Lie, Brandser and Angvik 
(2001), Egeland (2004a, 2004b).  
743 Cf. Solheim (1998, 1999), Holst (2003). 
744 Cf. Bojer (2001), Bugge Tenden (2002). 
745 Cf. Serck-Hanssen (2000/2001). 
746 Her proposal of a counter-rationality is very different from Habermas’.  
747 Gullvåg Holter mentions L’orange Fürst’s proposal of a feminine rationality of the gift as an example of a 
“de-economiz[ed]” approach to what “in reality is part of how economy works” (1991, 1995: 61). 
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Harriet Bjerrum Nielsen and Monica Rudberg’s psychological analysis of modernity. Bjerrum 
Nielsen and Rudberg interpret the capacity for reflexivity as a capacity better developed 
among the women (than men) of modernity; it is one of “the civilizatory contribution of 
women” (1994: 53). They elaborate the rationality of modern subjects, referring to Thomas 
Ziehe. It is a rationality characterized by: 
 
[…] first, reflexivity, a permanent need to relate to oneself and evaluate oneself; secondly, 
[by] an enormous belief in the makeability of ourselves and our circumstances, which also 
results in tiring demands to find good reasons for what we do and don’t do; and thirdly, [by] 
individualization – the fact that we are not products of our heritage or social position (op.cit.: 
52). 
 
Enlightenment is thus not associated exclusively with the expansion of instrumental 
rationality, but rather with the expansion of “reflexivity”, “makeability” and 
“individualization” (ibid.). 
 
Finally, a few contributors seem in fact to accept the view that thinkers of modernity prescribe 
us to act instrumentally and self-interested, without highlighting it as a problem.  Kristin Dale 
positions, for example, economics as part of the tradition from Adam Smith, T.R. Malthus, 
David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, which “[…] focused on the market as an instrument of 
division of labor and increased economic welfare”, and based on the presupposition that “the 
most common basis of rationality for the individual [is] maximizing […] [its] own utility” 
(1992: 247).  
 
Theories based on rational-choice theory and utilitarian moral philosophy can be of use in 
attempts to conceptualize and address distributive gender injustice (op.cit.: 251). Dale 
mentions John Rawls as an example: 
 
The philosopher John Rawls (1971) has suggested the maximin-criteria, which imply that the 
regulating principle should be to maximize utility for the person worst off. If a woman is 
worst off, the criterion is that one should choose the best alternative for her (ibid.).748 
 
In a positive reception of the liberal philosophy of John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor, Anne 
Birgitte Rønning stresses how  
 
                                                 
748 To interpret Rawls’ philosophy as founded in rational-choice theory and utilitarianism is most often done by 
his critics, not by his defenders. 
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[…] reflections on freedom, where equality among human beings is a presupposition for 
individual freedom, and a utilitarian perspective where human happiness and social utility and 
development are inextricably interconnected (1999: 186).  
 
Like Dale, Rønning assumes that liberal and utilitarian ideas are interwoven, and may be put 
in the service of feminism.749 
 
5.4.13 The aesthetical transcending the modern  
In her article “Kantian Pleasure and Feminist Theory. Dialogue with an Androcentric 
Philosopher”, philosopher Else Wiestad discusses the feminist relevance of Kant’s “much 
debated book” Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, where he 
develops “Rousseau’s anthropological theory of a gender divided human nature […] into a 
moral and aesthetic theory of gender” (1996: 84). Kant’s point of departure is Rousseau’s; 
“that human’s must be understood as two clearly different gender prototypes, equipped with 
incompatible, but complementary abilities and qualities” (ibid.). In Beobachtungen 
 
[…] gender is tied to the fundamental aesthetic notions of the beautiful and the sublime […]. 
Sublime (and masculine) emotions move us when we regard something great, powerful or 
mighty, which is elevated above the level of ordinary life. Beautiful (and feminine) feelings 
are awakened by everything that gives pleasure and delight, is playful and effortless, stirs and 
enchant us (original emphasis, op.cit.: 84-85). 
 
This aesthetic theory – Kant’s association from the sublime to masculinity, from the beautiful 
to femininity – is linked to Kant’s view that “women’s intellectual and moral capabilities” are 
linked to “her capacity of feeling” and considered “best developed in aesthetics and through 
refined sentiments”, whereas the man is considered “a creature of formal reasoning” equipped 
for “mathematics and natural sciences”; “the feminine rationality […]  is beautiful” while the 
masculine rationality is “deep” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 85). Women, according to Kant, 
should not “exert herself intellectually, she ought not to try to extend the limits of her natural 
capacity”; she is “bound by nature’s intrinsic goals and limits” (ibid.). Women are moreover, 
he maintains, incapable of acting “from duty”; “from regard for a common ethical law”, even 
if they may act “in accordance with” duty – their acts may be “correct”, but not “morally 
good” (ibid.). They are capable of acting “ethically beautiful, from love and sympathetic 
                                                 
749 There is, moreover, much debate on feminist strategies; on how feminists may achieve their aims effectively, 
in the material I have surveyed (see 5.4.6).  
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benevolence”, but “these acts are not genuine moral since they do not arise from universal 
principles” (ibid.). 
 
Wiestad is struck by the similarities between contemporary feminist moral philosophy of 
“care and responsiveness to others”, as it has been developed by among others Carol Gilligan 
and Anette Baier, and “the Kantian ethics of feminine pleasure”; Kant’s idea that women’s 
moral judgments are based on “aesthetic taste and refined emotions”, that is, if her “beautiful 
nature” is properly “cultivated” (op.cit.: 86, 89).750 Whereas contemporary care feminism 
“clearly contradicts Kant’s masculine morality, which emphasizes general principles and an 
autonomous, rational moral agent”, it is “in reasonably good harmony with his feminine 
morality” as developed in Beobachtungen (original emphasis, op.cit.: 88). Thus, Wiestad 
asserts, “referring to Kant’s moral philosophy, we cannot today discuss him merely as a 
typical example of the justice tradition” (op.cit.: 91). As far as women are concerned, Kant is 
“a philosopher of pleasure” who stresses the significance of “emotions of a delicate kind, 
developed into a refined aesthetic taste and capability of judgment” (op.cit.: 93). Wiestad 
envisages the need for both “feminine” care and “masculine” justice in contemporary 
societies: “[…] mankind in total is dependent on and must preserve many constructive 
traditional feminine and masculine values” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 96). Whether we “may 
utilize” both, “alternately or together, or whether we want to mutually modify, harmonise, and 
create a future gender transcending norm- and valuestructure” (ibid.).  
 
Hence, Wiestad argues that we should let aesthetic judgment influence our moral assessments: 
This female approach to morality should add to the male approach. Several contributors stress 
the significance of making aesthetics relevant in deliberations on what is good and right, and 
links, in different ways, the capacity to tie aesthetic reflections to such deliberations, to 
femininity.751 The feminine stress on the aesthetical is also used critically in attempts to 
reconstruct scientific practices and standards.752 Inspired by among others Roland Barthes and 
Helénè Cixous, the cultural theorist Sissel Lie “imagines a kind of scientific discourse” where 
“science is not reduced to fiction or poetry”, but where the author “[…] takes personal 
responsibility for her text, […][and] express herself in language, because science is language” 
(1990: 7, 11). “Scientific discourse” should be “overflowed” with a “discourse of freedom” 
                                                 
750 Wiestad refers to Baier’s elaboration of David Hume as “women’s moral theorist” (1996: 96). 
751 Cf. Svrljuga (1990), Kolbjørnsen (1994), Lie (1996, 2001), Bjørsnøs (1998), Meyer (1999), Langås (2002), 
Findal (2002),. See also the explication of Mühleisen argument against the public-private divide (5.4.10). 
752 See 5.4.5. 
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where scientists, “play with words”, “associate”, make “language games”, “use the poetic 
qualities of language to gain new knowledge”, “emancipate [their] creativity” to “make the 
world as [they] want it to be” (ibid.).  
 
Nordist and literary scholar Paal Bjørby, inspired by among others Michel Foucault’s 
“aesthetics of the self” and Judith Butler’s performative notion of gender, talks of a radical 
aesthetic intervention, not from a perspective of femininity, but from a queer perspective, that 
challenges both “epistemologically and politically”; that destabilize “the power/knowledge 
regime governing the constitution of self and society” generally (2001: 326, 337). “Those who 
refer to themselves as queer seek to avoid the discipline and normalizing power of the cultural 
categories of gender and sexuality”, so central to “the construction of individual identity, truth 
and knowledge” in our society, and they do so inspired by “the fractious, the disruptive, the 
irritable, the impatient, the unapologetic, the bitchy, the camp” (2001: 325-326, 344).753 
 
Not all link their argument for the significance of aesthetics to a critique of the modern 
imaginary, however. In a literary analysis of the novels of the Swedish author Moa Martinson, 
literary scholar Anne Heith concludes that analyses of Martinson’s novels anchored in 
“different perspectives grounded in different aesthetical ideals […] reach opposite 
conclusions” (1993: 7). She turns this conclusion into a general critique of established 
scientific standards which do not take into account how aesthetic judgment may influence 
what we regard as scientifically warranted. This critique overlaps, in her view, with Herbert 
Marcuse’s and Jürgen Habermas’ criticism of positivist ideas of science: “The ideological 
turn of the 1960s with the relativization of science as implication, can be seen as the point of 
departure for this look at the writings of Moa Martinson. In particular Jürgen Habermas’ 
works play here a central role […]” (op.cit.: 57).   
 
Some commentators are, moreover, skeptical of the whole idea of bringing aesthetics into 
politics and moral deliberations. Beatrice Halsaa (1998) questions the value of aesthetic 
theory for practical politics as well as for thinking about politics, worried that an increased 
focus on such theory may depoliticize the feminist research field.754 In her defense of 
established standards of good science from the attack of feminist postmodern and standpoint 
                                                 
753 Bjørby paraphrase and quote here David Halperin and Carol Dinshaw, editors of the journal GLQ (Gay, 
Lesbian, Queer). For similar arguments from a queer-perspective, see for example Solli (1999), Mortensen 
(2001), Svare (2001), Egeland (2004a, 2004b). 
754 See also Wærness (1993), Eeg-Henriksen (1998), Sümer (1998), Sørensen (1999), Skotnes (2004). 
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epistemologists, Tone Bleie (2003a) criticizes, moreover, both the experimental form of 
certain feminist epistemologists, and feminists’ attempt to transform standards of scientific 
warrant on the basis of misconceived ideas about the interconnections between aesthetics, 
politics and inquiry.  
 
5.4.14 Below the surface – phenomenology, existentialism, ontology 
Hva er en kvinne? Kjønn og kropp i feministisk teori (1998) 755 is the title of an essay by the 
literary theorist Toril Moi. In one of the chapters, Moi interprets Simone de Beauvoir’s 
statement in The Second Sex that “the body is a situation” in the light of “the 
phenomenological philosophy” of  Merleau-Ponty that inspired Beauvoir: When Beauvoir 
says that a woman’s body is her “situation”, she means to say that a woman has a peculiar 
“phenomenological experience” of her body that influences all her other experiences, as well 
as her “projects”; “the way she spends her freedom” (op.cit.: 91, 99).  
 
This approach to the body differs from the approach of “biological determinism”: Beauvoir 
“insists”, Moi argues, “that a woman can never be reduced to a female animal” (op.cit.: 92, 
93).756 It follows, moreover, from Beauvoir’s “existentialist view on what human beings are”: 
“[…] as human beings (in contrast to animals) women are always about to make themselves 
into what they are” (op.cit.: 94-95). They are “existence” before they are “essence” (ibid.). 
Beauvoir’s existentialism is, however, embedded in a phenomenological philosophy of human 
beings’, of women’s as well as men’s, fundamental embodiment. Human “transcendence” and 
“freedom” are always embodied: “[T]he body is a fundamental situation”, it is “the basis of 
my experience of myself and of the world” (op.cit.: 95).  
 
Women are thus embodied ‘existence’. However, they are embodied, phenomenologically 
speaking, before they are biological bodies with “object-like features” (op.cit.: 96). To say 
that the body is not a “thing” but a “situation” is to say that “the body-in-the world that we are 
[…] is an embodied, intentional relationship to the world” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 101).757 
Thus, “scientism, positivism, empiricism and other so-called ‘objectivist’ views on the world” 
                                                 
755 What is a Woman? Gender and Body in Feminist Theory. 
756 Moi takes part in a debate among feminist theorists on how to interpret Beauvoir’s works. Some feminists 
have interpreted Beauvoir as having “an essentialist view on biology” (Moi 1998: 92). Others have interpreted 
her as a vulgar “social constructivist” (op.cit.: 101). Moi considers both interpretations to be misconceived. 
757 Moi refers to the Finish feminist philosopher Sara Heinämaa. See for example Heinämaa (1996, 2000/2001). 
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should be dismissed; “the methodology of the natural sciences” cannot offer “a valid 
philosophy of human existence” (op.cit.: 96, 98). There are “innumerable ways” to live as a 
woman – to be a woman is compatible with so many “different projects” – and the basis of 
these projects is always a woman’s “specific bodily potential” (op.cit.: 99). 
 
To deny biological determinism is, however, not to deny that “biological facts” are an 
“element” in women’s embodied “situation”, Moi emphasizes (op.cit.: 94).758 Thus, on the 
one hand, Beauvoir’s approach to the body differs from the view that the body is simply a 
“social construction” (op.cit.: 101). On the other, Beauvoir maintains that the body cannot 
escape the social “faciticity” that surrounds it (op.cit.: 99). The body is always “historically 
situated, always part of an interaction between ideologies and other kinds of social practice” 
(op.cit.: 91-92). Hence, the phenomenological context of a woman’s project; her situation, her 
fundamental embodiment, should be considered as being influenced by her biological 
constitution, as well as by social power and practices. Beavouir’s original and crucial addition 
is, however, Moi maintains, that objectivistic descriptions of a woman’s biological features 
and social characteristics will never fully capture her phenomenological experience of being a 
woman, or completely define her projects; the basis of Beavouir’s feminism is “a non-
normative view on what a woman is” (op.cit.: 111). 
 
I wish to focus on the general idea that Toril Moi introduces in this section of her essay: That 
there is a set of descriptions; descriptions of the human situation or of women’s situations as 
phenomenological or existential situations, that cannot be warranted exclusively through 
empirical investigation, for example in science (this would be ‘scientism’), or assessed from a 
normative point of view; they are “non-normative” (ibid.). Other authors reflect along similar 
lines. Some are, like Moi, particularly interested in capturing ‘what a woman is’ in 
existentialist or phenomenological terms.759 Other commentators focus on the facets of the 
human situation in general. In an attempt to avoid the charge of biologistic and psychologistic 
essentialism, Harriet Bjerrum Nielsen and Monica Rudberg tie, for example, human identity 
to certain common human capabilities and existential experiences: 
 
Even though culturally and historically there seem to be variations in the degree to which this 
“me” is connected with an experience of being unique and irreplaceable, and in how it is 
experienced as separated or connected with others, we believe that the experience of being 
                                                 
758 The latter is a quote from The Second Sex (1949). 
759 Cf. Hamm (2001), Hainämaa (2000/2001), Owesen (2000/2001), Songe-Møller (2000/2001), Rekdal (2002). 
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somebody and of having thoughts and emotions should be considered as a common human 
feature, in the same way as, for example, the capability of making symbols (1994: 69). 
 
Descriptions of this kind, whether of women or of human beings, are, moreover, also referred 
to in other terms; they are referred to as descriptions of ontology and subject constitution as 
conceptualized in psychoanalysis,760 they are introduced as attempts to capture tacit 
dimensions of knowledge and practices,761 they are regarded as descriptions on an 
anthropological level,762 or of human embodiment.763  
 
Generally speaking, the analyses of the human situation and women’s situation inspired by 
existentialism and phenomenology, are presented as targeting, often radically, the modern 
imaginary.764 Several critics attempt, however, to make their interventions compatible with 
the moral core of modernity. This is, for example, how I interpret philosopher Kjell Roger 
Soleim’s dissertation (1994).765 On the one hand, he argues that “sexual difference” has a 
deep-seated ontological or existential dimension linked to the psychoanalytical constitution of 
subjectivity (1994: 7), a dimension often overlooked in feminist politics. On the other hand, 
Soleim insists that we should think the ontology of sexual difference through while at the 
same time recognizing the significance of “women’s struggle for equality […] in the feminist 
tradition of Simone de Beauvoir” (op.cit: 5, 10), a tradition which considers “[…] women’s 
emancipation as a continuation of the rationalist project” (op.cit.: 5): 
 
[…] my whole dissertation [is] influenced by a more or less indirect dismissal of the 
postmodern deconstruction of the Cartesian subject: I wish to show how [Jacques] Lacan 
instead of wiping out this subject, draws new aspects of its constituting conditions into the 
daylight (op.cit: 16). 
 
“[…] a total denial of cogito will be self-defeating” (op.cit.: 9), Soleim sums up. The 
challenge is rather to elaborate “the existential dimension of sexual differences” (op.cit.: 34) 
without making “the Occidental ‘metaphysical’ logos the main enemy” (op.cit.: 11).766 Toril 
                                                 
760 Cf. Soleim (1994, 1996, 1999), Andersen (1996, 1997), Bolsø (2002), Mortensen (2003). 
761 See for example Skramstad (1999). 
762 See for example Stamnes (2000). 
763 Cf. Engelsrud (1992), Langås (1996), Hellesund (2002), Granaas (2004), Paulson (2004). 
764 Consider again the explication of Ellen Mortensen’s argument in 5.4.1. Consider also how Vigdis Songe-
Møller (1990a, 1990b, 1999a, 1999b) positions her philosophical analysis of the characteristics and potentials of 
feminine thinking. 
765 See also for example Øverland (1996, 2002), Iversen and Rønning (1996b) 
766 “I wish in this dissertation to clarify the question about the theoretical status of the Cartesian subject of 
science by comparing it to Jacques Lacan’s theory about the unconscious subject. The point of departure here 
will be Lacan’s identification of the (sexual) subject of psychoanalysis, with the (non-sexual) subject of science. 
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Moi’s analyses of ‘what a woman is’ are in fact also significant in this connection. One of 
Moi’s main ambitions is to challenge the sex-gender dichotomy of conventional feminist 
theory without ending up with a disembodied conception of performative gender.767 It is as 
part of this project Moi makes Simone de Beauvoir her ally, because Beauvoir’s 
phenomenological-existential notion of ‘the body as situation’ may be conceived as a 
mediating notion between sex and gender. This stress on fundamental embodiment does not, 
however, imply that Enlightenment ideals of equality and freedom are dismissed. In her 
introductory essay to The Second Sex (in Norwegian translation), Moi highlights rather the 
intimate connection between liberal rights and “concrete liberties” on the one hand, and 
Beauvoir’s feminist vision of existential freedom for all, on the other (2000: xviii-xix). 
 
Other contributors are skeptical of the existentialist approach of Moi and Beauvoir, because 
they believe descriptions of women’s situation and the human situation need, as other 
descriptions, to be empirically warranted. Tone Bleie relies on natural-scientific studies of 
human evolution and cognition, when spelling out what she describes as “a common human 
nature”: “[…] all human mental and social activity have a biological and chemical template”; 
this has already been “solid[ly] empirical[ly] verif[ied] […]”, according to Bleie (2003b: 
187). Yet other contributors question the claim that the existential situation of women, or of 
men, is “non-normative” (Moi 1999: 111). In her dissertation, Normativity and Reality. A 
Study of the Ethical Demand in Human Life-Reality, Ulla Schmidt asks how “a normative 
claim purporting to regulate my conduct morally, could be justified” (1998: 1). As an answer 
to this question, Schmidt explicates what she considers to be an ethical demand within human 
life-reality. She argues that this ‘reality’; the “structures that are characteristic of human 
existence in the world” imply a standard of what we ought to do (1998: 5): Human life-reality 
is, in this sense, not ‘non-normative’. 
                                                                                                                                                        
The paradox suggested here linked to Lacan’s theory of the subject, I mean to trace back to Descartes’ method of 
investigation and the split between subject and object attached to it. I intend among other things, on the basis of 
Lacan’s theory of sexual difference, to try and show that this is a real paradox (for all beings with language) and 
not simply an expression of male-friendly dualism” (Soleim 1994: 14). 
767 Her main target in this connection is Judith Butler. For less critical readings of Butler’s approach to gender, 
see for example Egeland (2001) and Hellesund (2002). 
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Finally, some are skeptical of all kinds of descriptions of a common human nature, on 
whatever level, because they consider such descriptions to be a deeply problematic 
‘essentialist’ expression of deep-seated Western metaphysics.768  
 
5.4.15 Modernity, nature and culture 
In her article “Inn/vendinger mot naturen – omskapende politikker”769 the historian and 
science studies scholar Kristin Asdal explores how to study nature, given the insights of “the 
critique of positivism”; that knowledge cannot be “value-free and neutral”, and that research 
“objects” are always also “co-subjects” (1998: 149). But whereas the critics of positivism, 
such as Hans Skjervheim, considered this as insights relevant for the human and social 
sciences exclusively; when studying “human relationships”, Asdal argues that such insights 
should be considered relevant in studies of “nature, animals and things” (op.cit.: 149, 150). In 
this endeavor she relies on the work of Donna Haraway770 who attempts to find new ways to 
engage with “the inappropriate” or “strange other(s)”, such as “different forms of nature” 
(op.cit.: 150): The crux of “her ambitious political and epistemological project” is to 
challenge the “humanism” that allows human beings to put themselves “at the center”, with 
exceptional powers of “agency” – a challenge we need to take on are we to make “the 
political practice we call science […] a better and friendlier activity” (ibid.).  
 
The attraction of Haraway’s approach is that it, according to Asdal, avoids the dangers of, on 
the one hand, naïve “ecological” perspectives which aim at saving the untouched, “innocent” 
nature from “civilization”, “instrumental reason” and “the mechanical world-view”,771 on the 
other, naïve defenses of “culture”, of what “humans have created”, of “Western rationality, 
enlightenment and progress”, which dismiss ecological perspectives as “ideological” and 
”primitive”, as “a threat” to “civilization”772 (op.cit.: 153, 154, 155). Haraway dismiss both 
“the distance” to nature of the latter, as well as ecologism’s “nature romanticism and 
nostalgia” (op.cit.: 156). There is no such things as innocent “pure nature”: “In what we have 
historically referred to as nature, there is power and science, dreams and love, racist and sexist 
                                                 
768 See for example Gaarder (1990) and Gressgård (2003). See also 5.4.4 and 5.4.7. Contributors such as Moi 
(1999) and Mortensen (2002) would probably share this concern, however, but insist that their existential (or 
ontological) reflections are culturally embededded. 
769 “Turning to/against nature – transformative politics”. 
770 In particular Haraway’s article “The Promises of Monsters. A Regenerative Politics of Inappropriate/d 
Others”. 
771 Asdal’s example is the works of Donald Worster. 
772 Asdal’s example is Anna Bramwell’s critical analysis in Ecology in the 20th Century. 
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values” (op.cit.: 156, 157). “Nature” is “a result of our constructions, and it is part of our 
stories in different ways” (op.cit.: 157). But there is also no such things as “neutral”, 
“innocent scientific culture”: “The possibility of Western science to see everything from 
nowhere, is an illusion” (ibid.). There is no way to grasp “Reality from a space empty of 
culture. Science is a cultural practice”; it is “constructed”, “created and produced” (ibid.). 
This does not mean that science is simply “ideological”; nature’s “organisms” are “real 
constructions” produced in “discursive processes” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 158).  
 
The crucial question then, is who are legitimate participants in these processes: Who should 
“be given authority” to talk on behalf of “Nature” in “Science” (op.cit.: 162)? Not only human 
beings, is Asdal’s answer, echoing Haraway’s “posthumanism” or “antihumanism” (op.cit.: 
164). “Subjects and things”, “machines, non-machines, non-humans”773 and humans should 
“unite” building “the produced collective we call nature”774 (op.cit.: 164, 165). This approach 
will also take care of including humans often considered to be too “close” to nature to take 
part in “passionless”, “distanced”,  “civilized” science; “the pregnant woman, the natives of a 
threatened rain forest” (op.cit.: 163). This concern is also a feminist concern, Asdal argues: 
Women have often been regarded as “closer to nature” or as “more nature, than men”; as “the 
other, passive nature, the object” (op.cit.: 170). Sometimes idealized as “Mother Nature”, 
other times “reduced” to “biology” – but almost never included on equal footing in the 
processes in which “Nature” is produced (ibid.). Asdal’s claim is that women need to be 
included – along with other marginalized humans and non-humans – if we are to produce 
knowledge that is “friendlier” and “more solidaric”, and “life forms” that are more “just” 
(op.cit.: 162, 166). 
 
Asdal raises several claims familiar from discussions in previous paragraphs.775 In this 
paragraph I wish to focus on her main claim: that feminism as well as science generally needs 
to approach nature differently, and different from what is allowed for within the parameters of 
modernity.776 The philosopher Hilde Bondevik raises a similar concern in her reading of the 
                                                 
773 Haraway criticizes Bruno Latour for including only humans and machines in the process producing nature. 
774 This does not imply that other beings should be given the status of human beings. Animals, for example, are 
not “human beings of less value […]; they are other worlds” – they should not be “demystified”, and “cut down 
to our size” (Asdal 1998: 165). 
775 Consider for example the critique of the modern subject (5.4.4), the discussion on feminism and epistemology 
(5.4.5), the discussion of the relationship between individualism and collectivism (5.4.8), as well as the 
discussion of an alternative rationality (5.4.12). 
776 Asdal refers to Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway who are both critics of modern thought. See also for 
example Elstad (1993), Malterud (1996, 1997, 2002), Greve (1999). 
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seventeenth-century thinker Anne Conway. Conway criticized the dualisms of Descartes and 
the mechanical materialism of Hobbes, and introduced a “monist” and “vitalist” alternative 
(1999: 103). This alternative has inspired present-day feminist theorists such as Carolyn 
Merchant, author of the influential book The Death of Nature. Women, Ecology and the 
Scientific Revolution, Bondevik notes. Searching for alternatives to “the mechanistic approach 
to nature and the Western approach to science generally“ Merchant returns to the philosophy 
of the seventeenth-century to find “the roots to the present crisis”, where “the vitalists’ and 
Conway’s more organic approach to nature, and approach that takes as its point of departure 
the living nature, not the dead nature” catches her attention (op.cit.: 107). According to 
Merchant, this approach “points forward towards our times” (op.cit.: 107-108), it may 
contribute to “an ecological alternative”, and make it possible to escape the “global crisis” 
(op.cit.: 107, 108). Merchant’s reading of Conway is illuminating, according to Bondevik. 
She stresses, however, that Conway’s ideas should not be labeled as “specifically female”, 
even if they have inspired contemporary feminists (op.cit.: 107). Such labeling would end in 
“essentialism” with regard to “masculinity” and “femininity”, something she “does not wish 
to encourage” (ibid.). Also on this point, Merchant’s reflections may guide us, however: 
 
Merchant discusses […] the problem of focusing on something feminine and on nature. 
Historically, women have precisely been associated with nature, […] in opposition to man, 
rationality, culture and science. […] both women and nature [are] devalued in our culture 
[however] […]. And the hope of a more just world, and a world that is in better balance 
ecologically, can be found, according to Merchant, precisely in a changed attitude to nature as 
well as to women (op.cit.: 108) 
 
Hence, there are clear similarities between Asdal’s and Bondevik’s proposals of an alternative 
approach to nature. They criticize attempts to make a sharp distinction between a dead, pre-
social nature and the living, social culture, and link the oppression to women, associated 
culturally with nature, to the oppression of nature justified by Western humanism. Both are, 
moreover, reluctant to connect their critique to an idea of an alternative female way of 
ecological thinking. Other contributors make such connections, based on empirical studies of 
women’s and men’s different relationship to nature. Siri Gerrard and Halldis Valestrand sum 
up the conclusions of studies of women’s everyday life in the rural parts of the northern 
region of Norway: “[…] it was women in particular who managed the natural resources”, and 
they did it “in a way that was compatible with or had a potential in relation to sustainable 
development”, and in a way different from men (1999: 64). To conceptualize and value this 
female approach might have far-reaching implications, according to Gerrard and 
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Valestrand:777 It makes visible how “knowledge production” is a “political process”, and 
could change “the notion of knowledge” in itself (op.cit.: 70, 73). 
 
A set of contributors question, however, more or less explicitly, the attempts of feminists to 
replace the approaches to nature and a natural science of the modern imaginary with different 
alternatives. There is, for example, a certain opposition against feminist attempts to transform 
epistemology and methodology (see 5.4.5). There are contributors who are sceptical of 
attempts to replace the modern humanist notion of the subject with other notions (see 5.4.4). 
And,  there are critics that are, for different reasons, sceptical of attempts to link the struggle 
for women’s emancipation to ideas of an alternative female way of thinking, more caring, 
more responsible, more emotional, more solidaric – and more ecological. (see for example 
5.4.8, 5.4.11, 5.4.12 and 5.4.13).778 
 
 
5.5 The modern imaginary challenged 
 
5.5.1 A summary 
These fifteen arguments all touch upon meta-questions; they raise critique, in one way or 
another, against some of the fundamental presuppositions, distinctions and standards of the 
project of modernity. I will try to sum up what is claimed, and highlight how, more precisely, 
the modern imaginary is challenged.779 
 
i) The conservatism of modern thought 
The argument that the thinking of modernity is too conservative, or is, at least, ill equipped to 
facilitate the kind of changes feminists would need to favor, has many variations. It is difficult 
to say anything general about how far and in what sense the argument implies a reconstruction 
of modernity’s standards of critique. Moreover, what characterizes much of the change-talk in 
the material I have surveyed is, indeed, that it is undifferentiated: It is not always clear what 
kind of changes the different contributors would defend. There are, however, many more or 
                                                 
777 For similar reflections see Nordal (1993, 1996, 1997), Munk-Madsen (1995), Skjønsberg (1996a, 1996b), 
Fyhn (1997, 1999),  
778 See also Asdal’s and Bondevik’s reflections on this point in the elaborations above. 
779 Relying on concepts and distinctions introduced in Chapter 2. 
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less elaborated proposals to transform modernity’s standards of truth and morality, on the 
assumption that these standards do not adequately conceptualize and facilitate the changes 
feminists struggle to achieve. Several critics suggest, moreover, that the standards of truth and 
morality should be considered as interconnected, as well as interconnected with different 
ethical or political projects, or with aesthetical criticism. 
 
ii) Modern history – a history of patriarchy 
The argument that the thinkers of modernity have influenced modern history in an unfortunate 
way, and that their assessment of modernity is too optimistic, does not necessarily rely on a 
critique of modernity’s standards of critique. The critique is sometimes made, rather, from the 
point of view of these standards: To what extent the thinkers of modernity have influenced 
modern history, can be investigated without relying on alternative standards of truth. Whether 
their influence has been unfortunate or not, can be assessed without relying on alternative 
norms. However, when the argument occurs in the material I have surveyed, it is often 
accompanied by a critique of modernity’s standards.  
 
iii) The modern canon of patriarchal thinkers 
The argument that the thinking of modernity is a patriarchal mode of thinking, is sometimes 
made within the parameters of this thinking: It is assumed that modernity itself contains 
standards of critique incompatible with the patriarchal norms reproduced by particular 
thinkers of modernity. Many contributors suggest, however, fundamental transformations of 
the standards of modernity: They consider the modern imaginary as a patriarchal imaginary in 
the sense that its standards of critique do not target patriarchal oppression. 
 
iv) The abstractions of modernity 
To argue that one needs to be sensitive to empirical context when implementing moral 
principles, is compatible with upholding modernity’s distinction between standards of truth 
and rightness. Several authors argue, however, not only for empirical sensitivity in the process 
of applying moral principles, but also for the principles to be corrected by empirical 
knowledge: The principles should be ‘grounded’ empirically.780 This may be interpreted as a 
radical critique of differentiating questions of morality from questions of truth. More 
modestly, moves of this kind could be understood as attempts to correct the descriptions the 
                                                 
780 This is Anne Hellum’s expression (see 5.4.3). 
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rightness-idealization is based on, for example descriptions of what a human being is. In both 
cases what we are dealing with is meta-critique, however: critique of the elaboration of 
modernity’s standards or of the relationship between them. The critique of abstraction 
underlying ambitions to correct morality empirically, targets, moreover, the idealizations of 
the thinking of modernity qua abstractions: Several authors dismiss the attempt to address the 
problem of validity through an articulation of idealized standards (i.e. through abstraction) 
altogether. 
 
v) Critique of the modern autonomous subject 
The critique of the modern autonomous subject is often articulated as a fundamental critique 
of modernity’s standards of validity. What several contributors are skeptical of is to 
conceptualize standards of truth and morality in terms of what all would accept considered 
from a particular abstract perspective, i.e. from the point of view of human beings regarded as 
– or reduced to – free and equal reasonable persons. It is impossible for human beings to take 
on this perspective, it is argued; to reason and act as were we detached from our concrete 
embodiment, from the complex processes of subject constitution, from our embeddedness in 
social structures and culture. Hence, it is impossible for us from within the human condition 
to assess claims autonomously in the sense presupposed by the thinkers of modernity. 
Moreover, was this in fact possible, this would not necessarily be right from a moral point of 
view: That we, when we consider what is moral should not consider ourselves and our fellow 
beings as autonomous as the thinking of modernity prescribes (but rather, for example, as 
dependent), is a claim put forward by several critics. 
 
However, the modern notion of the subject can be criticized and debated on a less 
fundamental level. One may, for one reason or another, consider modernity’s standards of 
critique as generally compatible with descriptions of human beings as embodied and 
embedded beings, but question the way these descriptions are made by the thinkers of 
modernity, i.e. these thinkers’ explications of the standards of truth and rightness rest on a set 
of claims about human beings, and it may be argued that some of these claims are 
unwarranted. The outcome of correcting modernity’s picture of human beings might be a 
different set of moral norms. For example, several of the contributors argue that the norms to 
which all would agree in argumentative discourse as persons embedded in asymmetrical 
relations are different from the norms to which they would all agree as free and equal persons, 
i.e. as persons granted symmetrical recognition. However, by arguing along such lines, one 
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might end up by raising more fundamental critique of the modern imaginary’s ideas of 
morality: To claim that we are inevitably embedded in asymmetrical relations is, it would 
seem, to say that it is impossible for us to assess claims autonomously from within the human 
condition, the way the thinkers of modernity prescribe. 
 
vi) Epistemology and methodology 
Several of the contributors who address the relationship between feminism and epistemology, 
argue for a transformation of modernity’s truth-idealization, but also of its rightness-
idealization. Another tendency in these proposals is not to make a clear distinction between 
the two: Theories that are regarded as adequate theories about state of affairs are also those 
theories that are considered to facilitate women’s emancipation – and the other way around. 
Moreover, in these proposal issues of truth and issues of morality are not always clearly 
distinguished from ethical criticism, political views and even aesthetic criticism. The critical 
discourse on epistemology is thus a rather undifferentiated discourse, and it questions as such 
modernity’s fundamental distinctions; it fuses what the thinking of modernity consciously 
separates. However, the proposals differ among themselves when it comes to which changes 
are envisioned; not all proposals are obviously incompatible with a feminism of the modern 
imaginary. 
 
vii) Feminist strategies 
A strategic approach to the thinking of modernity is a critique of this thinking, in three senses. 
First, to approach arguments primarily from the perspective of what is rhetorically efficient is 
not to take the claims involved, i.e. what the thinkers of modernity say, seriously. Second, this 
move – not to assess arguments also from the perspective of validity – counters modernity’s 
standards of both truth and morality. Third, the strategic approach challenges fundamental 
distinctions of the modern imaginary, whether the approach is interpreted as reducing all 
discourses to pragmatic means-end discourse, or whether it is interpreted as prescribing 
undifferentiated discourse. 
 
Nothing of this implies, however, that feminists cannot participate in pragmatic discourse 
without challenging modern distinctions and idealizations; there are also examples of this in 
the material I have surveyed.  
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viii) The problem of universalism 
Any general dismissal of universalism – to deny that anything can or should be considered 
universally valid – targets the thinking of modernity in a fundamental sense: Such dismissal is 
not compatible with subscribing to modernity’s standard of truth and morality that are claimed 
precisely to be universally valid. When authors raise particular kinds of criticism against 
universalism; when they, for example, criticize ethical universalism or over-generalized 
descriptions of patriarchy and women’s situation, this is, however, not necessarily 
incompatible with a feminism of the modern imaginary. 
 
ix) Individualism and the good community 
That individuals, not collectives or groups, are primary normative units, is a fundamental 
assumption in the thinking of modernity. In so far as this assumption is challenged, like some 
contributors do, this thinking is thus radically challenged. To, more modestly, prescribe 
policies that address the concerns of certain groups or give the assessments of certain groups 
particular weight, like others do, is, however, not necessarily to question the assumptions of 
the project of modernity. 
 
Also fundamental to the project of modernity is its reliance on the authority of reason: The 
standards of what are true and right are linked to what individuals would find reasonable in 
deliberations. When collectivist concerns inspire contributors to replace the authority of 
reason with authorities of other kinds, for example our feelings of solidarity and 
responsibility, they challenge thus the standards of the thinking of modernity. These standards 
are also questioned when contributors prescribe political orders or human society generally to 
be based on common values; a comprehensive ethos: Such prescriptions challenge 
modernity’s distinction between the right and the good. 
 
x) Equality and power 
Several contributors criticize the norm of equal treatment. To claim that we sometimes need 
to treat differently situated individuals differently, to treat them as equals, is not necessarily to 
challenge the presuppositions of modernity. In so far as critics equate a norm of equal 
treatment with the norm of treating all with equal respect, and deny them both, they question, 
however, the moral core of the project of modernity. Prescribing equality of outcome in the 
name of treating everyone with equal respect may be done from within the horizon of 
modernity. Prescribing equality of outcome disregarding ideas of equal respect and individual 
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autonomy is, however, to question fundamental presuppositions of this horizon. To say that 
individual’s preferences and assessments are ‘false’ under present conditions, as some 
contributors do, can imply challenging, radically, the ideas of individual autonomy and 
responsibility developed by the thinkers of modernity. This may, however, also be a way for 
critics to say that individuals cannot, for some reason, be treated as autonomous and 
responsible individuals under present conditions, i.e. they do not necessarily mean to criticize 
ideas of autonomy and responsibility from a normative point of view.  
 
Generally speaking, it is not always clear how the different contributors’ position themselves, 
more precisely, on these issues, as the critique raised against the ideas of ‘equal treatment’, 
‘equality of opportunity’ and ‘individual autonomy’, is often of a general and sweeping kind. 
 
xi) The public and the private 
To argue that also institutions often referred to as belonging to the private sphere, such as the 
family, civil society – or indeed markets – should be assessed from the point of view of 
justice, as many contributors stress, is not necessarily to question the thinking of modernity. A 
critique of the modern private-public distinction, which disregards the significance of 
personal autonomy, challenges the thinking of modernity fundamentally, however: The 
critical standards of modernity are based on ideas of free deliberations among individuals, and 
presuppose that everyone is granted privacy.  
 
What is true and right according to the thinking of modernity, is what individuals would find 
reasonable under ideal conditions. When critique of the private-public distinction results in 
prescriptions about replacing the authority of reason in public deliberations with other sources 
of authority (for example the values immanent in the practice of mothering, or women’s free-
floating desires) – as often is the case in the material I have surveyed – the critique challenges 
modernity’s idealizations of truth and rightness. If the argument is, rather, that sources often 
granted authority in private relations should be granted authority also in public relations, 
because this can be reasonably argued, the argument is, however, not necessarily incompatible 
with modernity’s critical standards. 
 
xii) Capitalism and patriarchy 
To criticize capitalism and patriarchy is not necessarily to challenge modernity’s standards of 
truth and rightness: Capitalism and patriarchy, as captured be descriptions warranted 
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according to modernity’s standard of truth, can be criticized on the basis of norms found to be 
just, according to modernity’s standard of rightness. There are, however, in the contributions 
inspired by Marxism and radical feminism that have been analyzed in this chapter, sketches 
both of a different standard of truth – considered necessary if we are to capture adequately the 
mechanisms of capitalism and patriarchy – and of a different standard of rightness, i.e. 
standards that would make us capture the deeper injustices of capitalism and patriarchy.  
 
xiii) Rationality, femininity and sentiments 
The attempts to redescribe the rationality of moral assessment and truth-seeking in proposals 
of a different rationality can, very often, be interpreted as attempts to transform modernity’s 
idealizations of truth and rightness. The critique of the dominance of instrumental rationality, 
of egoism and narcissism, on which these proposals are based, is, however, not necessarily 
incompatible with a feminism of the modern imaginary: What deliberating participants in 
context-transcendent discourses on what is true and right under ideal conditions would agree 
to as reasonable, cannot simply be equated with what is reasonable according to criteria of 
means-end rationality and with what would serve all’s selfish interests. 
 
xiv) The aesthetical transcending the modern 
Aesthetical criticism can be raised and elaborated from within the horizon of modernity. To 
introduce aesthetical criteria in the institutional discourses of science and politics, or to 
highlight and elaborate aesthetical dimensions of ethical discourse, also does not in any 
obvious way conflict with the thinking of modernity. Several contributions make, however, a 
more general argument; they suggest that aesthetical concerns should make us transform the 
idealizations of truth and rightness. 
 
xv) Below the surface – phenomenology, existentialism, ontology 
To raise empirical criticism against descriptions of human nature or women’s situation, or to 
raise criticism against the more or less articulated moral or ethical subtext of such 
descriptions, can be done without challenging modernity’s scheme of idealizations and 
discourses. To introduce a new set of descriptions, that are not empirical, and thus not 
available for scrutiny in theoretical discourse, and also not claims of for example an ethical-
existential kind (if they are meant to be ‘non-normative’), represents, however, a challenge to 
the thinking of modernity: Introducing such (non-empirical and non-normative) descriptions, 
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raise questions about how such descriptions can be assessed, and of whether they are objects 
of critique at all. 
 
xvi) Modernity, nature and culture 
Critique of the natural sciences and of reducing the rationality of investigating nature to 
instrumental rationality, can be made on the basis of modernity’s standards of truth and 
morality. What several contributors suggest, however, is that critique of this kind, to be apt, 
need to transform these standards, i.e. they conceptualize ecological critique as a fundamental 
critique of modernity. To say, for example, that human and non-humans are to be included on 
equal terms in processes of assessments, challenge normative ideas of truth and morality as 
something free and equal human beings deliberate on qua reasonable beings. To say that 
groups of human beings that have often been considered closer to nature, such as women, are 
to be included in processes of assessments, is not necessarily in conflict with subscribing to 
what the thinking of modernity prescribes, however.  
 
5.5.2 A brief remark on assessment 
I will have to leave a systematic discussion and assessment of these arguments to a different 
occasion. Several of the arguments have, however, been touched upon in Chapters 1-4. I will, 
moreover, return to some of them in Part III of the dissertation.  
 
Furthermore, the summary of 5.5.1 is based on certain indicative assumptions. I assume, for 
example, that the different arguments we are dealing with here can be explicated in ways that 
do not necessarily or obviously make them incompatible with a feminism of the modern 
imaginary, and in ways that more or less radically challenge this imaginary. I try also, even 
though briefly, to demonstrate how I think this can be done.  A more thorough justification of 
this move, as well as a more thorough explication of how the different arguments might come 
in different versions, more or less critical of modernity, must be postponed to some other 
time. 
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5.6 Academic-feminist self-reflection in Norway after 1990 – some 
characteristics 
 
5.6.1 A critical interpretation of modern thought 
 
As suggested by Irene Iveresen in the quotation that introduced this chapter, the recent 
academic-feminist self-reflection, also in Norway, can be read as a debate on the merits of 
modernity. The reflexive turn in the Norwegian feminist research field parallels a similar turn 
in the international field of feminist theory. In both cases, the crux of the debate has been, and 
still tends to be, the relationship between feminist critique, on the one hand, modernity and its 
modes of thought, on the other. Several leading figures in international feminist theory 
defend, generally speaking, a feminism of the modern imaginary,781 such as Susan Moller 
Okin, Martha Nussbaum, Seyla Benhabib, Anne Phillips, Nancy Fraser, Jean L. Cohen, 
Marilyn Friedman, Helen Longino, Elizabeth Anderson and Onora O’Neill. Other leading 
figures dismiss this kind of feminism, on the basis of various arguments similar to the 
arguments circulating in Norwegian debates.  
 
There are, however, few engaged defenders of the thinking rooted in the tradition of 
Enlightenment in Norwegian debates. In Anglo-American feminist discourses critique of 
modernity has occurred against what some have referred to as a liberal-feminist hegemony 
(Butler and Scott 1992, Dean 2000). There can be no question of a similar hegemony in the 
Norwegian debates I have surveyed in this chapter.782 Only a few contributions defend whole-
heartedly a feminism of the modern imaginary.783 Defending the project of modernity is 
                                                 
781 They defend it even if they question specific elaborations of this imaginary from a feminist point of view. 
782 Precisely as during the 1970s, there are very few Norwegian feminists who refer to themselves as liberal 
feminists (see 5.2). 
783 Clear examples are, for example, Raaum (1995), Børresen (1995a, 1995b, 1998, 1999a, 1999b), Bojer (2001) 
and Serck-Hanssen (2000/2001). It should be noted that even if the arguments of Seyla Benhabib are subscribed 
to in several contributions, and, to a lesser extent, those of Nancy Fraser, Anne Phillips and Martha Nussbaum, 
this does not necessarily imply that the thinking of modernity is defended. Often what is highlighted is not these 
thinkers’ defense of modern thought, but instead the elements in their thinking that are critical of modern 
thought. In the reception of Benhabib, for example, her critique of liberalism is often stressed, not her intimate 
reliance on Habermas’s discourse ethics. On other occasions, Anglo-American feminists are interpreted as more 
critical of for example liberal principles than they in fact are (see for example my critique of Mari Teigen and 
Hege Skjeie’s interpretation of Nancy Fraser and Martha Nussbaum in Chapter 8).   
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exception to the rule, criticizing modernity, even dismissing its basic assumptions, is main-
stream. The debate on the merits of modernity in Norwegian feminist theory thus becomes 
very much a debate between feminists critical of modernity, on the one hand, and the thinkers 
of modernity as outsiders, on the other: Whole-hearted defenders of the project of modernity 
seldom participate in the debates of feminist theory in Norway; they are seldom insiders. In 
Anglo-American feminist theory the debate on the merits of modernity is, on the contrary, 
very much a debate among feminist theorists; among insiders. 
 
What I say here, is that there are few defenders of a feminism of the modern imaginary in the 
self-reflective discourse I have analyzed in this chapter. I have not investigated to what extent 
the empirical inquiry of the research field challenges modernity’s standards of validity in 
practice. So far, moreover, nothing is said about the discourses of political feminism. Is 
perhaps the state feminist model of citizenship a model of the modern imaginary? This will be 
discussed in Chapter 6.    
 
There are, furthermore, some patterns in the understanding of modernity, as well as some 
missing patterns, that should be stressed. There do not seem to be systematic differences in 
reception between male or female contributors, or between generations; men are not less 
critical of modernity than women, established researchers no less than the recruits.784 There 
are patterns in what kind of critical arguments that are raised, however. Established 
researchers seem, for example, to be somewhat more critical of postmodern or 
poststructuralist theory than the younger generation.785 There are, moreover, fewer authors 
coming from the younger generation who defend communitarian ideas of female solidarity. 
Among the established researchers many consider establishing a firm defense of such ideas to 
be essential. 
 
There are also certain patterns in the understanding of modernity along discipline lines: 
Contributors coming from some disciplines are less critical than others. Generally speaking, 
the interpretation of modernity and its modes of thinking seems to be more favorable within 
economics, political science and law than within other disciplines. 
 
                                                 
784 I thank Jørgen Melve who helped me make a list of the contributors’ date of birth, their educational and 
disciplinary background. 
785 I investigate this pattern in more detail in Holst (2001). 
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5.6.2 The Norwegian appropriation of feminist theory 
 
Several critics have interpreted the turn to feminist theory in the period of self-reflection in 
Norway as an expression of homogenization and increased Anglo-American and French 
influence. My investigations support this interpretation to a certain extent:786 The influence 
from Anglo-American and French feminist theory is significant. The picture is, however, 
more complex. Contributors in the period of self-reflection receive their intellectual resources 
from international feminist theory, but not only. Typically, there is a mixture of Norwegian 
and international influences, both from feminist theory and from theory not especially framed 
to address feminist concerns. A good example is Elisabeth L’orange Fürst’s dissertation. 
L’orange Fürst analyzes here what she considers to be an alternative rationality of the female 
lifeworld.787 She relies heavily on the contributions of the leading French feminists, such as 
Helénè Cixous and Julia Kristeva. She relies, however, also on Norwegian social 
philosophers, such as Dag Østerberg and Hans Skjervheim, on the phenomenological 
philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, on the deconstructive approach of Jacques Derrida, as 
well as on Hildur Ve’s (1999a, 1999b) notion of “rationality of responsibility”, Kari 
Wærness’ notion of  “rationality of care”,788 and Øystein Gullvåg Holter’s (1991, 1997) social 
form analysis of the interconnections between capitalism and patriarchy. 
 
There is, however, a certain tendency in the younger generation of researchers to rely more 
exclusively on international feminist theory than the established researchers do. There are also 
certain differences between authors coming from different disciplines. Contributors to 
feminist literary theory and philosophy rely, for example, more exclusively on international 
feminist theory than do, typically, feminist sociologists. 
 
5.6.3 A reflexive turn without normative theory 
 
It is noteworthy, moreover, that the Norwegian academic feminist field has passed through a 
decade and a half of intense self-reflection, in relative isolation from international debates in 
moral philosophy and political theory. On this point, the Norwegian case is considerably 
                                                 
786 I wish to emphasize, however, that I have not made a systematic comparison of theoretical influences in the 
research field before and after 1990. An intellectual history of feminist research in Norway is not yet written. 
787 Her proposal is elaborated in 5.4.12. 
788 For a recent discussion, see Wærness (2004). 
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different from Anglo-American feminism.789 This is not to deny that positions and contentions 
in Anglo-American feminism have both triggered and shaped several of the debates in 
Norwegian feminist self-reflection. The discussions on poststructuralism and on feminist 
epistemology, two major discussions in the Norwegian research field, are but two examples. 
The revival of normative theory in Anglo-American feminism has, however, no parallel in the 
reflexive turn of Norwegian feminism.790  
 
5.7 Why reflexivity? 
 
5.7.1 Some suggestions 
 
In this study I have not investigated why the reflexive turn in Norwegian feminist research 
occurred, and why it occurred when it did. In the following I will, however, comment briefly 
on some hypotheses.  
 
i) A new generation, a new paradigm? 
The period of self-reflection may be interpreted, with Thomas Kuhn, as linked to the 
introduction of a new ‘paradigm’, competing with the old paradigm: The reflexive turn may 
be an expression of a ‘crisis’ in feminist ‘normal science’. What characterizes crises of this 
sort; when paradigms clash, is precisely increased and intensified debate on meta-issues, on 
the adequacy of the fundamental concepts, theories and standards of the research field. 
Commentators have suggested that the increased and intensified debate on meta-issues in the 
feminist research field can be connected to the introduction of a new postmodern paradigm, 
and to the entering of a new generation into the research field that supports the ‘new’ against 
the ‘old’ (Blom 1995, Widerberg 2001, Halsaa 2003). Many researchers’ engagement with 
postmodernist or poststructuralist theory have no doubt both inspired and significantly shaped 
the radical questioning of the modern imaginary in the period of self-reflection. It should be 
stressed, however, that none of the fifteen arguments elaborated in this chapter are exclusively 
raised on the basis of such theory. The contributors articulate a rich set of challenges to 
                                                 
789 Not to mention from feminism in German-speaking areas. The influence from French feminism is significant 
in Norwegian feminist theory. The works of German-speaking feminist theorists, such as Herta Nagl-Docekal, 
Angelika Krebs, Gertrud Nunner-Winkler, Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Andrea Maihofer and Beate Rössler, are very 
seldom referred to. 
790 A similar point is suggested by other commentators, see Slagstad (1994), Skjeie and Hernes (1997), 
Ellingsæter (1999), Hagemann (2000).  
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modernity which cannot be reduced to a ‘postmodern’ challenge. Besides, even if there are 
generational patterns, they should not be exaggerated. Several of the established researchers 
are highly influenced by postmodernist or poststructuralist theories. 
 
ii) International trends? 
The period of self-reflection in Norwegian feminism parallels a period of meta-debate in 
international academic feminism.791 The reflexive turn in academic feminism is a global 
phenomenon, linked to, among other things, the entrance of Second and Third World 
feminists in the research field: Non-western feminists have started to question the established 
perspectives and approaches of Western academic feminism. As a global phenomenon, the 
reflexive turn is also an expression of certain intellectual trends in the feminist research field, 
for example many researchers’ increased engagement with postmodern or poststructuralist 
theory which questions fundamental presupposition of feminist politics and scientific practice.  
 
Commentators have suggested that the reflexive turn in Norwegian feminism reflects 
international trends (Wærness 1995, Bjørhovde 1997, Halsaa 2003). This is a reasonable 
suggestion. The arguments raised in Norwegian debates are familiar from international 
debates in feminist theory. In particular Anglo-American and French feminist theory is often 
referred to and actively engaged with. The Norwegian reflexive turn, has, however distinctive 
national traits. The Norwegian researchers publish, moreover, seldom on feminist theory in 
international journals and anthologies published outside Scandinavia. 
 
iii) A trend of modern times? 
Increased and intensified reflexivity has haunted other academic fields and disciplines than 
the feminist research field the last couple of decades. Such developments fit, obviously, well 
into analyses which point at increased and intensified reflexivity as distinguishing features of 
late modern societies (Giddens 1996, Beck 2004a, 2004b). It should be stressed, however, that 
not all disciplines and research fields have experienced a period of self-reflection comparable 
to that of feminist research.792 
 
                                                 
791 For overviews, see Assiter (1996), Arneil (1999), Jaggar and Young (2000), Braidotti and Griffin (2002). 
792 The articles on the development of gender-perspectives in different disciplines in Forståelser av kjønn (1992), 
edited by Taksdal and Widerberg, are illustrative. In some of the disciplines, such as social anthropology, the 
questions raised in the feminist self-reflective discussions add to similar discussions already going on in the 
discipline. In other disciplines, such as economics, there is no talk of a reflexive turn. 
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iv) Reflexivity as academization and de-politicization? 
It has been argued that the period of self-reflection in Norwegian academic feminism is an 
expression of an unfortunate de-politicization and academization of the research field (Strøm 
1995, Wærness 1995, Halsaa 1996a, Holter 1996b, Skotnes 2004). While researchers 
previously worked empirically and policy-oriented, in close contact with the women’s 
movement and femocrats in state bureaucracy,793 and in the interest of ordinary women, they 
are now, it is argued, more concerned with living up to internal academic standards and 
climbing in academic hierarchies.  
 
It is commonly assumed among commentators that this is a reasonable description of 
developments in the research field, even though it is a hypothesis that has yet to be 
investigated. A few things should be kept in mind, moreover. The number of activists in the 
women’ movement has decreased drastically since the 1970s (Halsaa 1996a). There have thus 
been fewer activists with whom feminist researchers could cooperate. Whether Norwegian 
feminist research has become more or less policy-oriented is something that has not been 
investigated in this study, or indeed elsewhere. After having surveyed articles, books, reports, 
papers and dissertations published after 1990,794 I am, however, not convinced that this is the 
case. Much of what has been published in recent years is policy-oriented. That meta-
theoretical debate has replaced empirical research and middle-range theorizing is simply not 
the case.795  
 
Furthermore, what kinds of inquiries serve ‘the interests of ordinary women’, is a complex 
issue. The questioning of concepts and standards that have made certain groups of women’s 
suffering invisible exemplifies that meta-questioning may very well be in ordinary women’s 
interest. It is, moreover, not self-evident that investigations that ‘serve the interests of 
ordinary women’ are genuine investigations. Genuine inquirers, in the feminist research field 
as well as in other fields of inquiry, should, first and foremost, be faithful to standards of truth 
and justice, and to the scientific ethos. The influences from values in different parts of the 
research project should, as far as possible, be explicated and assessed according to standards 
of reasonableness and ‘fairness’.796  
                                                 
793 See van der Roos’ (1996b) on the role of femocrats. 
794 See my analysis of the development in Norwegian feminist sociology from the 1970s to the 1990s (Holst 
2001). 
795 See also 5.1. 
796 See Chapter 2. 
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Whether Norwegian feminist research has become more or less genuine going through the 
period of self-reflection is yet another issue that has not been investigated in my study. When 
the intellectual history of the research field has been written, we are, hopefully, better 
equipped to answer this question. 
 
v) From state feminism to reflexive feminism? 
Finally, it may be connections between other characteristics of the socio-cultural and political 
setting of the Norwegian feminist research field and the outburst of a reflexive wave. In 
Chapter 6 I will discuss whether the political state feminist ideology may have inspired self-
reflection. 
 
 
 
5.7.2 The distinctiveness of Norwegian self-reflection: Some interpretations  
 
i) The critical interpretation of modernity 
Whether there are connections between the normative ideas of the state feminist regime and 
the distinctive profile of the recent academic-feminist self-reflection, for example its critical 
approach to modernity, is also a discussion left for Chapter 6. The critical stance towards 
modernity may, however, have other sources as well. It may be interpreted as a hyper-reaction 
against the dominance of empirical, policy-oriented research pursued in the research field 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Many have conceived of this research as empirical research in 
the spirit of modernity,797 and assumed, seemingly, that defending a different focus in 
empirical research, for example a less policy-oriented focus, is incompatible with sticking to 
the project of modernity.  
 
The particularly critical attitude towards modernity’s categories and distinctions in Norwegian 
feminist theory might also have something to do with which disciplines leading contributors 
belong to. Contributors coming from economics, political science and law are, generally 
speaking, more open for subscribing to a feminism of the modern imaginary than contributors 
engaged with literary, cultural, social and psychoanalytical theory. The latter have, however, 
                                                 
797 Cf. Blom (1995), Gulbrandsen (1995), Lotherington and Markussen (1999), Meyer (1999), Mortensen (1999), 
Bolsø (2002), Egeland (2004a, 2004b), Mühleisen (2004). 
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dominated the discussions of the reflexive turn,798 whereas economists, political scientists and 
scholars of law are in minority. This is very different from state of affairs in Anglo-American 
feminist theory, where political and legal theorists have been central in framing the debates.    
 
The critics of the thinking of modernity would obviously link their critical stance towards 
modernity to the validity of their critique; to the reasonableness of their stance: There may be 
good reasons for feminists to turn their back on the project of modernity. I question, however, 
this view elsewhere in this dissertation; in my discussions in Chapters 1 to 4, and in my 
elaborations in Chapter 7, 8 and 9. 
 
ii) The national distinctiveness 
Norwegian feminist researchers publish relatively infrequently on feminist theory in 
international journals. Moreover, even if they have engaged themselves with Anglo-American 
and French feminist theory, their reliance on concepts and variations of arguments developed 
in Norway, inside and outside the feminist research field, is significant. That international 
intellectual influences are tempered by and interpreted in light of national traditions in 
philosophy and theory, is, however, also the case in other research fields in the social sciences 
and the humanities, and in Norway more so than in other Scandinavian countries, analysts 
have claimed (Skirbekk 1992b, Slagstad 1998, 2005). The national distinctiveness of the 
reflexive turn in Norwegian academic feminism may thus be an expression of more general 
patterns.   
 
Whether the national elements in Norwegian feminism makes its theorizing richer and more 
original, or rather lower its quality and provincializes it, is a contested issue. Several 
commentators stress the value of Norwegian feminist research’s national distinctiveness,799 a 
few question it (Mortensen, Bjørby, Lie, Brandser and Angvik 2001, Mortensen 2002). The 
question should, probably, not be addressed in such sharp either-or terms. There are no doubt 
original contributions to feminist theory in the Norwegian research field, developed on the 
basis of a blending of international and national intellectual in-puts. Other contributions are, 
bluntly speaking, indefensibly uninformed. 
 
                                                 
798 Even if they do not necessarily dominate other discussions going on in the feminist research field. 
799 Cf. Leira (1992), Wærness (1995), Holter (1996c), Ve (1999), Widerberg (2001), Halsaa (2003), Hernes 
(2004). 
 277
iii) What about normativity? 
The revival of normative theory in Anglo-American feminism has no parallel in the reflexive 
turn of Norwegian feminism. This counters the homogenization-thesis: Norwegian feminism 
is not Anglo-Americanized in any straightforward way. The marginal interest in the 
arguments, approaches and questions of normative theory is indeed peculiar in a research field 
that is so intimately and explicitly defined as part of a normative project: feminism. The 
peculiarity may once more be linked to the disciplinary background of central contributors. In 
Anglo-American debates normative theory has been brought in by political and legal theorists 
and moral philosophers. The latter have not played a similar role in the reflexive turn of 
Norwegian academic feminism. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
STATE FEMINISM AND THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC 
CITIZENSHIP IDEAL800 
 
 
6.0 The normative basis of Norwegian political feminism 
 
Helge Hernes introduced the term state feminism in 1987 to describe how feminism might be 
promoted “from above in the form of gender equality and social policies” (1987: 153).801 
Hernes’ thesis was that feminist interests had been institutionalized on state level during the 
1970s and 1980s in Norway: The Norwegian welfare state had gradually developed 
distinctive feminist characteristics (Skjeie and Hernes 1997: 373). Along with women’s entry 
into welfare state professions and “the feminization from below among women activists in 
political and cultural activities”, state feminism had contributed to the development of a 
relatively “woman-friendly” society in Norway (Hernes 1987: 153). Continued mobilization 
from below combined with governmental policies from above would contribute, according to 
Hernes, in making Norwegian society even more woman-friendly. There is a potentially 
fruitful “alliance” between women and the welfare state, she concluded (op.cit.: 162). 
 
More or less effective attempts to insitutionalize feminist interests through the state have 
continued throughout the 1990s without major controversy. A recent study of attitudes in 
Norwegian elites shows that state feminist policies and ideology enjoy remarkable support 
today, among leading segments of the population (Gulbrandsen, Engelstad, Klausen, Skjeie 
and Teigen 2002). The discussion in this chapter will not, however, focus on the actual 
                                                 
800 Some of the ideas in this chapter (which is an edited and extended version of Holst 2002) were developed in 
the paper “Feminism, Autonomy and the State”, presented at a seminar at New School for Social Research, New 
York, March 2001. Previous versions of this chapter have been presented at seminars at the Center for the Study 
of the Sciences and Humanities, University of Bergen. I thank participants for comments, in particular Gunnar 
Skirbekk and Anders Molander. I also wish to thank David Plotke, Nancy Fraser, Mala Htun, Hege Skjeie, Helga 
Hernes, Kari Wærness, Lars-Ove Seljestad, Hilde Danielsen, Christine M. Jacobsen, Randi E. Gressgård, Rune 
Slagstad and Fredrik W. Thue for discussing different problems raised in this chapter with me on different 
occasions. 
801 As pointed out by Mona Livholts (2001), Hernes writes about state feminism and the conditions for 
developing a woman-friendly state already in Staten – kvinner ingen adgang? (1982). However, it is in her state 
feminist essays from 1987 she for the first time systematically elaborate and defend her thesis: that the state-
feminist, social-democratic citizenship model is a woman-friendly model. 
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support of the state feminist model, but on its normative basis or moral grammar.802 How can 
this grammar be described? And does it have any weaknesses? Are there aspects of state 
feminism’s normative basis of which we ought to be critical? 
 
My discussion begins with a closer examination of the state feminist, social-democratic 
project, as it is portrayed in Hernes’ Welfare State and Woman Power. Essays in State 
Feminism (1987).803 Hernes’ idea of a woman-friendly social democracy is both a distinct 
political-philosophical proposal and an interesting contribution to the discussion of the 
development of welfare-state capitalism. The first part of the chapter presents Hernes’ 
normative and sociological reflections.804 In the second part of the chapter I discuss what 
seems to be certain blind spots in the state feminist, social-democratic project. I argue that the 
project: 
 
i) suffers from a liberal deficit, and insufficiently recognizes the significance of private 
autonomy, 
ii) tends to reduce the discussion of political citizenship to a discussion of group 
representation and gender difference, 
iii) links welfare to employment, the welfare state to the aim of economic growth, social 
rights to citizens’ participation in paid (and unpaid) work, as well as 
iv) the legitimacy of the social-democratic system of rights to the values of Norwegian culture 
and history, in unfortunate ways. 
 
In the third part of the chapter I will return to my analysis of the reflexive discourses of 
Norwegian academic feminism (from Chapter 5), and discuss the relationship between these 
discourses, their occurrence and profile, and the moral grammar of state feminism. 
 
                                                 
802 The expression stems from the title of Axel Honneth’s book, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral 
Grammar of Social Conflicts (1996). Honneth believes that social struggles for a more just society cannot be 
perceived exclusively as conflicts of interests. They also have a moral grammar – they presuppose normative 
assessment of the legitimacy of social institutions (op.cit.: xii). In this chapter I will investigate critically the 
normative basis of the state feminist regime (Slagstad 2004, see also Chapter 5). 
803 According to Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy G. Mazur, Hernes was the first to use the concept of state 
feminism as an analytical term. Her works are often referred to in academic contexts, but also in program 
documents of the United Nations, where the development of “national machineries for the advancement of 
women” in the member states has long been an important goal (1995: 20).  
804 As they are elaborated in one of her state feminist essays: “The Welfare State Citizenship and Scandinavian 
Women” (Hernes 1987: 135-163). 
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6.1 Woman-friendly social democracy: Solidaric republicanism 
6.1.1 From state patriarchy to state feminism 
 
Hernes’ optimistic analysis of the development of Norwegian state feminism in Welfare State 
and Woman Power: Essays in State Feminism (1987) differs from her diagnosis in her article 
“The Transition from Private to Public Dependence” published earlier in the 1980s.805 In this 
article Hernes discussed women’s relationship to the state, as wage earners, mothers and 
unpaid care-workers in the family, clients and citizens. As paid workers, women are often 
directly affected by governmental decisions, because many of them are employed in the 
public sector. As mothers and unpaid care providers, women depend on public services and 
benefits. Women are overrepresented in several of the weakest client groups of the welfare 
state, for example is a majority of those on welfare women. As citizens women have less 
power than men. Women’s representation is lower than that of men in party politics and 
among decision-makers in the economic sector. All in all, these developments imply, 
according to Hernes, that women’s dependence on the state is increasing. With its 
institutionalization of “weak influence combined with strong dependence” (Skjeie 1998: 216), 
the welfare state represents the transition from a private to a public patriarchy (1987: 41).806 
 
A number of important contributions from non-Scandinavian feminist research, also from the 
previous decade, come to similar conclusions as the early Hernes (Fraser 1995, Young 1997, 
Pateman 1998, hooks 2000).807 More recent works in Scandinavian feminist research, inspired 
by Hernes’ optimistic turn in 1987, have been less critical of the welfare state and feminist 
strategies built upon political alliances between women and the state. State feminism and the 
welfare state have, it is claimed, contributed first and foremost to strengthening women’s 
economic independence and their political influence (Nagel 1998, Christensen and Syltevik 
1999, Skjeie and Siim 2000). A few, however, are more skeptical. Harriet Holter has argued 
that Norwegian society, despite women’s increased participation and the diminishing 
                                                 
805 It was originally published in Patriarchy in  a Welfare Society (1984). The article is re-printed in her 
collection from 1987. I refer to this edition. 
806 This was a common view among Norwegian feminist researchers at the beginning of the 1980s. Harriet 
Holter describes, for example, the development of the welfare state in Norway as a set of “changes from direct to 
indirect oppression, among other things as a movement from limited, but real rights for women, to equal, but 
empty rights” (1981: 227).  
807 Non-Scandinavian feminists’ critique of the welfare state reflects their experiences with specific welfare 
systems, such as the U.S. system, which are very different from the Scandinavian welfare states. Their 
discussions of the normative basis of feminism are, however, more generally relevant.  
 281
“individual dominance of men”, bears traces of male “models of power”, “male principles and 
values” (1996: 14, 15). Holter means, moreover, that women primarily gain entry into so-
called shrinking institutions: “Women [‘s increased representation] is limited […] to social 
positions that are about to become unimportant” (op.cit.: 32).808 The Swedish historian 
Yvonne Hirdman (1990) promotes a similar thesis in her analysis of how ‘the gender contract’ 
has changed in the wake of women’s entry into Swedish political and public life during recent 
decades.809 According to Hirdman, this new gender contract is also based on ‘the genus 
system’s’ two fundamental logics, however, namely ‘segregation’: the female and the male 
are made different, and ‘hierarchy’: the male dominates the female. Neither the gender 
dichotomy nor gender hierarchy have disappeared, despite the seemingly egalitarian re-
negotiations of the gender contract: Swedish society is split along gender lines, and women 
obtain power in spheres and agencies that are dominated by the spheres and agencies 
dominated by men, and over problem areas that are relatively unimportant compared with 
those ruled by men. 
 
Both Holter and Hirdman see also woman-friendly developments in Scandinavian societies. 
Both, however, assess the actual positive effects of the welfare state and state feminism as 
being less far-reaching and profound than the later Hernes and the more optimistic 
mainstream of Scandinavian feminist research (see for example Skjeie and Siim 2000). 
Holter’s and Hirdman’s optimism seems to give rise, first and foremost, to an empirical 
debate about whether the welfare state is “a partnership between the state and women” or in 
fact “a patriarchal state” (Leira 1998: 180). Does the success story of women’s peaceful 
revolution in Scandinavia reflect actual state of affairs (Togeby 1994)?810 An equally 
important question, in my opinion, is whether state feminism’s approach to citizenship is 
justified from a normative point of view. Is the type of partnership between the state and 
women, accepted as a taken-for-granted standard in much Scandinavian feminist social 
science, worth pursuing in every respect? The answer to this question depends, of course, on 
                                                 
808 For example the increase in women representatives in the Storting (Norway’s parliament) becomes less 
significant when important decisions are made more frequently in the private sector, by largely male-dominated 
interest organizations or by international agencies where women’s participation is low (Holter 1996: 32). 
Holter’s thesis that ‘women enter shrinking institutions’ (i.e. institutions that are loosing power) was introduced 
for the first time in 1976. The thesis is criticized in detail by Hege Skjeie (1992).    
809 Skjeie (1998) clarifies the similarities between Holter and Hirdman on this point. 
810 The different assessments of this question have different sources. The discussion between Skjeie (1992, 1998) 
and Holter (1996) on ‘women’s entrance into shrinking institutions’ reflects, among other things, their 
disagreement on how ‘shrinking’ can best be measured. This leads to different assessments of whether or not 
parliament is losing power. 
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what standard, more precisely, we are talking about. In other words, as a first step, we need to 
know what characterizes the Scandinavian model of state-women partnership. 
 
6.1.2 State feminism, women’s professions and women’s participation 
 
Hernes’ short definition of state feminism is: a system of gender equality and social policies – 
state feminism as feminism “from above” (1987: 153). In Norway, gender equality policies 
have, among other things, centered on drawing up and complying with the Equal Status Act, 
and on pursuing gender equality through state bureaucracy (‘femocracy’), through especially 
created governmental structures, such as the Equal Status Council, and through different 
regional and local structures (Bystydzienski 1995, van der Ros 1996, Skjeie and Hernes 
1997). State feminist social policies have centered, on the one hand, on the expansion of 
nursery schools, public welfare services for the elderly and health care services, and, on the 
other hand, on the expansion of public support services.811 State feminist gender equality and 
social policies, as they have been developed in the Scandinavian countries, represent, 
according to Hernes, a unique political experiment: “In no other part of the world has the 
‘state’ been used so consistently by all groups, including women and their organizations, to 
solve collectively experienced problems” (1987: 154). 
 
She stresses, however, that the development of state feminism must be seen in relation to 
feminization from below: “Feminization from below and state feminism from above 
circumscribe the area of women’s policy” (op.cit.: 136). In Norway women play an important 
role in the election channel.812 In addition, they are active in humanitarian and cultural 
organizations, in new social movements, in issue-related campaigns and, to an increasing 
degree, also in the public media. Women have less influence in the “national corporate 
system” which institutionalizes “the interface between the political-administrative system and 
the market” (op.cit.: 153). They have acquired increased influence in the professional 
associations of the public sector. Men dominate the trade unions, however, and women are 
only marginally represented among decision-makers in private business, and in the large 
organizations that determine the conditions for economic policies. In the long run, through a 
continued democratization and decentralization of the corporate system, “new actors, 
                                                 
811 Examples are maternity leave, one-time payments for mothers without paid work and benefits to single-
income providers, see Danielsen (2002). 
812 That is as voters and elected representatives to parliament, in government and in local politics. 
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especially women” will, however, acquire increased influence, Hernes argues, and “new 
political areas, especially in the area of reproduction” will have an increased significance 
(op.cit.: 152). 
 
A third element in the “Scandinavian system”– in addition to the feminization from above and 
below – is the feminization of the welfare state professions (op.cit.: 160). The expansion of 
nursery schools, public welfare services for the elderly and public health care services have, 
together with the development of social support services and welfare bureaucracy, created 
new employment possibilities for women. 
 
Just as in her article published in 1984, Hernes describes in her reflections of 1987 women – 
as clients, mothers, unpaid care-workers in the family and wage earners – as being especially 
dependent on the welfare state. Now she stresses also the citizenship aspect of these roles, 
however. Hernes sees a potential for client and consumer based power, for example through 
organized campaigns. Women’s role as mothers and their “continued responsibility for most  
daily needs” is described as more politicized; “the gender conflict dimension in political life” 
becomes more significant (op.cit.: 136). Moreover, women have power as wage earners in the 
welfare state, and, as Hernes notes: “The public sector’s welfare bureaucracies are dominated 
by women” (op.cit.: 146). Women’s increased bureaucratic power also represents an 
empowering feminization from below. In addition, Hernes’ analysis of 1987 is more 
optimistic concerning the possibility of strengthening women’s rights, participation and 
influence as citizens of the welfare state. The Scandinavian state feminist system is based on 
an understanding of citizenship that has the potential to include women in “a community of 
material rights”, in the “politico-legal community”, and in the distinctive Scandinavian 
“ethical community” (op.cit.: 161).  
 
6.1.3 The Scandinavian system and the woman-friendly society 
 
Thus Hernes (1987) operates in fact with two definitions of state feminism, one narrow and 
one broad. The narrow definition equates state feminism with gender equality and social 
policies developed to promote women’s interests. This is state feminism understood as a 
“regulatory regime” (Skjeie and Teigen 2001). The broad definition of Scandinavian state 
feminism refers to all three elements mentioned above: Feminization from above, below and 
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of the welfare-state professions. It is state feminism in the broad meaning which has, 
according to Hernes, a unique woman-friendly potential. Hege Skjeie puts it like this: 
 
[…] there is no reason to doubt that the participation dimension represents a decisive 
difference [for Hernes]. If state feminism exclusively refers to political processes that 
incorporate women’s political demands [and not also women as participants], […][nothing] 
distinguishes state feminism from state patriarchy (1998: 217). 
 
As I discuss below, the participation dimension – especially different forms of feminization 
from below – is a crucial feature of the social-democratic citizenship ideal outlined by 
Hernes.813    
 
Another question is what type of normative status Hernes actually gives the state feminist 
system. Should it be seen as an instrument helping to pave the way for the woman-friendly 
society, or should the system be understood as the political organization of a woman-friendly 
society par excellence? Does state feminism represent Hernes’ feminist ideal, or is feminism 
about something more than an effective institutionalization of the state feminist system? 
Hernes certainly does not imply that the Scandinavian system as it is today has fulfilled all of 
its woman-friendly promises: “Sweden and Norway embody a state form that may open the 
way for their transformation into women-friendly societies and polities, which are reasonably 
just in terms of gender” (1987: 135). Citizenship in the Scandinavian countries is, 
nevertheless, still gender biased: “After 20 years of equality policies at various levels, women 
and men’s life patterns have changed, but they still differ, and women still have considerably 
less societal power” (op.cit.: 141). 
 
Much indicates, moreover, that Hernes has a more demanding citizenship ideal than the 
social-democratic, state feminist ideal. In another essay she stresses that “[s]tate feminism 
must not be confused with women’s full citizenship, it cannot replace a full mobilization of 
women, their interests and preferences”.814 ‘Women’s full citizenship’ appears to require 
something more than a woman-adapted social democracy. The realization of a woman-
friendly society demands, she says, “fundamental changes in social institutions that are 
designed to uphold central societal values” (op.cit.: 138). Were these changes to become 
fundamental enough, they might possibly alter the Scandinavian system’s institutional design 
                                                 
813 This is why I refer to it as a republican citizenship ideal. 
814 Translated from Skjeie (1998: 216). 
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and ideas of citizenship. Hernes does not define the normative relation between the 
Scandinavian system and this ‘fundamentally’ transformed woman-friendly society in more 
detail, however. What is feminism about beyond the realization of the promises internal to the 
Scandinavian system? How does the ideal of ‘women’s full citizenship’ differ from the social-
democratic citizenship ideal inherent in Scandinavia’s societal development? And might there 
not be normative facets of the Scandinavian system that neither feminists nor others should 
defend? I will return to these questions throughout the chapter. 
 
There is no doubt, moreover, that Hernes considers a woman-friendly, social-democratic 
citizenship model preferable to other citizenship models in the political-philosophical 
tradition, and that she rates the Scandinavian state feminism system above other real-world 
political systems. At least in these senses, she defends the normative basis of Scandinavian’s 
state feminism against competing alternatives. This is the case with most analyses made of 
state feminism and social democracy in Norwegian feminist sociology and political science 
(for example Christensen 1997, Skjeie and Hernes 1997, Nagel 1998, Leira 1998, Skjeie and 
Siim 2000, Brandth and Kvande 2003). None of these poses fundamental critical questions 
concerning the validity of a woman-friendly social democracy as a political ideal.815 This 
chapter can be read as an attempt to scrutinize this underlying consensus in the literature on 
Norwegian state feminism more closely. 
 
One comment may be appropriate in this context. It is possible to speak of political ideals, and 
at the same time recognize the importance of what John Rawls refers to as the circumstances 
of justice. These circumstances arise in situations where there are conflicts over limited 
resources: “[…] whenever persons put forward conflicting claims to the division of social 
advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity” (Rawls 1999: 110).816 Conflicts of interests 
and reasonable disagreements are part of conditio humana: In human societies, the 
circumstances of justice are inescapable. The feminist project cannot therefore be formulated 
as a utopian philosophy of reconciliation, as an ideal of the end of politics. Instead, feminists 
should focus on how conflicts and disagreements may be regulated in the most just – also 
gender just – way. As Hernes accurately puts it: That a society or a state is woman-friendly, 
                                                 
815 Perhaps Hans Skjervheim is correct when he says: “Therefore one sees that when a socialist party transforms 
into a social-democratic party, it becomes un-ideological. The purely practical-political questions are what come 
to the fore; the ideological questions are left to students and working-class youths who are still green behind the 
ears” (1992: 180).   
816 See also 2.2.2. 
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must not tempt us into believing that “all difficult decisions or all forms of scarcity have been 
eliminated” (2001: 49).817 
 
6.1.4 The social-democratic ideal of citizenship 
 
In Welfare State and Woman Power Hernes outlines a distinct ideal of citizenship, more 
specifically, a feminist re-formulation of “the activist, participatory, egalitarian ideal of 
social-democratic citizenship” (1987: 139). Citizenship is defined as the rights and duties of 
the citizens of a state, both in relation to the state and towards each other (op.cit.: 135). 
Hernes’ interpretation focuses primarily on the rights of citizens. She differentiates, along 
with the historian T.H. Marshall, between civil, political and social rights, between what she 
calls “guarantees of personal autonomy”, “participatory rights” and “material entitlements” 
(op.cit.: 138). Different ideals of citizenship can be classified according to their different 
systems of rights, and their relationship to the idea of common “values” (op.cit.: 137).    
 
The republican ideal of “the full-time citizen”818 places great emphasis on collective opinion 
and will formation and political participation, and has been less concerned, traditionally, with 
social equality and the protection of citizens’ private lives. One example is the Greek polis: 
“In Aristotle’s Athens the public and private identity merged together”: “[…] patriotism and 
solidarity were […] one and the same. […] there were no loyalties that conflicted with those 
of life in the polis” (op.cit.: 139). Consequently, the development of a republican system takes 
place within the framework of a common cultural and ethical horizon. Both in the Greek 
polis, in the Roman Republic and later in Machiavelli, this horizon inspired the cultivation of 
typical masculine virtues. 
 
The liberal ideal of “the part-time citizen” has focused less on participatory rights than on 
guaranteeing “the right to the personal integrity of body and mind” and private autonomy: 
“Private pursuits of salvation and capital accumulation are more important than life in the 
political community”– and more important than social equality (ibid.) Neither can liberal 
                                                 
817 This reference is taken from the article: “Hvor kvinnevennlige er de skandinaviske velferdsstatene?” (“How 
woman-friendly are the Scandinavian welfare states?”), Kvinneforskning 3/2001, which is mainly a summary of 
important points from Welfare State and Woman Power. 
818 Hernes herself does not refer to the ideal of the full-time citizen as being republican. This is, however, a 
common term used to discuss the tradition she refers to in this passage (Pettit 1999). Also Skjeie and Siim (2000) 
elaborate the Scandinavian citizenship model as republican.   
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society be thought of as a community based on particular values; “self-realization and the 
good life [is placed] outside the public realm” (ibid.). With reference to Carol Pateman’s 
critique of liberalism Hernes claims, furthermore, that “liberal values and institutions deny 
women equal citizenship” (ibid).819 
 
The Marxist ideal of citizenship is interpreted as an anarchistic ideal. The aim of the working 
class taking over the means of production, and of Marxist prescriptions of egalitarian 
distribution of economic resources, is to receive more leisure time for all, as well as the 
abolition of the state and of citizenship itself. Consequently, Marxism idealizes a society 
without collective political activity, “public commitment and common ideals” (ibid).820 
Marxist political theory must also be regarded as masculine, according to Hernes, because 
Marx assumes that mobilization occurs via the market and cannot directly come into existence 
through confrontations between the state and its citizens: Marx’ approach makes it impossible 
to envisage women’s political mobilization “through their various ties to the state” (op.cit.: 
160). 
 
The social-democratic ideal, which captures important aspects of the Scandinavian societal 
model, is introduced as a more attractive fourth citizenship ideal. The social-democratic ideal 
has several republican characteristics. It stresses, like the republican ideal, political 
participation. The social-democratic goal is “the democratization of all areas of social life” 
(op.cit.: 144). In line with the republican ideal, the political unit is a cultural community based 
on shared values: “[…] an ethical community with shared meanings, identities and symbols” 
(op.cit.: 161). In addition, the social-democratic ideal is republican in the sense that it does not 
make a sharp distinction between the state and society (op.cit.: 153), the private and the 
public: “Institutional interdependence and a ‘public/private mix’ rather than a ‘public/private 
split’ and thus the absence of clearly defined institutional boundaries are among the hallmarks 
of Scandinavian historical development” (ibid.) In contrast to republicanism, however, the 
                                                 
819 It is unclear how Pateman’s (1988) revolutionary political ambitions, her critique of the state and of 
contractual relationships generally are compatible with state feminist reformism and optimism. Pateman delivers, 
for example, a sharp and thorough critique of the capitalist labor contract, while the ideal of social-democratic 
citizenship ideal assumes that high employment, brought about through the market, together with the welfare 
state, is a strategy to increase people’s well-being (1988: 39-76, 116-153). What would Pateman say to a system; 
“state feminism”, which is “neither more nor less than the result of negotiations and ‘contracts’ between the state 
and women” (Hernes 1987: 162)? 
820 On this point, Hernes agrees with the post-Marxist tradition that has criticized Marxism for lacking categories 
to assess the legitimacy of political institutions. This critique is often tied to analyses of Marxism’s 
communitarian and totalitarian tendencies (Benhabib 1986, Cohen and Arato 1995). Hernes, on the contrary, 
seems to fear that people in a communist society would have to bear too much freedom. 
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social-democratic ideal emphasizes social equality and material security for its citizens: The 
republican community needs a social basis. Finally, the social-democratic ideal has had, at 
least traditionally, a patriarchal subtext in common with the other three ideals. The social- 
democratic citizen has been perceived to be a “citizen worker”: 
 
HIS rights, identities and participation patterns were determined by HIS ties with the labour 
market and by the web of associations as well as corporate structures that had grown up 
around these ties. […] Until recently women were mainly citizen mothers, protected and 
supported in this role by a paternalistic state (original emphasis, op.cit.: 140). 
 
Social democracy has nevertheless, according to Hernes, contrary to the other competing 
ideals, a considerable woman-friendly potential. In Scandinavia social democracy’s traditional 
patriarchal subtext is about to change due to the state feminist project. A promising woman-
friendly moral grammar may be found in Scandinavia’s societal development. 
 
6.1.5 Social and political citizenship and the value of community 
 
The thesis of a woman-friendly ideal of social-democratic citizenship is Hernes’ original 
contribution to feminist political philosophy. What distinguishes her social-democratic ideal 
from the republican ideal is first and foremost the focus on social rights. Some of these are 
universal, but “many material rights are contingent, at least in size, on labour market 
participation” (op.cit.: 144). In addition “there is an underlying assumption […] that universal 
welfare state services and transfers should not exceed those earned in the labour market” 
(op.cit.: 143-144). The Scandinavian system’s ambition to guarantee its citizens a certain 
material standard has consequently not been unconditional. Such guarantees have been tightly 
linked, and partially subordinated, to the aim of increasing productivity; “the social-
democratic policy assumption” that “only full employment and growth can save the welfare 
state” (op.cit.: 155). Another important social-democratic goal is to secure the political rights 
of citizens, but broader political participation – through a greater diversity of forms of 
political participation – than what republican political philosophy prescribes. In Scandinavia 
an attempt to reach this goal has been made through the development of an institutionally 
defined political citizenship, a “participatory corporatism” (op.cit.: 145), as an important 
supplement to the election channel. Participatory corporatism is characterized by a wide-
reaching interface between the state, civil society and families, institutionalized both 
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nationally and locally, where citizens are included as far as possible in negotiations and 
decision-making processes. This fluid political situation is marked by decentralized, 
fragmented discussion- and decision-making processes, by “institutional interdependence” 
(op.cit.: 153), by ambiguous relations of influence and power and blurry divisions between 
the private and the public, which may lead to governance problems and “leadership crisis” 
(op.cit.: 159). Another important question is whether the individual’s private autonomy “is 
sufficiently protected in a system that sets such a high premium on participation” (op.cit.: 
145). All in all, however, the social-democratic system is assessed in positive terms. It 
provides increased possibilities for participation, creates legitimacy around political decisions 
and includes new groups of actors and political areas, especially because representation- and 
decision-making structures are uniquely linked to “political and social movements which have 
been the main source of political innovation” in Scandinavia in the past century (op.cit.: 154). 
As Hernes elaborates in another passage: 
 
The historical basis of citizen involvement is to be found in the waves of social movements 
that have formed Scandinavian history since the middle of the nineteenth-century, movements 
that were based on direct participation, but that later were absorbed into the representative 
structure, only to be followed by new waves of movements (op.cit.: 139-140). 
 
This quotation also illustrates a more general point. The social-democratic citizenship model 
claims to reflect Scandinavian societal development and culture. This culture can be described 
as national and homogenous – it makes sense, for example, to speak of Norway as a national 
ethical community – and as being deeply and emotionally internalized amongst its citizens; 
“the principle of coordination” is a “deeply felt community (Gemeinschaft)”, and “habits of 
the heart” (original emphasis, op.cit.: 161). The culture builds, moreover, on positive attitudes 
towards social equality and “strong bonds of solidarity” with the other members of the 
community (op.cit.: 161). In addition, this “altruistic impulse” is expressed as loyalty, support 
and a sense of duty (ibid.), not as a minimum concession from actors who first and foremost 
follow their own selfish interests (op.cit.: 141). 
 
6.1.6 Towards a woman-friendly social democracy 
 
What then about the woman-friendly potential of the social-democratic ideal? In what way is 
the state feminist project about to transform the social-democratic system of rights and its 
value basis? State feminism has to some degree made use of social democracy’s idea that 
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certain social rights ought to be universal. There are obvious woman-friendly implications of 
giving everyone, regardless of gender, the right to basic material security. Social rights in 
Scandinavia have, however, also become more woman-friendly alongside a clear recognition 
of women’s role as mothers, and of the societal significance of women’s unpaid care work: 
 
The recent political mobilization of Nordic women has enabled them to conceptualize the 
battle for equality in terms of gender specificity and difference rather than gender neutrality 
(op.cit.: 135-136).  
 
Social democracy has been able to link social rights to situations, activities and roles that are 
particular to women’s lives. For example, “a political struggle going on between women and 
men, for the right to count certain types of unpaid work as a legitimate basis for welfare 
entitlements” has taken place (op.cit.: 144). The key to an improvement in women’s social 
circumstances lies, above all, in the recognition of the special aspects of women’s life 
situations: “The challenge for these homogeneous societies is in fact to design a gender 
equality policy that allows for pluralism and gender difference while guaranteeing equality” 
(op.cit.: 162-163). The political right to participation in the Scandinavian system has also 
become more woman-friendly through the state feminist project, because women have 
acquired the same rights as men, but, more importantly, as a result of a stronger recognition of 
gender difference: “The legitimation of gender differences has given an important impetus to 
women’s participation in the public sphere” (op.cit.: 136). The social-democratic cultivation 
of political citizenship into a participatory corporatism, as in Norway, has, in addition, a 
particularly woman-friendly potential. State feminism can be read as an attempt to develop a 
corporative and democratic form of governance that also takes into consideration women’s 
life situation and feminist demands. Feminization from above has contributed to re-defining, 
in a woman-friendly direction, the existing regulatory regime of representation and decision-
making in the corporative channel, with the help of special national and local structures for 
promoting gender equality, the Equal Status Act, various kinds of gender equality policies – 
and policies sensitive to gender difference. Feminization from below has above all been about 
including women, women’s organizations and women’s professions in institutional 
negotiations both centrally and locally. Both have contributed to a stronger recognition of 
gender conflict and gender politics as part of the political agenda. A system characterized by 
institutional intermingling and a fluid division between private and public spheres is 
structurally adapted to accommodate the gender perspective and women’s liberation, Hernes 
argues:  
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The separation of private and public, personal and community aspects of life in most Western 
societies is usually regarded as one of the greatest stumbling blocks for the emancipation of 
women. Scandinavia is a deviant case in this respect (op.cit.: 162).  
 
The development of woman-friendly participatory rights and material well-being in 
Scandinavia is also dependent on certain cultural conditions. With time women have to a large 
degree become incorporated into the national solidaric community, into “folkhemmet”821, 
which guarantees the social-democratic system of rights (original emphasis, op.cit.: 161). 
 
6.1.7 Citizenship under welfare state capitalism 
 
Hernes introduces the ideal of social-democratic citizenship as an alternative to the 
established citizenship ideals in political philosophy. Welfare State and Woman Power 
contributes, however, also to a more concrete debate on the characteristics of welfare state 
capitalism, inspired by Jürgen Habermas’ theory of modernity (op.cit.: 156-158).822 A number 
of Habermas’ analytical concepts are adopted, such as his descriptions of the mutual 
interdependence between different institutions and specific roles within the institutions; the 
client, the consumer, the citizen and the worker (ibid). However, Hernes disagrees with some 
of Habermas’ most important conclusions. She criticizes, for example, his notion of a sharp 
divide between the system (“the public administrative system and the private market”) and the 
lifeworld or everyday life (“which consists of the public sphere of opinion formation and the 
private sphere of intimacy and the family”) (ibid); “the assumption that state and society form 
distinct and even dichotomous categories for social discourse and interaction” (ibid.). This 
type of dichotomy leads to, according to Hernes, two serious problems. First, it reduces 
economic production to system activities. This makes invisible women’s production of 
welfare services in the lifeworld, and, consequently, how women’s activities as mothers and 
unpaid care-workers are deeply integrated in the political economy of welfare state capitalism. 
Second, it becomes difficult to explain how meaningful political activity can take place within 
the framework of the welfare state, and not only in the publics and civil society of the private 
sector: 
 
                                                 
821 “The people’s home” is a well-known slogan used by Swedish social democrats in the 1930s. 
822  Hernes refers to Habermas (1981a): Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns and Habermas (1985): “Die 
Krise der Wohlfahrtsstaates und die Erschöpfung Utopischer Ideen”, Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit. 
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In the light of Scandinavian historical developments one must at least consider the possibility 
of the formation a political identity within the legal-administrative system. This is especially 
relevant in the case of women, who have so many different points of contact with the state 
(op.cit.: 158-159). 
 
The development of the welfare state should not be analyzed as a colonization of the 
lifeworld, where “the uncontrolled expansion of state and market power [has] […] increased 
the system’s control over us and limited our own control over our lives and our capacity for 
self-reflection” (op.cit.: 157), where we are reduced to clients, consumers and workers, and 
where the citizenship role is undermined. Habermas’ political and cultural diagnosis of the 
welfare state tends to be too pessimistic, Hernes summarizes. The same goes for general 
trends in international feminist literature on the welfare state, which do not take seriously the 
fact “that women’s client status and their dependence on – or rather integration into – the 
public distribution system contains the seeds of a new citizenship status” (op.cit.: 155-156).   
 
6.2 Critical perspectives on state feminism and social democracy 
 
6.2.0 Woman-friendly social democracy: A summary  
 
Consequently, Scandinavian social-democratic ideals stress: 
 
i) the significance of democratic participation in political decision-making processes, 
especially through a democratic-corporative system based on a broad network of contacts 
between the state, civil society and families, 
ii) citizens’ material well-being, guaranteed through a high level of employment and the 
social rights of the welfare state, and 
iii) the significance of an ethical solidaric community that ensures political and social 
citizenship.     
 
In addition, Scandinavian social democracy, despite its traditional patriarchal subtext, is about 
to be made more woman-friendly through the state feminist project: 
 
iv) Women are incorporated into the national ethical community; their political citizenship is 
strengthened particularly by the emphasis on gender differences and women’s representation; 
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their social citizenship is guaranteed, partly by universalizing social rights, partly by adapting 
them to the typical life situations and daily lives of women.  
 
There are, in my opinion, some normative problems connected with this political ideal. Where 
are its blind spots? I shall make four points. 
 
6.2.1 Social democracy and private autonomy: The liberal deficit 
 
Social democracy is characterized by a particular political and social citizenship, a “special 
interplay between participatory and material rights” (op.cit.: 93), what Skjeie and Siim refer 
to as “the two large inclusions” in recent Scandinavian history (2000: 347). In the introduction 
to Welfare State and Woman Power, Hernes describes the woman-friendly society as a 
feminist version of this political and social citizenship: “[A] woman-friendly state would 
enable women to have a natural relationship to their children, their work, and public life” 
(op.cit.: 15). There is no reason to doubt that societal democratization and the welfare state 
have contributed to making Scandinavian women better off in many ways when “we compare 
ourselves with women in other parts of the world” (Hernes 2001: 48), or to underestimate the 
importance of political and social rights. Modern systems of rights also contain, however, a 
third category of rights, namely our civil rights: The welfare state and democracy must be 
institutionalized under the rule of law, as a Rechtstaat. Civil rights should protect our private 
autonomy, our moral right to a negatively defined domain where we can freely act and 
express ourselves.823 Together with the demand for political and social rights, and after a time 
also cultural rights, the demand for civil rights and private autonomy has been struggled for in 
what social philosopher Axel Honneth (1996) refers to as ‘struggles for recognition’. The 
feminist ‘struggle for recognition’ is also concerned with the struggle for the individual 
woman’s right to a room of her own. In a woman-friendly society women ought to be given 
the opportunity to develop a ‘natural relationship’ to their ‘children’, to their ‘work’, and to 
‘public life’, but also to themselves. When Hernes writes that our private autonomy is perhaps 
not “sufficiently protected” in the Scandinavian system (op.cit.: 145), she draws thus attention 
to a problem that ought to be taken seriously by feminists. Especially because, as philosopher 
                                                 
823 The right is described as a right to a negatively defined domain of expression and action because it refers to 
our right to (negative) freedom from illegitimate restrictions. The relationship between negative and positive 
freedom (to), and between the formal right to and real opportunities to act and express oneself freely, is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
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Anita L. Allen points out, women often experience more illegitimate restrictions as private 
persons than men do: 
 
There is an unequal distribution of privacy and autonomy in our society. Women […] have 
too little of the privacy and private choice they need to live up to their potential as the equals 
of men (2001: 35). 
 
This makes the demand for private autonomy an issue for feminism. For feminist political 
philosophy it becomes a crucial task to examine how normative concepts of autonomy and 
private life should be formulated, if they are also to recognize women’s integrity as private 
persons.824 
 
Welfare State and Woman Power devotes too little attention, in my opinion, to the moral 
significance of the individual’s right to autonomy in personal matters. One expression of this 
insufficient attention, is the somewhat one-sided normative discussion of the institutional 
interconnections and the rubbing-out of the distinction between public and private spheres in 
the Scandinavian system. Generally speaking, Hernes describes ‘the public/private mix’ that 
characterizes Scandinavian social democracies as something positive, as a woman-friendly 
opportunity: It is easier to follow up the feminist slogan of ‘making the personal political’ in a 
society where the divide between the personal and the political is in flux (op.cit.: 153-154, 
161-162). This is a reasonable hypothesis. However, in a system where private and public 
spheres, personal and political issues, are interwoven, it can sometimes also be more difficult 
for the individual to demand the right to private autonomy – the right to approach life’s small 
and large issues on the basis of one’s own preferences and evaluations, independent of 
prevailing public opinions.825 As Hernes observes, “Scandinavian political culture and 
institutions offer a greater variety of public citizen roles – if not private roles – to both women 
and men than most other cultures do” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 147). I believe it is important to 
discuss this feature of the Scandinavian system as a significant problem. A system that has 
grown out of a homogeneous ethical community, based on a strong sense of duty between the 
members of society, is a system based on collectivist values. Such values may have 
contributed to the growth of the system of social rights in Scandinavia. It is less likely that 
they form the best cultural safeguard against normalization and violations of citizens’ private 
autonomy. 
                                                 
824 See Chapter 9. 
825 One should not use this freedom, however, to infringe upon the rights of others (see Chapter 9). 
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The liberal tradition is the political and philosophical tradition that has stressed most 
consistently the importance of the citizen’s right to a negatively defined domain of personal 
freedom.826 In Hernes’ discussion the liberal citizenship ideal is generally described as the 
opposite of a woman-friendly social democracy: “[…] liberal values and institutions […] deny 
women an equal citizenship” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 139). Even the liberal demand for 
“personal integrity of body and mind, and certain forms of personal autonomy” appears 
mildly suspect in her presentation: It is concerned with nothing more than protecting “private 
pursuit of salvation and capital accumulation” (ibid.). To be sure, liberal interpretations of the 
notion of autonomy stress the individual’s right to economic freedom. In the liberal tradition 
there are, moreover, contributions that equate the freedom of the individual with homo 
economicus’ freedom of contract, and question the legitimacy of redistribution of goods 
(Nozick 1974). All the same, Hernes’ interpretation of liberal ideas of freedom and rights are 
unreasonably reductionist. Representatives of egalitarian liberalism, such as John Rawls and 
Ronald Dworkin,827 have developed a sophisticated defense of political rights and social 
redistribution. The thinking of Rawls and Dworkin is not essentially women-unfriendly. 
Egalitarian liberalism should, on the contrary, be integrated in the normative basis of 
feminism.828  
 
Hernes’ reflections on Habermas’ theories on modernity and welfare-state capitalism are in 
many ways enlightening. She correctly points out the dangers in considering the distinction 
between the system and the lifeworld as a distinction between different institutions; as being 
similar to the distinction between material and symbolic reproduction. This approach makes 
invisible the material reproduction in the lifeworld, such as women’s unpaid care-work in the 
family. Moreover, it underestimates the potential for citizenship and political opinion 
formation in a situation like that in Scandinavia, where the state – and therefore ‘the system’ – 
and civil society enjoy a relatively large numbers of contacts. The distinction between the 
                                                 
826 The significance of private autonomy is also recognized, however, in recent republican works which, like 
Hernes, focus on participatory rights and the sovereignty of the people. Philip Pettit criticizes what he calls 
“populist” republican thought that defines freedom quite simply as political participation: “Democratic control 
should certainly be regarded as important in the [republican] tradition, but the importance comes, not from any 
definitional connection with liberty, but from the fact that it is a means of furthering liberty” (1999: 30).  
827 Key works include Rawls’ A Theory of Justice and Dworkins’ Taking Rights Seriously. Rawls and Dworkins’ 
liberalism is based on Kant’s moral philosophy. Robert Nozick’s (1974) economic liberalism takes Locke’s 
contract theory and defense of private ownership as its point of departure. It is important to differentiate between 
these two branches within the liberal tradition.  
828 Consider my use of Rawls in other chapters. Egalitarian liberalism should also be integrated in the normative 
basis of socialism (as suggested by for example Roemer (1994), but also by Rawls (2001) and Kymlicka (2002). 
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system and the lifeworld should first and foremost be viewed as a distinction between two 
different principles of societal integration that function in both ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
institutional contexts. On these points, Hernes’ analyses coincide with the feminist criticism 
of Habermas, as it is expressed for example by Jean Cohen (1995) and Nancy Fraser 
(1995).829 Both Cohen and Fraser fear, however, like Habermas, welfare state paternalism: 
 
[…] when welfare regulations, employing criteria of equal treatment in an attempt to secure 
an actual equality in living situations and power positions, achieve this goal only under 
conditions or with instruments that, as far as the presumptive beneficiaries are concerned, also 
severely limit the vulnerable areas in which individuals can autonomously pursue a private 
life plan (original emphasis, Habermas 1999: 416). 
 
Here Habermas re-articulates the liberal concern: Welfare-state systems can acquire a shape 
that threatens the individual citizen’s private autonomy. Systems that try to create a material 
basis for freedom of action may instead produce new forms of dependency (“the possible gain 
in the material capacity to act changes into a new dependency” (ibid.). A similar liberal-
feminist concern is that the loss of autonomy that results from normalizing welfare 
arrangements can affect women in particular, because women form the welfare state’s largest 
client group. Welfare-state policies are often two-faced. One example from Norway is the 
right to maternity benefits: On the one hand, this right has contributed to strengthening the 
economic position of large groups of women. On the other, because the right is tied to the 
mother’s participation in paid work before birth, it inspires women to subject themselves, for 
financial reasons, to a regime of paid work that places considerable restrictions on how the 
individual organizes her daily life.830  
 
What mechanisms can be developed as protections against a welfare state paternalism that 
values certain ways of life above others? Hernes’ republicanism makes her stress the 
importance of broad political participation. This is highly significant. The welfare state 
becomes normalizing and illegitimate if different groups of women, with different concepts of 
                                                 
829 According to Cohen, and contrary to what Fraser asserts, Habermas does not equate the system-lifeworld 
division with the distinction between material and symbolic reproduction. Cohen, however, agrees with Fraser 
that Habermas formulates, wrongly, the division between system and lifeworld as a division between different 
institutions. This criticism has many similarities with Axel Honneth’s (1985) criticism of Habermas. Habermas 
considers this criticism to be based upon an incorrect interpretation of his ideas: His notion of the lifeworld is a 
pragmatic notion (introduced in an analysis of the pragmatic conditions for communication), not a sociological 
one (1995: 370).  
830 If the mother does not have a paid job before birth, she has the right to a one-time payment, but this is at a 
much lower level, see Danielsen (2002). 
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the good life, are not given a chance to participate in political discussions and decision-
making processes.  
 
However, it is important to be clear about the limitations of the republican solution. Collective 
democratic opinion and will formation should not be regarded as a replacement for private 
freedoms. One can mobilize against welfare state paternalism by developing a political 
citizenship. However, clients are also citizens who should acknowledge their civil rights and 
private autonomy in addition to their political rights. Socio-political systems that infringe on 
women’s private autonomy, do not become more legitimate because they function within the 
framework of a system, such as the Scandinavian one, where women have considerable 
influence over the formulation of social policies, for example through participatory 
corporatism and through women-dominated welfare-state professions. It is important to 
acknowledge the mutual connections, the “reciprocal references” between private and 
political autonomy (Habermas 1999: 417).831 The relationship between liberal rights and 
republican ideals are mutually constitutive. In Welfare State and Woman Power Hernes 
correctly couples women’s increased freedom with the development of democracy and 
participatory rights. This kind of analysis, which has been central to feminist political theory, 
has undoubtedly inspired Habermas when he analyses challenges  for gender-equality 
politics:832    
 
[…] no regulation, however sensitive to context, can adequately concretize the equal right to 
an autonomous private life unless it simultaneously strengthens the position of women in the 
political public sphere and thereby augments participation in forms of political 
communication that provide the sole arenas in which citizens can clarify the relevant aspects 
that define status (original emphasis, Habermas 1999: 426).    
 
Recognition of women’s right to private autonomy presupposes that women are able to 
participate on an equal footing in political discussions on how this right can be concretized 
and delineated. The opposite, however, is also the case. To reverse Habermas’ chain of 
analysis: Women’s political demands which are formulated through public discussions are not 
genuinely representative, if women are not guaranteed their private autonomy. Without such a 
right, without the individual woman being afforded an domain in which she can express 
herself and act freely, and thus develop into a unique person different from all others, a 
number of relevant aspects, which ought to be taken into consideration when political 
                                                 
831 See Chapter 9.  
832 Habermas refers to Iris Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib and Martha Minow (1999: 562-563). 
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demands on behalf of women are to be formulated and discussed, will become suppressed 
from the very outset. There is a deep internal connection between the aim of making “all areas 
of social life” democratic and a “sufficient” protection of our “individual autonomy” (Hernes 
1987: 144, 145). 
 
6.2.2 Political citizenship and the representation of women 
 
Hernes links woman-friendly political citizenship to representation, in particular to the 
representation of women as a group. Political group rights that are gender-based, such as 
different types of quota systems, are legitimate, according to Hernes, because women have 
specific experiences and interests, especially as mothers and unpaid care-workers. Also these 
experiences and interests should be represented where political alternatives are discussed and 
decisions are made. Skjeie and Siim point out a dilemma attached to gender differentiated 
citizenship ideals: “[…] the emphasis on women’s experiences ‘as women’ tends to tie 
women conceptually to ‘motherhood’ and thus to enforce their maternal role” (2000: 352). 
Feminist strategies that stress women’s difference can end up producing repressive maternal 
stereotypes of what women ‘are’, what they can do and what they want. All “pluralism”, 
individual and cultural difference between women, is not captured solely through a 
recognition of “gender difference” (Hernes 1987: 163).833 This is also the case regarding 
pluralism between men. In a situation where several groups of men challenge hegemonic 
masculinity by, among other things, participating in care-work and by linking their 
masculinity to care-giving, cultural stereotypes linking care too intimately to motherhood, will 
eventually be discouraging, especially if they are given political importance.834  
 
Besides, feminist strategies that stress women’s difference can result in concealing social 
conflicts and power relations between individuals and groups of the same gender. It would, 
however, be incorrect to claim that the Scandinavian system does not recognize social 
inequalities between women as a problem. Hernes’ ideal is “a woman-friendly state […] 
where gender based injustice is to a large degree eliminated without leading to greater 
inequality in other areas, for example between groups of women” (2001: 49).  An important 
                                                 
833 Compare with Hernes’ conclusion: “The challenge for these homogeneous societies is in fact to design a 
gender equality policy that allows for pluralism and gender differences while guaranteeing equality” (my 
emphasis, 1987: 163).  
834 Men should be included and made responsible in the political arenas where normative regulation and policies 
of child-care and care for the elderly are discussed. 
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challenge then is to clarify how egalitarian considerations of this kind may be reconciled more 
specifically with state feminism’s strong focus on women’s similarities and common interests. 
How a gender-differentiated political citizenship can be reconciled with the existence of 
individual and cultural diversity, is a question that has scarcely been raised in Scandinavian 
debates on state feminism and social democracy, until recently. Skjeie and Siim (2000) 
believe that the dilemma can be solved with the help of principles of political representation 
which do not take as a starting point essentialist notions of social groups,835 and which 
combine principles of representation with procedures of communicative opinion and will 
formation that respect the individual participant’s autonomy.836 Such an approach makes 
problematic the linking of political rights to a basis of common female experience, but also, 
perhaps to a greater degree than Skjeie and Siim themselves recognize, other traits of the 
social-democratic citizenship model. To start with: If the ideal is actually democratic 
representation and communication, it also becomes critical to discuss both normative and 
institutional conditions for democratic communication, not only for democratic representation 
(op.cit.: 353). A clarification of normative conditions for communication will raise a number 
of questions, concerning the relationship between rationality and feelings, communicative and 
strategic rationality, needs and interests and needs and interest interpretation, language and 
experience, rhetoric and argumentation, legitimacy and power in public discussions. A 
clarification of institutional conditions will raise the question of how communicative 
principles for social integration with roots in the lifeworld can be institutionalized through a 
set of different publics. It is rather unclear what roles communication, the public sphere and 
independent social movements are supposed to play in the state feminist system (Halsaa 
1996).837 This is, however, a central question. To believe that political struggles, such as the 
feminist, can be carried out by means of gender differentiated interest representation and 
strategic negotiations alone, would be to commit an “instrumental mistake”, to borrow a term 
from Hans Skjervheim’s (1976) classical criticism of the Norwegian regime. Second, if the 
ideal is a communicative democracy that respects the individual participant’s autonomy, this 
implies, as I see it, that the feminist struggles normatively considered, should not be 
prejudged either in a difference-feminist or in an equality-feminist direction. If women’s self-
                                                 
835 Such concepts wrongly presuppose that all members of a group have common ‘objective’ experiences and 
interests.  
836 Skjeie and Siim base their reflection on Anne Phillips’ and Iris Marion Young’s political theories. 
837 By independent social movements I mean movements that either cannot or will not orient their activities 
toward the political agenda of the corporative channel. Halsaa (1996) analyzes in particular the challenges and 
problems of the independent women’s movement and grass-roots feminism in the state feminist system.  
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determination is a categorical imperative,838 in private as well as in public contexts, equality- 
and difference-centered policies ought to be considered as situation-based strategies that are 
more or less able to realize this goal. The adequacy of legislation, welfare systems or political 
procedures, which are respectively gender neutral or gender specific, can only be decided 
when it becomes clear whether they hinder or promote women’s autonomy (Pauer-Studer 
2000: 248-283). This analysis already underlay Simone de Beauvoir’s freedom-based feminist 
analysis in The Second Sex: The attempt to promote equality and solidarity must never 
undermine the first ideal of the French Revolution, namely the freedom of the individual.839 
Infringing the freedom of human beings, infringes their humanity, Beauvoir asserts. Feminist 
projects should be formulated in accordance with such humanistic perspectives. 
 
6.2.3 Employment, production and social rights 
 
Material security and social redistribution are important features of the social-democratic 
citizenship ideal. The social dimension is to be realized partly through a high level of 
employment, partly through universal social rights, partially through women-specific social 
rights,840 and partly through social rights brought about by participation in paid and unpaid 
work. Will such a combination of measures actually secure social redistribution and the 
material security of citizens? The answer depends on several factors. If high employment is 
made one of the primary goals, as in the Scandinavian system, the degree of redistribution and 
economic security will be dependent on the job market. Today’s labor market is influenced in 
part by large – and in Norway as in other OECD countries, increasing – salary inequalities. 
The employment society is not moving in an egalitarian direction. Neither is it a given that 
participation in the labor market secures material security for the individual. In a situation 
where the labor market is liberalized, for example, and salary determination is to a large 
degree market-based, we could reach a situation where on the contrary parts of the active 
workforce could have very low salaries, and even fall below the poverty line.841 Claims that 
high employment leads to welfare and equality therefore rests on the premise that the labor 
                                                 
838 Skjeie and Teigen (2001) describe today’s state feminist regulation regime as regulated by “the categorical 
imperative of gender balance”. In Chapter 8 I argue against their principle of gender balance. 
839 Toril Moi reflects on this in her introduction to the Norwegian translation of Beauvoir’s book. Moi’s 
reflections make visible how discussions on whether The Second Sex has an equality-feminist or a difference-
feminist tendency, have unfortunately overshadowed Beauvoir’s thoughts on feminism and freedom. Beauvoir’s 
existentialistic notion of freedom is, however, problematic.   
840 Typical examples of the latter are maternity leave and one-off benefits for mothers without paid work. 
841 As in the U.S. (Mink 1998). 
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market is to some extent politically regulated. For those who believe that egalitarian 
citizenship ideals can be best realized through achieving full employment, it becomes 
important to discuss how such regulations can be formulated, and what decision procedures 
ought to be institutionalized to deal with questions relating to “justice at work” (Shapiro 1999: 
143-195). 
 
The socio-political consequences of the social-democratic goals of full employment and 
economic growth, are somewhat uncertain. These goals are also problematic, however, when 
seen in the light of present-day ecological challenges. The task of contemporary welfare states 
is to secure a just redistribution within the framework of a sustainable economy, where 
production, employment and consumption have to adapt to nature’s ability to endure. A 
reasonable social system of rights should, in my view, take into account, additionally, a 
situation where a stable high percentage of the population has no connection to the labor 
market. Several considerations point towards this: If the development of the Norwegian 
economy is to coincide to a lesser or greater degree with development within the OECD-
region in the future, it is likely that unemployment will increase. It is important to construct 
welfare systems that are prepared for such a future scenario. Even today groups that are 
outside the labor market suffer because a succession of welfare benefits are tied to 
participation in paid work: Exclusion from the labor market is one of the most important 
causes of poverty in Norway today (Backe-Hansen 2001).  
 
Women dominate the groups that are excluded from the labor market. Single mothers and 
women from minority backgrounds without paid work, are greatly overrepresented in 
Norwegian poverty statistics. These are women who spend a lot of time and energy on unpaid 
care work. Hernes’ critique of a citizenship ideal based on the citizen worker, leads to a 
defense of linking the earning of welfare rights not only to participation in paid work, but also 
to participation in societally important unpaid work. This seems fair from any reasonable 
conception of justice, even though this type of reform would be difficult to carry out, also in 
Norwegian society, where unpaid care work is acknowledged as valuable (i.e. as having 
value) only to a limited degree (Holter 1997, Christensen and Syltevik 1999). Such rights 
ought, however, to be tied systematically to the activity, to unpaid work, and not to the gender 
that carries it out. Making a connection between social rights and unpaid work would no 
doubt improve women’s economic situation, but it ought not to be perceived exclusively as a 
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woman-specific right.842 The principle of every individual’s right to equal moral respect does, 
however, make it reasonable to argue that each and everyone of us has the right to basic 
material security, independent of our paid or unpaid contributions,843 for example in the form 
of an unconditional basic income. Analyses of this sort challenge, radically, the social-
democratic connection between work and welfare.  
 
6.2.4 Community values and social-democratic citizenship 
 
Welfare State and Woman Power ties the development of the social-democratic citizenship 
ideal to the deeply felt national and ethical sense of community found in the Scandinavian 
countries. “The altruistic impetus”, duty and feeling of solidarity among members of society 
explains “the stability of the Scandinavian system” (Hernes 1987: 141). This can be 
interpreted as being a claim about a causal relationship: The existence of certain cultural 
norms in Scandinavia can contribute to explaining the growth of the social-democratic system 
of rights. It is, however, also a claim about the legitimacy of the Scandinavian system: The 
social-democratic citizenship model receives its particular qualities from the superior values 
and virtues that characterize Scandinavian culture and historical development. The history of 
Scandianvian development told in Welfare State and Woman Power is marked by a 
considerable moral involvement. The conception of Scandinavian history is almost 
teleological: Social democracy and state feminism emerge as the natural high-point in a 
historical development marked by progressive social movements and countercultures – which 
have been integrated into an ever ‘friendlier’ state.844 In addition, Scandinavian societies of 
today will progress further still if they simply follow their own progressive historical logic – if 
we do not allow the distinctive Scandinavian solidarity to fade away (ibid.). 
 
Both the historical elaboration of and the communitarian justification for the social-
democratic system of rights raise a few questions.845 One is how a state feminist social 
democracy can become institutionalized in cultural contexts other than the Scandinavian one, 
                                                 
842 Some important rights, however, tied for example to pregnancy, will be de facto women-specific. 
843 This can, for example, be said to follow from Rawls’ (1999) concept of primary goods and of Amartya Sen’s 
(1993) capability approach. 
844 Fredrik W. Thue (1995) discusses the Norwegian historian Ernst Sars who suggets that Venstre (the Liberal 
Party in Norway) “represented the historically necessary consummation of Norway’s self-realization as a 
nation”. Social democracy plays a not so different role in Welfare State and Woman Power, even though Hernes’ 
account is less influenced than that of Sars by Hegelian metaphors and reconciliation-philosophical tendencies. 
845 Communitarians believe that a society’s political system reflects – and ought to reflect – the society’s 
common ethical horizon. For a more complete definition, see Fjørtoft (2002). 
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if its development is so tightly bound to the Scandinavian countries’ historical development 
and political culture.846 Perhaps it is the case that one should look more optimistically in the 
light of Scandinavian historical development at the possibilities for democratization and 
increasing the political power of citizens through the state (op.cit.: 158-159). However, such 
optimism presupposes that similar democratizing possibilities may also be found in capitalist 
welfare-state societies with a different historical development from that in Scandinavia. To 
what extent are the democratization and feminization of political and social citizenship in the 
Scandinavian system dependent upon a specific historical development, which other states 
cannot easily copy? To what extent, for example, can a woman-friendly participatory 
corporatism become institutionalized in a nation with a different political tradition from that 
of Norway? 
 
Another question is whether the descriptions of an especially positive moral grammar in 
Scandinavian history and tradition in Welfare State and Woman Power are somewhat 
exaggerated. Modernity in Scandinavia is a story about the growth in civil, political and social 
rights, the breakthrough of new social movements, and the integration of new social groups. 
Yet, Scandinavian history is also a story about the expansion of the state and the market, 
weaker possibilities for democratic governance, the consolidation of old forms of power and 
the establishment of new ones, the reproduction of social inequality, cultural normalization 
and exclusion of those who are different. The consequences of modernization are ambiguous, 
even in the Scandinavian countries. 
 
A third question is whether it is necessarily particularly ideal that a “political-legal 
community” should be organized with its starting point in a relatively homogenous national 
“ethical community” (op.cit.: 161). A state founded on cultural homogeneity and a common 
ethical horizon can come to oppress alternative cultural considerations and individual 
diversity. In modern pluralistic societies it is problematic, both in the moral sense and in 
practice, to promote certain ethical views and ideas about the good life through the use of 
governmental power. 
 
                                                 
846 This problem is discussed in several contributions in Stetson and Mazur (1995). For example Jean Robinson 
asks in her article on the developmental characteristics of state feminism in Poland, “Women, the State, and the 
Needs for Civil Society”, about the following: “Does the literature on state feminism presume a particular 
relation between state and society, one that is seated on the assertion that the state has been created out of the 
collection of practices and discourses embedded in liberal democratic histories and the existence of a civil 
society that enables various groups to articulate their interests and compete over power?” (1995: 204).                 
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It is also rather unclear how Marshall’s modern system of rights can emerge out of a tight 
value- and solidarity community. As Robert E. Goodin (1987) points out in his analysis of the 
welfare state’s political philosophy, such a system of rights cannot logically be derived from 
solidarity and a perceived fellowship between members of a society. An obvious illustration is 
the position of women in Norwegian society. It seems unreasonable to assert that Norwegian 
women were not included in the national ethical community before they gained the right to 
vote in 1913 or various welfare rights after World War II. Women were probably considered 
already in 1814 to be both caring subjects and romantic objects that contributed to ‘the 
altruistic impetus’ in Norwegian culture, without their receiving the right to vote for that 
reason. Moreover, Goodin points out that there are no clear empirical connections between 
Gemeinschaft-relationships and the development of the modern system of rights.847 For 
example, it does not seem that a reduction in social rights necessarily weakens the solidarity 
bonds between members of society to a significant degree: “[…] cutbacks that have happened 
in Scandinavian welfare programs over the recent years seem not to have done any noticeable 
damage to the sense of community in those nations” (op.cit.: 107).848 In the U.S., 
communitarian arguments about societal responsibility and solidarity enter into conservative 
arguments against universal social rights, and for a charity-based welfare system. Goodin’s 
third point is that there are other and better ways of justifying people’s rights than appealing 
to citizens’ national solidarity and sense of community. Human rights can, for example, be 
justified with reference to the basic norm of equal respect. What the political theorist Jodi 
Dean (1996) calls “the solidarity of strangers”,849 i.e. the solidarity with those who do not 
belong to one’s own ‘ethical community’, has become even more important in a situation 
characterized by globalization processes, where social relations that cause injustice, 
exploitation and oppression are established across state borders. Such developmental features 
are the reasons feminists need to be more global in their thinking on justice, and challenge the 
normative status of state borders in the same way as they have challenged the borders between 
the private and the public sphere. Onora O’Neill writes in an essay on feminism and 
globalization: 
 
We rely on numerous transnational economic and political processes and institutions, and so 
cannot consistently insist that justice (conveniently for the developed world) stops at state 
                                                 
847 It is important not to forget that the development of the modern system of rights coincides with the 
development of Gesellschaft. 
848 Recent analyses seem to confirm Goodin’s impression, see for example Stjernø (2005). 
849 This is the title of her book. 
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frontiers, any more than we can rely on women’s rationality and their productive contribution 
and then argue that justice (conveniently for some men) stops at the edge of a supposed 
‘private’ sphere, whose existence and demarcation are in fact presupposed in defining a 
‘public’ sphere (2000: 158). 
 
As pointed out by Hernes in her recent reflections, “the internationalization and globalization 
of the nations in which we live and of our existence” is a crucial challenge for feminism in the 
future (2001: 52). 
 
 
6.3 State feminism and the period of self-reflection 
 
Is it reasonable to believe that normative facets of the state feminist regime can have inspired 
the reflexive turn in Norwegian academic feminism that was traced and analyzed in Chapter 
5? And, more specifically, is it probable that the significant critical interpretation of 
modernity characterizing the reflexive turn can have something to do with dominating 
citizenship-ideas in the Norwegian system? What are the connections between the moral 
grammar of a state feminists system and the self-reflection of its feminist academics?  
 
Different hypotheses come to mind: 
 
i) Feminists might not raise much critique in a state feminist system, because its women-
friendliness makes critique superfluous. This has, however, not been the case in Norway. The 
field of feminist research, in which feminist critique of different kinds has been raised, has 
expanded significantly after the 1970s (i.e. in the period of the development and consolidation 
of the state feminist system), assessed relative to the number of contributions and 
contributors.  
 
ii) Feminists might not debate standards of feminist critique in a state feminist system, 
because the standards of feminism set by the women-friendly state are accepted as valid, and 
meta-debates are considered unnecessary. There might, however, be debate on whether the 
state-set standards are in fact lived up to, and, if many reckon they are not, on how they might 
be better fulfilled: The critique raised in a state feminist system might be mostly of an 
immanent kind. And it is the case that most of what has been written, even in what I have 
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referred to as the period of self-refection in the Norwegian research field, has expressed 
critique of the latter kind: Meta-debates do not dominate the agenda of the field. They are, 
however, significantly present. 
  
iii) Feminists might debate standards of feminist critique in a state feminist system, because 
the standards of feminism set by the women-friendly state are not accepted as valid in all 
respects by all, so meta-debates are considered necessary. Several of the contributors to the 
reflexive turn of Norwegian academic feminism link their meta-critique to a critique of 
Norwegian political feminism; to the concepts and standards of the state feminist regime.850 
This critique of state feminism is in turn linked to a critique of the project of modernity, 
because many critics regard state feminism as a regime in the spirit of modernity:851 
Postmodern as well as communitarian critics of state feminism in the Norwegian research 
field tend to fuse their criticism of the state feminist regime with a critique of the project of 
modernity. 
 
As the analysis in this chapter suggests, this might, however, be somewhat of a 
misconception. The normative blind spots I have elaborated in the previous paragraphs, are 
referred to as ‘blind spots’ relative to my critical yardstick; a feminism anchored in the 
normative horizon of modernity.852 The normative perspectives of Norwegian state feminism 
should not, as several critics do, be conceived as simply expressing this horizon. I have, on 
the contrary, criticized the normative basis of this feminism from within this horizon.  
 
Several of the contributors to the reflexive turn of Norwegian academic feminism defend 
indeed the standards of the state feminist regime.853 My point here, however, is that defending 
Norwegian state feminist standards cannot simply be equated with defending a feminism of 
the modern imaginary. 
 
                                                 
850 See for example Bjerrum Nielsen (1995), Gulbrandsen (1995), Davidsen, Solli and Waaler (1996), L’orange 
Fürst (1997), Martinsen (1997), Christie Mathiesen (1998), Meyer (1999), Mortensen (1999), Birkeland (2000), 
Annfelt (2000), Monsen (2000), Borchgrevink (2002), Bugge Tenden (2002), Loga (2002), Markussen (2002), 
Danielsen (2004). 
851 Consider, for example, Siri Meyer (1999), one of the researchers of the research project of Power and 
Democarcy (commented on in Chapter 4 and 8), who connects her radical critique of the project of modernity to 
a critique of the Norwegian regime, assuming the latter is a regime in the spirit of modernity. 
852 See also Chapters 2, 7-9. 
853 I have already mentioned the sociologists and political scientists who have studied Norwegian state feminism 
empirically (see 6.1.3). 
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The precise status of my claims here should be stressed. Helga Hernes explicates the 
underlying normative and political ideas of the Norwegian state feminist regime. I have, 
however, not investigated to what extent actual state feminist policies are expressions of these 
ideas. To do so; to investigate the relationship between state feminism as political philosophy 
and real-life state feminism will be crucial in any assessment of Scandinavian state feminism 
as a feminist model system. The four blind spots of state feminism’s political philosophy 
highlighted in this chapter suggest a place to start a balanced but critical investigation of its 
merits. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
RICHARD RORTY, FEMINISM AND MORAL 
UNIVERSALISM854 
 
In 1990 Richard Rorty held The Tanner Lecture of Human Values with the title “Feminism 
and Pragmatism”. In the lecture he attempts to demonstrate that “pragmatic philosophy might 
be useful to feminist politics” (1998a: 206): “[He] is addressing feminists as a suitor with a 
marriage proposal”, as one commentator puts it.855 Rorty believes that feminism is about 
giving “redescriptions” of the gender relationship: The path to a “less painful future” where 
“men do no thank God […] they were not born women”, comes through the use of language 
(“creative uses […] and misuses of language”) in ways that touch us (“change instinctive 
emotional reactions”) (op.cit.: 204, 207, 224). Feminism cannot be justified with reference to 
a norm of treating everyone as equals (“treat them on par”) independent of gender (op.cit.: 
217). I will examine his argument against moral universalism.856 
 
Rorty is an anti-realist. He wants us to stop searching for knowledge about “the Way the 
World is”; “drop the appearance-reality distinction in favor of a distinction between beliefs 
that serve some purposes and beliefs that serve other purposes” (op.cit.: 206).857 To reject 
moral universalism follows from this anti-realism. “[If] we drop questions about the Way the 
World Is, [we] […] drop the Ideas of the Nature of Humanity and of the Moral Law” (Rorty 
1998a: 206). This conclusion is based on the following argument: Moral universalists are 
moral realists; “someone who thinks that true moral judgments are made true by something 
out there in the world” (op.cit.: 205). The typical “truth-maker” is “the intrinsic features of 
human beings qua human” (ibid). The typical truth-making “intrinsic feature” is “Reason” 
(op.cit.: 217): Reason is our “reality-tracking […] faculty” (op.cit.: 208). If we cannot say that 
                                                 
854 This chapter is an edited version of the paper “Richard Rorty’s Marriage Proposal”. The paragraph at the end 
of the chapter (Exkurs: Richard Rorty and Nancy Fraser) is developed further in Holst (forthcoming b). I thank 
Petter Nafstad, Gunnar Skirbekk, Olav Korsnes, Anders Molander and Hanne Marlene Dahl for comments. I also 
wish to thank Jon Hellesnes, Audun Øfsti, Jodi Dean, Albrecht Wellmer, Wolfgang Kuhlmann, Oddvar Storebø, 
Ellen Mortensen, Tone Bleie and Randi E. Gressgård for discussions. 
855 Nancy Fraser (1991: 259). 
856 This is a more thorough discussion of some of the topics raised in Chapter 2. Consider also 5.4.7. 
857 As an implication of this anti-realism, he asks feminists to stop raising impossible questions about “the 
accuracy of their representations of women’s experience”, and instead “see themselves as creating such 
experience by creating a language” (original emphasis, Rorty 1998a: 212). 
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something in the world is – something we cannot do – we also cannot say that human beings 
are something in particular, for example rational, but unless human beings are rational we 
cannot in turn say that something is morally right. Because then there is no “object” – reason 
– “that makes true moral judgments true” (op.cit.: 206). There is no longer any basis for 
saying that “some traditional occasions of revulsion really are moral abominations and others 
only appear to be”; or for thinking of “moral progress as an increasing ability to see the reality 
behind the illusions created by superstition, prejudice, and unreflective custom” (my 
emphasis, op.cit.: 205). In the following I will scrutinize this argument. 
 
1) 
Rorty describes the history of humankind as a continuation of the history of evolutionary 
biology (op.cit.: 206).858 From this it follows that “the only intrinsic features of human beings 
are those they share with brutes – for example, the ability to suffer and inflict pain. Every 
other feature is up for grabs” (op.cit.: 205). Therefore, something about human beings is: Not 
everything is up for grabs. Rorty believes that to assert that something is, however, is not the 
same as asserting that something is true. When we assert that something is, we assert 
implicitly that we can justify that something is, not that we can justify that something is true; 
“the universal desire for truth is better described as the universal desire for justification” 
(Rorty 2000: 2); “once you understand all about the justification of actions, including the 
justification of assertions, you understand all there is to understand about […] truth” (original 
emphasis, Rorty 1998b: 21). By justifying Rorty means to give reasons (ibid).859 When we 
assert that something is, we implicitly assert that we can give reasons for our assertion. If an 
audience accepts our reasons, the assertion is justified for this audience. Rorty stresses, 
however, that we do not know whether all possible audiences would have accepted our 
reasons, and if we had known that all possible audiences had accepted our reasons, this would 
not make the assertion true, only justified for all possible audiences (ibid). 
 
                                                 
858 In “Feminism and Pragmatism” there are “individual outcasts” that “band together” in “clubs”, “groups” or 
“shared practices”, and “masters” who oppress them or gradually accept them, so that “the practices (of the) 
outcasts” become a part of “the practices of the common culture” (op.cit.: 223, 224). The struggle between 
collectives of “outcasts” and “masters” are to be conceived as “evolutionary struggles”: “The history of human 
social practices is continuous with the history of biological evolution, the only differences being that […] memes 
(turns of speech, terms of aesthetic or moral praise, political slogans, proverbs, musical phrases, stereotypical 
icons) […], [competing] with one another for the available cultural space […], take over the role of […] genes” 
(op.cit.: 206). 
859 “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of our belief, and good, too, for definite, 
assignable reasons” (Rorty 1998b: 21). 
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Rorty is correct that in practice we always justify assertions for specific, concrete, historically 
situated audiences, and that we do not know how other audiences might react to our 
justifications. This does not mean that the reasons we present are not meant to be valid 
reasons for other audiences than the one we are faced with, or that the audience we are faced 
with, if it had accepted our justifications, would not believe that other audiences also would 
have to accept them. Albrecht Wellmer puts it like this:  
 
Even if the justification always is justification for somebody at a given time […] the 
justification of assertions and beliefs from the perspective of those, who put forward or accept 
such justifications, is necessarily meant as the justification of a context-transcending truth-
claim. Truth is claimed for what is asserted; and the only way to redeem such claims is to 
justify the assertion. To make a sincere assertion or to justify a belief would not be what it is 
if it were not connected with the understanding that the assertion or belief could be acceptable 
to any sufficiently competent or enlightened person (2001: 14-15).  
 
Here Wellmer claims both that our justifications of assertions are meant to be context-
transcending, that the audience860 we are faced with who considers an assertion to be justified, 
considers it justified in a context-transcending sense, and that to consider an assertion as 
justified in a context-transcending sense – as justified for all possible audiences of 
‘sufficiently competent or enlightened persons’ – is what we mean when we say we regard an 
assertion to be true.861 Rorty rejects this and similar arguments.862 He believes that: 
 
a) This is a flawed description of what we actually mean when we say we regard an assertion 
to be true.863 
b) The concept of truth should not be understood like this. 
c) If we by true assertions mean assertions that can be justified for all ‘sufficiently competent 
or enlightened persons’, true assertions do not necessarily represent reality.864 
                                                 
860 Rorty’s notion of audience reflects the problematic communitarian tendency in his thinking; “his rhetoric of 
audiences tends to obfuscate the heterogeneous character of at least modern communities and audiences: that is 
their internal differences regarding beliefs, vocabularies and standards of argumentation” (Wellmer 2001: 6).  
See also Fraser (1989: 104, 1991: 264).  
861 To consider an assertion as true in this sense does not mean that one precludes that it later can prove itself to 
be false: All empirical assertions are fallible. However, the reason why an assertion we consider to be true today, 
can prove to be false in the future, is not that future audiences will not be able to find the same reasons 
convincing that the present audience does; that “justification is relative to audience” (Rorty 1998b: 21): “Other 
people (other audiences) may come upon new arguments, new evidences, new ways of speaking, or new 
theories, in the light of which our current justified beliefs might turn out to appear as questionable or false. 
Appear to whom? Not only to new audiences, but, ideally speaking, to us as well (if we were in the position and 
were ready to respond to these new arguments, evidences or theories)” (Wellmer 2001: 3).  
862 For a similar argument, see Habermas (2000). 
863 See for example Rorty (1998b). 
864 For a comprehensive explication of this (classic) philosophical point, see Rorty (1980). 
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Re. a) 
There are a number of different conceptions of truth. In a philosophical context there are, 
however, few who would call an assertion true if it could not be presented reasons why it 
should be regarded as true, or if it could only be presented reasons that a particular audience 
would accept: There is considerable disagreement among philosophers about which reasons 
lead us to believe that an assertion is true,865 there is less disagreement on whether a true 
assertion is an assertion we can justify as true for all ‘sufficiently competent or enlightened 
persons’. Those who, in a philosophical context, believe that the notion of truth should be 
understood differently, seldom use the notion of truth in philosophical contexts for other 
purposes than for the purpose of arguing that the notion of truth should not be used in 
philosophical contexts. Among these are Rorty. Furthermore, whether Rorty’s notion of truth 
is more adequate than Wellmer’s notion of truth, or visa versa, is not an issue of how many 
philosophers prefer Rorty’s notion over Wellmer’s.866 This is an argumentative issue.867 
 
Re. b) 
Rorty argues for an exclusively “commending […] and cautionary use” of the notion of truth:  
 
The reason there is less to be said about truth than one might think […] is that terms used to 
commend or caution – terms such as good!, true!, false!, way to go! and watch it! – do not 
need much philosophical definition or explication (1998b: 21).  
 
However, if we are not going to call assertions true that we believe can be justified based on 
reasons that all ‘sufficiently competent or enlightened persons’ would accept, we still need 
another term to characterize such assertions. We need this not only because many actually 
believe there are such assertions (see re. a). But because assuming that what we assert can be 
justified this way, that is in a context-transcending sense, is a constitutive condition for 
                                                 
865 One reason may be that the assertion is in line with our sense impressions. Another reason may be that it is 
consistent with other assertions we hold to be true. A third reason may be that other ‘sufficiently competent or 
enlightened persons’ hold the assertion to be true. A fourth reason may be a combination of these reasons. 
866 Perhaps Rorty would agree with me that Wellmer in his account captures how many philosophers understand 
the meaning of regarding an assertion as true. Rorty’s point is perhaps that most people use the notion of truth in 
line with his instructions (2000: 4): His approach is so to say more in line with common-sense, if not with 
current philosophical conceptions. That the notion of truth is in line with common-sense does not, however, 
mean that it is adequate.   
867 The-most-philosophers-argument and the common-sense-argument are relevant, but are in no way decisive 
arguments in this connection. Both philosophers and most people can be mistaken. We need to ask why they 
believe what they believe (for example about what truth means), in order to evaluate whether their reasons for 
believing what they believe are warranted. 
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asserting anything at all: If one “makes a sincere assertion”, one assumes that what one asserts 
can be justified in a context-transcending manner – or one is doing something else than 
asserting (or one is “asserting” something one would not seriously assert) (Wellmer 2001: 
14):  
 
[…] the concept of truth is expressive of a constitutive trait of our practice of making and 
justifying assertions. The context-independence of true makes explicit, what the implicit point 
of our making and justifying assertions always-already is (ibid).  
 
This condition for asserting – why not refer to it as the truth-condition? – is constitutive, 
because one, if one denies it, commits a performative self-contradiction (or does not assert 
that one denies it). A performative self-contradiction is a contradiction between the content of 
an assertion and what one assumes when one asserts it (“zwischen dem Inhalt einer 
Proposition und dem selbstbezüglichen – impliziten oder performativ expliziten – 
intentionalen Inhalt des Aktes des Vorbringens der Proposition im Rahmen eines 
argumentativen Diskurses” (Apel 1996: 22). When Rorty asserts that we do not, when we 
assert something, assume that what we assert can be justified by reasons all ‘sufficiently 
competent or enlightened persons’ would accept (that “justification is relative to audience” 
(1998b: 21), he either entangles himself into a contradiction of this kind: He asserts something 
(that justification is not context-transcending) that contradicts what he presupposes when he 
asserts (that what he asserts can be justified in a context-transcending sense). Or he is not 
asserting something he seriously believes he can justify (he is not participating in 
argumentative discourse).            
 
There is reason to believe that Rorty would reject this line of reasoning from two angles. He 
would, first, claim that the argument of performative self-contradiction lacks rhetorical force: 
“I do not think that there are many clear examples of such a charge [of performative self-
contradiction] being taken to heart” (2000: 8). Second, he would claim that his assertion that 
justification is relative to audience also is an assertion which justification is relative to 
audience. Therefore, he does not commit any performative self-contradiction: He does not 
assume that the assertion that justification is relative to audience can be justified with reasons 
acceptable to all possible audiences (he does not assume what the content of the assertion 
denies). This does not mean that he does not seriously assert that justification is relative to 
audience, or means the reasons he presents could not convince many people. We may very-
well say that he argues, but not if what we by ‘arguing’ mean a context-transcending 
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argumentative discourse where one assumes, when one asserts, that what one asserts can be 
justified with reasons all participants in discourse would accept. 
 
However, Rorty does not think the argument of performative self-contradiction lacks 
rhetorical force in all contexts. He himself presumes a variant of this argument when 
criticizing postmodernism: “[The] postmodernist rhetoric of unmasking” is described as “self-
contradictory” and “internally inconsistent”:  
 
Many self-consciously postmodern writers seem to be trying to have it both ways – to view 
masks as going all the way down while still making invidious comparisons between other 
people’s masks and the way things will look when all the masks have been stripped off 
(1998a: 209, 211).868  
 
Arguments can, moreover, not be considered exclusively from a rhetorical perspective, as “a 
good tool for persuading a particular audience”, on the basis of whether it “works” when 
introduced for a particular audience; “win[s] […] it over as it were” (Wellmer 2001: 4, 5). 
They cannot, because a purely instrumentalist notion of what a good argument is, is not 
reconcilable with “the perspective of a participant in the normative game of giving and asking 
for reasons” (op.cit.: 5):  
 
Only if one steps out of this game and looks at it […] from above, that is not from the 
perspective of a participant which is always a committed one, one could say that whether an 
argument […] is good […] depends on whether it works by being de facto accepted by a 
specific audience (ibid).869  
 
If one argues that what one is arguing for does not have argumentative force, one commits a 
performative self-contradiction – the same performative self-contradiction one commits if one 
argues that justification is relative to audience (which is to defend a purely instrumental 
notion of what a good argument is). Rorty will, however, as mentioned, reject that he argues 
for the assertion ‘justification is relative to audience’ in a way that makes him commit a 
performative self-contradiction: One might very-well say that he argues that justification is 
                                                 
868 Compare with Apel’s criticism of Jacques Derrida’s performative self-contradiction; “the condition of the 
possibility of normal communication (e.g. that of Derrida’s discourse about the différance) is […] provided by 
the sufficient fulfillment of the contrafactually anticipated conditions of ideal communication […]. This 
correction indeed implies a negation of Derrida’s dramatically deconstructivist contentions concerning the 
consequences of the différance […],” see (Apel 2001: 9). 
869 As noted by Wellmer, one thus leaves the game “momentarily” when one reflects on it, or “moves to another 
level of it”. But were we to give a reflective description of it, “we would misrepresent it if we forgot that it is a 
game played between committed players who use terms like good, right, true and justified in a committed, that is 
in a normative sense” (2001: 5). 
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relative to audience, but not if ‘arguing’ refers to a context-transcending argumentative 
discourse where the participants implicitly assume they are able to give reasons acceptable to 
all possible audiences. That is, Rorty does not wish to classify his assertions either as rhetoric 
or as argumentation, to see them either from an instrumental perspective or from a normative 
perspective:  
 
[…] the distinction between the strategic and the non-strategic use of language is just a 
distinction between cases in which all we care about is convincing others and cases in which 
we hope to learn something. […] These cases are two ends of the spectrum […]. Most of the 
time we are somewhere in the middle between these two extremes (Rorty 2000: 6).  
 
This clarification does not solve the dilemma, however. If Rorty finds himself on one end of 
the spectrum, if he when he asserts that justification is relative to audience is only concerned 
with winning the audience (“use[ing] any dirty trick […] [he] can [lying, omissio veri, 
suggestion falsi, etc.]”), he has not in fact asserted anything in a committed sense (ibid). If he 
finds himself at the other end of the spectrum, if he when he asserts that justification is 
relative to audience is a “better” description of what justification is (Rorty 1998a: 207), he 
must either mean that it is better for reasons all ‘sufficiently competent or enlightened 
persons’ would accept (assume that the assertion is justified in a context-transcending sense, 
an assumption contradicting the content of the assertion), or for reasons only a few audiences 
would accept (which is not to be committed when he asserts that the description is better). 
And if he finds himself at a place between the two extremes, which must mean that he relates 
unclearly or imprecisely to the question of whether he is asserting that justification is relative 
to audience in a committed sense or not (he has, for example, not thought through whether he 
is committed or not, or he considers himself as more or less committed), he, when he comes 
with the assertion, could be asked by others whether he asserts it in a committed sense or not. 
Also then he has the choice between not asserting in a committed sense, that justification is 
relative to audience, or asserting it – and so commit a performative self-contradiction. 
 
A final option is that ‘justification is relative to audience’ is not an assertion – or indeed 
something Rorty does not actually assert – but rather a redescription.870 In “Feminism and 
Pragmatism” feminism is described as women’s struggle to redescribe – acquire semantic 
                                                 
870 See 2.3.3. 
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authority over – the category of woman (Rorty 1998a: 223).871 The oppressed liberate 
themselves through redescriptions, by creating new vocabularies, redescribing themselves; 
“[create] a voice never heard before” (op.cit.: 202). “In the language of the oppressor” their 
demands would only seem absurd (op.cit.: 203). Redescriptions “expand [logical] space” 
(ibid): They are the outcasts’ “flirtations with meaninglessness” (op.cit.: 225), they represent a 
kind of “abnormal discourse” (Fraser 1989: 100), and will only make fully sense in a new and 
better future where they are included in normal discourse, where they have been incorporated 
“in the linguistic and other practices of the common culture” (Rorty 1998a: 224). Is 
‘justification is relative to audience’ a redescription – a flirt with meaninglessness? Does it 
belong to a better vocabulary of the future? Is that why it does not make sense to us today? 
Would it be possible to justify ‘justification is relative to audience’ to future audiences that 
speak in new and better ways? Assuming that ‘justification is relative to audience’ is not an 
assertion but a redescription in a new and better vocabulary, is, however, to make the 
assertion that a new vocabulary is better. This assertion, if it is committed, would have to be 
an assertion one could justify with reasons all ‘sufficiently competent or enlightened persons’ 
would accept. One can, therefore, not assert that ‘justification is relative to audience’ belongs 
to a new and better vocabulary, and, thus, that the justification of ‘justification is relative to 
audience’ is relative to a future audience – which is to assert that justification is relative to 
audience – without committing a performative self-contradiction. There is, as Wellmer puts it, 
an internal connection between assuming that a new vocabulary is better and questions about 
“truth and justification”:  
 
New vocabularies are useful if they lead to a better web of beliefs, better practical 
orientations, a better self-understanding; and what better (more useful) means here, cannot be 
spelled out without reference to truth and justification in their ordinary sense. Conversely, our 
truth-oriented practices (practices of justification) cannot be fully perceived, if we are not 
aware that ordinary questions of truth (related to the referential form of argument) may at any 
given point of discourse give rise to a dialectical form of argument where not only single 
propositions but the language and its referential network, that is the vocabulary and ways of 
speaking become the object of debate (2001: 17).  
 
One cannot distinguish in any absolute way between redescriptions (“a dialectical form of 
argument”) and assertions made in argumentative discourse (“an inferential form of 
                                                 
871 Rorty describes modern feminism as a struggle for women to be able to speak as women, for a future where 
we are able to hear “what women as women would have to say” (1998a: 203). The women’s movement 
struggled – and continues to struggle – for “semantic authority” over the category of “woman” (op.cit.: 223). 
“Woman” should no longer be “at most, the name of a disability”, but instead “the name of a moral identity” 
(op.cit.: 205). 
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argument”). Redescriptions also implies asserting (one asserts that one’s re-description is 
“better”; that it is a “better social construct” for “a less painful future” (Rorty 1998a: 207, 
227), where one, as far as one is committed to one’s redescription, assumes to be able to 
justify it in a context-transcending sense.    
 
Rorty would perhaps reply that redescriptions should not in fact be justified, meaning made 
reasonable (i.e. on the basis of reasons) relative to a future audience. Redescriptions are about 
getting “people to feel indifference or satisfaction where they once recoiled. And revulsion 
and rage where they once felt indifference or resignation” (my emphasis, op.cit.: 204): They 
are going to change “instinctive emotional reactions” (ibid). This cannot be achieved if one is 
faithful to the existing community’s standards for “rational acceptability” (op.cit.: 214). But 
perhaps one cannot be faithful to future community standards of rationality either? Perhaps 
redescriptions are not to be justified, i.e. with reference to reasons, at all? Perhaps they are to 
be assessed exclusively as rhetoric, as an “extreme case […] of strategic use of language” 
(Rorty 1998b: 21)? That ‘justification is relative to audience’ belongs to a larger and powerful 
prophecy that touches and moves some of us, or which may come to touch and move some of 
us, so that we feel different, is possible. And perhaps there is nothing more Rorty wants to 
accomplish by asserting that justification is relative to audience than to appeal to our 
emotions. If so, this is his reason for claiming that justification is relative to audience: When 
one uses language strategically, one has strategic reasons for using it (for example, one uses 
language as a tool for changing people’s feelings). However, using language strategically is 
not to abandon “the normative game of giving and asking for reasons” (Wellmer 2001: 5). 
That is: By asserting something strategically, for example in order to change people’s 
feelings, outside the normative game of giving and asking for reasons, is not to assert. And if 
Rorty is not actually asserting that justification is relative to audience, there is nothing to 
discuss. Asserting that justification is relative to audience in a purely strategic sense within 
the normative game of giving and asking for reasons is to argue that what one is arguing for 
has no argumentative force. If Rorty does this, he commits a performative self-contradiction – 
the same performative self-contradiction he commits if he non-strategically argues that 
‘justification is relative to audience’ has argumentative force (which also is to argue that what 
he argues for does not have argumentative force). However, Rorty might consider 
‘justification is relative to audience’ a genuine contribution to “sentimental education” and 
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“[the] progress of sentiments” (1998c: 180, 181)872 – prophetic redescriptions should perhaps 
not be perceived as purely strategic appeals to people’s emotions. In that case, he asserts that 
redescriptions represent Bildung and progress, which is a variant of the assertion that they 
belong to a better vocabulary. This assertion, if it is committed, needs to be justified with 
reasons that all ‘sufficiently competent or enlightened persons’ would accept, a condition that 
contradicts the content of the assertion ‘justification is relative to audience’. Rorty can, 
therefore, not assert that ‘justification is relative to audience’ is a legitimate contribution to 
sentimental education and the progress of sentiments without committing a performative self-
contradiction – unless he asserts something he does not sincerely assert.    
              
Re. c) 
Given that we now have refuted Rorty’s objections in a) and b); given that we actually assume 
(see re. a), and in a constitutive sense must assume (see re. b), when we assert that something 
is, that it can be justified to all ‘sufficiently competent or enlightened persons’, and, in that 
sense, that what we assert is true. This does not necessarily mean that the assertions are true in 
the sense that they represent something real: Perhaps all ‘sufficiently competent or 
enlightened persons’ are mistaken about what is real? Something we believe now to be true 
about reality may prove to be false in the future (all empirical assertions are fallible):  
 
Other people (other audiences) may come upon new arguments, new evidences, new ways of 
speaking, or new theories, in the light of which our current justified beliefs might turn out to 
appear as questionable or false (Wellmer: 2001: 3).  
 
And vise versa: Something we believe to be false about reality today may show itself to be 
true in the future. The question the objection in c) raises, is, however, how we can know 
whether anything we consider as true about reality at some point in time represents something 
real – independent of whether what we consider as true could be proven false at some other 
point in time or not (perhaps it would not be proven false at any point in time), independent of 
how many audiences think there is reason to believe that what we regard as true represents 
something real (also all possible audiences). How can we know that reality-for-us is reality-
in-itself? As Karl-Otto Apel points out, the question should instead be how we can know that 
reality-for-us is reality-it-is-possible-to-have-knowledge-about. Asking how we can know 
whether reality-for-us is “reality of unknowable things-in-themselves” is a “nonsensical” 
                                                 
872 Rorty refers to Anette Baier, see Rorty (1998). 
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question (2001: 6): It is asking how we can have knowledge about something that we have 
defined as something we cannot have knowledge about. Reality-it-is-possible-to-have-
knowledge-about is that which corresponds to what all possible audiences of ‘sufficiently 
competent or enlightened persons’ in an argumentative discourse think is (meaning, what they 
think is real.) This is Peirce’s central point, as Apel quotes:  
 
[…] on the one hand, reality is independent not necessarily of thought in general, but only of 
what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it; and […], on the other hand; 
though the object of the final opinion depends on what that opinion is, yet what that opinion is 
does not depend on what you or I or anybody thinks. […] and if, after the extinction of any 
race, another should rise with faculties or dispositions for investigation, that true opinion must 
be one which they would ultimately come to (op.cit.: 5).  
 
This idea about an ideal argumentative discourse where all possible audiences participate, and 
opinions are therefore ‘final’ and ‘ultimate’ – and correspond to reality-it-is-possible-to-have-
knowledge-about – should be considered as a regulative idea (Apel) or as a performative 
idealization (Wellmer), an idea/idealization we implicitly assume (Wellmer)/contrafactually 
anticipate (Apel) when we assert something (and therefore cannot reject without committing a 
performative self-contradiction): “[it] cannot be factually reached but only approximated” 
(op.cit: 9).873 Reality-for-us can therefore only be more or less true874 (in the meaning 
corresponding to reality-it-is-possible-to-have-knowledge-about), in the sense that we through 
actual argumentative discourse, in which ‘you or I or anybody’; ‘sufficiently competent or 
enlightened persons’, ‘with faculties or dispositions for investigation’ participate, approach 
reality-it-is-possible-to-have knowledge-about. 
 
2) 
With that we can return to the quotation from Rorty which we took as our starting point in the 
discussion about the relationship between asserting that something is, asserting that something 
is true, and asserting that something is real; “[…] the only intrinsic features of human beings 
are those they share with brutes – for example, the ability to suffer and inflict pain. Every 
other feature is up for grabs” (1998a: 205). One can assert that human beings are in a certain 
way (as one can assert that other things in the world are in a certain way), that they for 
example have particular abilities. If one asserts this (because one can assert it), one also 
asserts that it is true (in the sense elaborated in the previous section), and real (in the sense 
                                                 
873 See 2.3.3. 
874 Given fallibilism. 
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elaborated in the previous section). One may also assert that human beings have specific 
primary features, which should not, however,  be considered as ‘intrinsic’,875 but which are 
not ‘up for grabs’ in the same manner as their other features. Not in the sense that there can 
never come a day where human beings no longer have these primary features. But when 
human beings no longer have these primary features, and we even so continue to refer to them 
as human beings, that which we mean by the term ‘human being’ will be radically different 
from what we today mean by the term human being. To assert that human beings have an 
ability to relate themselves reflectively to and let their actions be motivated by reasons – to 
assert that human beings have a capacity for reason – is not different in principle from 
asserting, as Rorty does, that human beings have the ability to suffer and inflict pain. This is 
not to say that everyone who has the ability to suffer and inflict pain also has a capacity for 
reason. But to assert that human beings have an ability to suffer and inflict pain and to assert 
that human beings have a capacity for reason, are two cases of asserting that something is, and 
thus that it is true and real (in the sense elaborated in the previous section). If we can assert 
that human beings have the ability to suffer and inflict pain – something Rorty believes we 
can – then there is no reason in principle why we cannot assert that human beings also have a 
capacity for reason. Rorty assumes, also, that human beings in fact have a capacity for reason 
(which is to assume that the assertion that human beings have a capacity for reason can be 
justified for all participants in argumentative discourse). He believes our justifications are 
relative to audience; we have the ability to justify, meaning giving reasons. If human beings 
actually have a capacity for reason (and we can know it), then Rorty cannot justify his 
assertion that we cannot assert that something is morally right because we cannot know 
whether people have a capacity for reason: He can, of course, still assert that universal moral 
norms (‘the Moral Law’) cannot be justified (starting with ‘Reason’), but not that they cannot 
be justified because ‘Reason’ (can)not be (because we cannot know whether anything is). 
 
Moral universalism presupposes that we are rational (and in that sense that something is). It 
is, however, misleading to assert that moral universalism presupposes moral realism (as if 
one, in order to be a moral universalist, must believe that there are moral facts). Norms are 
                                                 
875 The word gives essentialist associations. It is therefore surprising that Rorty uses it. He rejects explicitly 
essentialist approaches to what a human being is (1998a: 206), just as he rejects essentialist notions of women. 
Women are created and re-created through speech: “New social constructs” create “new beings” (op.cit: 226). 
Women are not real; i.e. they have no essential traits (he is not an essentialist realist). He also does not consider 
the term woman as having an essential meaning (he is not an essentialist nominalist). There are absolutely no 
conceptual limits of how ‘she’ can be described and re-described: It is our changing “purposes”, our “courage 
and imagination” that decide (op.cit: 209, 222). Rorty imagines, even, “a society in which the male-female 
distinction is no longer of much interest” (op.cit: 227). 
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regulators of interaction. One cannot deduce norms (given that there are no normative facts) 
from facts, from is to ought – or from the fact that human beings have an ability to justify 
norms, to specific norms. When we assert that a moral norm is valid, we assume, in a 
constitutive sense, that the norm can be justified to all ‘sufficiently competent or enlightened 
persons’, and in that sense, that the norm is right. That is to say: If we assert that a moral norm 
ought to regulate interaction, but not that it is right, we are either not committed when we 
make the assertion, or we commit a performative self-contradiction: The assertion that a 
moral norm we are committed to is not right, contradicts that which we implicitly 
presuppose/contrafactually anticipate as regulative idea/performative idealization when we 
assert it. Rorty claims in his Tanner Lecture that there is no method or procedure for 
evaluating moral norms “except courageous and imaginative experimentation” (1998a: 217); 
brave and creative redescriptions in a better vocabulary: “Prophecy, as we [pragmatists like 
myself] see it, is all that non-violent political movements [like feminism] can fall back on” 
(op.cit: 207). The regulative idea/performative idealization about a context-transcending 
argumentative discourse that we implicitly assume when claiming that a moral norm is right 
indicates, however, a method or procedure for evaluating moral norms. Feminists have more 
to fall back on than prophecies. In addition, the ideal argumentative discourse has a normative 
basis. Also this basis cannot be denied without committing a performative self-contradiction, 
because to deny it, is to deny the basis of the ideal argumentative discourse we implicitly 
assume when denying. In argumentative discourses as regulative ideas/performative 
idealizations, assertions about truth and rightness are justified by all ‘sufficiently competent or 
enlightened persons’ – as free and equal. It is  
 
[…] a speech situation that satisfies improbable conditions: openness to the public, 
inclusiveness, equal rights to participation, immunization against external and internal 
compulsion, as well as the participants’ orientation toward reaching understanding (Habermas 
2000: 46).  
 
This ideal situation cannot be actually reached, Habermas emphasizes; it “satisfies 
improbable conditions” (my emphasis, ibid.). We can, however, “imagine in the present what 
an approximately ideal satisfaction would look like” (ibid) – and do our best to correct our 
practices relative to this idea. What is defined here, therefore, is not what Rorty claims, i.e. 
“[an] impossible task of developing a non-hegemonic discourse, one in which truth is no 
longer connected with power” (1998a: 210), but a normative obligation – inferred from the 
constitutive conditions of language use – to show each other equal respect. 
 323
 
Feminist demands can be linked to this normative obligation: Everyone, regardless of gender, 
should be treated with equal respect. If someone denies this norm, they deny the normative 
basis of the argumentative discourse they implicitly assume when denying. To this Rorty 
would object that he does not necessarily deny that all are to be treated respectfully. 
Endorsing this idea, is, however, not to assert a moral norm, i.e. a norm that all possible 
audiences would accept: Justification is relative to audience, also if what we are justifying are 
moral norms (as if what we are justifying are assertions about what is). To assert that 
justification is relative to audience in a committed sense is, however, to commit a 
performative self-contradiction. That is: If one in fact does not sincerely assert that 
justification is relative to audience, there is nothing to discuss. If one is committed when one 
asserts, the assertion’s content contradicts the condition for asserting; that the assertion can be 
justified for all possible audiences.876      
 
3) 
Rorty is mistaken when he claims that feminism cannot be justified with reference to a norm 
of treating everyone with equal respect, independent of gender, because such a norm cannot 
be justified. To claim that the justification of this norm is relative to context (i.e. ‘justification 
is relative to audience’) is to commit a performative self-contradiction on two levels. One 
denies that which one implicitly presupposes/contrafactually anticipates as regulative 
idea/performative idealization when asserting – namely a context-transcending argumentative 
discourse. And one denies the norm of equal respect that is the basis of this discourse. 
 
Rorty thinks feminists must touch and move their audiences to achieve their aims. They must 
affect them, change their feelings. He claims that the norm about everyone’s equal worth does 
not touch us. Feminists need, indeed, powerful redescriptions in new and better languages “to 
change particular reactions of revulsion, horror, satisfaction, or delight” (op.cit: 204). 
However, the norm of everyone’s equal worth, in different vocabularies, has already affected 
a number of audiences, and continues to do so. The fact that norms move us and touch our 
feelings, does, however, not necessarily mean that they are ‘better’. They must also stand the 
test of argumentative discourse. This is the case for all assertions. Assertions, including those 
                                                 
876 This would also be the case if Rorty states that justification is relative to audience during strategic language 
use, or if ‘justification is relative to audience’ is to be considered a redescription in a better vocabulary (see the 
previous discussion). In both cases a dilemma arises: Either he does not assert that justification is relative to 
audience, or he does assert it, and commits a performative self-contradiction.    
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involved in feminist demands, can be redescribed in a better language. Such redescriptions 
cannot be separated from the assertion that they are better, however. “Feminism and 
Pragmatism” is Rorty’s attempt to introduce feminism by way of redescriptions as an 
alternative to a feminism based on moral universalism. But feminist redescriptions 
presuppose moral universalism; they cannot and should not be regarded as its alternative. 
 
Exkurs: Richard Rorty and Nancy Fraser  
 
In her early works, Nancy Fraser, one of the central contributors in feminist theory debates 
from the 1980s and onwards, was highly influenced by Richard Rorty’s approach to 
philosophy. In her article in Feminism as Critique (1987) she defends, with reference to 
Rorty, a ‘social criticism without philosophy’, as an alternative to, on the one hand, Seyla 
Benhabib’s defense of feminist critique as a morally based critique, on the other, Judith 
Butler’s notion of critique as deconstruction. According to the early Fraser, criticism does not 
need a moral justification. Critical theory’s only standard, the hallmark of critical theory 
compared to other theories, is, in her view, its political relevance.  
 
She advances her views in the collection Unruly Practices. Power, Discourse and Gender in 
Contemporary Social Theory, published two years later. In her article “Solidarity or 
Singularity? Richard Rorty between Romanticism and Technocracy”, Fraser criticizes Rorty’s 
political program and social-theoretical assumptions. She subscribes to his philosophical 
assumptions, however. Referring to Rorty’s Consequences of Pragmatism, she defends a 
“zero-degree pragmatism” which criticizes “traditional philosophical concepts like truth and 
reason, human nature and morality” (Fraser 1989: 106). In “Feminism and Pragmatism” 
Rorty, accordingly, sums up his discussion with Fraser in the following way: “I suspect my 
differences with Fraser are concrete and political rather than abstract and philosophical” 
(Rorty 1998a: 209).  
 
Obviously, the early Fraser’s philosophical commitments make her critical of Habermas’ 
notion of justification. In another article in Unruly Practices, “Foucault. A Young 
Conservative?”, her main target is indeed Michel Foucault and his critique of humanism. She 
criticizes, however, also Habermas and his defense of general humanist standards with a 
moral status: 
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[…] it may turn out that there will be grounds for rejecting, or at least for modifying and 
resituating, the ideal of autonomy. If feminists succeed in reinterpreting our history so as to 
link that ideal to the subordination of women, then Habermas’s own normative paradigm will 
not survive unscathed. The broader question about the normative viability of humanism is still 
open (1989: 53). 
 
Fraser’s clearest and most detailed rejection of giving social critique as moral basis is 
expressed in yet another article, however; in “What’s Critical about Critical Theory? The 
Case of Habermas and Gender”. “To my mind”, she says, 
 
[…] no one has yet improved on Marx’s 1843 definition of critical theory as ‘the self-
clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age’. What is so appealing about this definition 
is its straightforwardly political character. It makes no claim to any special epistemological 
status but, rather, supposes that with respect to justification there is no philosophically 
interesting difference between a critical theory and an uncritical one. However, there is, 
according to this definition, an important political difference. A critical social theory frames 
its research program and its conceptual framework with an eye to the aims and activities of 
those oppositional social movements with which it has a partisan, though not uncritical, 
identification. The question it asks and the models it designs are informed by that 
identification and interest (1989: 113). 
 
The critical theorist should, according to Fraser, conceptualize the demands and criticisms 
raised by oppositional social movements, movements with which she should identify, 
although not uncritically. This implies that the critical theorist, for example, can work on how 
social movements might most efficiently reach their aims. She can raise immanent critique; 
point at, for example, conflicts between the different aims on the social movements’ agenda. 
She can, moreover, analyze the social movements’ demands and criticisms as expressions of 
real contradictions in culture and society. And she can, finally, identify and develop the social 
movements’ critique of social pathologies.877 The critical theory’s agenda overlaps thus with 
the political agenda of social movements: Critical theory is critical when it is politically 
relevant (i.e. relevant relative to the political agenda of oppositional social movements), was 
the early Fraser’s position. To what extent demands and criticisms could be justified in moral 
discourse, she considered irrelevant – at the time. 
 
Recently, Fraser seems to have changed her position. In Recognition or Redistribution? 
(2003) she presents her critical theory as a theory of justification with a moral basis.878 The 
                                                 
877 See also my discussion of different kinds of social critique in Holst (forthcoming a). 
878 I quote from Fraser (2002). 
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norm of “parity of participation”879 should be considered as a universally binding justice 
norm; “like principles of Kantian Moralität, they [the justice norms] hold independently of 
actors’ commitments to specific values” (2002: 22). Participatory parity, and the social 
redistribution and cultural recognition that is necessary for insuring everyone participatory 
parity, are demands from the perspective of justice. They are not tied to particular ideas of 
self-realization and goodness: In contrast to “[the] canons of Hegelian Sittlichkeit” their 
legitimacy is not linked to a “culturally and historically specific horizons of value, which 
cannot be universalized” (ibid.). Fraser’s critical theory is “deontological and non-sectarian”:  
 
Embracing the spirit of ‘subjective freedom’ that is the hallmark of modernity, it [Fraser’s 
critical theory] assumes that it is up to individuals and groups to define for themselves what 
counts as a good life and to devise for themselves an approach to pursuing it, within limits 
that ensure a like liberty for others. Thus […] [it] does not appeal to a conception of self-
realization or the good. It appeals, rather, to a conception of justice that can—and should—be 
accepted by those with divergent conceptions of the good. What makes misrecognition [and 
mal-distribution] morally wrong, in this view, is that it denies some individuals and groups 
the possibility of participating on par with others in social interaction (op.cit.: 25).  
 
This moral justification of critical theory, the establishment of justice instead of self-
realization, the right instead of the good, as standard of social critique, is what most 
fundamentally separates Fraser’s approach in Recognition or Redistribution? from that of 
Axel Honneth.880 Fraser believes Honneth fails to give his critique of social pathologies an 
adequate justification. As an alternative to his attempt to ground his critique in what he refers 
to as ‘a formal ethic of the good’, she argues that critique, also feminist critique, must be 
rooted in a general deontological humanism where justice is standard. Her philosophical 
position is not explicated beyond general references to Rawls’ and Habermas’ theories of 
justice. This is, however, in itself significant. The early Fraser rejected Habermas’ notion of 
justification, and sided, in this question, with his opponents – be it Rorty or the Marxists. 
 
If Fraser now understands feminist critique as a morally based critique, this is in fact a 
significant event in feminist theory. Her previous notion of feminism as simply ‘political’ was 
articulated explicitly as an intermediary position between feminism as a morally based 
critique on the one hand, and postmodern deconstructive feminism on the other. With 
Recognition and Redistribution? Fraser approaches Seyla Benhabib, Onora O’Neill, Martha 
                                                 
879 See also Chapter 8. 
880 Recognition or Redistribution? is written as a political-philosophical exchange between Fraser and Honneth.  
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Nussbaum and other feminist theorists who, in different ways, have long defended a feminism 
based on moral universalism.   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
THE PRINCIPLE OF GENDER BALANCE 
 
8.0 Feminist equality – perfect equality? 
Menn imellom. Mannsdominans og likestillingspolitikk881 (2003) by Hege Skjeie and Mari 
Teigen sums up the study of gender, power and democracy made as part of the research 
project Power and Democracy (1998-2003), ordered and funded by the Norwegian parliament 
(Stortinget). In Menn imellom Skjeie and Teigen introduce the principle of gender balance; 
”literal equality or perfect equality, 50/50” between women and man as a central aim in 
feminist politics (2003: 28).  
 
In her article “Kjønnsfrihet” (“Gender freedom”), published later, in Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 
1/2004, Mari Teigen attempts to clarify and justify this principle.882 I have ten comments to 
her attempt.883 
 
8.1 Freedom and balance 
Teigen says in her article that the aim of perfect balance between women and men does not 
conflict with individual freedom. I cannot see that she demonstrates it, however. Obviously, 
citizens in a society can make use of their personal autonomy in ways that do not result in 
50/50 distributions between women and men on a group level. In such cases, should measures 
be taken, or should measures not be taken, to prevent uneven group level distributions? And 
which measures should be taken? Should measures that come in conflict with personal 
                                                 
881 Among Men. Male Power and Politics of Gender Equality. This chapter is an edited version of the article 
“Det kjønnsbalanserte samfunn” (“The gender balanced society”), published in Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 2/2004. I 
wish to thank Fredrik W. Thue, Eirinn Larsen, Rune Slagstad, Øyvind Østerud and Anders Molander for 
discussions. 
882 The article is framed as a reply to my review of Menn imellom, published in Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 3/2003. 
883 The research project on Power and Democracy (1998-2003) was led by a group of five professors, Øyvind 
Østerud, Per Selle, Fredrik Engelstad, Siri Meyer and Hege Skjeie. Meyer and Skjeie decided not to sign the 
final report of the project, because they disagreed with several of its conclusions. Instead, each of them wrote a 
separate concluding report (see also my brief comment on this in Chapter 4). Skjeie’s report was primarily based 
on Menn imellom. In this chapter I do not discuss Skjeie’s concluding report or Menn imellom generally, but 
concentrate on the principle of gender balance she (and Teigen) introduce.  
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autonomy be accepted, in the name of gender balance? Or are such measures unacceptable? 
Teigen should, in other words, order her principles.884  
 
8.2 Individual and group 
Teigen argues that the basic normative unit is the group: Justice is “equality of outcome” in 
the sense of “distributional equality on group level” (Teigen 2004: 87). I take the basic unit to 
be the individual. Justice is what we owe to each other as persons. Our principles of justice 
should express the respect and recognition that our status as persons accord us. Balanced 
distributions of “power, influence and resources between women and men” may hide large 
inequalities in the distribution of power, influence and resources within the two gender groups 
(op.cit.: 86). A 50/50 distribution between women and men says nothing about the individual 
woman’s living conditions. Gender balance defined as equality of outcome at the 
(gender)group level, does not guarantee all women’s dignity. The principle of balance is 
therefore inadequate as a feminist principle of justice. This is not because freedom does not 
presuppose equality in a number of respects. Feminism should be egalitarian: That 
guaranteeing “equal rights is a question of guaranteeing equality”, is obvious (op.cit.: 87). 
However, the principle of gender balance is not egalitarian. On the contrary it allows for huge 
inequalities as long as the group distributions are balanced.  
 
8.3 Balance of equality in what? 
It is unclear what should be balanced. The principle of balance is presented as a principle of 
gender balance in elite positions, in the distribution of power, influence and resources, and as 
a principle prescribing gender balance in societal participation as such (op.cit.: 93).885 The 
principle in its broadest meaning and in its narrowest meaning suggests highly different 
normative prescriptions. 
                                                 
884 See for example John Rawls’ notion of “lexical order” in A Theory of Justice: “This is an order that requires 
us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before we can move on to the second, the second before we can 
consider the third and so on. A principle does not come into play until those previous to it are either fully met or 
do not apply. […] those earlier in the ordering have an absolute weight, so to speak, with respect to later ones, 
and hold without exception” (1999: 38). Rawls orders his principles lexically. His first principle of justice: “Each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
system of liberty for all” takes precedence over the second one: “Social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” 
(op.cit.: 266). 
885 It is, in short, unclear whether the principle of balance concerns positions (2b in Rawls), social and economic 
goods (2a), or societal participation in the broad sense which is Nancy Fraser’s (2003) point of departure (“parity 
of participation”). 
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8.4 Choices and circumstances 
It is claimed that the presence of “gender-segregated patterns” makes the idea of “real 
preferences” behind “gender-typical” choices “illusory” (op.cit.: 90). Preferences may be 
described as ‘false’ to the extent that they are determined by circumstances over which we 
have no control. In that case, the focus should be on under what circumstances our choices 
are made, not on what we choose, whether we, for example, choose gender-typical or gender-
untypical. Unbalanced gender distributions can be a result of ‘false’ preferences or ‘real’ 
preferences. Imbalance on group level does not necessarily indicate lack of freedom at the 
individual level, regardless of the circumstances, nor are the untypical choices that are made 
necessarily more free than the typical ones. 
 
Being aware of this imbalance – knowledge of what is typical and untypical to do in the group 
to which one belongs – can certainly be one of the circumstances under which one makes 
choices. Different cultural and psychological mechanisms often make many do what the 
majority does – the preferences are adapted to typical preferences. Awareness of what women 
typically do, can in this way contribute to that more women make typical choices. 
Mechanisms of this kind make it more complicated to speak of ‘real preferences’ behind 
gender-typical choices—but not ‘illusory’.  
 
To label one’s fellow citizens’ preferences as ‘false’ is drastic. It is to say that their wishes 
and priorities should not be taken seriously. It is to deny them what democratic governance 
presupposes that citizens accord each other – autonomy and responsibility. This is a  reason to 
approach the topic with some caution.886 
 
8.5 Nancy Fraser on parité 
Teigen attempts to ally with the political philosopher Nancy Fraser. This alliance seems to be 
based on a misunderstanding. The principle of balance is inspired by the French parité-
concept.887 Parité refers to, Fraser writes:    
 
                                                 
886 For discussions on so-called adaptive preferences, see for example Martha Nussbaum (1999, 2000: 135-147) 
and Anne Phillips (2001). 
887 For an explication of the link between the principle of balance and the concept of parité, see for example 
Teigen (2000: 70-71, 74-75). 
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[…] a law mandating that women occupy half of all the slots on electoral lists in campaign for 
seats in legislative assemblies. […] it means [accordingly] strict numerical equality in gender 
representation in electoral contests. For me, in contrast, parity is not a matter of numbers. 
Rather, it is a qualitative condition, the condition of being a peer, of being on par with others, 
of interacting with them on an equal footing. That condition is not guaranteed by mere 
numbers […]. To be sure, the severe underrepresentation of women in legislative assemblies 
and other formal political institutions usually signifies qualitative disparities of participation 
in social life. But numerical quotas are not necessarily or always the best solution. Thus, my 
conception deliberately leaves open (for democratic deliberation) the question exactly what 
degree of representation or level of equality is necessary to ensure participatory parity 
(original emphasis, 2003: 238).888 
 
Concerning regulating other areas of society according to the principle of balance, Fraser 
notes: 
 
[…] justice requires parity of participation in a multiplicity of interaction arenas, including 
labor markets, sexual relations, family life, public spheres, and voluntary associations in civil 
society. In each arena, however, participation means something different. […] No single 
formula, quantitative or otherwise, can suffice for every case. What precisely is required to 
achieve participatory parity depends in part on the nature of the social interaction in question 
(op.cit.: 239). 
 
Hence, Fraser explicitly distances herself from the principle of balance as a standard of 
justice. She does not reject affirmative action policies, but, generally speaking, she prefers 
what she refers to as transformative strategies – strategies that correct the generative 
mechanisms producing injustice – rather than affirmative compensating strategies (Fraser 
2003: 175-212). 
 
8.6 Justification of balance 
 
Feminists should have “an ambition to redistribute” (Teigen 2004: 93). The question is what 
should be redistributed,889 but also which distributions should be the outcome of 
redistribution. The justification of the principle of gender balance is unclear. Why redistribute 
so the outcome is perfect 50/50 distributions? The authors of Menn imellom refer to the fact 
that “women make up half of the population” (Skjeie and Teigen 2003: 27). However, just 
simply because a group – for example people with blue eyes – makes up a percentage share of 
the population of a society, does not grant it a proportional percentage share of its goods. 
                                                 
888 To my mind, the article I refer to here is published only in Swedish and French. 
889 This is dealt with in my third comment. 
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What distinguish gender groups from other groups? Teigen suggests an answer. She claims 
that women have “shared interests” in a “minimalistic sense” (Teigen 2004: 91).890 This 
shared interest is not based on women having shared subjective “experiences or views” 
(Skjeie and Teigen 2003: 28). It is also not based on women’s objective position in a universal 
gender power system, as in traditional theories of patriarchy (Teigen 2004: 91). Ultimately, 
there is no mention of what the shared interest is based on. Moreover, why one group’s 
minimalistic shared interests should entitle the group to a share of the goods that corresponds 
to the group’s percentage of the population, moreover, remains unelaborated .     
 
8.7 Gender and other differences 
 
If women, because they have minimalistic shared interests, have a right to 50% of the goods 
of society, notwithstanding how these goods are defined, also other groups with minimalistic 
shared interests – such as social classes and ethnic groups – should have a right to goods 
equivalent to their percentage of the population. As Fraser says, justice requires:   
 
[…] participatory parity across all major axes of social differentiation, hence not only gender 
[…]. […] this entails that proposed reforms be evaluated from multiple perspectives – hence 
that proponents must consider whether measures aimed at redressing one sort of disparity are 
likely to end up exacerbating another (my emphasis, 2003: 239) 
 
Teigen does not discuss such issues.891 
 
8.8 Is and ought 
 
 Is-questions and ought-questions should be kept relatively separate.892 As Teigen points out, 
the basis of Ronald Dworkin’s arguments is “ethical individualism” (my emphasis, 2004: 89). 
This is, obviously, not because he “outright” rejects “group affiliation as […] social reality” 
(my emphasis, op.cit.: 88). One does not need to deny elementary descriptions of social life in 
                                                 
890 It is therefore surprising that Teigen denies something that ought to be less controversial; that women in the 
Norwegian elite may have a shared interest in certain affirmative action measures. There is, for example, reason 
to believe that many of the women who would be considered for elite position where affirmative action is 
implemented, are women who already belong to the elite. 
891 Of course, women do not have a “particular responsibility” for discussing these issues (Teigen 2004: 92). 
Women are citizens with a similar responsibility to struggle against injustice, gender injustice and other kinds of 
injustice, as other citizens. 
892 See Chapters 2 and 9. 
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order to believe that the individual ought to be the basic normative unit. One can acknowledge 
the existence of groups without accepting that justice is to be understood as the equality of 
outcome between groups.893 One cannot, in short, infer from is to ought. 
 
8.9 Principles and policies 
 
The connections between general principles of justice and concrete policies are not simple. 
One can, for example, commit oneself to a general principle of gender balance, and still reject 
affirmative action policies. One may give other principles precedence and for that reason 
reject affirmative action. One may give the principle of balance precedence, but believe that 
the affirmative action policies will not effectively contribute to balance, at least not on all 
arenas. And one may reject the principle of balance from a normative point of view, and favor 
certain variants of affirmative action policies anyway, like Fraser. 
 
The complex connections between principles and the application of principles, morality and 
politics, occur because principles are to be applied in different situations: Principles require 
different things in different situations. Another complicating factor is that principles may be 
interpreted differently. In a democracy questions linked to the interpretation and application 
of principles are the concerns of citizens. Citizens may delegate such questions to the judicial 
system and professional expertise. However, judicial discretion and expert’s assessments are 
not above democratic opinion and will formation. 
  
8.10 The limits of state power 
 
The basis of feminist policies should be a “principle of freedom”, according to Teigen (2004: 
93). She believes that this principle of freedom “is about the right to make gender-untypical 
choices, about the right to live and choose in other ways than what gender conformism 
dictates” (ibid.). I believe the responsibility of the state should be to guarantee the individual 
citizen her right to ‘live’ and ‘choose’ as autonomous person. Protecting certain gender-
untypical lives and choices may require particular political measures. However, the state 
should not as a matter of principle value gender-untypical lives and choices above the gender-
                                                 
893 To reject justice as equality of outcome between groups is not to commit a “fallacy” (Teigen 2004: 90). It is 
to reject a mistaken conception of justice. 
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typical ones. First, because the value of one particular lifestyle is not relative to the average 
lifestyle of the group to which one belongs. A lifestyle does not become more valuable 
because it is untypical rather than typical. Second, because the state, generally speaking, 
should be careful with rating some notions of the good life above others,894 for example, a 
gender-untypical notion above the gender-typical. 
 
Teigen stresses that gender-typical choices should not be prevented be the use of 
“punishment” and “coercion” (op.cit.: 90). It is unclear what she means by punishment and 
coercion in this context. The state has a number of measures at its disposal; some are more 
‘coercive’, require more use of force, than others. The use of state power is, however, always 
linked to coercion in the sense that states possess monopoly over the legitimate use of 
coercive power. There is thus connected a fundamental ambivalence to using the medium of 
state power. The state can promote justice and values so effectively among other things 
because of its monopoly over the use of coercive power. The limitations of state feminism are 
linked to the ambiguity of the medium of state power.895 As emphasized by Fraser, state 
intervention may be necessary in a number of contexts. It cannot, however, replace “the use of 
nongovernmental counterpowers like social movements and democratic political associations” 
(1989: 110).896  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
894 As stressed by Simone de Beauvoir: “The possibilities of the individual” should not “be defined” with 
“notions tied to happiness, but with notions tied to freedom” (Teigen 2004: 93). 
895 See Chapter 6. 
896 “This is the view of many feminists”, she adds. In Scandinavia there has been little debate among feminists 
on the problems associated with the ambiguity of the medium of state power. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY:  
A FEMINIST RE-INTERPRETATION 
 
 
9.0 Privacy – for feminists? 
 
Every woman should have a right to a private domain; a room of her own, Virginia Woolf 
wrote in A Room of One’s Own. Woolf attempted to link the struggle for women’s liberation 
to the individual’s right to privacy. What conception of privacy is compatible with feminism? 
What should the right to privacy protect?  
 
Feminists have rightly criticized a number of conventional conceptions of privacy. Their 
critique is succinctly expressed in the slogan ‘the personal is political’. This slogan unites 
most traditions of feminist thought, and challenges Western philosophy’s division between a 
private, non-political sphere and a public, political sphere, a division adopted from ancient 
Greek philosophy, but most often associated with the liberal contract tradition.897 To discuss 
private issues as public and political, presupposes new and less exclusive conceptions of the 
public sphere. Feminists have contributed considerably to the critique of the public sphere 
during the past decades.898  
 
What feminists think of privacy, is a much more open issue. Discussions on the topic have 
been limited and sporadic.899 Nonetheless, feminist claims are difficult to articulate without 
assuming the value of privacy in one way or another. The question is in what way: How does 
one conceptualize people’s right to a room of their own without covering up and justifying 
violations against women, as conventional conceptions of privacy have done so often? How 
may the struggle for the right to privacy become a significant feminist struggle, in the spirit of 
                                                 
897 See for example John Locke’s Two Treaties of Government (1689/1690). For a more recent explication, see 
John Rawls (1993: 137): “The political is distinct from the associational, which is voluntary in ways that the 
political is not; it is also distinct from the personal and the familial, which are affectional, again in ways the 
political is not.” 
898 For overviews, see Benhabib (1996) and Landes (1998). 
899 Significant contributions are Allen (1988), Rössler (2001), and Cohen (2002). In Norway among others Nina 
C. Raaum (1995) and Tordis Borchgrevink (1995) have written on this topic (see Chapter 5). See also 5.4.10. 
 336
Virginia Woolf? I will attempt to specify a normative conception of privacy which is not only 
compatible with feminism, but which, in my opinion, will also enrich it.900  
 
9.1 Feminist critique of the private-public divide: Empirical and 
moral 
 
The feminist critique of the private-public divide has been of an empirical and of a moral 
nature. Feminists have claimed on the one hand, that one must include practices, cultural 
patterns and social relations which are internal to the private sphere, or cross conventional 
demarcations between the private and the public, in order to describe gender relations 
adequately.  
 
On the other hand, feminist critique of the private-public divide is a moral critique and a 
contribution to the discussion on how society should to be organized. Struggles for a just 
society need to take justified feminist concerns into consideration: They must include 
struggles against gender injustices. Such injustices manifest themselves, however, not only 
through relations in the public sphere, but through relations that are internal to the private 
sphere, or cross the established private-public divide. Thus, what are often referred to as 
private and non-political should be turned into public, political matters, also for moral 
reasons, feminists have argued. Their objection to rigid boundaries between private and 
public, have been directed especially, if not exclusively, against liberal political philosophy.901 
The division also has pre-modern philosophical roots, however. Moreover, it is, for example, 
built into, Marxism and its distinction between reproduction and production, and in neo-
Aristotelian communitarianism (Okin 1989).902 It also appears, often as silently assumed, in 
postmodern works (Boling 2000). 
 
In this chapter I discuss primarily the morally based feminist critique of the private-public 
divide. I shall attempt to work out a normative conception of privacy that is consistent with 
this critique. Feminism appear to presuppose such a concept: Few feminists dismiss Virginia 
                                                 
900 This chapter is an edited version of Holst (2002). I wish to thank Hege Skjeie, Hilde Danielsen, Christine M. 
Jacobsen, Randi E. Gressgård, Kjersti Fjørtoft, Turid Markussen, Gunnar Skirbekk, Anders Molander, Fredrik 
W. Thue, Bente Nicolaysen and Lars Blichner for comments. 
901 Some feminists reject a partnership between feminism and liberalism (Pateman 1988). Others, such as myself, 
find valuable resources for feminist analysis in the liberal tradition (see also Okin 1989, 2002, Cornell 1995, 
1998, Fraser 1999, Nussbaum 1999, 2004, Phillips 2001). 
902 Okin analyzes Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1984) proposal of a neo-Aristotelian ethic of virtue. 
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Woolf’s moral intuition and the value of privacy altogether, even though some do, among 
feminist communitarians (Glendon 1987, 1991). More feminists, however, deconstruct 
existing conceptions of privacy, without specifying alternative conceptions, or discussing why 
privacy is worth defending. Typically, feminists argue convincingly that the right to privacy, 
as it has been conventionally defined, has contributed to oppressing women (Pateman 1988, 
MacKinnon 1989). At the same time, human life without any privacy – in “total institutions” 
(Goffmann 1988), in totalitarian regimes903 – is morally outrageous: It is inhuman do deny 
someone a room of her own. The question is how these two positions, which both seem 
reasonable, can be defended simultaneously. 
 
9.2 Feminism, politics and the public sphere 
 
The lack of discussion of privacy among feminists stands in contrast to the rich feminist 
discussions on how public space may be democratized. The feminist critique of the public 
sphere has a set of common features. It has focused on: 
 
1) The conditions necessary for guaranteeing everyone a real possibility of participating on a 
free and equal basis in the public sphere, in political discussions about issues that concern 
them.904 
 
2) The need to include more topics, discourses and vocabularies in public, political 
discussions. Feminists have argued against excluding certain topics from political discussions: 
“Only participants themselves can decide what is and what is not of common concern to 
them” (Fraser 1992: 129). They have argued against tendencies of reducing public discourse 
to moral, legal and pragmatic discourse, and of marginalizing ethical discourse on the good 
life (Benhabib 1992, Mouffe 1992), and for including more properly aesthetic-expressive 
vocabularies in public, political debate (Young 1997, McAfee 2000). 
 
                                                 
903  See Hannah Arendt (1973). George Orwell (1949) describes totalitarianism in his famous novel 1984.  
904 Judith Butler (1992) claim that the idea of universal, egalitarian inclusion is self-contradictory, because 
classifying is excluding; to limit something from something else. However, as Jodi Dean (1996) points out, 
excluding something, because complete representation of meaning is impossible, must be distinguished from 
excluding someone from political discussions. 
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3) Ways to politicize the private-public divide. The boundaries of the public sphere should not 
be considered as absolute; they are negotiated and re-negotiated, institutionalized and re-
institutionalized after political discussions and social struggles.905 
 
4) The public sphere is not homogeneous. There is not, nor should there be, only one public, 
but different publics. Some publics are “strong”, the publics where binding decisions are 
made according to formal procedures. Other, “weaker” publics of democratic opinion and will 
formation are less formalized. Ideally, social movements and discussions of weak publics 
inspire and influence decisions and procedures of strong publics (Fraser 1992).     
 
5) Ways to construct conceptions of the public sphere and politics that do not disregard 
significant differences between groups and individuals, or the complexities of and shifts in 
individuals’ identities; “differences within women” (Lauretis 1987: 2). 
 
 
9.3 The right to privacy as a precondition for critique of the 
public sphere 
 
In most feminist discussions of the public sphere, the notion of privacy ends up being an 
insufficiently developed residual category (Cohen 1992, 2001). Much is written about when 
and how private concerns should be politicized, less is written about when what is private 
should remain private. This has caused some critics to describe feminism as a project 
advancing a tyranny of intimacy that is incompatible with any notion of privacy. No concerns 
are to be considered private, our lives are made into a public concern, without restrictions.906 
To become a public concern is to be made more vulnerable to informal pressures of 
conforming to public opinion, and to the formal political decision-making power of the 
majority. If we, as entire persons, if our bodies and souls unmodified, are made into public 
concerns, then all aspects of our person could, potentially, be made into topics of collective 
                                                 
905 The private-public divide is a social construction, but also the outcome of normative considerations: “The 
claims of social construction are important, but cannot be pressed too far. That privacy is socially constructed 
does not mean that it should not be subject to normative critique and evaluation, nor does it mean that privacy is 
immune to legal and political influence” (Schauer 2001: 228).  
906 Dean criticizes the publicity-hounding which “Habermachosistic” conceptions of the public encourages: 
Everything is considered potentially to be of public interest (1999: 162). Moon introduces a liberal critique of  
discourse ethics’ theory of the public sphere, as this theory has been developed by among others Habermas, 
Benhabib and Fraser. According to Moon, a clear boundary should be drawn between issues that belong in the 
political discussions of the public sphere, and the issues that belong in the private, non-political sphere 
(discussed in Habermas 1999: 309-310).  
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discussion and majority rule. Without the right to privacy being recognized as a fundamental 
right, the way is cleared for the tyranny of the majority; for the political majority freely 
dictating the most private details of our lives (Rawls 1996, Alexy 1994). 
 
A reasonable interpretation of the feminist critique of the public sphere may, however, be 
combined with a defense of personal autonomy.907 The feminist critique of the public sphere 
presupposes, in fact, a right to privacy. The right to privacy allows us to pull back from public 
political discussions to make sovereign decisions on our own behalf. This possibility to 
retreat, the possibility of personal autonomy, is a precondition for public or political 
autonomy; for our participation as free and equal in different publics, in different discourses, 
about different political issues, and about the limits to politics. Why a precondition? First, 
because individuals’ participation in public discussions cannot be referred to as free, if 
individuals are not guaranteed the right to retreat from participation. The right to privacy 
understood as a negative right to pull back, is constitutive for communicative freedom in the 
public space: 
 
The decision to communicate must be free. It is constitutive for the freedom of the speaker to 
raise a validity claim as well as for the hearer’s freedom to take a positive or negative 
position. Any coercion would violate the sincerity condition of the illocutionary success of a 
speech act. Thus, ‘communicative freedom’ always presupposes ‘negative liberty’ or a right 
to privacy on a very fundamental level (Günther 1996: 1040).      
    
Second, it is difficult to elaborate the normative significance of including everyone in 
collective political opinion-and will formation, without presupposing the importance of 
protecting the private sphere of individual opinion- and will formation. Feminist conceptions 
of the public sphere are made so radically inclusive, because it is assumed that each voice 
makes a difference. The interconnection between collective-democratic and individual 
opinion- and will formation is, for example, evident in recent feminist contributions inspired 
by poststructuralism, which have focused on the need to develop conceptions about the public 
sphere that are more sensitive to differences (Mouffe 1992, Honnig 1998). But if there should 
be any point in making the public more sensitive to differences, there must be differences to 
which the public may be sensitive. Significant differences between and within each of us will, 
                                                 
907 Unreasonable interpretations, interpretations coming to the opposite conclusion, may be due to the fact that 
radical, populist and communitarian traditions within feminism have outlined their critique of the public sphere 
unreasonably. Unreasonable interpretations may also be due to unreasonable readings of feminist critique of the 
private-public divide.  
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quite simply, ultimately cease to exist, if the individual is not guaranteed physical and 
psychosexual integrity and existential autonomy. Everyone should have the right to a room of 
her own, “a transitional space”, where they can construct complex and distinct individual 
identities (Morris 2000). As Jean L. Cohen points out: “[…] the right to privacy, provide[s] 
the protection of levels of difference that no combination of democratic publics can directly 
accommodate” (1996: 191). 
 
It seems, thus, possible to infer at least rudiments of a right to privacy from the feminist 
critique of the public sphere. The right to privacy can, however, also be given a freestanding 
justification based on the moral norm of equal respect.908 
 
9.4 The moral right to privacy  
 
How should our moral right to privacy be elaborated? What, more specifically, are included in 
the privacy we owe each other? We fail to treat each other with equal respect, if we do not 
recognize each other’s: 
 
1) right to a negatively defined domain where we can freely act and express ourselves. 
Everyone has the right to be protected from having this domain limited by others, unless the 
limitations can be justified with reference to the norm of equal respect.   
 
This basic right to negative liberty presupposes: 
 
2) a right to physical and psychosexual integrity. Everyone has the right to be protected from 
physical and psychosexual violations.  
 
The basic right to negative liberty implies, moreover: 
 
3) a right to negative communicative freedom. Everyone has the right to participate in public 
discussions. Everyone is, however, also free not to participate.  
                                                 
908 This is what moral philosophers refer to as an autonomy-based justification of the right to privacy, in contrast 
to consequentialist or conventionalist justifications (Frey 2000, Weinreb 2000). There have been various 
attempts to outline a justification of privacy based on the norm of equal respect (see for example Rawls 1996, 
1999, Dworkin 1978, Wellmer 1991, Benhabib 1992, Habermas 1993, O’Neill 2000). I will not discuss the 
different attempts here. For a justification of the norm of equal respect, see Chapter 2. 
 341
 
The basic right to negative liberty presupposes, furthermore, that we are guaranteed certain 
positive liberties: There are normative interrelations between negative and positive 
liberties.909 We have 
 
4) a right to existential autonomy. Everyone is free to make “strong evaluations” about self-
realization and way of life, and, thus, to create oneself as unique person with a distinct and 
complex personal identity (Taylor 1995). When we carry out these evaluations, we can, and, 
of course, we often do, seek the advice of others.910 And, from an ethical point of view, it 
could be argued that we should make strong evaluations that are sensitive to the strong 
evaluations of others, for example those who are close to us, family, friends and lovers; those 
we care for. It is, moreover, reasonable to adjust our expectations to what we can reasonably 
expect to achieve, and rational, from a pragmatic point of view, to choose the means that will, 
most effectively, make us achieve our goals.911 A right to existential autonomy implies, 
nevertheless, that we have, ultimately, a right to act exclusively on the basis of our own strong 
evaluations,912 in ways that go against public opinion and the points of view of family, friends 
and lovers, in ways that contradict instrumental rationality claims, and reasonable assessment 
of what we can reasonably expect to achieve, if this is what we decide to do (Wellmer 1993: 
39, fill in quote).  
 
Furthermore, we have 
 
5) a right to make weak evaluations. We have a right to autonomy, not only when we make 
deep decisions about way of life; when we advance and act upon “higher preferences” 
(Habermas 1999: 205), but also when making the many minor choices of everyday life.  
 
A right to privacy needs, moreover, a real basis; we need to have real possibilities to make use 
of it: 
                                                 
909 Negative liberty is freedom from something. Positive liberty is freedom to something. As Alexy (1994) points 
out, the claims of negative and positive liberties are also conceptually interrelated: One claims freedom from 
something to something – for example, the freedom from certain restrictions – to practice existential autonomy. 
See also Chapter 6. 
910 Intrasubjective dialogue has as its precondition the intersubjective communication of the lifeworld (see 
Chapter 2). However, in George Herbert Mead’s terminology: The ‘I’ has, ultimately, the right to veto the ‘me’ 
(Dean 1996, Forst 1999).  
911 See 2.4.4 and 2.4.5. 
912 If our actions are compatible with the norm of equal respect. 
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6) Cognitive, linguistic and psycho-sexual “conditions of individuation” should be guaranteed 
(Cornell 1995: 3-27, 1998).913 If such conditions are unfulfilled, the individual will develop 
neither basic communicative and moral skills, nor the self-confidence and self-respect 
necessary for exercising individual autonomy. 
 
7) The right to privacy should be made into a legal right, a Grundrecht that is unconditional 
and cannot be put aside, not even by the political majority.  
 
8) The limits of the right to privacy should be drawn in political processes of democratic 
deliberation. Everyone has the right to be protected from having her negatively defined 
domain of freedom limited by others, unless the limitations can be justified with reference to 
the norm of equal respect.  The justification of the limitations should be made in public 
discussions where all concerned are included as free and equal, and have “a right to a moral 
veto right” (Forst 1996: 218): We have a right to veto others’ use of their privacy right in 
ways that disrepects our own right to privacy. 
 
9) All should be guaranteed basic social rights without which they cannot act and express 
themselves freely as private persons.914  
 
9.5 Conventional conceptions of privacy: A critique 
 
This conception of privacy differs from a number of other conceptions of privacy. First, this 
conception is not privacy considered as a natural right to negative liberty, such as the classic 
liberal “right to be let alone” or “the right to non-interference” (Frey 2000; Schauer 2001).915 
The privacy defended here, regards negative and positive liberties as interconnected,916 the 
                                                 
913 Cornell argues that these conditions may be understood in terms of  “primary goods” (Rawls 1999), or as 
basic “capabilities” (Sen 1993). 
914 Consider, for example, the list in Nussbaum (1999). Social rights require subtler consideration of 
responsibilities than do freedom rights. Universal freedom rights correspond to universal responsibilities: “A 
right not to be raped […] will be marred if it is a right against some but not against all others. If it were some 
others who have no obligation to refrain from raping […] then nobody would have an unrestricted right” 
(O’Neill 2000: 101). The rights to goods and services are of a different kind. These rights “can[not] be fully met 
if somebody – or some body – [does not] provide […]. It is not necessary that everyone contribute to provision, 
and wholly counter-productive, not to say impossible, if everybody attempts to be the provider on all occasions” 
(original emphasis, op.cit.: 101, 103).  
915 The norm of equal respect is not natural or pre-social. It is a norm human beings as language-users 
presuppose in social interaction. 
916 Both conceptually and normatively. 
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limits of privacy as the concern of citizens under the rule of law,917 it prescribes social 
redistribution and public education. It should, thus, not be confused with the libertarian right 
to private property and contract freedom:918 This right to privacy is not an unconditional right 
to own the product of one’s own labor and keep the surplus of freely established contracts of 
exchange (Nozick 1974).919 Second, this conception of privacy is not established on the basis 
of conventional standards of decency: What is private is not defined as that which is indecent 
to expose and deal with publicly, because conflicting with hegemonic ideas of what is 
valuable and virtuous in a community (MacIntyre 1984).  
 
Third, this conception of privacy differs from patriarchal conceptions of privacy that 
considers personal privacy as equivalent to the privacy of the family. Patriarchal conceptions 
of privacy are introduced and re-introduced despite feminist criticism, by communitarians, but 
also by liberals.920 A feminist defense of privacy is based on moral individualism; it defends 
the autonomy and integrity of the individual vis-à-vis others, also vis-à-vis other members of 
her family. The right to privacy is individual. It does not protect certain groups or institution 
from political intervention, if this is required for moral reasons (Rössler 2001: 49-55). That 
the right is an individual right does not imply, however, that it presupposes a notion of 
individuals as asocial, isolated, disembodied, strategic actors, as communitarians often 
argue.921 The proposal is based on a notion of a complex embodied, socialized, psycho-sexual 
individual with a developed and differentiated capacity to reason.922 
 
                                                 
917 Under a rule of law where the right to privacy is a Grundrecht. 
918 Consider in this connection that Rawls regards two regimes as compatible with his principles of justice: “a 
property-owning democracy” and a “liberal  socialism” (2001: 135-140). In the latter regime “the means of 
production are owned by society” (op.cit.: 138). 
919 For a thorough critical discussion of the libertarian notion of self-ownerskip, adopted from Locke, see G. E. 
Cohen (1995). 
920  For critical discussions of Rawls on this point, see Okin (1989), Cornell (1998), Nussbaum (1999). For 
critique of recent critique of liberal contributions on this point – from a liberal-feminist perspective – consider 
Okin (2002). 
921 Communitarians have claimed that the liberal idea of individuals as rights-holders is based on this flawed 
notion of human nature (Sandel 1989, Glendon 1991). Right are, however, decisive, precisely because they 
protect our freedoms as concrete, vulnerable persons from offenses in our interactions with others. Those who 
defend rights, seldom reject basic sociological and anthropological ideas about human interaction. Their concern 
is to outline and  justify normative regulations of this interaction. Consider, for example, how Jean L. Cohen 
explicates the relationship between individual reproductive rights and the social embeddedness of women’s 
actual reproductive choices: “Thus on the privacy justification of reproductive choice, a woman may decide for 
or against abortion on the basis of her community’s values or her religious worldview, or after discussion with 
“significant others – her relation to tradition, community, or loved ones is not in question here. Her right to 
decide does not dictate the basis of her decision” (my emphasis, 1996: 198).      
922 So that it, for example, can participate in moral and ethical discourse. 
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Fourth, this notion of privacy is not exclusively Western. The demands for individual, private 
freedoms, similar to those I have outlined above, have been criticized for being ethnocentric 
(Gilman 1999, Morris 2000). Individual moral norms are, however, not essentially Western. 
In social struggles of both Western and non-Western cultures, the right to privacy has been 
and remains a central normative reference (Williams 1991, Cornell 1998).923 Accepting the 
arguments for moral individualism appears, consequently, not to require a cultural horizon 
that is exclusively Western. Debating this, it is crucial to distinguish between the historical 
genesis or origin of norms and their validity. Even though individualism has had a strong 
impact on Western culture, certain conceptions of moral individualism may have wider inter-
cultural validity. 
 
 
9.6 The struggle for women’s privacy 
 
 
Why put the right to privacy on the feminist agenda? What injustices may the right to privacy 
protect from that are of particular relevance from a feminist point of view? Let me give some 
examples. 
 
A woman’s right to a room of her own protects her as an individual; it protects her status as 
person. The conception of privacy defended here does not protect certain institutions; the 
family, civil society or the private economic sector, from political intervention, if this is 
required for moral reasons. On the contrary, this conception of privacy prescribes political 
intervention in private institution, if necessary, for example, from the point of view of gender 
justice. When women are exposed to violence from a spouse or a partner, when deep-seated 
cultural norms reproduce notions of women’s altruistic nature and impose on them the main 
responsibility for child-rearing, housework and the care of older family members, when 
authorities of religious communities forbid female members to have an education, or when 
women employees are exposed to sexual harassment at work, intervention in private 
institutions is essential in order to protect women’s individual right to privacy. 
 
                                                 
923 When, for example, struggles are made in the language of civil rights.  
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The right to a negatively defined domain where we can freely act and express ourselves (1),924 
is decisive for all critical projects, the feminist project included: Free political will and 
opinion formation is impossible if civil liberties are not guaranteed.  
 
The individual’s private freedoms may, however, be restricted with a reference to the norm of 
equal respect. A man’s right to sexual freedom should, for example, not be used to violate a 
women’s right to sexual freedom and physical integrity (2).925 The latter right guarantees her, 
among other things, reproductive freedom, freedom from sexual coercion and violence in 
intimate relationships, and freedom from heterosexuality.  
 
The cognitive, linguistic and psycho-sexual conditions of individuation must, moreover, be 
guaranteed (6). The fulfillment of these conditions requires, for example, that we are cared for 
as children; when we develop basic cognitive and emotional skills, personal and sexual 
identities (Meeham 1994). In order to become autonomous, responsible persons with “a sense 
of justice” (Rawls 1999), we have, thus, as children, a right to care. This right makes visible 
the moral significance of women’s care-giving in the family, that has been systematically 
overlooked in much political and moral philosophy (Pauer-Studer 1998, Schwickert 2000, 
Hutchington 2001).926  
 
The fulfillment of the basic conditions of individuation requires, also, special protection of 
intimate relationships and life world communication. This implies a right to what Beate 
Rössler refers to as informational privacy (“Informationelle Privatheit”) in intimate issues and 
freedom from being continually monitored, from “das Panoptikon” (2001: 201, 216). To be 
relentlessly observed deprives the observed of her subject status. As Jeffery Rosen puts it:  
 
To be observed out of context in private spaces […] transforms the self from subject to object; 
and uncertainty about pervasive surveillance makes the development of the subjective self 
impossible. This objectification is one of the injuries that is a result from being observed out 
of context – not merely an offense against dignity, or a recipe for social misjudgment, but also 
an intrinsic injury against the autonomous self (2001: 209).  
                                                 
924 The numbers refer to the list outlined in 9.4. 
925 This should be the normative basis of legal regulation of, for example, prostitution and pornography (see for 
example Cornell 1995, 1998, and Nussbaum 2004), not conventional standards of decency. 
926 To emphasize the moral significance of women’s care-giving in the family, does not imply claiming that it is 
first and foremost women who are obliged to care, or that all care-giving should necessarily be tied 
institutionally to the family. It is also essential to make a distinction between child-care defined as a basic moral 
right that obliges political authorities (as in this discussion), and care as a component in a comprehensive ethic 
for the good life. This distinction has been too little attended to in the feminist ethics of care tradition.  
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It is crucial for women to insist on their right not to be monitored and objectified in a culture 
where the female body has long been considered a natural object and eye-catcher, “the second 
sex”, in the vocabulary of Simone de Beauvoir. For feminist purposes, it is also essential to 
protect spaces for intimate dialogue. Violations and violence against women in the family had 
not been put on the public agenda by the women’s movements, if violations and violence had 
not, initially, been conceptualized as violations and violence in more intimate settings, for 
example in conversations woman to woman.  
 
Women have, moreover, a right equal to that of men, to hold back intimate information about 
themselves from the public. Women are especially vulnerable to the terror of publicity and the 
tyranny of intimacy,927 because they are symbolically associated with that which is feminine; 
the personal, emotional and embodied. They are therefore, more often than men, expected to 
account for intimate details in public: Femininity becomes easily “re-privatized” in the public 
sphere (Solheim 1998). This exemplifies the value of negative communicative freedom for 
women (3); their right to freedom from having to explain and justify everything about 
themselves and their lives to others. 
 
Everyone, also women, should be granted existential autonomy (4). The right to make strong 
evaluations is a protection against paternalism; if parents force a particular spouse on their 
daughter, or if welfare state bureaucrats interfere with the life choices of single mothers. The 
right to make weak evaluations is connected intimately to the right to make strong evaluations 
(5). Seemingly trivial, everyday dilemmas often have existential, strong dimensions. What are 
defined as weak and strong evaluations, higher and lower preferences, depend also on who 
make the definitions. For example, when literary scholars describes literature written by 
female authors as “trivial”, it is partly because they do not, apparently, see the existential 
aspects of women’s experiences and evaluations (Scheffels 1996). The right to make weak 
evaluations is, however, crucial in itself. It is hard to maintain one’s self-respect, if even 
private, trivial decisions are controlled by others. 
 
Struggling for the right to privacy is, thus, to limit public interference, but through public 
democratic deliberations (8). There are intimate interconnections between women’s 
                                                 
927 As outlined by for example Richard Sennett (1992). 
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participation as free and equal in the public sphere, and the fact that patriarchal conceptions of 
privacy are being criticized, and alternative conceptions are introduced and integrated in 
legislation (7). The right to privacy requires, moreover, a social basis. Developed welfare 
states are often referred to as women-friendly,928 among other things, because its benefits and 
services have contributed to guaranteeing women’s personal autonomy (9).  
 
Finally, a woman’s right to a room of her own should be understood literally; as a right to a 
place where she can be left alone. According to traditional socialization, women are more 
often than men expected to be supportive, to be available, setting aside their own needs if 
others have conflicting needs: in the family, at school, at work. Everyone deserves a private 
domain, however; their own room, a door to close, a drawer to lock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
928 See Chapter 6. 
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ERRATA 
 
 
p. 24: … it goes without saying that it cannot be reduced to a context of social negotiation … 
p. 26: If this is not the case, if we cannot say that p1 is more warranted than p2 … 
p. 46, n. 82: … quantum physics […] from a feminist point of view” (Haack 1998: 116). 
p. 67, n. 136: … “Rationalitätskriterium, praktische Grundnorm und regulative Idee” … 
p. 68, n. 140: … norms justified in actual fallible discourse (approaching the infallible ideal of 
argumentative discourse presupposed in such discourse) or as ethical-political prescriptions. 
p. 75, n. 160: … whether they in fact behave as strategic egoists … 
p. 77, n. 166: … between the truth-idealization and the rightness-idealization … 
p. 78, n. 168: … theoretical justification free from ‘values’ qua moral norms … 
p. 79: How should genuine inquirers relate to ethical claims … 
p. 80: Thus, in contrast to how they are pictured by Haack … 
p. 81, n. 174: … theoretical justification free from ‘values’ qua values … 
p. 87, n. 194: Haack suggests that there are funding-priorities … 
p. 98: … the essentially social practice of reason-giving and reason-taking … 
p. 102, n. 230: See for example Martin Hollis’ (1982) … critical discussions … 
p. 108: … whether there are also persuasive patriarchal structures or patterns on other levels 
… 
p. 128: There are differences between women’s and men’s experiences … 
p. 129: … this is what she seems to say. 
p. 137: The reflexive discourse may, however, also have distinctive … 
p. 139: The ambition behind the agency-studies were critical: to reveal the patriarchal and 
capitalist oppression … 
p. 140: First, a self-reflective wave in this research field can indeed be identified the last ten to 
fifteen … 
p. 144: … Kvinder, Køn & Forskning … 
p. 146: … might be taken to refer also to research carried out outside … I am analyzing here. 
In Norwegian kjønn denote both ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ … 
p. 152: Philosopher Linda M. Rustad argues for example … 
p. 155, n. 375: … argues that radical modern individualism is community-undermining. 
p. 156, n. 377: … like Nina Karin Monsen (2000) … 
p. 159: One example is social anthropologist … 
p. 169: … some reasonable ranking of the values in question. 
p. 180: … autonomy is both impossible and morally suspect. 
p. 211: Her view, that ethical universalism is hardly or not at all achievable, is however 
compatible with … 
p. 226: … as expressions of “the power of goodness in the political sphere” … 
p. 238: … the means of transforming the gendered power structures of work: … 
p. 240: “Distributive inequality is a far too narrow concept” … 
p. 259, n. 775: … , as well as the discussion of an alternative rationality … 
p. 265: … that are claimed precisely to be universally valid … 
p. 267: … very often, be interpreted as attempts to transform … 
p. 274, n. 794: … from the 1970s to the 1990s … 
p. 275: … for example a less policy-oriented focus, is incompatible with sticking to the 
project of modernity. 
p. 280, n. 805: Patriarchy in a Welfare Society 
p. 290: … to conceptualize the battle for equality in terms of … 
p. 290: Feminization from below has above all been about including women … 
p. 300, n. 838: In Chapter 8 I argue against their principle of gender balance. 
p. 300: … we could reach a situation where on the contrary parts of the active workforce 
could have very low salaries, and even fall below the poverty line. 
p. 315: … justification is relative to audience (which is to defend a purely instrumental notion 
of what a good argument is). 
p. 318: Perhaps redescriptions are not to be justified, i.e. with reference to reasons … 
p. 318/319: However, Rorty might consider ‘justification is relative to audience’ a genuine 
contribution to “sentimental education” and “[…] the progress of sentiments” (1998c: 180, 
181) – prophetic redescriptions should perhaps not … 
p. 319: The question the objection in c) raises, is, however, how we can know whether 
anything we consider as true about reality at some point in time … 
p. 322: The assertion that a moral norm we are committed to is not right, contradicts that 
which we implicitly presuppose/contrafactually anticipate as regulative idea/performative 
idealization when we assert it. 
p. 326: If Fraser now understands feminist critique as a morally based critique … 
p. 326, n. 880: … as a political-philosophical exchange … 
p. 338: … institutionalized and re-institutionalized after political discussions and social 
struggles. 
p. 338: To become a public concern is to be made more vulnerable … 
p. 339: Feminist conceptions of the public sphere are made so radically inclusive, because it is 
assumed that each voice makes a difference. 
p. 339, n. 907: … have outlined their critique of the public sphere unreasonably. 
p. 341: … , if this is what we decide to do … 
p. 345: … and freedom from heterosexuality. 
p. 346: … their right to freedom from having to explain and justify everything about 
themselves and their lives to others. 
